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This thesis explores the everyday lives of five older people with dementia and three 
spouses. All live at home in the same Scottish town, but have different life 
circumstances. There has been a tendency to think about the experience of older people 
with dementia as something singular and dominated by the condition, rather than 
recognising that each person has a unique life history, set of relationships, interests and 
concerns, and that his or her ongoing priorities in life may or may not relate to 
dementia. The study develops detailed understandings of the different ways that older 
people respond to, make sense of and live with a diagnosis of dementia.  
The study uses a methodology called narrative-in-action, which draws on the 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s thinking about the dynamic, circular relationship between 
narrative and life. The researcher met with each couple or individual seven times over 
a period of at least six months. During these meetings the researcher joined the 
participants in enacting activities of their choice within the home or the surrounding 
area, including the mundane activities that made up their daily lives plus other 
activities that they identified as important to them. The analysis of the data generated 
through these activities used Ricoeur’s thinking.  
The narratives highlight the obstacles, dilemmas and opportunities that the older 
people encounter and demonstrates how they negotiate them and contribute to 
ordinary social life. They illustrate the very different ways of responding to a diagnosis 
and the different part that dementia plays in the context of people’s whole lives. The 
study considers these differences in light of the interplay between biography, 
relationships with contemporaries, predecessors and the next generation, and wider 
societal practices, including diagnostic practices and ongoing cognitive testing. The 
study offers an understanding of later life with dementia that is hopeful but not naïve.  
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This thesis explores the ongoing accomplishment of ordinary life with dementia and 
asks how older people variously negotiate and make sense of the obstacles, dilemmas 
and opportunities of everyday life as lived. The thesis responds to persistent calls to 
recognise the heterogeneity of people living with dementia and to challenge 
predominantly negative cultural stereotypes. It draws together parallel developments 
in contemporary dementia studies, namely the extension of social citizenship into the 
realm of the ordinary and fresh critiques of the biomedicalisation of ageing, particularly 
the rapid expansion of its technologies into the domain of cognitive impairment. In 
different ways, these developments bring a more overtly political impetus to the 
research agenda.  
The research study takes the form of ‘narrative-in-action’ (Alsaker et al, 2009), a mode 
of Narrative Inquiry that combines Paul Ricoeur’s (1984) early narrative theorising 
with ethnographic methods. The study expands the theoretical underpinnings of this 
methodology by engaging more deeply with Ricoeur’s (1992) elaboration of the 
dynamic relationships between narrative and life, narrative and temporality, and 
incorporating critical insights from narrative gerontology. The resultant methodology 
facilitates an understanding of experiences as expressed in practice and through time 
by embodied, emotional, relational persons.  
The study explores the everyday life of three couples, one man and one woman (aged 
78-85 years) residing at home in a small Scottish town. This entailed meeting regularly 
with each person or couple over a period of six or seven months and participating in 
their choice of everyday activities.  The length and intensity of involvement required 
careful deliberation about the creation and ongoing negotiation of uniquely constructed 
relationships that altered and deepened as the study progressed. Narrative analysis 
engaged with events, happenings and the various shifting and patterned meanings 
made within the flow of actions in different settings and over time, and was informed 
by Ricoeur’s (1984, 1992) notions of mimesis, emplotment and narrative identity. 
The resultant narratives offer a nuanced understanding of different ways of living with 
dementia in later life. They illustrate how meanings were made in different situations 
and over time, depicting diverse implicit or purposeful ways of resisting the dominant 
cultural narrative of loss and contributing to ordinary social life. These distinctions 
were manifest in the dynamic, dialogic configuration of identities.  Despite these 
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differences, the spectre of testing coloured each narrative, extending its reach into 
recollections of the past and also influencing the ways in which future possibilities 
were embraced, discounted or denied. This spectre also impacted upon the larger task 
of trying to make meaning of life as a whole in the face of ageing and memory loss. 
The thesis augments current conceptualisations of citizenship-as-practice in dementia 
studies through the construct of recognition. It also highlights the potential of the 
narrative-in-action methodology to enrich the notion and study of ‘narrative 
citizenship’ (Baldwin, 2008); in this study, it facilitates an understanding of later life 
with dementia that is optimistic but not naïve. Taken together the narratives illuminate 
the risks of prescribing how people should respond to a diagnosis based on 
observations of how some individuals adapt successfully. Finally, the thesis concludes 
that unless we attend to productive as well as repressive forms of power, there may be 
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Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis presents the result of a doctoral research study. The study takes the form of 
Narrative Inquiry and asks how everyday life with dementia is accomplished by eight 
older people (three couples, one man and one woman) who reside in the same small 
Scottish town. This overview sets out what’s in store, providing a short summary of 
each chapter. The thesis is presented in the traditional format, comprising introduction, 
literature review, theoretical and methodological frameworks, ‘results’ and discussion. 
As I do not introduce the people who took part in the study until Chapter Six, I open 
with Dandelion Clocks, a modern pantoum poem comprising one phrase expressed by 
each person - a poetic solution to my desire to foreground their unique contributions.  
Chapter One, The Political is Personal, sets the scene. I provide a brief account of 
Narrative Inquiry and the requirement, as a narrative inquirer, to make visible and 
account for my presence in the research. I identify what I believed to be my motivation 
for undertaking the study as a specific concern about the UK policy push for earlier 
diagnosis of dementia sub-types1, and the potential misrecognition of older people so 
diagnosed, later acknowledging that the study has deeply personal undertones. I reflect 
upon my personal experiences and connect with larger issues of social significance, 
raising questions that I then seek to address through a two-pronged review of the 
literature. 
In Chapter Two, Disentangling Ageing and Dementia, I present the first part of the 
literature review, charting the history of the dementia phenomenon and its 
entanglement with the problematisation of ageing in Western society. The review 
brings together longstanding arguments concerning the biomedicalisation and 
politicisation of cognitive impairment in later life with fresh critiques prompted by the 
recent rapid expansion of biomedical technologies earlier into the ‘disease process’ and 
the catastrophisation of dementia discourse. I highlight what’s at stake for older people 
and for society. In so doing, I renew the case for alternative social understandings of 
dementia, detect a growing interest in the ‘ordinary doings’ of people with dementia 
and identify a need for counter-narratives that bring humanity back into view. 
                                                          
1 Dementia is a syndrome or collection of symptoms and cannot be diagnosed, only recognised. The different 
sub-types of dementia, such as Alzheimer’s disease or vascular dementia, are diagnosable as diseases because 
they appear to have different manifestations in the brain, although as will be discussed, this distinction is less 
clear than usually presented. 
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In Chapter Three, Dementia and Citizenship: Recognition Reconsidered, I present the 
second part of the literature review, which considers the response of the wider 
academic research community to the dementia phenomenon. I trace the development 
of alternative social interpretations of dementia and the shifting focus of empirical 
attention. Detecting and responding to a persistent plea for ‘ordinariness’ from people 
living with dementia2, I spotlight the potential of theoretical developments within 
dementia studies that emphasise narrative citizenship and extend consideration of 
citizenship-as-practice into the realm of ordinary life, augmented by wider arguments 
that foreground social recognition. I identify a gap in understandings of how everyday 
life (with dementia) is accomplished, together with the need for nuanced accounts that 
respect diversity and explore the complexities and dynamics of identity configurations.  
 
Chapter Four, The Bridge, draws upon narrative theory to facilitate an exploration of 
the issues identified through the literature review, forging connections to the 
methodological approach taken in conducting the study.   I first describe ‘narrative-in-
action’ (Alsaker et al, 2009), a mode of Narrative Inquiry that combines Ricoeur’s 
(1984) narrative theorising on Time and Narrative with ethnographic methods. I 
explain how I established the potential to extend its application to a study of everyday 
life with dementia and engage with tensions between the increasing biomedicalisation 
of later life and pleas for ordinariness from older people living with dementia. I recount 
why, upon entering the field, I experienced a need to expand the study’s theoretical 
underpinnings by engaging more deeply with Ricoeur’s (1984, 1992) philosophy, and 
drawing insights from narrative gerontology. In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur’s (1992) 
extended account of the various meaning-making processes inherent in the nested 
levels of praxis that comprise our lives, I find support to consider the co-authored 
nature of our narratives, the dialogic nature of selfhood and forms of recognition. I 
conclude the chapter by setting out the methodological implications and research 
questions for the study.  
 
In Chapter Five, Carving a Path to the Domain of the Possible, I document the 
methodological approach adopted to facilitate an exploration of everyday life as lived. 
In setting out the overarching research design, I discuss my commitment to 
participatory and ethical principles and the alignment of the chosen ethnographic data 
                                                          
2 Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘people living with dementia’ to include both people diagnosed with a 
dementia sub-type and significant others who live with them. 
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creation methods. I reflect upon my experiences of finding a means of accessing 
participants with diverse backgrounds and current life circumstances and their 
recruitment to the study. This is followed by a brief summary of the time I spent in the 
field. A discussion of the narrative analysis process paves the way for consideration of 
criteria for determining the trustworthiness and authenticity of the results of the 
Narrative Inquiry.  
 
In Chapter Six, Opening Doors, I introduce the people who participated in the study in 
the form of short pen portraits. Each portrait is followed by a thick description of the 
circumstances surrounding our introductory meetings, which surfaces questions about 
different understandings of ‘everyday activities’, the possibilities for doing everyday 
activities together and a summary of the ways we spent time together over the study 
period. I also consider the implications of the various understandings, possibilities for 
and enactments of everyday activities for the development of the research 
relationships and for gaining insights into each person or couple’s everyday life.  
 
In Chapter Seven, Walkways, I recount one particular experience of ‘walking’ out onto 
the three-dimensional Narrative Inquiry landscape and spending time with each person 
or couple. Each description is followed by an interpretation that draws upon narrative 
theory, connecting everyday activities with moral dilemmas, engaging with the how of 
meaning-making and forging connections between the past, present and implied future. 
I attend to the welcome and less welcome possibilities alluded to and conclude by 
considering the interpretive implications of the different ‘walkways’ taken. 
 
In Chapter Eight, Fallen Fruits, I revisit, contextualise and expand upon the specific 
experiences detailed in the previous chapter, presenting the ‘fruits’ of the Narrative 
Inquiry in the form of five narratives plus supporting interpretations. In each case, I 
identify a plotline that connects various activities, events and happenings enacted or 
recounted over the study period. I ask what part ‘dementia’ does, or does not, play 
within the different narrative and narrative identity configurations. Each narrative 
conveys uncertainties regarding continued participation in and contribution to 
ordinary social life and the extent to which bodily ageing and local cultures open or 
foreclose opportunities for being and doing the things that the participants value, and 
are socially valued. The narratives depict diverse ways of resisting the dominant 
cultural narrative of loss. I also highlight the different ways in which spectre of testing 
colours each narrative, extending its reach across different temporal zones.   
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In Chapter Nine, The Personal is Political, I bring together the different elements of the 
thesis, reflecting upon the research questions through a social citizenship value lens by 
employing the EXPECT framework (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010) as a heuristic device. 
Through its application, I consider the theoretical, methodological and empirical 
contributions of the research and reflect upon the participatory and ethical dimensions 
of conducting the study. I summarise the study’s alignment with the need to adopt a 
more critical perspective in dementia studies and conclude by exploring options for 
translation of the study outputs into different fields of practice.  
 
With Endless Orchards, the thesis concludes, as it began, with the words of the people 





There's more to me than this; people forget 
The love that I feel still grows 
There's life in the old dog yet 
Where there's life there's hope. 
 
The love that I feel still grows 
You can't turn back the clock 
Where there's life there's hope 
This life is all I know. 
 
You can't turn back the clock 
So much is lost in the mists of time 
This life is all I know  
Tis but a touch of frost. 
 
So much is lost in the mists of time 
There's life in the old dog yet 
Tis but a touch of frost 
There's more to me than this; people forget. 
  
                                                          
3 To tell the time by Dandelion Clock, you blow until the seed is all blown away, and you count each of the puffs, an hour to a 
puff. There is no singular ‘right time’; unlike standardised, mechanical clocks, the time told by each person differs because we 
all blow differently. The poem title reflects my concern upon commencing this study that ‘timely diagnosis’ was being equated 








The Political is Personal  
 
In the beginning, it was all black and white 
Maureen O’Hara 
Overview 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by enhancing understandings 
of the narrative citizenship and social citizenship of older people living with the 
phenomenon we currently call “dementia”4. It charts a doctoral research study that 
develops a nuanced understanding of different ways of living with dementia in later 
life, adding to the ‘nascent field of academic narratives of resistance’ (Beard, 2016:232).  
Using narrative-in-action methodology (Alsaker et al, 2009), a form of Narrative 
Inquiry combining narrative theory and ethnographic methods, the study asks how 
everyday life is accomplished by eight older people (three couples, one man and one 
woman) living in a small Scottish town. This chapter sets the scene.  It provides a brief 
account of the nature of Narrative Inquiry, traces the impetus for the research, 
establishes moorings for the study and identifies key questions to be addressed 
through a two-part review of the literature.  
Narrative, Narrative Inquiry and the unmasking of the narrative inquirer 
‘Narrative’ is used equivocally in qualitative research studies. I describe competing 
understandings of narrative, the Narrative Inquiry methodology and the theoretical 
underpinnings of narrative-in-action in detail in Chapter Four. In brief, ‘Narrative 
Inquiry’ is concerned with understanding people’s experiences and tries to make sense 
of life as lived (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000:78). It features to varying degrees the 
interplay between the researcher’s own subjectivity and the subjectivities of those 
whose lives and worlds are in view (Gubrium and Holstein, 2009). The narratives 
presented later in this thesis are derived from participant observation, when I join 
                                                          
4 This thesis questions the appropriateness and utility of the umbrella term “dementia” and welcomes its 
replacement in the 5th edition of the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) as a small step in a 
less stigmatising direction. Most study participants resist the term, preferring to talk about the specific form of 
‘Alzheimer’s’ or ‘memory loss.’  Following the approach taken by Hughes (2013:12), I use the term as if it were 
unproblematic for pragmatic reasons and from here on without the “scare quotes” favoured by Gullette 
(2014:127) to aid readability.     
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Chrissie, Ann, John, Jim, Mary, Hector, Tommy and Grace in enacting and talking about 
the activities, events and happenings of their lives over several months. Through the 
resources of narrative-in-action (Alsaker et al, 2009) and narrative theory (Ricoeur, 
1984; 1992) I attend closely to the various meaning-making processes of those whose 
activities, experiences and lives are under consideration. As a ‘narrative inquirer’ it is 
impossible (or self-deceptive) to stay silent (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000) or hide 
behind the mask of ‘the researcher’. Throughout the study, I take special notice of my 
own participation, perspective, voice and emotional experience in relation to the 
experiences of those being studied and am mindful of my own narrative practices. This 
taking notice begins with my research interests, which emerge from my own narrative 
and shape the inquiry as whole. It is important to keep sight of topics of personal and 
social justification and I retrace the impetus for the research below.  
The Black and White World of Beginnings 
Before commencing this research study my world was rather black and white. I’d 
worked in Scottish health and social care service improvement contexts for many years, 
latterly with a focus on improving personal outcomes5 for older people. I became 
increasingly concerned about the influence of neo-liberalism and consumerism in 
mainstream UK health and social care policy, which together have privileged market 
mechanisms and individual choice-based models of support over relationality and 
collective responsibilities to meet needs for care (Barnes, 2011). Neo-liberalism is 
underpinned by the notion of the rational, autonomous, responsible, active citizen 
(Needham and Glasby, 2014). Bolstered by biomedicine, it equates difference with 
deficit and locates problems in individuals (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016) deflecting 
attention from societal ills. I observed the capacity of mainstream policy to marginalise 
older persons who do not live up to neo-liberal ideals (Barnes, 2011) and experienced 
difficulties in challenging it due to its unfortunate intertwining with seemingly 
progressive rights-based arguments that foreground individual choice and control 
(Needham and Glasby, 2014; Morris, 2011).  
 
Following the introduction of dementia specific policy across the UK (Department of 
Health, 2008; Scottish Government, 2008), I was troubled by the political push for 
early, proactive diagnosis, particularly through the introduction of targets and 
                                                          
5 Personal outcomes are broadly defined as what matters to a unique and particular person in the context of his 
or her whole life rather than through the filter of diagnostic labels or services (Miller, 2011).  
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incentives. However, it was perceived limitations of post-diagnostic support provisions 
for people with dementia that motivated my decision to embark on a doctoral study. Or 
so I thought. In narrative thinking, ‘temporality’ is a central feature, requiring 
engagement with the complex interplay between past, present and future. In the course 
of completing the study, I’ve come to make connections with events and happenings 
from much earlier in my life, reinterpreting them in the perspectival light of the 
present, finding new meanings and appreciating their influence on my thinking. I have 
come to appreciate that what I thought was a socio-political interest in dementia has 
deeply personal undertones. As a narrative inquirer, inevitably I meet myself in the 
past and the implied future where there are no field texts, yet the experiences are very 
much part of the inquiry and have to be accounted for (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).  
I reflect upon these experiences in the sections below.  
Shades of Grey: Retracing the Four Moments in Conceptualising Dementia  
My understanding of dementia has been shaped by prevailing societal understandings 
and various personal and professional encounters with people with dementia. How we 
as a society think about dementia matters because it speaks to the forms of human life 
that we value and the quality of human relationships (Downs, Clare and Mackenzie, 
2006). How I think about dementia as a researcher matters as it determines the course 
of the inquiry.  In documenting the impetus for the study and developing its 
overarching aim, a personal sense of justification is not enough. I therefore seek to use 
my shifting understandings of dementia over the last thirty-five years constructively, 
grasping together significant events and happenings, and locating them within what 
have been described as the ‘four moments’ in conceptualising dementia (Bartlett and 
O’Connor, 2010). Through this process, I identify and connect with larger issues of 
social significance. I raise questions pertaining to the history, biomedicalisation, 
politicisation and catastrophisation of dementia and the relationship with ageing, 
which guide a selective review of the relevant literature in Chapter Two. I also establish 
important markers for the conduct of the study, and I identify points of interest that 
direct my engagement with the academic literature to establish the theoretical 
orientation and empirical relevance of the research, as summarised in Chapter Three. 
In the sections that follow I retrace my shifting understandings of dementia from the 
first moment when dementia was regarded as ‘senility’, through biomedicine’s disease 
model, followed by Kitwood’s (1990) neuro-psycho-social conceptualisation to the 
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emergence of a ‘fourth moment’ that significantly recasts the social in considerations of 
dementia, bringing a social citizenship value lens to the fore (Bartlett and O’Connor, 
2010).  
The first moment: Dementia as senility -concealment and containment 
My earliest encounter with dementia coincides with the ‘first moment’ of 
understanding, back when dementia was considered a fairly predictable if not 
inevitable sign of normal ageing, consigned to the realm of ‘senility’ and hence largely 
unremarkable and invisible (Cohen, 2006). My paternal grandfather, Lachie, was some 
sixteen years older than my gran, Nancy.  A tall man with thinning grey hair, Lachie 
grew his own vegetables and wore cardigans with large leather buttons and I suppose I 
always thought of him as ‘old’. When I was a child he handed out pan drops if my sister 
and I behaved, and cursed us in his native Gaelic if we did not. As a self-absorbed 
teenager in the early 1980s, I was vaguely aware that he was becoming ‘a bit confused’, 
but Nancy managed to keep the true extent of the changes in his cognitive condition 
hidden behind closed doors for quite some time. It was only when his physical 
condition also deteriorated that it all became too much for this diminutive and proud 
lady. Meeting the personal care needs of her much larger husband, helping him in and 
out of the bath or back on his feet when he fell on top of her was a physical 
impossibility.  
I had left home to study when Lachie was admitted to a ‘geriatric ward’, confined within 
the walls of the old City hospital and I was told that he had ‘gone senile’. I accepted this 
without question, not even a flicker of curiosity. I found the ward surreal, referred to it 
unkindly as the twilight zone, visited very infrequently and was relieved to be informed 
that there was ‘no point’ going back as ‘he no longer recognised anyone’. Taylor (2008) 
suggests that the inability to recognise others may result in the person with dementia 
ceasing to be recognised, either as themselves or as a person. It is hard to pinpoint the 
emotion I felt when he died on Christmas Day in 1987; I had ‘said goodbye to him’ 
many years before.  
I was largely protected from the details of Lachie’s decline and from Nancy’s struggles, 
but I do not look back on this period with rose-tinted spectacles. It now seems 
unthinkable that this way of ending a human life was countenanced just thirty years 
ago. My former self’s attitude to ‘old age ‘is also disconcerting, exposing the deeper 
issue of ageism and the relationship between age and dementia. In the next chapter, I 
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question the subsequent and ever-expanding biomedicalisation of cognitive 
impairment in later life and this sobering personal experience serves as an important 
marker, offering a valuable point of return.  
The second moment: Dementia as disease -categorisation and cure 
It was less than a decade after Lachie’s death that my second closer and more 
prolonged encounter with dementia commenced. By the time Dougie, my maternal 
grandfather, began to show signs of forgetfulness, the ‘second moment’ had come to 
dominate.  Specifically, ‘dementia’ had been adopted as an umbrella term for 
behavioural changes associated with various concomitant changes in the brain caused 
by a number of conditions. These include by far the most common form, Alzheimer’s 
disease, but also vascular dementia and less familiar conditions such as dementia with 
Lewy bodies, Parkinson’s dementia and frontotemporal dementia. Indeed, in the short 
interval separating the cognitive losses experienced by my two grandfathers, dementia 
and ‘Alzheimer’s’ had become household names with highly emotive connotations, 
begging the questions how and why this paradigm shift came to pass. While some of the 
conditions finding shelter under the dementia umbrella are better understood than 
others, the net result was that deteriorating cognitive function in later life was 
relabelled a biomedical condition, characterised by a trajectory of irrevocable decline.  
Dougie was 50 years old and a rather handsome and athletic man when I was born. His 
wife, Nan, died of a pulmonary embolism following a routine operation on my fifth 
birthday back in 1969. My sister was just a toddler at the time and my mum, still in her 
early twenties, was devastated. Our family life was turned upside down, Dougie spent a 
lot of time in our home and the two of us became ‘good pals’, we were ‘as thick as 
thieves’. He remained a central figure in my life, assuming the role of great-grandfather 
to my children with enormous pride. In his early 80’s, he became uncharacteristically 
uncertain. He was initially diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, later revised to 
‘dementia with Lewy bodies’, and his future laid bare – eventually he would ‘forget how 
to swallow’. Until then his symptoms were to be managed through a trial and error 
medication regime, mostly error. As he lived alone, there was no one to conceal or 
contain the ravages of this condition. It was a fraught and distressing time for him and 
for my family. 
Dougie suffered horrendous hallucinations and he became increasingly agitated and 
unpredictable. My parents tried hard to support him on a daily basis, but then came the 
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game changer; he started taking to the streets in the middle of the night, searching for 
his mother, who had died twenty years earlier, and a house that had since been 
demolished. Somehow, he’d find his way back hours later, freshly grief-stricken, and 
invariably having locked himself out. My parents were increasingly called upon in the 
small hours by an anxious neighbour, a frail lady a couple of years older than Dougie 
who lived directly below. I remember being called out on one occasion when my 
parents took a rare holiday, finding Dougie walking purposefully up a nearby street 
carrying a plastic bag containing clean socks, underpants, a toothbrush, an empty 
microwaveable fish pie carton and a red velvet bow tie. Back at his house we initially 
had a good laugh trying to imagine what the bow tie might have been for, but then I 
caught the look of fear in his eyes; it haunts me.  
Dougie wanted to stay ‘at home’ and as a family we all tried hard to support this, but 
our efforts were doomed as he no longer recognised the place where had lived for over 
fifty years as home, once familiar objects forgotten or obscured by the strange figures 
of his hallucinations. In contrast, his memories of his childhood home and the 
unconditional love that he had known there were crisp and clear, but the fragile 
tendrils rooting these images to the past were broken and he repeatedly tried in vain to 
return. Eventually this would-be time lord did not make it back from one of his 
nocturnal excursions. A kindly taxi driver found Dougie at three a.m. in the middle of a 
rain storm, lost, confused and soaking wet, and took him to the nearest hospital. He was 
admitted and my mum was told firmly that it was time to look for a care home. She 
found one, a far cry from Lachie’s lamentable ‘geriatric ward’ and a pretty good choice 
all in all, given that no one in the family had any real idea what to look for. Dougie 
remained there for five years.  I visited often and my son, just a young lad at the time, 
somehow, perhaps not seeing what I saw, managed to retain a special connection with 
his great-grandpa, filling me with bewildered awe.  
This time I was very curious. Sadly, I asked all the wrong questions. My first degree is in 
Chemistry and I worked in informatics for the first phase of my career. Perhaps 
inevitably, I sought information on the neuropathology and symptoms, the mechanisms 
through which the various drugs were supposed to work, and of course the prognosis. 
Whenever I looked at Dougie I saw only the losses, the deficits and the ominous spectre 
of what was to come. In short, I subscribed to an exclusively biomedical understanding 
of dementia. Hughes (2011:128) has asserted that if one was ‘to mistake the disease 
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model for the whole picture, the effect would be clinically, socially and ethically 
disastrous’. It was. 
Over the years, concerns about Dougie’s ‘failing brain’ were dwarfed by the failings of 
his body. He spent too many nights lying on trolleys in hospital corridors and survived 
too many ‘scares’, including a traumatic emergency operation to relieve a twisted 
bowel that remained undetected for far too long, defying all odds. I nicknamed him 
Lazarus, affectionately, and I suppose I expected him to ‘keep going’ forever. When he 
died on 27th October 2004 it was ‘long overdue’, ‘a kindness’, ‘a blessing’, but like every 
human life, his was irreplaceable and he left a huge hole and an unfathomable sadness. 
I miss him still. Looking back, my primary emotion is regret. His suffering at the end 
was undeniable, but there had been suffering much earlier too that I shied away from 
simply because I didn’t know how to respond.  
The literature on ‘social death’ (Sweeting and Gilhooly, 1997) whereby the person with 
dementia is no longer seen as being active in his relationships strikes a painful chord, 
although with a twist. Undoubtedly one of the more unusual books that I have read in 
the course of completing this study is Hallam, Hockey and Howarth’s (1999) ‘Beyond 
the body: Death, dying and social identity’, which presents a new approach to the 
sociology of the body. It contrasts accounts of people who are biologically alive but 
socially dead with those of people who are biologically dead but socially alive. In 
amongst the weird chapters on ghosts, clairvoyants, zombies and vampires, I found 
more poignant accounts of the ways in which people continue to influence the lives of 
others long after their biological deaths. It is important for me to acknowledge Dougie’s 
influence on my research. This influence has been much, much stronger than I 
appreciated at the outset, and at times has proved emotionally overwhelming. 
Rather than trying to banish emotions to the side lines of the study, I have drawn upon 
them. Writing about the intelligence of the emotions, Nussbaum (2001) argues that 
emotions should not be dismissed as non-rational, but should be attended to in our 
deliberations because they have important things to say to us about what it is that we 
value. This experience reminds me of the practical issues and the roller coaster of 
emotions that we faced as a family when Dougie still lived at home. It has also pulled 
me back to earth whenever I was at risk of floating off and getting lost in the strange 
space of ontological and epistemological debate. I document it in some detail because it 
is a vital marker for the study, anchoring my commitment to contribute to an 
14 
 
understanding of dementia that is more optimistic, but without denying the existence 
of suffering and being honest about its different forms.  
The third moment: Dementia reconsidered - care and compassion 
It was just a few months after Dougie’s death that my career took a rather unexpected 
turn, when the established tools of my trade in health informatics proved unable to 
accommodate the growing interest in ‘patient experience’. Thanks to one imaginative 
geriatrician, I was plucked from my spreadsheets and thrust into the world of ‘patient 
stories’, quickly confronting our over-reliance on verbal communication. I had the 
opportunity to work with some remarkable practitioners who had a more hopeful 
understanding of dementia, characteristic of the ‘third moment’ and based on a 
humanistic, dignified and ethical approach. I was introduced, perhaps a little late in the 
day, to the work of Tom Kitwood (1990; 1997) who identified a lack of recognition of 
the person with dementia in institutional care settings. Challenging the attribution of 
the low level of interactions he witnessed solely to cognitive impairments, he expanded 
understandings of dementia. The old scientist in me was still seduced by formulae and I 
interpreted his position as an additive one, a synthesis, captured in the equation D = NI 
+ H + SP + B + P (where D is dementia, NI is neurological impairment, H is health, SP is 
social psychology, B is biography and P is personality).  
 
In Dementia Reconsidered, Kitwood’s (1997) insistence that the person comes first and 
that we must see the PERSON with dementia not the person with DEMENTIA jolted my 
thinking onto a different plane. The practitioners that I worked alongside sought to 
maintain ‘personhood’, (re)conceptualised as the ‘standing or status bestowed on one 
human being, by another, in the context of relationship; it implies recognition, respect 
and trust’ (Kitwood 1997:8). They encouraged me to enter into the PERSON with 
dementia’s reality rather than imposing my own and I had the opportunity to support 
people through life story work and the creation of memory boxes. The experience was 
transformative and the importance of a relational understanding of ‘personhood’ stays 
with me. It is a third point of anchoring.  
 
Emerging from this setting, I was initially upset and angry with myself, furious that I 
hadn’t ventured into this goldmine before, but also perplexed as to why this 
understanding had remained confined to specialist dementia care settings. I was 
determined that at the very least ‘no relative of mine’ would be left in ignorance, but I 
soon discovered that my newly acquired insights were not always welcome. For 
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instance, when told that my great-aunt Ethel had started conjuring up a friend called 
‘wee Ethel’, who only appeared in her bedroom, I quickly established that she had a 
full-length mirror on her wardrobe door. I suggested that perhaps Ethel was no longer 
recognising her own, now much smaller reflection, enthusiastically adding that her 
naturally warm disposition had served her well, as her instinct had been to make 
friends; had she been inclined to chase this ‘visitor’ away, the experience could have 
been altogether different. My enthusiasm was not reciprocated. I hadn’t quite grasped 
Kitwood’s point about not imposing our own reality on others. I also hadn’t considered 
that the possibility of ‘not recognising herself’ might be far more unsettling than the 
rather sweet acquisition of an imaginary companion. The uniqueness of subjectivity is 
another important marker for the study and I develop my understanding of this in the 
chapters that follow. 
 
Despite valuing this more relational perspective, I had a niggling feeling that the 
emphasis on memory boxes, life story and even personhood were concerned more with 
preservation than with future possibility. I wondered how useful this way of thinking 
would be around the time of diagnosis, at the time of the ‘red velvet bow tie moment’, 
or indeed at the end of life. In my day-to-day work, there was a growing worry that, 
unlike Kitwood’s (1997) depiction of person-centred care, policy interpretations 
employed a highly individualistic notion of ‘person’, neglecting the importance of inter-
personal relationships and the contributions that older people make. I was introduced 
to the thinking of Mike Nolan (Nolan et al, 2004; 2006) and found his account of 
relationship-centred care helpful in making these elements explicit, although its 
application was again largely confined to a few institutional care settings. Ultimately 
this experience raised questions about the continued domination of the disease model 
of dementia, which I explore in Chapter Two. It also surfaced some largely unformed 
concerns about possible limitations of understandings of dementia grounded in 
personhood and notions of person-centred or relationship-centred care. I revisit the 
strengths and limitations of this ‘third moment’ in Chapter Three.  
 
The emergence of a fourth moment: Contextualisation, capabilities and citizenship  
My understanding of dementia evolved again late in 2009 when I was introduced to 
members of the Scottish Dementia Working Group, bringing me to the emergence of a 
‘fourth moment’ (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010) in dementia studies. This ‘fourth 
moment’ is defined by the need to capture a more dynamic and critical perspective that 
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recognises the unique capabilities and contributions of persons with dementia as 
stakeholders in ordinary social life, values them as equal citizens and locates their 
experiences within a broader societal context.  
I spent a considerable amount of time with one group member who gave me 
permission to use a collection of photographs that he had taken using a sophisticated 
camera, having been retaught the necessary skills by a support worker. Was this even 
possible? The collection was aptly called ‘opening shutters, opening minds’, as I was 
amazed by what was being achieved through the campaigning efforts of the group 
members. These activists were challenging assumptions about what a person with 
dementia can do and highlighting some saddening experiences of discrimination. I was 
however struck by how relatively young the group members were, given that two-
thirds of people with dementia in the UK are over 80 years old (Brayne and Davis, 
2012). Although I accepted that it was perhaps inevitable that the campaigns were 
being led by the younger, fitter and more articulate minority, the experience 
nevertheless raised questions about both the thinking behind and consequences of this 
atypical portrayal of the human face of dementia, including the risk of rendering older 
or less capable people with dementia invisible. I also wondered if perhaps older people 
have different life priorities. This experience increased my interest in the relationship 
between ageing and dementia, which I explore in Chapter Two. 
My questions resurfaced a short time later when I had the privilege of working with 
several older people with dementia (aged between 82 and 92 years) occupying the 
middle ground between the care home and the campaign trail. We created digital 
stories6 together to communicate their efforts to continue with the daily round of life at 
home and in their local communities with diverse levels of support. ‘Dementia’ 
occupied varying positions within these digital stories and, in some cases, it did not 
feature at all, with quite a few people preferring to regard their memory loss as part of 
the ageing process. Moreover, some people constructed positive personal accounts and 
others expressed unrelated concerns for themselves or family members.  These short 
stories had a different ‘feel’ to them than those of the dementia activists and there was 
something ‘extraordinary’ about their ordinariness. Whilst sowing seeds of possibility 
for engaging with the more everyday practices of older people living with dementia, 
                                                          
6 Digital stories are short multi-media presentations combining spoken or written words, personal photographs, 
other still images and music, typically between three and five minutes long. 
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these did not germinate as I was diverted by the issues I encountered upon responding 
to a raft of dementia-specific policy imperatives, as discussed below.  
The UK Policy Context, Politicising Diagnosis and the Risk of Misrecognition 
My interest in dementia veered in a different direction following implementation of 
dementia-specific policy in Scotland, particularly the push for early, proactive diagnosis 
through the introduction of a national target (Scottish Government, 2008). Policy 
documents invariably present the benefits of early diagnosis as self-evident, although 
there are no efficacious treatments and diagnosis is not straightforward. I was troubled 
by the apparent lack of evidence to justify early diagnosis and struggled to see the 
difference between proactive case finding and screening, with dementia failing to meet 
the criteria for the latter. I also began to question the assumptions underpinning the 
estimated and projected prevalence of dementia and the alleged under-diagnosis of its 
various sub-types.  And I was deeply concerned about the risk of failing to respect the 
unique perspectives and preferences of the persons and families concerned.  
Some of my more basic concerns were partially alleviated by the subsequent policy 
guarantee of post-diagnostic support for one year (Scottish Government, 2013). I 
appreciated that post-diagnostic provision was based on sound evidence of what works 
for people who have purposefully accessed dementia-specific care and support services 
(Alzheimer Scotland 2012a, 2012b), but soon developed reservations about the 
capacity of the ostensibly ‘person-centred’, yet largely dementia-centric provisions to 
meet the varying needs of the diversity of people receiving a diagnosis. More 
fundamental questions about politically-driven diagnoses continued to niggle.  
My concerns intensified when I participated in a post-diagnostic support 
implementation workshop in 2013, where practitioners reflected that although the 
model of support was ‘just right’ for some people, for others it was falling wide of the 
mark.  This was attributed to it being ‘too soon’ for some people, while for others it was 
‘too late’, calling to mind the story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Moreover, there 
was a disconcerting tendency to refer to people who resisted the diagnostic label, 
departed from the tale of tragedy (Basting, 2009) or did not fit within the parameters of 
‘expert’ agendas and interventions as ‘lacking insight’ or ‘in denial’.  
I reflected back on my earlier digital storytelling work. ‘Dementia’ had occupied varying 
positions within the stories created and in some cases did not feature at all, but at the 
18 
 
time I’d viewed this absence positively and had not attributed it to lack of insight.  My 
involvement however was brief and my role confined to facilitating the stories, rather 
than supporting or assuming responsibility for people’s wellbeing going forward. The 
implications were quite different for encounters between specialist practitioners 
(whose ‘success’ was being tightly measured according to external criteria) and people 
recently diagnosed who ‘lacked insight’, were ‘in denial’, had different priorities, or 
simply did not want to allow ‘dementia’ to take centre stage in their lives at that point 
in time.  
This brings me full circle to my original proposed starting point for the study. It touches 
upon the following argument: 
  ‘[S]ociologically, it would be hazardous and potentially unethical to extrapolate from 
observations of how some individuals or communities cope successfully with health challenges 
in ways which prescribe how others ought to behave’ (Taylor and Bury, 2007:39 italics in 
original).  
My practice observations also speak to more recent philosophical concerns about 
making normative assumptions about what should be important to people accessing 
health and social care services based on their diagnostic label and failing to recognise 
that they might be highly motivated to improve or maintain other aspects of their lives, 
thus restricting their opportunities (Entwistle and Watt, 2013). These assumptions 
may result in people’s contributions and alternative narratives of wellbeing being 
overlooked, discounted or discredited. Such concerns run contrary to the idea that 
everyone’s authenticity and quest for wellbeing is unique and should not be curtailed 
by the dominant order (Taylor, 2004). They allude to specific forms of misrecognition 
(Fisher, 2008; Honneth, 1996). I wondered what happened within these post-diagnostic 
practice encounters and with what consequence and I developed my original research 
proposal on this basis.  
Looking Through the Other End of the Telescope 
Upon commencing the PhD studentship in 2013, I gradually came to appreciate the 
limitations of my original research ideas. Specifically, although my professional interest 
in personal outcomes ensured that I was concerned with people with dementia in the 
context of their whole lives, I viewed practice encounters as my default entry point. My 
goal was to develop knowledge that would contribute to improvements in the lives of 
older people affected by dementia, but through the assumed medium of health and 
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social care practice and policy, a form a practice and policy myopia as result of working 
in these domains. Reflecting upon personal experiences concerning my two 
grandfathers reminded me of the relatively minor part that encounters with care 
services played in their stories, in their lives. A provisional review of the dementia 
literature also underscored the need for research that looks beyond the health and 
social care landscape, setting its sights on ordinary social life. I undertook to look at the 
research puzzle through the other end of the telescope, exploring everyday life as lived 
and attending to the neglected aspects of life, the opportunities entertained, the 
overlooked contributions and the alternative accounts of wellbeing. 
The dominance of dementia as disease: Catastrophisation and colonisation 
The study took further shape following an episode of Scotland Tonight7 on 11th 
December 2013 (the date then Prime Minister, David Cameron, pledged to double 
funding to find a cure for dementia). Five minutes of television served as an enactment 
of wider power plays. Grim forecasts of the scale and cost of the dementia ‘epidemic’ 
were presented, providing the backdrop to the search for a cure. The studio panel 
comprised a ‘person with dementia’ – a very smart and articulate man, a female carer, 
and a leading male representative from a dementia organisation. Slightly out of camera, 
a female academic tried to join the discussion by video-link. When the presenter asked 
the ‘person with dementia’ what it was like to suffer from dementia, he departed from 
the script, responding that he didn’t suffer, his memory loss didn’t concern him and 
that he had found new meanings in life through painting. I could scarcely watch as, in 
Hitchcockesque close-up, the presenter recoiled, unable to disguise her disbelief and 
discomfort. She turned swiftly to the carer who willingly supplied the expected tragic 
tale in response to the prompt, ‘but they call this disease the long goodbye’.  
This painful viewing provided a very obvious reminder of the capacity of the media to 
foreclose the narratives of people with dementia through the deployment of metaphors 
of contagion and living death, and with far greater reach than direct care practices 
aligned to biomedicine. It caused me to question what other forms of misrecognition 
people with dementia negotiate in their everyday lives. I read with interest 
anthropologist Janelle Taylor’s (2008) account of staying in relationship with her 
mother through the advances of dementia. Taylor also finds people ready to embrace 
the narrative of loss, but disinclined to hear that she still enjoys her mother’s company. 




Thus, while my initial study ideas were concerned with diagnostic expansion, I found 
my own interests expanding to encompass the disease model’s seepage into 
contemporary society, a form of colonisation (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016), and the 
catastrophisation of dementia in the media and wider public discourse.  
Entering the domain of the possible 
While acknowledging that many families may be less fortunate, Taylor (2008:324) 
argues that her experience with her mother’s dementia is ‘no “horror story”—and this, 
too, lies within the domain of the possible’. What struck me most about her account is 
that in seeking to challenge negative assumptions about life with dementia, she does 
not inadvertently reinforce Western society’s ‘action bias’ (Hoggett, 2000; Madhok, 
2013) that privileges individualist notions of responsibility, independence and active 
ageing. Adopting the broad research aim of exploring everyday life with dementia, I 
undertook to suspend assumptions and enter the domain of the possible too. In so 
doing, I adopted the overarching argument that the many alternative ways of 
understanding and responding to ‘dementia’ or memory loss in later life require equal 
consideration. Through my founding socio-political interests, I determined to locate the 
study within the ‘fourth moment’ of understanding and my reflections prompted me to 
attend closely to underpinning conceptualisations of what it is to be a person. 
Reflections and Way Forward 
This introductory chapter provided a brief introduction to Narrative Inquiry and the 
role of the narrative inquirer. I outlined the impetus for the research study, founded 
upon specific practice observations about the risk of care services making assumptions 
about what should be important to older people with dementia, foreclosing other 
possibilities and potentially resulting in secondary labelling. Through reflection upon 
formative personal encounters with people with dementia, I came to wonder what 
those other possibilities might be. I identified the importance of venturing out beyond 
the familiar health and social care landscape and developed the overarching study aim 
of exploring everyday life with dementia, locating my research interest within the 
‘fourth moment’ of understanding in dementia studies. In so doing, I called attention to 
the deeper issue of ageism, competing notions of personhood, the uniqueness of 
subjectivity and the potential for misrecognition, which serve as important moorings 
for the study. The concerns and motives set out in this chapter are however based 
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primarily on limited personal observations, and the reflective process raised many, 
many questions: 
 
How did the disease model of dementia come to the fore and why does it continue to 
dominate? What is the relationship between ageing and dementia? What’s driving the political 
push for early diagnosis and the metaphorisation of dementia, and with what effect? How can 
the ‘horror story’ be reconciled with diagnostic expansion? Why are counter-narratives so 
readily discredited in the public domain, care practice settings and the private sphere? How far 
have we actually travelled since the redefinition of ‘senility’ in the 1980s? What are the 
limitations of understandings of dementia anchored by the notion of personhood? What 
promise does the emergent ‘fourth moment’ hold?    
 
My world was no longer quite so black and white. To further develop my broad 
research aim, formulate the research questions, establish the theoretical orientation 
and empirical relevance of the study, I appreciated that I needed to embark upon a two-
pronged review of the literature. In Chapter Two, I begin this process through a focused 
review that examines the entanglement of ageing and dementia, questioning how and 
why the disease model of dementia came to dominate, why its expansion continues, 
and with what consequences. In Chapter Three, I continue this process, turning to the 
literature documenting alternative social interpretations of dementia. I summarise 
what’s known about the experiences of older people with dementia as stakeholders in 
ordinary social life, identifying aspects of the ‘ordinary’ that have been overlooked and 
theoretical lenses that may help to illuminate them. My approach to searching and 









Disentangling Ageing and Dementia 
Overview 
This chapter builds directly upon the motivations, interests, concerns and questions set 
out in Chapter One, where I established the overarching study aim of exploring 
everyday life with dementia. This chapter represents the first step in shaping the 
direction of the inquiry through a review of the literature. In the sections that follow, I 
look more closely at the entanglement of ageing and dementia and consider potential 
routes to the marginalisation of older people living with dementia. I detail the dividing 
practices associated with age-as-pathology and the dominant dementia-as-disease 
episteme, and consider the discursive work of metaphor.  Consistent with the 
principles of Narrative Inquiry, I understand dementia practices and discourse as 
unfolding in time. I look to the past, to historical developments including the 
problematisation and (bio)-medicalisation of ageing before examining the specific case 
of the pathologisation and politicisation of cognitive impairment in later life. In so 
doing, I draw upon longstanding arguments from cultural anthropologists and critical 
gerontologists, moving into the present by introducing fresh critiques, sparked by the 
political push for early diagnosis of the dementia sub-types and the expansion of 
biomedical technologies earlier into the putative disease process. I look to the implied 
future, to the implications of new scientific discoveries and developments, revised 
demographic projections and the continued metaphorisation of dementia.  I finally 
draw conclusions which serve as an analytical anchor for the study and inform the 
continued review of the literature in Chapter Three, where I consider alternative social 
interpretations of dementia and identify gaps in the knowledge base.  
The Entanglement of Ageing and Dementia 
Age is the single most important and universal risk factor for dementia (Lock, 2013). 
The sociological influences that frame the construction of dementia can be set against a 
more general reading of the attempt to bring the aged body under control (Elias, 1994) 
and under medical scrutiny (Davis, 2004). This attempt has rested on the scientific 
ability to identify dysfunction and pathology and ultimately to question whether old 
age per se is a normal physiological process or a pathological condition. Against this 
backdrop, the relationship between old age and (senile) dementia has constituted a 
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singularly thorny issue and the entanglement has been debated for more than a 
century. At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the most common form8 
of dementia, Alzheimer’s disease (AD), is a distinctly pathological state or a quantitative 
extreme of ‘normal’ ageing (Ballenger, 2006:6). Much hinges on this word ‘normal’, 
which I discover depends in large part on cultural and political influences on 
expectations about ageing (Lock, 2013). The terms of the debate have become more 
aggravated in an ageing world (Beard, 2016) and have recently been stoked again by 
dementia policies pushing for early diagnosis. In the sections that follow I look at the 
entanglement of ageing and dementia in more detail. I begin by reviewing the 
problematisation and increasing biomedicalisation of ageing and take forward the 
critical insights distilled when I consider the pathologisation, politicisation and 
catastrophisation of cognitive impairment in later life.  
The Problematisation and (Bio-) Medicalisation of Old Age and Death 
Ageing and death are universal phenomena. All cultures have methods of explaining 
and dealing with them and in the modern West the culture that performs that function 
is heavily framed by science (Vincent, 2006). Historical shifts in understandings of old 
age, the power and legitimacy that science gives to particular ways of understanding 
old age and the rise and dominance of medical definitions of the phenomenon have 
been extensively documented (e.g. Estes and Binney, 1989; Estes et al., 2003; Gilleard 
and Higgs, 2010; Lupton, 2000; Thane, 2000). Historical accounts point to critical 
transformations brought about by medical research in the nineteenth century. This 
research generated a set of ideas and associated practices that ‘captured the aged body 
through three commanding perceptions’ (Katz, 1996:40). These are (1) ‘the aged body 
as a system of signification’ – physicians examine bodies for indications that they mask 
‘inner states of disorder’; (2) the aged body as having a distinct pathology requiring 
medical therapy; and (3) the aged body as dying (ibid). As a result, ‘the aged body 
became reduced to a state of degeneration where the meanings of old age and the 
body’s deterioration seemed condemned to signify each other in perpetuity’ (Foucault, 
1973:41).  
                                                          
8 Figures vary and even those included in key policy documents are invariably generated by the Alzheimer’s 
Association, but it is estimated that AD accounts for between 60% to as many as 80% of cases of dementia 
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2015). This percentage is also likely to rise through the push for early diagnosis 




The entwining of science, welfare and healthcare  
As the percentage of the population living into old age increased, a societal response 
was deemed necessary and the understanding of old age advanced by science became 
intertwined with welfare considerations. The social structures developed by modern 
society are intended to protect vulnerable individuals and society at large (Estes et al, 
2003). There has however been a persistent tendency to meet the needs of the ‘ideal’ 
citizen at the cost of ‘others’ leading to their marginalisation and exclusion (O’Brien and 
Penna, 1998). In the process of securing a place for old age, ways of being old that were 
too uncivilised for society to tolerate demanded constraint or concealment, with many 
of the impotent poor confined to work house infirmaries (Elias, 1994).  
 
Following World War II, a more optimistic attitude towards ageing emerged alongside a 
commitment to improving the lives of older people (Ballenger, 2006). Retirement 
became part of life and pensions were established. The downside of this intervention 
was the imposition of a structured dependency anchored by the reductive criterion of 
chronological age (Townsend, 1981).  Attention also expanded from a preoccupation 
with the management of the aged poor to physical infirmity and the problem of old age 
became an issue within the health system (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010). Science indicated 
that infirmity was neither a natural nor an inevitable consequence of old age and the 
specialism of geriatric medicine developed, admirably aspiring to release older people 
from incarceration and ‘rescue old age from the margins… to a real and valued position 
within society’ [Warren, 1943 in Gilleard and Higgs, 2010:124). This rescue operation 
was dependent upon the development of skills and practices to differentiate older 
persons with social needs from those whose needs stemmed from sickness and 
infirmity, and those who were remediable from the irremediable. It fell to science to 
supply the means. However, the anticipated reduction in the numbers of aged poor in 
effect resulted in a progressive rise in the numbers of older people occupying hospital 
and nursing home beds (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010).  
Interweaving the threads of the market and the promise of successful ageing 
In capitalist societies, the nature of welfare provision is influenced by market factors, 
the drive to make profit (Estes, 1979; Estes and Binney 1989; Robertson, 1990) and the 
industrio-medico complex (Estes, 2001). From the 1950s to the 1970s, old age was 
reconstructed as a time of independence from the demands of the labour force and 
support of children. The ‘young old’, mediated by market practices and electoral 
incitements, were set to age successfully, avoiding the stigma of physical and economic 
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frailty (Ballenger, 2006:7). Those imbued with a ‘gerontological persuasion’ argued 
that problems of ageing were pathological by-products of modern life, with older 
people ‘made decrepit because modern society no longer made a place for them’ 
(Ballenger, 2006:109). This argument persisted through the 1960s. By the 1970s, the 
market became more critical than welfare apparatus to available forms and narratives 
of successful ageing (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991). A mix of market and welfare 
forms developed to meet the different needs of those who aged successfully and those 
who failed to do so (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016). With regard to the latter, the 
management of the rising numbers of older people requiring long-term care and the 
associated costs became the major source of policy preoccupation, rather than the 
redress of marginalisation or restoration of value (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010).   
Promissory science and the biomedicalisation of ageing  
Medicalisation – the expansion of medical jurisdiction, authority and practices into new 
realms – was first noted by Zola (1973). The ‘problem’ of the growing numbers of 
people reaching old age in recent decades has resulted in the massive expansion of the 
medicalisation of ageing and extensive industries to assess who is and is not part of 
‘normal’ society (Katz, 1996).  In 1989, Estes and Binney (1989) called attention to the 
influence of the ‘biomedicalisation of ageing’ on clinical practice, research and public 
opinion, suggesting that the construction of ageing as a process of decline, disease and 
decay brought it within the domain and control of biomedicine and was accompanied 
by the naturalisation and normalisation of medical intervention. The rapid pace of 
subsequent developments in the biomedical sciences and in geriatric medicine 
continue to shape knowledge about the aged body and expectations about intervention 
in later life (Kaufman, Shim and Russ, 2004), impacting on individual, family, medical 
and societal decision making. Despite some counter-narratives inviting mankind to 
come to terms with its mortality (e.g. Gawande, 2014; Hughes, 2013) this expansion 
continues amid allegations that the new longevity is creating the most expensive 
generation in history (Beard, 2016), casting ageing as a profoundly problematic burden 
on society.  
Biological mutations and the cultural crisis of ageing  
Determining where normal ageing stops and the pathological starts is a perennial 
problem, and the terms of the debate have mutated through more recent developments 
in biology and the study of the etiology and treatment of diseases at cellular or 
subcellular levels. The term ‘biomedicine’ masks a critical disciplinary rift between 
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medicine and biology (Vincent, 2006).  At the boundary is the question of whether or 
not ageing itself should be considered a disease. As outlined above, as a result of 
developments in scientific knowledge, ageing progressively became associated with 
what went wrong, with failure. Within the bio-sciences, failure is associated with 
cellular maintenance and repair systems, such that ultimately old age can be 
constructed as a pathological condition which science has the prospect of curing 
(Vincent, 2006). Ageing is not called a disease because it is regarded as universal and 
natural, but this view has been challenged within the biosciences. At the core of this 
challenge is the rationale that if ageing is a disease, then it is possible to try to cure it. 
Without the label ‘disease’, research projects to discover successful interventions are 
unlikely to be funded (ibid). Cultural anthropologists underline how scientific activity is 
not always about uncovering “nature”, but rather ‘is a fierce fight to construct reality’ 
(Graham, 2006:83). Rather than valuing life in all its forms, including the final stage, 
what has developed within this field is ‘a process view that has detached old age from 
the level of the organism and the level of humanity’ (Vincent, 2006:691).  
Taking stock 
In reviewing this literature, I am mindful of the apparent capacity of ‘science’ to alter 
meanings of ‘old age’, inform the practices that differentiate between ‘normal’ and 
‘pathological’, legitimise and naturalise medical intervention, and denaturalise ageing 
and death. The concepts are not objective or given, but constituted in particular social 
and political contexts and elaborated over time as scientific knowledge changes and 
different pressures come to the fore. I recognise the need to keep sight of the ethical 
and political choices involved in what are reported as neutral positions of fact.  The 
willingness within sections of the bio-scientific community to challenge what is taken 
as natural, universal and given and construct its own version of reality in the quest not 
for truth, but for research funding is noteworthy. Yet it also raises questions as to why 
these (re)constructions may be accepted more broadly, and what this says about our 
political and socio-cultural values. These strike me as very important handles to hold 
on to when considering the construction of dementia, particularly in its most common 
manifestation, Alzheimer’s disease. I review the history of this construction below.  
The Pathologisation and ‘Alzheimerisation’ of (Senile) Dementia 
The thin line between normal and pathological is particularly contentious in the case of 
what was formerly called ‘senility’. The extensive body of literature that documents and 
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critiques the pathologisation and biomedicalisation of ageing is complemented by 
volumes dedicated specifically to the history, medicalisation and politicisation of 
‘senility’ and its putatively more palatable successor ‘dementia’. The offerings are 
particularly rich with respect to the most common dementia sub-type, Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD) (e.g. Ballenger, 2006; Basting, 2009; Beard, 2016; Bond, 1992; Cohen, 
1995; Fox 1989, George and Whitehouse, 2014a; 2014b; George et al, 2012; Holstein, 
1997; Leibing and Cohen 2006; Whitehouse and George, 2008).  
 
The Alzheimer’s story is long and murky, with a new chapter being written through the 
current push to extend the medical gaze earlier into the so-called ‘disease process’. The 
political pressure has given rise to provocative and extensively researched accounts 
that not only review a rather dubious history and synthesise important arguments 
previously advanced by critical gerontologists, but also introduce fresh evidence of 
recent developments that challenge the dominant conceptualisation of Alzheimer’s 
disease (Beard, 2016; Lock, 2013). In particular, anthropologist Professor Margaret 
Lock’s (2013) The Alzheimer Conundrum draws upon in-depth interviews with eminent 
international psychiatrists, neurologists and neuro-geneticists together with potent 
insights from the British epidemiologist, Professor Carol Brayne. As late onset 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common diagnosis in the dementia stable and is 
shrouded in the greatest controversy, I look at these developments in closest detail. 
First, I consider the umbrella term ‘dementia,’ which in itself is not without 
terminological, conceptual or diagnostic difficulty. 
Dementia: A useful classification heading or hollow label? 
As noted in Chapter One, ‘dementia’ is an umbrella term, a heading in our established 
systems of disease classification encompassing a group of conditions that share the 
common characteristic of neurocognitive dysfunction. Until the end of the 19th century, 
dementia was a much broader clinical concept, encompassing mental illness and any 
type of psychosocial incapacity, including some that were reversible. In people aged 
over 65 years, senile dementia or senility was viewed as a normal if not inevitable 
aspect of growing old, rather than caused by any specific diseases (Berrios, 1990). 
Senility is now considered a derogatory term in popular discourse, but this was not 
always the case (Katz, 1996). 
 
While the adoption of the clinical term ‘dementia’ encompassing a range of diseases 
worthy of medical care and attention may appear to represent an advance in medical 
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thinking and social awareness, it has not altered socio-political relations of domination 
and difference (Lock, 2013). Part of the problem is the term ‘dementia’ itself.  Unlike 
the benign origins of senility, the word dementia derives from the Latin demens or de 
mentis— literally meaning out of the mind. In Thinking through Dementia, the 
philosopher Julian Hughes (2011) rejects dementia as a useful term, synthesising 
various medical and philosophical perspectives. Underscoring the importance of 
language, he suggests that terminology is a matter of morality and common humanity. 
On these grounds alone he contends that the term is insulting and stigmatising and 
should be abandoned. Clinicians too experience difficulty with the term because it is 
gloomy, distressing for people still capable of managing their lives and it contributes 
significantly to their reticence when establishing or disclosing diagnosis (ibid).  
 
It appears that the medical community is beginning to take note and the term 
‘dementia’ has been replaced with ‘major neurocognitive disorder’ in the latest version 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-V (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Hughes (2013) questions whether we actually need a 
systematic classification heading to group the various sub-types. He adds that the 
alternative advanced by the DSM, although preferable, remains problematic as 
‘disorder’ is morally loaded, suggesting something wrong as opposed to not working as 
well as it once did. Gullette (2014:127) who dislikes the term “dementia” intensely and 
only uses it ‘in scare quotes’, also welcomes the change in the DSM manual, observing 
that critiques culminating in the revision render “dementia” a hollow label, of limited 
diagnostic utility, combining categorical misclassification with etiologic imprecision. 
Nevertheless, she observes that the label — ‘and its horrible vernacular forms, 
“dementing” and “demented” remain active, with malevolent effects’ (ibid). While 
‘dementia’ is entrenched in policy, services, academic literature and everyday language, 
thus making its replacement appear daunting, Hughes (2011) points out that other 
insulting terms such as mongoloid and moron have been eradicated not through 
scientific re-classification, but as result of consciousness raising. I endorse his 
conclusion that there are times when political correctness is warranted.  
Dementia: The question of value judgements and the medical-moral tug-of-war 
In addition to the regrettable terminology, the label raises diagnostic and conceptual 
difficulties (putting to one side the problem that a definite diagnosis can only be made 
post-mortem). According to the DSM-V, diagnosis calls for evidence of significant 
cognitive decline from a previous level of performance in one or more cognitive 
30 
 
domains of learning and memory, language, executive function, complex attention, 
perceptual-motor and social cognition. The cognitive deficits must also interfere with 
independence in everyday activities, such that, at a minimum, assistance should be 
required with complex instrumental activities of daily living. Separate diagnostic 
criteria exist for each dementia sub-type, although differentiating between these 
conditions is problematic and ‘mixed dementias’ are not uncommon.  Conceptually, the 
DSM-V definition is limited in that the predominant focus on cognitive impairment and 
the ‘loss of points on an intelligence test’ (Hughes, 2011:17) detracts from a broader 
reality that includes the whole person. Further, Hughes et al (2006:2) highlight that the 
disease status is something to do with a failure of action or ‘ordinary doing’, which 
alerts us to the possibility that at the heart of the diagnosis ‘lurks some sort of 
evaluative judgement’. The observation that there is no hard, scientific boundary 
between pathology and normality is not new, but the resultant need to reference 
functional abilities and thus introduce questions of value gives rise to a tug-of-war 
between medical and moral models (Hughes et al, 2006:3). The following quote cuts to 
the heart of the difficulties: 
‘Push the balance too far towards an exclusively medical model and this risks a slide 
from a properly medical role into coercive functions… but push too far towards an exclusively 
moral model and we end up denying the resources of medicine to those who most desperately 
need them’ (Dickenson and Fulford, 2000:55 in Hughes et al, 2006:3).  
 
Hughes et al (2006) comment that similar dangers lurk in our judgements about what 
will and will not count as normal ageing and normal forgetfulness. It is in respect of the 
latter that the most heated debates have arisen. People forget, particularly as they age 
and the threshold of ‘ordinary forgetting’ is highly ambiguous (Lock, 2013). In the next 
section I highlight that in the moral-medical tug-of-war over Alzheimer’s disease, there 
are some heavy weights with political and industrial interests pulling on the medical 
end of the rope. The slide is well underway. A key question is which side are the 
onlookers cheering on? 
The making of Alzheimer’s disease: The dawning of a calculated politics of anguish 
As indicated above, the history of Alzheimer’s disease has been extensively 
documented but I consider it worth revisiting, both because many of the early 
ambiguities continue to haunt contemporary debates, and on account of the questions 
it raises about the location and enactment of power against a backdrop of supposed 
scientific certainty.  
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When in 1906 Alois Alzheimer described the clinical condition that now bears his 
name, dementia associated with old age was still considered an expected part of age-
related decline. Alzheimer documented the first case of the condition when a woman, 
known as ‘Auguste D,’ presented in an asylum where he was working with behavioural 
symptoms remarkably similar to those observed in cases of senile dementia. She was 
fifty-one years old (Fox, 1989). Her condition deteriorated and she died four years 
later. Upon autopsy, her brain was found to contain the amyloid plaques and 
neurofibrillary tangles now associated with AD.  In 1910 the eponym Alzheimer’s 
disease was first used by the German physician Emil Krapelin when he registered it as a 
new disease category in the forerunner to the DSM. Dr. Krapelin asserted that what he 
observed in pre-senile patients (those under 65 years) was a new disease, distinct from 
senile dementia. The registration was based on only four cases, the neuropathology 
was not identical in each case and it took place despite the noted scepticism of Dr 
Alzheimer himself (George et al, 2012). Historians suggest Krapelin rushed the decision 
to register a new disease to promote his own interests (Hoff, 1991). The term AD thus 
originally related to dementia in people with pre-senile onset of symptoms, while 
‘senile dementia’ was used when symptoms commenced in people over the age of 65 
years and was not considered a disease per se (Lock, 2013). 
In 1933, a study by German neurologists highlighted that the plaques and tangles of the 
type found in the brain of ‘Auguste D’ were present upon autopsy in 84% of persons 
dying over the age of 65, suggesting that the plaques are a normal part of ageing and 
causing the dementias to fall into a ‘no-man’s land’ (Lock, 2013:37). By the mid-
twentieth century, against the backdrop of a more favourable gerontological 
persuasion, as described previously, pathological interpretations of senile dementia 
gained currency (Beard, 2016). Competing theories were advanced centred on the 
relationship between mind and body. In contrast to the ‘localisation theory’ (Lock, 
2013) which locates the problem firmly in the brain, some gerontologists considered 
ways in which mind, persons, life events, ageing and environments might interact to 
bring about neurological and behavioural changes that could become pathological. 
However, the ‘entanglement theory’ (Lock, 2013:5) was dwarfed by the ‘localisation 
theory’ throughout the 20th century. In 1968, an extensive study showed that tangles 
like those found in ‘Auguste D’s’ brain appeared in the brains of 62% of all older people 
upon autopsy (Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth, 1968). This was interpreted as indicative 
that AD was considerably more prevalent than first thought, and it seems the 
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possibility that the ageing process had been incorrectly medicalised was not 
countenanced (Beard, 2016). Throughout the 1970s, many leading researchers and 
neurologists contended that it was pointless to maintain a distinction between senile 
dementia and AD based on age alone, but struggled to gain support (ibid).  
Fox (1989) points out that it was the serendipitous coming together of several forces 
rather than the generation of new scientific knowledge that caused this rumbling issue 
to finally capture the attention of the media and bring about the unification of pre-
senile AD and senile dementia. In concert with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 
the USA, researchers and families of people affected by senile dementia united in search 
of diagnoses, treatment, support for family caregivers, and ideally, a cure (ibid). The 
Alzheimer Disease and Related Disorders Association (ARDA) was formed in 1980 to 
progress these concerns. Around the same time, it was reported that actress Rita 
Hayworth had the condition (Beard, 2016) and the resultant stimulation of public 
sympathy and support proved a critical ingredient. The power of science thus drew 
upon wider cultural and political influences on expectations about ageing and death. 
The unification transformed AD into the fourth or fifth leading cause of death in the 
USA overnight (Butler, 2008) and it has subsequently become a global policy concern. 
The unification also closed the door to alternative psycho-social, socioeconomic, 
political and public health arguments (Lock, 2013). In a personal communication to 
Fox, Robert Butler, the first director of the NIA, articulates his intention to claim 
Alzheimer’s disease as a major research area for the NIA: 
 ‘’I decided that we had to make it [Alzheimer’s disease] a household word. I call it the 
health politics of anguish’’ (Fox, 1989:82). 
 
It would appear he has succeeded. Fox (1989) indicates that the search for a cure is 
commendable, but the endeavour is a business with powerful economic interests. The 
seemingly questionable tactics deployed appear to be readily accepted within the 
neuroscience community. In conversation with Lock in 2008, neuro-geneticist John 
Hardy stated that the consolidation of AD as a singular condition was “just a political 
manoeuvre to get funding, and then some people actually came to believe that this is 
the case” (Lock 2013: 41, emphases added).  
Politics, power and the sacrilegious 
In calling attention to the political manoeuvring of the NIA, it is important to stress that 
the behavioural changes related to concomitant changes in the brain are undeniably 
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real and dementia has many causes, some of which are well understood (Lock, 2013). 
Moreover, there is broad consensus that early onset AD conforms closely to the plaque 
and tangle pathology first identified by Alois Alzheimer in 1906. For the majority of 
people diagnosed however, namely people over 75 years old who receive a diagnosis of 
the AD subtype, it is argued that there is something different at work (ibid). Key 
questions are why the unified biomedical explanation has been so readily embraced 
and with what consequence.  
The vast majority of the subsequent billions of dollars of funding has been directed 
towards imaging techniques, memory clinics, diagnostic tools including reductive 
cognitive scoring mechanisms, pharmaceutical interventions of limited efficacy and the 
ongoing search for an elusive silver bullet rather than support for caregivers (Lock, 
2013).  This channelling of funds may have been expected to provoke a backlash from 
family caregivers who took part in the campaign. Fox (1989) points out that while the 
user movement in part sought support for caregiving, it also wanted senility recognised 
as a disease of the brain, challenging stigma and shifting moral responsibility for its 
occurrence. He concludes that the families had little time for competing psycho-social 
models of senility (ibid).  
Drawing upon a Foucauldian analysis, Davis (2004) extends the rationale for 
acceptance of the dementia-as-disease episteme to the public, suggesting that 
sociological conditions enabled its propagation. He concludes that this construction 
must satisfy some productive element of power’ (p371) namely producing a more 
palatably reassuring image of ageing. He proposes that it is better to witness armies of 
doctors and scientists making visible (with a view to possibly eliminating) the 
foundation of a disease than to fear a normalised deterioration without recourse to any 
structured cultural explanation. Hoggett (2000:44) also observes that to call attention 
and give some value to the immutable, untreatable and incurable has become deeply 
unfashionable, even sacrilegious. This would suggest that in this particular tug-of-war 
the onlookers tend to be on the side of medicine. As we move forward in time, a key 
question is whether the support will hold through unprecedented diagnostic expansion 
(Conrad, 2008) and the catastrophisation of dementia (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016), as 
discussed below.  
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A New Chapter: Looking at Recent Developments in the Artificial Light of the Lab 
The contested relationship between ageing and dementia looks no closer to being 
resolved today, with many arguments becoming more acrimonious in an ageing world. 
Of particular note, as a result of recent findings in neurogenetics, epigenetics, 
epidemiology and genomics, a partial rethinking is taking place toward greater 
recognition of mind, body and environment entanglement, whereby neuropathology 
can be influenced by social circumstances, and vice versa. What appear to be opposites 
are interwoven in neuroplasticity, the malleability of a nervous system in contact with 
the outer environment (Lock, 2013:235). This expands Kitwood’s (1990) account of the 
interplay between neuropathology and psycho-social factors, reaching far beyond the 
confines of the immediate care environment into local cultures and society and taking 
cognisance of entanglements over the entire life course. The symptoms and behaviour 
patterns we call dementia appear to be the outcome of accumulating exposures to 
harms or denial of protective benefits over decades (Drew, 2014). In the long term, this 
understanding paves the way for preventive approaches, more tractable by social, 
public health and wider societal means than by medical treatments (Lock, 2013; Wu et 
al, 2015). More immediately, it perhaps unexpectedly lends scientific credence to social 
interpretations of dementia characteristic of the third and fourth moments in 
understanding. 
 
In parallel, advances in neuroimaging have confirmed what was once only available on 
autopsy, namely that one third of ‘normal’ living persons exhibit neuropathology in 
their brains (Lock, 2013:5). Recent predictions suggest that roughly 65% of people 
over the age of 80 would be diagnosed with AD or pre-disease based on imaging 
(Beard, 2016:29) and the plaques and tangles are sometimes not present in the brains 
of people diagnosed with AD (Kauffman, 2006; Lock, 2013). The assumed “factness” of 
Alzheimer’s as a disease is now being questioned by a growing minority of experts’ 
(Lock 2013: 7), with potentially profound implications for future research, policy, 
practice and public expectations, characterised by the diversion of the medical gaze. 
 
Alongside these developments, news stories of breakthroughs consistent with the 
dominant ‘localisation theory’ continue to circulate and in the UK, policy continues to 
champion the search for a cure (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). The focus on the rising 
prevalence of AD puts the emphasis firmly on age, yet many research studies involve 
younger people without any comorbidities, making the results difficult to apply and 
potentially engendering false hope (Lock, 2013). Interestingly, although the value of the 
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market for medication to treat AD stood at more than $3.7bn in 2013, there are signs 
that the pharmaceutical industry is losing enthusiasm for researching new treatments 
and is experiencing funding fatigue after a history of failures (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 
2016). It is also increasingly emphasising improvements in behaviours and daily 
activities over memory in the promotional literature for existing products (Lock, 2013) 
and the potential for earning profits from dietary supplements for dementia prevention 
has also been noted (Thompson, 2014). Lock (2013) suggests the new emphasis on 
biomarkers seeking to identify biological changes in pre-symptomatic individuals is not 
only ethically questionable, but is also being hyped to deflect attention from the failure 
to achieve laboratory results and the low efficacy of available treatments.  
 
The upshot of all this activity however is that the ontological question of what AD is and 
the epistemological question of the relationship of ageing and dementia remain 
unanswered; dementia and old age are deeply entangled (Lock, 2013). Despite this 
deep entanglement, the ageing of the population has fuelled even greater efforts to 
differentiate between normal and pathological ageing within the laboratory and in 
clinical practice. The pressing concern expressed by many observers pertains to the 
bioethical implications of the current push for earlier diagnosis of AD and related 
dementias. The uncertainties surrounding AD and dementia more broadly set out 
above cast the calls for proactive diagnosis in a dubious light and suggest that the value 
judgements that characterise the medical-moral tug-of-war may be inching over the 
midway mark of coercion. In Chapter Three, I review the literature concerning the 
everyday lives of older people with dementia, but for now I move closer to this sphere 
by stepping out from the artificial light of the laboratory into the shadowy middle 
ground of clinical practice.    
Another Chapter: Entering the Shadowy Middle Ground of Clinical Practice  
Much of the critique of the diagnostic expansion (Conrad, 2008) associated with 
dementia has been directed at developments in the USA, particularly the exponential 
growth of memory clinics. Some cognitive neuroscientists have also questioned their 
own validity claims (Moreno, 2009 cited in Gullette, 2014; Noë, 2009). A further source 
of controversy is the introduction of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) as a disease 
category in the DSM-V, together with its ambiguous interpretation as a precursor stage 
for AD (Katz, 2017). However, the repercussions have been felt across the Western 
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world. In the UK, a core concern is whether the political push for early, proactive 
diagnosis crosses the mid-point of the moral-medical tug-of-war. 
Politicising dementia and incentivising diagnosis 
In England, dementia was first identified as a national priority in 2008 with the 
publication of the National Dementia Strategy (Department of Health, 2008; 2009). The 
previous year, the Scottish Government (2008) made dementia a national priority and 
set a target for improving diagnosis rates in 2008. This commitment to dementia has 
been refreshed and incentivised in different ways in subsequent dementia strategies 
and specific policy initiatives across the UK, with varying success.  Of particular note, 
the Government in England introduced a financial incentive in 2013 to reward General 
Practitioners (GPs) for assessing patients aged over 75 years for dementia and 
cognitive impairment, but it was later withdrawn after GP representatives and patient 
groups fiercely condemned the payments as ethically questionable and damaging to the 
relationship between doctor and patient (Guardian, 2014).  
In Scotland, the 2008 target to increase the number of people with diagnosis of a 
dementia was delivered and then replaced by a new national standard to maintain the 
proportion of people diagnosed on the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
dementia register and other equivalent sources. The national standard is that two 
thirds of the estimated number of people with dementia should have a diagnosis with 
appropriate post-diagnostic support (NHS England, 2017). Although there is no direct 
financial incentive, the QOF represents one of the main sources of potential income for 
general practices across the UK (Information and Statistics Division Scotland, 2017). 
Stretching the rules: Questioning the ethics of proactive case finding 
The diagnostic push has sparked disquiet about the implications for older persons 
diagnosed with AD in its earliest stages (Beard, 2016), for older persons who have 
simply become forgetful (Brayne and Davis, 2012) and whose experience of later life 
may be marred by anxiety that they may become so (Spence, 2012). Population 
screening for dementia is not justifiable (or ethical) based on the current UK criteria, in 
that there is no effective treatment or evidence of better outcomes, no simple, safe 
screening tool, no detectable, understood disease course and no evidence of cost 
effectiveness (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016). Manthorpe and Iliffe (2016) suggest that the 
National Health Service has evaded its own screening rules by rebadging this as ‘case 
finding’, giving voice to a concern which triggered my decision to embark upon this 
study in 2013. In addition to the question marks surrounding the ethics of proactive 
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case finding, diagnostic targets and incentives, I was also motivated by concerns about 
the mechanisms used to measure progress against the target, which I consider below.  
Lack of evidence: Putting the cart before the horse 
The British epidemiologist9 Professor Carol Brayne (2007; Brayne et al, 2011; Brayne 
and Davis, 2012) has played an instrumental role in underlining the limitations of 
statistics used to communicate the actual and estimated prevalence of dementia in the 
population, nationally and internationally, including those used in conjunction with the 
UK national standard for diagnosis rates. Indeed, there are recent signs that the actual 
increase in the numbers of people developing dementia in some countries may have 
been over-estimated, probably unintentionally, with statistics indicating decreased 
incidence in several countries including the USA, England, Germany and Spain 
(Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016). Brayne et al (2011) highlight that accurate assessment is 
simply not possible, suggesting that the fact that the number of cases and predictions 
about the impending catastrophe are reported with great assurance further muddies 
the water in terms of getting to grips with what AD is, how it relates to ageing and how 
best to confront it. Writing about the use of dementia statistics more broadly, Brayne 
and Davis (2012) stress that it is of crucial importance that approaches and findings are 
anchored to the reality of dementia in the true population if we are not to continue to 
drain public and commercial resources on the basis of overextended claims.  Writing in 
the British Medical Journal, Brayne (2013) articulated concerns that the studies 
required to justify dementia screening have not taken place, calling this a case of 
putting the policy cart before the research horse.  
Clinicians question the use of figures widely publicised by the Alzheimer’s Society and 
UK Government to try to show the size of the problem, and consider their application to 
criticise GPs and the NHS more broadly for under-diagnosing in a bid to shame them 
into diagnosing more people a most unfortunate development (Brunet et al, 2012). The 
suggestion that clinicians are not acting in the best interests of people presenting with 
possible dementia has been refuted by narrative research unpacking the black box of 
timely diagnosis (Dhedi et al, 2014).  
 
                                                          
9 Professor Brayne is the Principal Investigator in a research program that commenced in 1985 that focuses on 
longitudinal population based studies of people aged 65 and over 
38 
 
Professional disagreements regarding pathological loss 
Given the diagnostic ambiguity surrounding dementia and the inevitable recourse to 
value judgements, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is disagreement between the 
medical professions as to what constitutes pathological loss. Psychiatrists, geriatricians, 
general internists and GPs have been found to take very different approaches to 
diagnosis, focusing respectively on affective qualities, functional and global concerns in 
relation to neurological components, systemic signs and symptoms, and finally the 
ability of the person and the family to manage in everyday life (Graham, 2006). They 
may also reach different diagnostic conclusions (Lock, 2013). 
Lack of evidence: Uncertain harms and benefits of diagnosis 
The forceful promotion of the systematic identification of people with risk factors for 
dementia has been critiqued on the grounds that we do not know enough about the 
benefits and harms of doing so (LeCouteur et al, 2013). Whereas policy documents 
invariably present the benefits of early diagnosis as axiomatic, the medical press and 
academic research papers assert that the benefits of early diagnosis cannot be assumed 
(Dhedi et al, 2014). While some people may benefit in the short-term from 
pharmaceutical treatments, the gains at population level are minimal (Manthorpe and 
Iliffe, 2016). It is too early to reach a definitive conclusion about the merits of post-
diagnostic support provisions and early evaluations of dementia adviser services 
indicate that there is no singular model on which to base service development (Clarke 
et al, 2013). 
Concerns have been expressed about the possible harms associated with premature 
diagnosis and over-diagnosis (Brayne and Davis, 2012; Brunet et al, 2012; Dhedi et al, 
2014; Spence, 2012). Diagnosis of a dementia sub-type is a complex medical and social 
practice, which involves balancing a range of judgements (Dhedi et al, 2014). Although 
most persons with dementia appear to adjust to diagnosis without seriously 
contemplating hastened death, some do consider it and express suicidal ideation and 
behaviour during the adjustment period (Draper et al, 2010). Moreover, a diagnosis can 
result in a ‘defectological’ view in which ‘the afflicted person is defined principally in 
terms of catalogued dysfunctions’ (Sabat 2001:10). This can restrict activities, 
compromise social relationships and result in well-meaning but overly protective 
measures by family members (Bamford et al, 2004).   
For the above reasons, many GPs have argued against early diagnosis (LeCouteur et al, 
2013), favouring timely diagnosis in line with bioethical recommendations (Nuffield, 
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2009). GPs are often also more inclined to understand how the person and family are 
coping with everyday activities and daily life rather than push for a precise diagnostic 
category (Graham, 2006). The diagnostic process itself has also been critiqued for its 
over-reliance on neuropsychological test batteries (Sabat, 2001) constituting symbolic 
violence (Smith, 2009) and taking the form of a degradation ceremony (Beard, 2016). 
Dhedi, Swinglehurst and Russell (2014) highlight that expanding the diagnosis of 
dementia mostly increases profit for corporations and industries involved with 
developing screening and early-diagnosis tests, and pharmaceutical and 
complementary medicines marketed to maintain cognition in old age. Pharmaceutical 
companies sponsored the study that resulted in the above UK Government initiative 
that provided financial rewards for increased diagnosis rates, and funded the 
development of, and distribute, the Seven Minute Screen for dementia (ibid). There is 
therefore a serious risk that proactive diagnostic procedures and low efficacy 
medications will absorb resources that are badly needed for the ongoing care of people 
with dementia as it progresses (Lock, 2013). While my motivating concerns were 
primarily ethical and epistemological, I find the expenditure associated with this, at 
times unwelcome proactivity, hard to reconcile with the drastic cuts to social care 
services.  
A final difficulty is that despite the putative diagnostic benefits of offering a legitimate 
explanation for changes in individual function and increasing community awareness of 
dementia, the social response has not improved in terms of removing stigma. Ballenger 
(2006) highlights the source of the stigma surrounding dementia is fear rather than 
ignorance, and clinical legitimacy is not the issue.  The fear of dementia in the West has 
been attributed to our hyper-cognitive culture (Post, 2000), whereby the privileging of 
cognition and reason can result in cognitive impairment being equated with loss of self. 
Fear is also compounded by the catastrophic cultural representations of dementia, 
including the use of apocalyptic demography and the perpetuation of the individual 
horror story alluded to in Chapter One.  I consider the implications of such 
representations below. 
A Final Chapter: Looking at Dementia in the Harsh Glare of the Media  
Cultural representations can serve to legitimise the status of persons who conform to 
the dominant norm whilst delegitimising and marginalising others (Plummer, 2003). 
‘Others’ are marginalised and excluded in their day to day interactions with the world, 
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not only through social structures, but through representations and language used in 
both the public and private sphere. Institutionalised ageism coupled with negative 
cultural representations reinforce negative attitudes towards older people (Bond et al, 
2004).   The fear with which modern societies look on old age, impairment and death 
has been widely noted (e.g. Elias, 1994; Featherstone and Wernick, 1995). This fear is 
compounded by the threat of dementia (Beard, 2016).  
 
More than a decade ago, Bond and colleagues (2004) suggested that in order to address 
the stigma surrounding dementia it will be at a societal level where most change must 
occur, reframing the issue as discrimination and drawing attention to the need for 
more positive cultural representations and narratives of older people with dementia. It 
would appear that positive portrayals do not serve the interests of those concerned 
with the generation of funding for scientific research. Having set out to create ‘a politics 
of health anguish’ through the unification of early and late onset dementia (Butler cited 
in Fox, 1989:8), Butler (2008) has more recently suggested that unless we find ways to 
prevent or cure Alzheimer’s and other severe dementing diseases the world will shortly 
be confronted with… the epidemic of the 21st century. This depiction of dementia as an 
epidemic is only one of a number of emotive metaphors that is regularly deployed in 
dementia discourse, and the metaphorisation of dementia has recently become the 
subject of academic interest.  
The metaphorisation of dementia 
Researchers have critically examined representations of dementia in the media, both 
internationally (e.g. Clarke, 2006 (Canada); Kang et al, 2010 (USA) and Kirkman, 2006 
(New Zealand)) and in the UK (e.g. Gordon, 2014; Johnstone, 2011; Mitchell et al, 2013; 
Peel, 2014; Zeilig, 2013). Zeilig (2013) makes an important contribution to 
considerations of the implications of the metaphorisation of dementia by looking at the 
way in which metaphor works. She highlights that by making an implicit comparison 
between two unlike things, whereby something unfamiliar is described by something 
that is familiar, both the principal and subsidiary subjects are transformed and yet 
preserved (Radley, 1993 in Zeilig, 2013). It is not only the similarity between the things 
compared that is important but also the difference. Through the combination of 
transformation and preservation, metaphors influence the way in which we perceive 




Examining newspaper accounts, speeches by prominent politicians, documentary and 
feature films, Zeilig (2013) finds that patterned and systemic use of a range of 
metaphors about dementia pervades the popular imagination. Critical analysis reveals 
that discursive practices frequently equate the dementia phenomenon with disaster, a 
rising tide, a silent tsunami, an unstoppable force of nature. She detects an 
undercurrent of hysteria in many of the stories we are told about AD or related 
dementias (ibid). Most tellingly, metaphorical descriptions of dementia are readily 
found in medical and scientific texts and persistently conflate dementia with crisis. 
Zeilig (2013) also observes that the term dementia has itself become a metaphor for 
wider social ills. Peel’s (2014) study of UK national newspaper articles identifies a 
‘panic-blame’ theme, which again represents dementia in catastrophic terms (e.g. 
‘worse than death’), but notably also uncovers the promotion of a paradoxical 
representation focused on individualistic lifestyle changes and assuming individual 
responsibility to ‘stave off’, “fight” or “beat” the condition. 
Johnstone (2011) exposes the problematic use of five key metaphors: the Alzheimer 
metaphor, reinforced by three additional metaphors, namely the epidemic, military and 
predatory thief metaphors; and the euthanasia metaphor. She stresses that while at one 
level ‘the Alzheimer metaphor’ might seem mundane, encompassing little more than 
the use of everyday language to describe and help give meaning to a perceived 
everyday reality of those diagnosed and living with the disease, this is an incomplete 
account of what the metaphor is achieving, particularly when reinforced by other 
metaphors. All metaphors were found to be morally loaded and used to stigmatise 
Alzheimer’s disease (ibid).  
Johnstone’s (2011) analysis complements Zeilig’s (2013) account of dementia as crisis, 
underscoring the ways in which metaphors de-humanise the person with dementia. For 
instance, the ‘predatory thief’ steals the inner being, such that what is left is a walking 
corpse, a zombie, a body left behind. Once de-humanised it is but a short step to 
regarding such persons as being of limited moral worth. This is a dangerous line of 
thought as the next logical step is that the cessation of life is made comprehensible. 
Indeed, Johnstone (2011) uncovers a particular issue through the use of metaphor as 
an end-of-life ‘solution’ for people with dementia within the debate on the legalisation 
of euthanasia / physician assisted suicide. With euthanasia depicted as beneficent, the 
‘Alzheimerisation’ of the euthanasia debate (ibid) brings death back into the frame. 
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Dementia and dementia discourse throw up deeper, philosophical issues about the 
value we attach to different forms of human life (Hughes, 2013).  As biomedical 
technique has extended choice to every aspect of existence, death is often a matter of 
choice and it seems there is a responsibility to choose (Kaufman, 2006). Strong 
ambivalence has come to haunt the value of the lives of persons with advanced 
dementia. In recent years, there has been a palpable shift in public attitudes and beliefs 
about the desirability and moral permissibility of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide as an end-of-life ‘solution’ for people living with Alzheimer’s disease, not just at 
the end stage of the disease, but also at its beginning stage (Hertogh, 2009). Perhaps 
the real tragedy of Alzheimer’s is the tragedy of our attitude to life (Hertogh et al, 
2007). The unwelcome “war” that we have been conscripted into appears to be a 
culture war, and ‘no other ongoing culture war dares to call so openly for the death of 
its victims’ (Gullette, 2014:134).  
The above analyses of cultural representations of dementia underscore just what’s at 
stake for older people and for society. They must be set alongside the questioning of the 
assumed ‘factness’ of Alzheimer’s as a disease (Lock, 2013: 7). Beard (2016:229) states 
that we must ask ourselves what early diagnosis means, sociologically speaking, for all 
of us as we ourselves age and anticipate ourselves as future old people. She adds that 
bioethical discourse must attend to the potential effects of medical reductionism on the 
everyday lives of people who may be deeply forgetful (ibid). This body of literature 
suggests to me that the search for pathology is seriously misdirected, with the major 
pathology located not in aged brains, but in society itself. There has been a failure in the 
external ecology of relationality and recognition (Jennings, 2017).  
Reflections and Way Forward 
This chapter has considered the mutability of the normal: pathological divide, and the 
role of science in constructing old age as progressive decline and naturalising medical 
intervention in the domestic and social lives of older people (Robertson, 1990). The 
decision to include senile dementia within the Alzheimer’s disease category took place 
against this backdrop, opening up the possibility of finding biomedical means of cure 
and treatment and authorising socio-cultural norms. The biomedical understanding of 
dementia is flawed yet has come to dominate, colonising everyday life (Manthorpe and 
Iliffe, 2016). Its expansion is fuelled by catastrophic cultural representations and 
increasing politicisation, driven by the need to be seen to do something, rather than 
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evidence-based decision making. The questionable push for earlier diagnosis at a time 
when the ‘assumed factness’ (Lock, 2013) of AD is increasingly being questioned may 
stretch the frayed medical-moral tug-of-war rope to breaking point. This has numerous 
implications, but we cannot turn back the clock to the time when senile dementia was 
considered part of ageing. My memories of visiting Lachie in the abominable geriatric 
ward intimate that we should not aspire to, and the productive power of the disease 
model proposed by Davis (2004) cannot be discounted.  
Fresh insights, such as those distilled by Lock (2013) and Beard (2016), underscore the 
need to divert our gaze away from the lab and the memory clinic towards psycho-social 
approaches and longer term public health preventive efforts, which would require 
major changes in economies and in society. Peel’s (2014) review of UK newspaper 
articles serves as an early warning of the need to remain alert to the risk of shifting 
responsibilities onto individuals, should a more preventative agenda take hold. These 
insights also underscore the need to draw upon social interpretations of dementia, 
which I review in Chapter Three. 
Whether or not ‘normal’ ageing is a disease, or senility in old age is normal are 
questions that existed long before recent forms of medico-cultural negotiation emerged 
(Kaufman, 2006). What is at stake within the current debates is that, at the boundary 
between life and death, the common denominator is the detachment from humanity. 
This holds whether with recourse to intra-cellular activity in the bid to evade ageing or 
death by reconstructing old age as a pathology that may be cured, or forging 
associations with non-human forms to endorse euthanasia for a life already tainted by 
death. There is a desperate need to bring humanity back in. And there is an urgent need 
for less disastrous or horrific cultural representations of dementia. An inspiring culture 
of ageing needs critically interrogative narratives, inspiring counter-narratives (Baars, 
2012) and a new moral vision (Jennings, 2017).  
Manthorpe and Iliffe (2016) draw upon Bender’s (2003:55-79) analysis of why the 
biomedical understanding of dementia is so dominant, despite its weaknesses. As 
discussed in this chapter, contributory factors identified include the issues of changing 
demography and estimated costs, the profit-seeking ethos of the pharmaceutical 
industry, the fear of dementia and the resultant desire for a cure, and the favouring of 
‘brain disease’ explanatory models within the better resourced medical specialities 
(ibid).  In addition, the list includes the interest of academia in framing problems in 
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particular ways so that they can then solve them. In progressing this study, I am 
therefore mindful that a biomedical label not only easily occludes the everyday lives of 
people so labelled, but can also shape research questions and influence the knowledge 
produced (Alsaker and Josephsson, 2011). 
 Manthorpe and Iliffe (2016:24) do not underestimate the difficulties of changing the 
ways in which people think about dementia and replacing the powerful metaphors and 
narratives that construct these thought processes, yet believe it is possible. I agree. I 
suggest that a useful place to start is by following Taylor (2008) into ‘the domain of the 
possible’ and attending closely to the possibilities entertained, pursued and actualised 
in the everyday lives of older people with dementia, without neglecting those 
possibilities discounted, discouraged or denied.  
This chapter has drawn up the thoughts of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, 
epidemiologists and GPs, all of whom, in different ways, have articulated the need to 
move away from the preoccupation with diagnosis and look at the person and how s/he 
manages in daily life. Even the pharmaceutical industry and the media may be resetting 
their sights on everyday activities and lifestyles! Going forward, the focus on ‘ordinary 
doing’ (Hughes et al, 2006) seems set to intensify. In Chapter Three, I ask what’s 
already known about the ‘ordinary doing’ and the everyday lives of older people 
affected by dementia and identify a gap in our understanding. I also seek theoretical 
support to enable me to pursue this line of inquiry by reviewing alternative social 
understandings of dementia and notable developments in citizenship studies more 
broadly. In so doing, I hold on tightly to both the pervasiveness and limitations of 




Dementia and Citizenship: Recognition Reconsidered 
Overview 
This chapter complements and builds upon the literature review presented in Chapter 
Two, which recounted and critiqued the history, dominance and continued expansion 
of the biomedical understanding of dementia. Revisiting this literature was of value, 
identifying fresh sources of support for ‘entanglement theories’ of dementia and 
discerning potential future interest in ‘ordinary’ doing. In this chapter, I identify a lack 
of attention to how an ordinary, everyday life is accomplished, despite persistent pleas 
for ordinariness from older people living with dementia. I review theoretical 
perspectives that advance alternative social interpretations of dementia, tracing early 
applications of the social model of disability to cognitive impairment and the 
subsequent reframing of arguments through an inclusive and relational understanding 
of citizenship-as-practice. I then summarise specific developments within this 
understanding, notably dementia activism, expansion of the social practices of 
citizenship into the realm of ‘the ordinary’ and calls for a narrative citizenship in 
dementia studies. More broadly, I consider the focus on recognition as a vital aspect of 
citizenship. In so doing, I consider the distinctive contribution of an ‘ethic of care’ 
perspective, notably in problematising the private: public divide and exposing ageist 
and gendered assumptions regarding contemporary Western understandings of 
‘achievement’.    
Shifting Understandings of Dementia Revisited: The Limits of the Third Moment 
As set out in Chapter One, there has been a series of moments in understandings of 
dementia over the last 35 years in Western society, signalling marked shifts in values, 
power relations and the construction of subjectivity and agency (Gilmour and 
Brannelly, 2009). For many years the person with dementia was reduced to sufferer, 
inscribed as subaltern (Gilmour and Brannelly, 2009) and rendered invisible. The 
introduction of person-centred care (Kitwood 1990; Kitwood and Bredin, 1992; 
Kitwood, 1997) sought to reclaim personhood, restoring the visibility and voice of the 
PERSON with dementia. Kitwood’s work transformed dementia care practices, 
redressing the ultimate act of exclusion by encouraging us to think afresh what it 
means to be a person and underscoring our relationality and unique subjectivity. 
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However, Kitwood’s (1997) methods have been criticised as pseudo-scientific and 
lacking validity (Davis, 2004; Dewing, 2007). Moreover, his conceptualisation of 
personhood has been identified as facing several limitations, as summarised below. 
First, depicted as a ‘status bestowed’ by caregivers, personhood reclaims the person 
with dementia as someone who matters, but does not necessarily suggest agency 
(Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010). Secondly, although posited as a psycho-social extension 
to neuropathology, this understanding tends not to truly enter into the social realm, 
instead remaining at the level of the basic psychology of the individual (Baldwin and 
Capstick, 2007; Hulko, 2004). Thirdly, while stressing the importance of eliciting the 
experiences of people with dementia, the emphasis has been on perspectives as they 
relate to experiences of care, within the context of caring relationships, plus responses 
to diagnosis and coping mechanisms. Finally, the privileging of the relational self 
overlooks a vital part of selfhood inherent in our embodied existence, denying the body 
any intentionality or agency (Kontos, 2004). In view of these limitations, steps have 
been taken to bring the body back into view (e.g. Kontos, 2012; Watson, 2016) and to 
further the enactment of social justice in relation to people with dementia by advancing 
more overtly socio-political interpretations. Social citizenship has emerged as a key 
concept for dementia studies and practice (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2007).  
 
The limitations of the established body of empirical research in dementia studies have 
been a key driver for the introduction of a social citizenship value lens. Nevertheless, 
innovative research methods and earlier diagnosis have made it possible to ‘hear more 
voices’ of older people living with dementia and the literature does provide important 
insights of direct relevance to this Narrative Inquiry. I provide a necessarily brief 
summary of the most salient insights from the more established literature below, then 
devote the remainder of the chapter to the ‘fourth moment’ in dementia studies, 
particularly the literature pertaining to dementia and citizenship. 
Discerning a Plea for the Ordinary  
In Chapter Two, I highlighted the concern that exclusively biomedical understandings 
not only risk occluding the everyday lives and meanings of people ascribed a diagnostic 
label, but can also frame research questions and influence the knowledge produced 
(Alasaker and Josephsson, 2011). This concern was substantiated by a selective review 
of the literature regarding the experience of dementia, using the approach described in 




The overall picture is one where most older people do adapt to a diagnosis and 
systematic reviews have found a high degree of consistency in the range of coping 
strategies identified across studies (Steeman et al, 2006; 2007).  Of particular interest 
to this study, the review highlights that many older people with dementia contextualise 
their experiences within normal old age, rather than understanding dementia as a 
disease (Gillies, 2000), need not perceive it as a problem (Phinney, 2002) and prefer to 
talk about having memory problems or being forgetful (Langdon et al, 2007).  
 
There are persistent pleas for an ‘ordinary life’ from older people living with dementia 
(e.g. Beard, 2004; Hulko, 2009; Steeman et al, 2006; Von Kutzleben et al, 2012). 
Similarly, other studies highlight that older people strive for ‘normalcy’ and may 
redefine what is normal (e.g. Cheston and Bender, 2003; Gillies, 2000; Hulko, 2004; 
Lyman, 1998; Phinney, 1998). Older people do not have to accept the diagnosis to enjoy 
a good quality of life (Beard, 2016). Age can mediate the meaning of illness (Pearce et 
al, 2002) and dementia may pose a lesser threat when it occurs later in the life course.  
 
Importantly, the review found that it is possible to reject the dominant cultural 
narrative of loss and incorporate dementia into a positive story of living (e.g. Beard et 
al, 2009; Cheston and Bender, 2003; Dorenlot, 2005; MacRae, 2008; Steeman et al, 
2007). Some people use the disease label strategically, both as a resource and as 
something to be incorporated into their identity, depending on the extent to which they 
think it benefits or harms them in different realms and specific situations (Beard and 
Fox, 2008; Beard, 2016). ’Awareness’ is a highly complex, value laden, context-sensitive 
concept (e.g. Cadell and Clare, 2010; 2011; Clare, 2002; 2003; Howorth and Saper, 
2005) and it makes little sense to talk about ‘acceptance and denial’ (Macquarrie, 2005) 
as people with dementia often oscillate between these standpoints, suggesting a 
‘pendular’ rather than linear trajectory (Beard, 2016).   
 
Writing about AD in particular, Beard and Fox (2008) contend that people are 
socialised by medical structures and the mass media into adorning the diagnostic label. 
More recently, Beard (2016) reports that the first step in this process of socialisation, 
namely receiving a diagnosis, need not lead to the adoption of the ‘master status’ of 
‘Alzheimer’s patient’ and indeed this adoption is neither intuitive nor the predominant 
reaction. In her extensive study of the experience of and response to receiving a 
diagnosis of AD in the USA, some people never took the second step of ‘accepting’ their 
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forgetfulness as a disease and a small minority rejected the diagnosis explicitly. Beard 
(2016) theorises that joining an AD support group socialises people into seeing their 
forgetfulness as a disease and this proves a crucial third step in solidifying the identity 
of ‘an Alzheimer’s patient’.  
 
In terms of my interest in ‘ordinary doing’, literature review found that establishing 
routines and keeping busy in meaningful activities have generally been discussed as 
means of coping (e.g. De Boer et al. 2007; Harris 2006). Everyday activity is believed to 
be meaningful when it provides people with dementia with a sense of social belonging 
and continuity of identity (Beard and Fox, 2008; Harmer and Orrell, 2008; Menne et al, 
2002; Phinney, Chaudhury, and O’Connor, 2007). Helping others has been found to 
enable persons with dementia to feel useful and that they are making a contribution 
(Beard and Fox, 2008; Menne, Kinney and Morhardt, 2002). Family identity may be 
sustained through prioritisation of efforts to continue with activities valued by all 
family members (Davies, 2011; Genoe et al, 2010; Phinney et al, 2007) and different 
responses to altered activities by gender have been highlighted (Phinney et al, 2007). 
 
While a few studies have explored how family caregivers promote the person’s 
involvement in everyday activity (Hasselkus and Murray, 2007; Perry and O’Connor, 
2002; Phinney, 2006), a small and more recent body of work shifts attention from 
personhood to ‘couplehood’. A systematic literature search by Olivia and colleagues 
(2016) unsurprisingly found couples vary greatly in their response to dementia, but 
many were striving to maintain their shared sense of being a couple. While differences 
in response can result in ‘narrative collisions’ (Tolhurst, Weicht and Kingston, 2017), 
partners do not need to react to a diagnosis in the same way to be coping as a couple 
(Beard et al, 2012) and resistance to the label by the person with dementia was 
generally understood as a means of coping rather than pathologised as denial (ibid).  
 
Overall, the research has a dominant focus on how people cope and what kind of 
adaptations people have made in their lives as a consequence of their condition. The 
importance of contributing and continuing with valued activities for identity is apparent, 
although with few exceptions, such as Hulko’s (2004; 2009) consideration of 
intersectionality, the complexity of identity is generally overlooked. Importantly, the 
literature exposes discrepancies between exclusively negative cultural representations 
of dementia, as discussed in Chapter Two, and the actual lived experience of the persons 
or couples taking part in the studies reviewed. There is however a lack of research that 
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suspends assumptions of difference to consider how an ordinary, everyday life is 
accomplished. 
Towards Social Citizenship: Broadening the Dementia Debate 
Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) cite three main reasons why the dementia debate must 
broaden. First, one consequence of earlier diagnosis of AD and related dementias is that 
many people so diagnosed are participating in and contributing to society and an 
alternative model is needed to reflect that reality. Secondly, there is a need to move 
beyond the discourse about disease and the emphasis on individual adaptation and 
coping to address the societal attitudes and barriers that people face. Thirdly, there is a 
need to introduce a more critical perspective that challenges the assumed homogeneity 
of people with dementia and considers the influence of multiple sources of privilege 
and disadvantage on their everyday experiences (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010:7). 
 
The authors adapt a previous model for contextualising personhood in dementia 
(O’Connor et al, 2007) to recognise the multiple layering associated with the socio-
cultural context and to incorporate the notion of citizenship. In so doing, they draw 
together the emancipatory ethos and explicitly political orientation of the disability 
movement with calls from critical gerontology to attend to structural and discursive 
forces, such as those described in Chapter Two. The resultant conceptual framework is 
founded on the need to ‘move beyond seeing the person as a passive care recipient to 
seeing a person as an active social agent in the broad context of their lifestyle’ (Bartlett 
and O’Connor, 2010:4). This aspiration aligns well with the overarching aim of the 
research study. 
 
Modern day citizenship has been concerned with equality, political, civil and more 
recently social rights, and reciprocal responsibilities (Marshall, 1949/92). While the 
concept has been used successfully by the physical disability movement, its 
introduction into other domains has often been accepted uncritically (Johnson and 
Walmsley, 2010). Grounded in assumptions that citizens have the capacity to make 
reasoned decisions, assume responsibility and fulfil civic obligations, Bartlett and 
O’Connor (2007; 2010) stress that this view of citizenship makes it virtually 
unworkable for dementia studies, adding that what citizenship actually means in 
relation to individuals with dementia, particularly those who are severely cognitively 
impaired, remains under-theorised. Their positioning of the framework developed in 
response to this theoretical gap is encapsulated in the title of the book, ‘Broadening the 
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Dementia Debate: Towards Social Citizenship’. The book sets out to expand imagination, 
raise questions, to inform and evoke debate and inspire others to think deeply, rather 
than provide definitive answers (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010:129). One of the issues 
the authors continue to grapple with is the relationship between personhood and 
citizenship (p127) and this is an issue that I grapple with too. In the discussion that 
follows, I remain attentive to the type of agent, subject, self, person or citizen in view.    
Revisiting beginnings: The social model of disability and cognitive impairment 
The social model of disability, first championed in the context of physical disability, has 
contributed powerfully to arguments for people with impairments to make their own 
decisions about how to live their lives and what support they need, to advance 
disability legislation and human rights, and ultimately to be regarded as equal citizens.  
Over the last 20 years, the model has also been used as a framework for 
conceptualising cognitive impairment (Bartlett, 2000; Gwilliam and Gilliard, 1996; 
Marshall, 1998).  
 
There have been ‘two waves’ within disability studies, which differ in emphasis and 
aims (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010:8). The first wave exposes and examines problems 
in society. It views disability as a form of oppression and is committed to assisting 
people with impairments to fight for full equality and social inclusion. This model, first 
proposed by disability researchers such as Oliver (1996), severs the casual connection 
between bodily impairment and disability, thus diverting attention away from the 
impairment and from experiences of impairment. The model has been critiqued (e.g. 
Corker, 1999; French, 1994; Thomas, 2004) for being dominated by the concerns of 
physically disabled, educated, white, young men, and ignoring people with disabilities 
from marginalised groups. Moreover, care has often been depicted as demeaning and 
oppressive, reducing people in support roles to technological aids (Meyer et al, 2007), 
thus contributing to the devaluation and marginalisation of care (Johnson and 
Walmsley, 2010; Barnes, 2011).  
 
Such critiques have given rise to a second wave of disability scholars who emphasise 
the interactions between people with impairment and social locations. They do not 
sever the causal connection between bodily impairment and disability, as this is seen as 
denying the daily realities of people with impairment and those who care for them 
(Barnes et al, 1999; Thomas, 1999; 2004). Moreover, they recognise that impairments 
are likely to matter for wellbeing and life projects no matter how accommodating the 
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social response (Nussbaum, 2006). The extent to which the barriers to full societal 
participation can be reduced when the impairment is cognitive rather than physical is 
contestable (Chappell, 1997; Shakespeare, 2006). It is the understanding embedded 
within the second wave that been taken forward within dementia research (Bartlett, 
2000).  
 
The introduction of the concept of disability has been helpful in moving dementia 
theorising into the realm of the social, posing questions about the relationship with the 
wider environment, particularly the influence of the social and built environment in 
enabling or disabling people with dementia (Marshall, 1998). Importantly, viewing 
dementia as a disability also encouraged a focus on remaining abilities instead of losses 
and stressed the importance of attending to personal experiences of dementia (ibid). 
This triggered the adoption of more emancipatory approaches to research seeking to 
change the situation of people with dementia, with many researchers seeking to 
meaningfully include participants with dementia and employing innovative methods to 
achieve this (Wilkinson, 2002).  
 
Although holding potential to increase awareness of the ways in which people with 
dementia are discriminated against or marginalised, initial applications of the social 
model of disability were limited, largely taking the form of a logical extension to the 
personhood model’s relationship between neuro-pathology and the interactional 
environment. This limited reach has been attributed to the apolitical nature of 
‘personhood’ that continued to anchor dementia studies (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2007).  
Adopting the language of rights: Abandoning care? 
One problem attributed to the notion of personhood is that it can lead to needs-based 
language, positioning the person with dementia as a care recipient. In contrast, rights-
based talk repositions the person with dementia as a citizen and assumes legitimacy 
and value (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010:63). Rights have important symbolic as well as 
judicial value, and in a society where independence is valorised, can enable people to 
give, seek and receive care without this being perceived as burdensome (Barnes, 2012). 
However, the downside of the adoption of a more overtly political vocabulary is that it 
can devalue care or render it invisible (Barnes, 2011). Care ethicists have argued that a 
focus on rights alone is incapable of addressing the ‘situatedness of human needs or the 
relationality of processes through which needs are met’ (Sevenhuijsen 1998:8). This 
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assertion has been affirmed in the context of dementia studies concerned with long-
term care decision-making (Brannelly, 2011a; 2011b).  
 
In Chapter One, I alluded to my professional experiences of working to the 
personalisation agenda, whereby disability rights-based arguments unfortunately 
became conflated with consumerist and neo-liberal ideals (Needham and Glasby, 
2014). Long-term campaigner, Jenny Morris, has reflected that activists within the 
Independent Living Movement may inadvertently have provided support for 
Government aspirations to divest collective responsibility for welfare and wellbeing, 
with activists’ claims for the right to self-determinacy equated with individual 
responsibility, and independence with freedom from dependency on the state (Morris, 
2011). Nevertheless, the moral authority invested in the seemingly progressive rights-
based discourse at the heart of personalisation cannot easily be challenged (Needham 
and Glasby, 2014). Older people with dementia who need care at home have not been 
well served by the resultant individualised market-based solutions that they have the 
right to choose between (Hart, 2014).    
Conceptualisation of the person in liberal theories of justice: The monologic self  
Traditional liberal justice discourse is grounded in philosophical assumptions of 
rationality, reflection and conscience, relegating those whose reason is perceived to be 
flawed to the margins (Nussbaum, 2000) or excluding them from the category of 
person (Kittay and Carlson, 2010). The putatively ‘universal’ Charter of Human Rights 
has required the introduction of several additional conventions for traditionally 
marginalised groups (Johnson and Walmsley, 2010). Despite these often-overlooked 
limitations, ‘human rights’ has provided a useful lens to critique the status of older 
people with dementia. For instance, findings from an enquiry into the treatment of 
older people in hospitals and care homes in the UK showed some of the areas in which 
human rights were contravened (House of Commons, 2007), mostly the right not to be 
ill-treated. Boyle (2008) notes that civil rights accorded can be over-ridden and are 
often constrained by lack of access to social rights, particularly adequate community 
services. While the various rights of people with dementia are important and have 
inarguably been neglected for too long, the limits of a focus on rights alone intimates 
the need to take a broader view. The notion of citizenship-as-practice offers a more 
holistic lens.  
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From citizenship-as-status to citizenship-as-practice 
The meaning of ‘citizenship’ is subject to ongoing scrutiny, debate and development. 
The founding idea of citizenship as membership or status is problematic, part of a 
larger dynamic of exclusion and othering (Lawy and Biesta, 2006). Moreover, the 
compliant yet active citizenship embedded in much contemporary policy discourse is 
associated with a neoliberal view of the citizen-consumer; a rights holder and claimant, 
who in turn fulfils his responsibilities and is explicitly concerned with his own 
interests. The neo-liberal blueprint designates only certain practices and ways of being 
as appropriate to citizens (Fisher, 2008). While it may be convenient for government to 
regard citizenship in this way, a more inclusive approach is required. The notion of 
citizenship-as-practice, articulated as an inclusive and relational concept (Lister, 2007), 
provides a richer framework for elucidating what it means to be a citizen. It is 
concerned with people’s lives, invests in their understandings and agency and does not 
seek to impose a particular interpretation upon them (Lawy and Biesta, 2006).   
 
Within the context of dementia studies, Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) expand citizenship 
to include ‘social practice,’ informed by work of Prior, Stewart and Walsh (1995), in 
which individuals are understood to relate to their communities and the state through 
participation in life (rather than through political participation as narrowly 
understood) and through their everyday talk and actions (Barnes, Auburn and Lea, 
2004). Citizenship is thus understood as something that people do, realised through 
action and in relationship. This idea fits with ‘the cultural turn’ in sociology, 
deconstructing tightly structured accounts of social life in favour of more relational and 
culturally based explanations (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2007:112). Drawing upon such 
developments, the authors advanced the following working definition of social 
citizenship, opening the door to the potential application of citizenship to studies of the 
lives of people with dementia: 
‘A relationship, practice or status in which a person with dementia is free from 
discrimination and has opportunities to grow and participate in life to the fullest extent 
possible’ (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010: 37). 
The shifts in understandings of dementia in recent decades suggest possibilities for 
future change. This is important as it is still early days for the citizenship of people with 
dementia (Bartlett, 2016), as reflected in the empirical research literature. Upon 
commencing this study in 2013, there was a relatively sparse body of literature on the 
subject of ‘citizenship and dementia’, the majority post-dating Bartlett and O’Connor’s 
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(2007) original article. Perhaps inevitably, the earliest articles and studies embraced 
issues of social inclusion, rights and responsibilities, such as mental capacity legislation 
(Boyle, 2008; 2010). This paved the way for applications within institutional care 
settings, such as the adoption of an ‘ethic of care’ perspective on citizenship in 
connection with long-term care, mental health nursing and social work practices 
(Brannelly, 2011a; 2011b). The corpus has grown in the intervening years and the 
concept of social citizenship has been used in different ways, such as in relation to the 
work of dementia activists (Bartlett, 2014a; 2014b) and in conjunction with policy 
debates in Sweden (Nedlund and Nordh, 2015). Much of the research however 
continues to be based in public service settings, with a focus on care dyads between 
service providers and families affected by dementia (Bartlett, 2016).  
 
The growing interest in citizenship and dementia culminated in the publication of a 
special issue in the journal Dementia in 2016 (eds. O’Connor and Nedlund) 
representing work across two continents. This illustrates a more recent and tentative 
expansion of the concept into community settings, including an innovative community-
based walking programme for people with early onset AD (Phinney et al, 2016), a 
community arts project (Dupuis et al, 2016), agentic expressions in the beauty salon 
(Ward et al, 2016) and the possibilities for citizenship afforded by rural and semi-
urban spaces (Clarke and Bailey, 2016). What unites these studies is the desire that 
people might live well with their diagnoses, whether by attending to discriminatory 
practices or participatory opportunities.  
 
In parallel, concepts emerging from broader citizenship studies continue to be 
reviewed to ascertain if they might increase the possibilities for the advancement and 
enactment of social justice in the lives of people with dementia (Bartlett, 2016). This 
includes refinements to facilitate utilisation in connection with persons whose capacity 
to be effective citizens is compromised neurologically as well as socio-culturally (ibid). 
These constructive developments are summarised below before turning to the largely 
untapped potential of recognition (e.g. Fisher, 2008; Honneth, 2001; McNay, 2008), a 
vital aspect of citizenship-as-practice (Lister, 2007). 
Citizenship and dementia activism 
The traditional view of citizenship neglects the influence of social movements (Bartlett 
and O’Connor, 2010). The notion of citizenship-as-practice in contrast facilitates 
academic engagement with the significant minority of people with dementia in the 
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United Kingdom and elsewhere who are uniting in collective action, challenging 
marginalisation and influencing policy, practice development and societal attitudes 
about people with dementia (e.g. Bartlett 2014a; 2014b; Clare, Rowlands, and Quin, 
2008; MacRae, 2008). Members of groups such as the Scottish Dementia Working 
Group (http://www.sdwg.org.uk/) and Dementia Advocacy and Support International 
(http://dasninternational.org/) are establishing their position as active citizens rather 
than victims of a disease (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2007). This movement has been highly 
effective, exerting direct influence on Scottish and UK Dementia Strategies (Department 
of Health; 2009; Scottish Government, 2010; 2013-2016; 2017).  
The group members are ensuring that the next generation of people diagnosed have a 
richer repository of stories from which to draw and their actions and visibility in the 
public sphere constitute a counter-movement to the negative culture of previous 
decades. Bartlett (2014a:641) recognises that one possible risk is that ‘people with 
dementia who are not verbally fluent, visible, mobile and self-confident remain 
stigmatised and discriminated against’. A nuanced and more fully inclusive approach is 
required to ensure effective citizenship is meaningful for people with dementia who 
may not be willing or able to get involved, and for people who are ambivalent about or 
actively resist the dementia label.  
 
Tremain (2005) adopts a Foucauldian perspective to argue that the social model of 
disability remains wedded to a repressive conception of power embedded in 
oppressive structures, calling into question both the largely uncontested object 
“impairment,” as well as overtly political arguments for rights. Specifically, while 
“impairment” may offer leverage and legitimacy courtesy of medicalisation, often this is 
at unrecognised cost. It isn’t simply that society constrains the freedom of persons with 
pre-existing impairments, rather, the process of diagnosis and subsequent response 
constitute freedom in ways that are circumscribed as “impaired”. In Foucault’s terms, 
there is a need to attend to productive as well as repressive forms of power. This 
observation seems particularly pertinent in the case of older people labelled as 
impaired as the result of a politically motivated push for early diagnosis, and where the 
cost is often apparent. It speaks to Davis’ (2004) remarks regarding the productive 
power of the biomedicalisation of dementia summarised in Chapter Two. Tremain 
(2005) goes further however, suggesting that as the ascribed identity must meet the 
requirements of certain social and political arrangements, social movements that 
ground entitlement in that identity will ultimately extend those arrangements. 
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I find Tremain’s perspective thought-provoking, particularly as many dementia 
activists are not only more able and articulate, but are also considerably younger than 
the majority of people with dementia, concluding that much will depend on what is 
being campaigned for.  Bartlett (2014b) has identified three emergent modes of 
dementia activism, with people motivated to campaign to protect the self against 
decline, (re) gain respect and create connections with other people with dementia. This 
emphasises a distinctive feature of dementia activism, namely temporality. Bartlett 
(2014b) draws upon Carstensen’s (1995) socioemotional selectivity theory to suggest 
that because time was perceived as limited by the study participants, they privileged 
emotional goals and campaigned for equality and respect as opposed to a stake in 
knowledge production.  Moreover, as reported separately, the activists experienced 
emotional fatigue due to non-conformance with expectations about what people with 
dementia should be like (Bartlett, 2014a).   
 
Bartlett’s (2014a, 2014b) findings take me back to the issues that first motivated this 
study, notably the discounting of stories that depart from the dominant cultural 
representation, as encountered on national television, in practice settings and in 
ordinary social life. They underscore the importance of recognition of and respect for 
differences in a person’s response to and lived experience of dementia. Responses may 
range from quietly embracing the diagnosis, embarking on a pendular trajectory of 
acceptance-and-denial, preferring to think of cognitive dysfunction as part of ageing, or 
actively campaigning for equality.  
 
As Bartlett observes (2014a), her study raises important questions about what effective 
citizenship means for people with dementia who are unable to contribute in this way, 
and I would add, who may be highly motivated to contribute to social life in other ways. 
Three notable developments seeking to further extend the applicability of a social 
citizenship value lens are: 1) the expansion of citizenship into the realm of the ordinary 
in dementia studies; 2) calls for a narrative citizenship for people with dementia and 3) 
the focus on recognition as a vital aspect of citizenship. Each is discussed in turn. 
Stepping into the Ordinary 
As intimated above, the majority of research articles addressing citizenship and 
dementia focus on care relationships between service providers and families affected 
by dementia, often set within public service settings. Recently, Bartlett (2016) has 
sought to expand the utility of social citizenship for dementia studies by drawing upon 
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a particular development in citizenship studies, namely an understanding of citizenship 
as occurring in ordinary places, relating this to the development of Dementia Friendly 
Communities. This step into the ordinary includes both ordinary citizens, understood 
as people who are not politically engaged, and ordinary places, defined as ‘mundane 
spaces of daily sociability’, such as buses, parks, bars and cafes (Neveu, 2015:147).  
 
Neveu (2015:147) suggests that these ‘mundane spaces’ have political potential 
because they provide opportunities for ‘subject positions to be experimented with and 
relations transformed’. She argues that approaching citizenship processes ‘from the 
ordinary’ is a fruitful perspective, which can render otherwise unseen barriers to 
participation and growth visible and from which the political dimensions of usually 
unseen or unheard practices and sites can be grasped (Neveu, 2015:141). What is 
‘rendered visible’ is not only ‘daily, hardly visible resistances’, but also ‘established 
configurations and representations that often frame our gaze and forbid us, as 
researchers, to critically explore them’ (Neveu, 2015:150). This attention to the unseen 
and unheard practices and barely discernible resistances of ordinary social life was 
something that I identified as a gap in the dementia literature when I commenced the 
study, and something that I sought to ‘render visible’. 
 
Bartlett’s (2016) account of ‘the ordinary’ face of citizenship was published as I neared 
the end of the study, together a few articles more directly concerned with ordinary 
people in ordinary places, albeit generally mediated through community projects (e.g. 
Phinney et al, 2016; Ward et al, 2016). Of particular note is the study by Clarke and 
Bailey (2016) which explores everyday life with dementia in rural and semi-urban 
settings and asks whether people with dementia feel on the inside or outside of 
physical places. The authors depict citizenship as co-constructed through everyday 
practices that take place between people with dementia and their social and physical 
environments, and manifest in the stories they tell of belonging (or not) in a social and 
physical place. In so doing, they draw upon Baldwin’s (2008) ‘narrative citizenship’, a 
notion which first alerted me to the possibility of exploring the relationship between 
narrative and everyday practices, and of engaging methodologically with the ‘ordinary 
doing’ (Hughes et al, 2006) of everyday life as lived. 
Narrative Citizenship 
Baldwin (2008) makes an important contribution to the advancement of citizenship in 
dementia studies, responding to Bartlett and O’Connor’s (2007) discussion paper by 
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bringing together narrative and citizenship and calling for a ‘narrative citizenship that 
is given structural and organisational form’ (Baldwin, 2008:223). He observes that 
citizenship relates to our own existence, our sense of belonging in and contributing to 
society and thus ‘[t]he legal, political, and social rights of citizenship are embedded in 
social relationships and everyday activities’ (Powell and Edwards, 2002 in Baldwin, 
2008:224).  
 
Baldwin (2008) questions the rigid distinction between personhood and citizenship, 
offering a performative understanding of personhood. He asserts that we are narrative 
beings and that the personal and political are connected through the stories we tell and 
told about us. In so doing, he alludes to the constitutive role of narrative and introduces 
the idea of the dialogic self, namely the inter-subjectivity of self and Other, with ‘Other’ 
expanded to include both interpersonal and institutional Others.  Finally, he observes 
that collective narratives such as policy narratives define the space in which individuals 
exercise their citizenship rights and identities can be legitimately performed, adding 
that these spaces may not be the ones that individuals would choose (Baldwin, 
2008:224). Baldwin (2008) goes on to underscore the importance of countering meta-
narratives, such as the cultural narrative of loss. Consistent with a performative 
understanding of personhood, he states that to challenge disabling meta-narratives, 
counter-narratives that are individual, enabling and meaningful need to be both 
constructed and realised (Baldwin, 2005:1027). 
 
Although connecting narrative with the everyday social practices of citizenship, 
Baldwin (2008) focuses primarily on the stories we (try to) tell and that are told about 
us. This is consistent with his commitment to highlighting and countering the ‘narrative 
dispossession’ of people with dementia and maintaining the person with dementia’s 
narrative agency as far as possible. Clarke and Bailey (2016) similarly apply the 
concept to engage with citizenship practices as manifest in the stories people with 
dementia tell. My interest in ‘ordinary doing’ steered me in a different direction. Finally, 
drawing from Plummer’s (1995) sociology of stories, Baldwin (2008:25) discusses the 
constraining force of ‘stories in the wider world’, whereby some voices are capable of 
framing the questions and setting the agendas, restricting the stories that can be heard.  
This reminds me of Bender’s (2003) observation that the framing of research questions 
may unwittingly contribute to the perpetuation of assumptions of difference, as 
described in Chapter Two. 
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Baldwin’s (2008) ideas have far-reaching implications, both for people who may 
become ‘narratively dispossessed’ as a result of an inability to tell a verbal story and, of 
particular interest to this study, for people who wish to narrate accounts, and indeed 
live lives, that conflict with dominant cultural representations but nevertheless exist 
‘within the domain of the possible’ (Taylor, 2008:324). The relationship between 
narrative and the everyday practices of citizenship, narrative and life is explored in 
detail in Chapter Four. I begin to expand upon Baldwin’s (2005; 2008) ideas in the 
remainder of this chapter by looking more closely at the notion of the relational, 
dialogic self and the human need for recognition. I then establish the place of 
recognition in a relational and inclusive understanding of citizenship-as-practice 
suitable for dementia studies. 
The Politicisation of Recognition  
The Hegelian concept of recognition is implicit in Kitwood’s (1997:8) definition of 
“personhood” – ‘it implies recognition, respect and trust’. In recent years, theories of 
recognition have assumed an overtly socio-political orientation. Recognition is premised 
on understandings of subjectivity as dialogic, generative and situational (McNay, 
2008:4) whereby individuals come to understand themselves only through and in relation to 
others.  The self, whether an excluded subject or a moral agent, is generated through 
ongoing engagements with the world, and these embodied practices are materially, 
socially, culturally and historically mediated (McNay, 2008). As such, agents acquire 
their moral identity through their everyday practices (Sevenhuijsen, 1998:56).  These 
theories challenge the foundational assumptions of Western liberal philosophy and present 
different ways of conceptualising what makes for a good life (McNay, 2008).  
 
Recognition theorists deal, in slightly different ways, with questions of social and political justice 
and the injustice resulting from withholding recognition and claims of identity.  Honneth (2001) 
contends that we need to feel cared for and loved in our intimate relationships (self-
confidence), appreciated by our community, (self-esteem) and respected as equal in society 
(self-respect) to build and maintain a positive identity throughout our lives. He holds that our 
dependence on inter-subjective recognition is institutionalised in society in three 
spheres of life, the family in the private sphere, work in the public sphere and equality 
in law and status in the legal sphere (ibid). In all three spheres, the establishment of 
one’s self-understanding is inextricably dependent on recognition by others and all 
three types of recognition lead to human beings enjoying dignity and integrity. Honneth 
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(2001:50) describes integrity as ‘individuals’ ability ‘to rest secure in the knowledge 
that the whole range of their practical self-orientation finds support within society.’  
While the importance of equality in law and status has received attention in dementia studies, 
other sources of recognition remain largely unexplored.  
 
Violations of recognition patterns, withheld recognition or forms of disrespect can be 
viewed as distortions of the good life. Honneth (2001) is concerned with pointing out the 
disruptions, pathological distortions, everyday troubled identities and experiences of 
humiliation, suffering and injustice, ranging from the relatively harmless case of not 
greeting someone to the serious case of stigmatisation. The task is ‘to elucidate and 
diagnose social pathologies’, where pathologies are developments in society that are 
‘wrong’ rather than simply unjust (Honneth, 1996:370). He contends that this 
elucidation must relocate its analysis in the structural conditions of reciprocal 
recognition. His work thus introduces possibilities for extending considerations of the 
malignant social psychologies that Kitwood (1997) sought to expose and rectify in 
institutional care settings to the social pathologies in societal institutions. These 
possibilities have been enriched through feminist revisions and particular empirical 
applications, as discussed below.  
 
‘Misrecognition’ is empirically evident in a range of exploited, excluded and oppressed groups’ 
collective identity claims and claims for difference. Such claims have been the subject of 
extensive discussion (e.g. Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Taylor 2004; McNay 2008).  Of particular 
interest to this study, Fisher (2007; 2008) has considered misrecognition experienced in health 
settings and care encounters. She highlights a particular form of misrecognition that 
occurs when people are measured according to normative frameworks, based on 
ontological separatism. Bolstered by biomedical models, they connect difference and 
individual deficiency (Fisher, 2008). This speaks directly to my motivating concern 
about post-diagnostic support encounters between practitioners and older people with 
dementia, but as outlined in Chapters One and Two, the influence of biomedicine is 
pervasive, seeping into policy, the media and the lifeworld (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016). 
The potential for misrecognition in the course of ‘ordinary doing’ appears significant. 
  
Human recognition is understood as a precondition of agency. Needs for love, 
appreciation and respect do not disappear as we age and may become even more urgent when 
people lose their functional abilities and become more dependent on others. While 
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misrecognition is likely to undermine agency, people may be prompted to resist10 in 
myriad ways, whether by constructing counter-cultures such as dementia activism 
(Bartlett, 2014a), counter-narratives as encouraged by Baldwin (2008) or the barely 
discernible resistances of ordinary people engaged in ordinary doing in ordinary places 
that Neveu (2015) seeks to render visible. Diverse forms of resistance and 
sophisticated forms of agency have been testified by a number of qualitative studies 
conducted with so-called vulnerable groups (Black, 2009; Charmaz, 1999; Fisher, 2008; 
Wheeler, 2005). Fisher (2008) has noted how resistance among socially marginalised 
groups can trigger alternative articulations of citizenship that challenge neo-liberal 
models emphasising individual autonomy.  
 
Recognition has been identified as an important aspect of inclusive citizenship (Lister, 
2007:51). Given the growing diversity and expectations of men and women with 
dementia, it follows that there are many different ways of practicing and realising 
social citizenship (Bartlett, 2016). Following Fisher’s (2008) line of argument, the quest 
of people with dementia to construct positive understandings of the value of their lives 
may be impeded or halted by forms of misrecognition that position them as inferior 
and vulnerable to patterns of disrespect, and those that fail to appreciate their 
particularities and distinctive contributions, impacting on self-esteem.  
 
Fisher (2008) also calls attention to Arendt’s (1998) differentiation between ‘who’ a 
person is and ‘what’ she is. ‘What’ refers to capabilities and labels that may be 
attributed externally and may be subject to comparison. ‘Who’ a person is refers to 
more intangible and unique qualities, which cannot be predicted or controlled, only 
revealed through speech and action. To define a person according to membership of a 
single group, such as a person with dementia, is to deny the complexity of human 
identity. Fisher (2012) asserts that this is why qualitative studies should seek to reveal 
rather than to erase the complexities of identity, adding that the framing of identities 
within qualitative studies can either open up or close down possibilities for complex 
and radical self-representations. She warns of the danger of constructing the identities 
of socially marginalised people as necessarily embedded in forms of suffering. Studies 
should also remain alert to the possibility that social suffering may prompt radical 
forms of resistance (ibid). These remarks, coupled with Neveu’s (2015) attention to the 
                                                          




barely discernible resistances of ordinary life, had a significant bearing on my thinking 
about how best to frame the research questions and upon the study design. 
Dismantling the public - private divide 
Honneth (2003:141) has asserted that ‘achievement’ is located in the ‘public’ sphere 
and measured according to ‘[a] value standard whose normative reference point is the 
economic activity of the independent, middle-class, male bourgeois’. In so doing, his 
concern is to identify contemporary social pathologies that disrupt this traditional 
source of recognition. Fraser and Owen (2008) critique the notion of ideal citizenship 
as associated primarily with activity in the ‘public’ domain rather than the ‘private’. 
They build on previous analyses grounded in an ‘ethics of care’ to challenge normative 
notions of citizenship based on economic self-sufficiency (Fisher, 2007; Kittay, 2001; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Williams, 2001). Care ethicists assert that this distinction itself is 
an ideological construct, based on highly gendered and also ageist assumptions that 
define some forms of participation and contribution as legitimate and exclude others 
(Fraser, 2008). For example, Skeggs (1997) found that working class women often 
reject a contractually based ‘rights and responsibilities’ agenda and gain a positive 
sense of self through appearance and domestic and caring activities. In the absence of 
other opportunities, this ‘corporeal generosity’ (Diprose, 2002) was highly valued as a 
form of cultural and emotional capital. I suggest that there is scope to extend 
considerations of alternative forms of ‘achievement’ to dementia studies in general and 
particularly when engaging with the ‘ordinary doings’ of older people with dementia.  
 
Bartlett (2016) also observes that what happens inside and outside the home is 
inevitably intertwined and politicised for many people living with dementia. While she 
is concerned with the absence of discussion about the micro-injustices faced by people 
with dementia within the home, care ethicists, in this respect, are keen to replace 
narrow, gendered accounts of achievement as confined to the public sphere. Entering 
the private sphere thus holds potential to render visible previously hidden forms of 
misrecognition and discrimination as people go about their everyday lives. 
The Place of Care in Citizenship 
The ‘ethic of care’ has been referenced in this chapter in a restricted way, notably to 
highlight the limits of a focus on rights alone and to challenge gendered assumptions 
about the public: private divide. More broadly, care ethicists make what I consider to be 
a compelling case for care to be valued and deemed necessary for citizenship and social 
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justice. Specifically, the ethic of care provides a framework for sustaining citizenship in 
the context of the situated and often difficult circumstances of care (Tronto, 1993), 
where care is broadly defined. The framework is based on the acceptance of human 
interdependencies. It calls attention to the need to handle the embodied nature of 
humanity and how this intersects with our own emotional responses to the processes 
of ageing and impairment (Barnes, 2012).  
 
The ethic of care literature has grown considerably over the past thirty years from its 
early considerations of care as a private, devalued and highly feminised practice to 
engage with care as a political value and set of sensitising principles. These principles 
of attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness (Tronto, 1993) and 
trust (added by Sevenhuijsen, 1998 as both a condition for and outcome of care) give 
ethical content to four interconnected phases of care, all of which must be present if 
care is to have integrity: caring about; taking care of; care giving and care receiving. The 
framework has been used to guide assessments as to whether diverse types of 
relationships, practices, processes of decision making and policies meet or are capable 
of enabling the conditions in which we can all live well (or as well as possible) 
individually and together (Barnes, 2012). Its application requires deep knowledge of 
the particularities of the situation. Although not seeking to apply the framework to the 
research study’s core interest in ‘ordinary doing’, in Chapter Nine I utilise the ethic of 
care principles to evaluate the research relationships with the study participants. 
Reflections and Way Forward 
Having uncovered a growing interest in the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday life across 
various disciplines in Chapter Two, my research interest in ‘the ordinary’ was 
reinforced by a persistent plea for ‘ordinariness’ from people living with dementia 
when I reviewed the empirical dementia literature. I found further encouragement to 
progress this interest through recent developments expanding citizenship practices 
into the realm of ‘the ordinary’, encompassing ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘mundane spaces 
of daily sociability’ (Neveu, 2015).  
 
The literature review also established the place of recognition in a relational, inclusive 
and nuanced understanding of citizenship-as-practice. Expanding Fisher’s (2008) 
arguments to dementia studies, the quest of people with dementia to construct positive 
understandings of the value of their lives may be impeded or halted by forms of 
misrecognition which position them as inferior and vulnerable to patterns of 
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disrespect, and also those which fail to appreciate their particular contributions, 
impacting on self-esteem. In addition to my earlier concerns about framing the 
research questions in a way that might inadvertently reinforce assumptions of 
difference, I now take cognisance of Fisher’s (2012) observations, aspiring to preserve 
the complex, dialogical nature of identity.  
 
Further, the emphasis on practice within the citizenship literature in general and on the 
performative in ‘narrative citizenship’ (Baldwin, 2008) helped shape my 
methodological thinking, stimulating my desire to engage directly with action, 
interaction and the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday life as lived. I also sought to better 
understand the relationship between narrative and the everyday practices of 
citizenship. Baldwin’s (2008) account of ‘narrative citizenship’ provided clues as to 
how this might be possible.  
Discovering narrative-in-action 
Acting on the above clues, I purposefully expanded my search of empirical studies 
beyond the dementia literature. I sought to develop a broad understanding of potential 
methodological approaches that would facilitate engagement with the situated nature 
of everyday activities and the enactment of everyday practices of citizenship, and then 
assess the likely utility of these approaches in a study involving older people with 
dementia. My search led me to the ‘narrative-in-action’ methodology (Alsaker, 
Bongaardt and Josephsson, 2009; Alsaker and Josephsson, 2010; 2011; Alasaker, 
Josephsson and Dickie, 2013), a form of Narrative Inquiry, which introduces both 
theoretical and methodological possibilities for engaging with the meaning-making 
processes inherent in everyday activities.   
 
Alsaker and colleagues (2013:66-67) recognise that everyday life comprises numerous 
and diverse activities, but ‘the pace, the meanings, the shifting and overall variety that 
characterise everyday activities and the interplay with place, condition and sociality 
are difficult to grasp’. The significance of formerly unnoticed activities becomes 
apparent when the ability to perform them is compromised. As a result, once taken-for-
granted and even mundane activities assume altered values, not simply on account of 
performance abilities, but according to meaning-related issues (ibid). 
 
Alsaker and colleagues (2009) developed the methodology to facilitate a study with 
women with chronic rheumatic conditions, but they share my concern that research 
tends to focus on subjective experiences of disruption and what kind of adaptations 
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persons have made, rather than suspending assumptions of difference and asking how 
everyday life is lived.  Extending their thinking to the experiences of people with 
dementia, the ‘how’ focus acknowledges persons with dementia as one facet among 
many in a varied population, with varying ‘ordinariness’. Instead of focusing on the 
meaning of dementia or difference in the performance of everyday activity with and 
without dementia, research would ask how a person living with dementia makes 
meaning in and through these activities.  In view of this, together with the insights 
distilled through my engagement with the literature, I refined the overarching study 
aim to explore how ‘ordinary’ everyday life is accomplished through a social citizenship 
value lens.  
 
The narrative-in-action methodology offers provisional resources to engage with 
meaning-making in action in the form of Ricoeur’s (1984) early narrative theorising 
combined with ethnographic methods. I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this 
methodology in Chapter Four, then engage more deeply with Ricoeur’s (1992) narrative 
hermeneutics in order to facilitate the study of dialogic, dynamic and complex identity 







The Bridge: Narrative Theory 
Overview 
In this chapter, I describe the narrative theories that underpin this Narrative Inquiry 
and conclude by defining the research questions. The chapter constitutes the bridge 
between the issues identified through literature review, as summarised in Chapters 
Two and Three, and the methodological approach taken in conducting the study, which 
I detail in Chapter Five. Specifically, in order to address the study’s aim of exploring 
how everyday life with dementia is accomplished through a social citizenship value 
lens, I find theoretical support to engage with possible tensions between pleas for 
ordinariness from older people living with dementia and the increasing 
biomedicalisation of later life through the meaning-making processes inherent in 
everyday activities.  I also find support to engage with the complexities of identity and 
the human need for recognition. 
 
Narrative Inquiry refers to a subset of qualitative research designs used to describe 
human action. The term narrative has been employed equivocally by qualitative 
researchers. In the context of Narrative Inquiry, narrative is recognised as the linguistic 
form uniquely suited for displaying human existence as situated action. Using narrative 
theory, the narrative analysis is an attempt to understand persons, including their 
spontaneity and responsibility, as they act in the concrete social world (Polkinghorne, 
1995). This Narrative Inquiry utilises narrative theorising in a distinctive way, namely 
to engage with participant meaning-making processes in the flow of action and over 
time, as well as the more customary guiding of narrative analyses, as set out in the 
sections that follow. 
 
I begin by describing the backstory and how, upon entering the field, I identified the 
need to expand upon the theoretical underpinnings of narrative-in-action by engaging 
more deeply with Ricoeur’s (1984, 1992) phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy. 
I then explore the connections that Ricoeur makes between action and narrative and 
how these connections are affected by temporal and cultural influences. I suggest that 
Ricoeur’s (1984) depiction of narrative as embedded in action and his sophisticated 
elaboration of the relationship between narrative and life can facilitate a multifaceted 
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understanding of the person engaged in the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday life, both 
within a given acting situation and over time.  
 
Attending closely to Ricoeur’s (1992) articulation of the mediating role of narrative in 
the construction of identity, I illustrate that this holds significant promise to consider 
identity implications for older people living with dementia, in all their complexity, as 
they negotiate opportunities for and obstacles to participation and contribution in 
ordinary social life and seek recognition. I also draw upon specific insights from 
narrative gerontology and respond to the challenges that narrativity can present in the 
specific context of dementia research. In so doing, I underscore the potential to expand 
important arguments that promote the ‘narrative citizenship’ (Baldwin, 2008) of 
people with dementia. Finally, I set out the research questions for the study and 
summarise the key methodological implications of the Narrative Inquiry, which are 
then explicated in Chapter Five.  
The Backstory 
As alluded to in Chapter Three, I came upon the theoretical perspectives set out in the 
first part of this chapter as a result of a search for empirical studies that engaged with 
the situated nature of people’s everyday activities. Alsaker et al’s (2009) ‘narrative-in-
action’ combines ethnographic methods of data collection with Ricoeur’s (1984) ideas 
about meaning-making in everyday action from his writings on mimesis. The authors 
illustrate its application by considering the everyday activities and experiences of 
women with chronic rheumatic conditions. The authors’ concerns about the 
consequences of diagnostic labelling and tensions with the wish for ordinariness from 
people so-diagnosed resonated strongly with my own conclusions as result of my 
engagement with the dementia literature.   
 
At the point of discovering this approach, my thinking was explicitly socio-political in 
orientation. I was excited by the ways in which studying narrative-in-action might 
provide access to the “hows” as well as the “whats” of meaning-making and, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, I identified several possible advantages of using the 
advocated ethnographic methods in conjunction with mimetic theory with older people 
with dementia. But I was equally seduced by the findings. The studies showcased the 
potential to understand personal meanings in light of biomedical discourses and 
contemporary local cultural contexts.  
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However, when I first entered the field I found that my encounters with the 
participants had a rather different feel to them. Their activities generally took the form 
of the recounting, enactment and undertaking of responsibilities and commitments not 
only to contemporaries, but also to successors, absent friends and predecessors. The 
plea for ordinariness that I’d anticipated was made, but the ‘ordinary doings’ of 
everyday life were framed within a quest for the good, which ultimately related to 
laying claim to having lived a good life, whatever happens next. The participants were 
reading cultural texts as anticipated, but were often somewhat more concerned with 
‘reading their lives’ (Randall, 2008) even in the midst of doing everyday activities. 
Running through this was the fragile thread of temporality and its unavoidable 
intertwining with memory and imagination.  
 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000:50-51) highlight that a narrative researcher always finds 
herself situated in a three-dimensional inquiry space, so that she is in a particular place 
and that work involves moving ‘in and out’ from the inner world of the narrator to the 
wider socio-cultural realm and ‘back and forth’ in time. It was this ‘back and forth’ 
movement that dominated and the emphasis placed on the role of luck, contingency 
and happenstance across the life course also took me by surprise. I appreciated that to 
ignore this temporal dimension would, somewhat ironically, be tantamount to a form of 
misrecognition. I was mindful of Fisher’s (2012) observation that researchers should 
seek to reveal the complexities of participant identities. To avoid closing down 
possibilities for complex, authentic self-representations, I had to go deeper into 
Ricoeur’s theorising and also engage with narrative gerontology. I had to exercise, with 
some discomfort, my wholly undeveloped philosophical imagination. The theoretical 
perspectives set out in this chapter, and that later serve as interpretive tools, are the 
result of this deeper engagement. 
Ricoeur’s Phenomenological Hermeneutical Philosophy 
Before summarising the essential elements of Ricoeur’s (1984; 1992) account of the 
connections between narrative and life, I think it is important to say a little about the 
man and his work. Paul Ricoeur was a French philosopher whose publications span 
nearly six decades from the latter half of the twentieth century. Ricoeur made a major 
methodological shift during his career, expanding his early work in the tradition of 
existential phenomenology (put simply, the study of consciousness and the objects of 
direct experience) to combine phenomenological description with hermeneutic 
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interpretation. He identifies engagement with and experience of the physical world as 
prerequisite to attempts to interpret and understand, asserting that meanings are not 
given directly to us, and that we must therefore make a hermeneutic detour through 
the symbolic apparatus of our culture (Ricoeur, 1992:197). The hermeneutic tradition 
emphasises that human existence ‘in itself’ involves a process of constant 
interpretation and meaning-making. Consistent with accounts of the dialogic self, as set 
out in Chapter Three, throughout his work, Ricoeur attends closely to our relational as 
well as our embodied nature and questions the privileged place of reason in 
understandings of personhood.  
The turn to narrative 
Ricoeur witnessed the use of power to disenfranchise whole populations of their basic 
human rights and dignity. As a precociously bright, studious and deeply religious young 
man, he endured the horrors of World War II, first as a soldier in the French army and 
then as a prisoner of war in a German concentration camp for five years (Hall, 2007). 
The volumes that I primarily draw upon (Time and Narrative I and Oneself as Another) 
reflect Ricoeur’s interest in the ways that our previous experiences shape our 
comprehension of the world. Part of this interest was a drive to understand what 
narrative theory lends to self-understanding (Hall, 2007) and how narratives can be 
used to influence our beliefs and behaviours so that we might develop the necessary 
tools and understandings to challenge their misuse. I regard the focus on enhancing 
‘narrative citizenship’ (Baldwin, 2008) in dementia studies as consistent with this 
drive, and find in Ricoeur’s thinking several ideas with considerable potential to 
progress this particular agenda, as summarised below. 
Navigating a course from ‘ordinary doing’ to ‘the aim of a good life’  
In the following sections, I follow the overall trajectory of Ricoeur’s thinking from 
everyday activity to the ethical aim of a good life through the construct of narrative 
identity. I begin with my interest in understanding situated everyday activity and 
consider the spiral relationship that Ricoeur (1984:54-78) establishes between action 
and narrative through his process of ‘threefold mimesis’. I suggest that this process may 
be instructive when exploring situated activities and the ‘small stories’ of everyday 
events, and may constitute a provisional resource for engaging with people’s unfolding 
narratives.  To develop this capability further, my attention then shifts from practical 




Narrative identity underpins narrative citizenship and has far-reaching implications, 
both for people who may become ‘narratively dispossessed’ (Baldwin, 2008) and for 
people who wish to tell stories that conflict with dominant cultural narratives, but 
nevertheless exist ‘within the domain of the possible’ (Taylor, 2008:324). Its 
conceptualisation therefore requires careful deliberation. I then reconnect with the 
acting and suffering agent at the level of practical life. I review Ricoeur’s (1992:153-
163) extended account of social action through the introduction of and two-way 
movement between the nested levels of praxis, namely ‘practices’, ‘life plans’ and the 
practical ideal of the ‘narrative unity of a life’. Finally, I move from self-understanding 
to self-esteem through considerations of the relationship between self and Other and 
the aim of a good life. I suggest that these concepts may be instructive in interpreting 
the ways in which disparate activities and events are incorporated into the unfolding 
narratives of older people living with dementia and shape the future possibilities for 
participation that they consider, actualise, discount or are denied. 
The Relationship between Practical Life and Narrative  
The relationship between practical life and narrative emerges from Ricoeur’s 
investigations into time, history and narrative in Time and Narrative (1984-1988). It is 
worth considering this backdrop because it establishes some important concepts that 
frame aspects of his theory of direct relevance to the study, particularly with regard to 
identity and the temporal dimension of the self, which is essential to his reflective 
philosophy. Through this body of work, he considers the divergence between 
cosmological and phenomenological notions of time. Rather than formulating a 
convincing, non-circular theory of time that integrates both dimensions, Ricoeur 
(1984:52) sets out to show that the failure of systematic approaches to the ‘aporias’ of 
temporality is inevitable. Instead he first entertains the idea that there is a correlation 
‘between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal11 character of human 
existence’ that constitutes ‘a trans-cultural form of necessity’. He then advances the 
following hypothesis:  
‘Time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
experience’ (Ricoeur, 1984:52). 
                                                          
11 Davis (2004) critiques Tom Kitwood’s work for trying to preserve personhood-without-memory by drawing upon 
Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective on Being-in-Time and temporality. Although outside the scope of this discussion, 
given the importance attached to temporality in this study, in Appendix XVI I summarise Ricoeur’s (1992:319-329) critique of 




To demonstrate this correlation, he introduces a process that he calls threefold mimesis 
(Ricoeur, 1984:54), which I describe below. Before doing so, it is noteworthy that it 
falls to narrative to bring together the two dimensions of time: where philosophical and 
scientific approaches cannot generate a proper solution to conceptual antinomies, we 
have to look to metaphors or narratives (Teichert, 2004:118 [italics added]). Mimesis is 
the Greek word for imitation. In using this term, Ricoeur (1984) draws upon Aristotle’s 
notion that ‘art’ (here broadly understood) is a poetic imitation of action and life. 
Narrative is thus a poetic solution – a poetic imitation of action and life, rather than an 
exact copy. Ricoeur sees narrative as deeply rooted in life, but this does not mean that 
life should be equated with story (Verhesschen, 2003).  
Action, narrative and the process of threefold mimesis 
The concept of triple mimesis sets out different levels of meaning-making and the 
ongoing intertwinement of personal, cultural and historical narratives. Mimesis1 is the 
narrative prefiguration of action and life. Ricoeur (1984) claims that our ability to 
understand fictional and historical narratives is based on the way that our everyday 
activities and lives are narratively prefigured, and that the ways we understand each 
other in daily life involve an irreducible narrativity. Mimesis1 concerns those aspects of 
action that have a pre-narrative quality and is the means by which acting and suffering 
rise to meaning at a descriptive, pre-reflective level within a particular situation. 
Ricoeur (1984:55-56) identifies three points of narrative anchorage in the world of 
action. The first point of anchorage is our familiarity with the ‘semantics of action’ itself. 
In essence, narratives presuppose our ability to understand features of action structure 
such as ‘agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, success, 
failure etc.’ When we describe a particular event, we use narrative’s structural 
elements. In addition, certain discursive features are added that distinguish a narrative 
from a simple sequence of action sentences. Narrative comprehension therefore 
presupposes a familiarity with the rules of composition that govern the diachronic 
order of a story.  
 
The second point of anchorage lies in the ‘symbolic resources of the practical field’ 
(Ricoeur, 1984) and is concerned with the public character of symbols or shared 
meanings. ‘If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already 
articulated by signs, rules, and norms’ (p57). Signs and symbols are representations 
from a given culture. ‘The term ‘symbol’ further introduces the idea of a rule… in the 
sense of a norm’ or ‘what we ought to do’ (p58). This suggests that we and others can 
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evaluate our actions as good or bad, which is of particular relevance to the study’s 
concern with normative assumptions and the risk of misrecognition. Once the symbolic 
values of our culture are acquired, we intuitively know how to navigate through them 
through the development of practical understanding (p61).  
 
The skilfulness of practical understanding increases with experience, connecting 
experience to the final point of anchorage, time. In order to be able to understand an 
action, the ability to recognise temporal structures in action is also presupposed. He is 
not overly concerned with the ‘all too evident correlations’ between projects and a 
future orientation, actions that draw upon acquired dispositions and past experiences, 
or the sense of ‘I can’, ‘I do‘, I suffer’ that we spontaneously associate with the present 
(p60). Rather, he calls our attention to the way in which the actual doing of action 
within time orders the ‘present of the future, present of the past and present of the 
present’ in terms of one another. Ricoeur (1984:59) argues that we experience time 
narratively and in his view these temporal features call for narration.  
 
Mimesis2 is the narrative configuration of action, which is a second layer of meaning-
making and can be understood as a double hermeneutic; it serves to structure or 
configure what is already prefigured in action into a unified totality via the operation of 
‘emplotment’ (Ricoeur, 1984:64).  Configuration is always a mediator between a need 
for concordance and the admission of discordance. Emplotment has a mediating 
function in three ways. First it entails combining or ‘grasping together’ a series of 
events into the story as a whole. In this way, a given event takes its meaning, not from 
itself as a single occurrence, but from the contribution it makes to the story as a whole 
(Verhesschen, 2003). Second it brings about a synthesis between disparate 
components like actors, goals, means, circumstances, interactions, unexpected results. 
Thirdly it mediates between two kinds of time, first an episodic sequencing which 
suggests not simply that one thing happens after another, but because of the other, and 
second the creation or configuration of a unified totality (Ricoeur, 1984:65-66). 
 
It is significant that configuration stands outside of the narratively pre-figured field of 
action as it is this distinction that gives narrative its status as composition or poetic 
imitation. In addition to ordering and giving meaning to events in the context of a 
narrative, the mediating operation of emplotment creates the space for considering 
other possibilities for action, or the kingdom of ‘as if’ (p64). The plot is not fixed. Events 
which happened in the field of action can be configured (or reconfigured) in different 
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ways and assume new meanings. Ricoeur (1984) argues that narrative is the process 
through which time becomes human because the plots we construct are bound up with 
the things we care about, our life concerns. 
 
Mimesis3 is the narrative refiguration of action through the act of ‘reading’ (Ricoeur, 
1984:70-77); it concerns the relation between narrative and temporal experience in 
that to read is to imaginatively inhabit the temporal world of the text and to be guided 
by the narrative’s horizon of experience. This provides the reader with distance or 
‘distanciation’. The reader must make the traversal in the same state of imperfect 
knowledge as those inside the text (Teichert, 2004). Fiction can be a revelation when it 
calls attention to aspects of experience that we did not notice before, extending an 
invitation to see the world and ourselves differently (Ricoeur, 1984:72). Moreover, as a 
narrative is never ethically neutral, it can contain an invitation to act in a different way. 
Narrative understanding in this sense is practical understanding. This is what Ricoeur 
(1984) calls the transformative power of narrative. Our transformed experiences in 
turn will call for narration, and this will lead to different narratives. In Ricoeur’s 
(1984:72) view, the relation between narrative and life is a circular one, preferably 
regarded as an ‘endless spiral’ to refute any suggestion that it is a vicious circle. The 
promise of revelation and transformation may inform studies of narrative citizenship 
more broadly, notably with regard to the nature and consumption of stories about 
older people living with dementia (Plummer, 1995 in Baldwin, 2008). 
Applicability of Ricoeur’s threefold mimesis to the study 
Ricoeur’s (1984) emphasis on the link between action and narrative via the pre-
narrative quality of action offers important insights for the study. In an everyday 
setting, narratives are not complete with a beginning, middle and end and a clear plot; 
they are nascent stories (as yet) untold (Ricoeur, 1984:71) or stories in the making. In 
the course of carrying out everyday activities, people may spontaneously create images 
from the past or the future, which may be brought together in the acting situation. This 
spontaneity or the ‘simple evocation of a memory that comes to mind’ alludes to a 
different mnemonic phenomenon than effortful recollection through active search 
(Ricoeur, 2004:29). Older people with dementia have been observed to exhibit 
different capabilities in this respect in everyday as opposed to clinical test situations 




Moreover, culture is infused with metaphors (not always pleasant ones, as discussed in 
Chapter Two) and meanings that the person cannot avoid when acting (Ricoeur, 1984). 
The person may relate meaning to such possibilities, creating a situational 
interpretation. Pre-reflective descriptions, triggered memories, imaginings or 
situational interpretations may then be verbalised and told to a co-participant. Episodic 
memories, naturally evoked while carrying out everyday activities through the forging 
of connections to the past are often recounted as stories with dramatic structure 
(Ricoeur, 2004). Bamberg (2004) also privileges the fleeting and the fragmented, the 
‘small stories’ of the moment as contributing to identity and suggests they resonate 
more strongly with those whose experience may be more fragmented. 
Methodologically, being with someone in the flow of everyday activity may present 
opportunities to access these small stories, plus accounts of past or anticipated events 
and happenings, partly linked or not linked at all, but embedded in the person’s 
practical actions (Alsaker and Josephsson, 2010).  
 
In addition, Ricoeur (1984) highlights that the pre-narrative quality of action and life 
does not mean that the plot is always clear. The relation between action and a narrative 
in which the action gets its meaning is not always obvious (Verhesschen, 2003:455). 
Emplotment is therefore an important mechanism for bringing together the disparate 
elements recounted or observed in real-time with the unfolding story of the person’s 
life, and also creating spaces for imagining other possibilities, positive or less positive. I 
see the different levels of meaning-making set out in the conceptualisation of triple 
mimesis as holding the potential to differentiate my own meaning-making activity in the 
form of emplotment of research narratives, grasping together various events, 
happenings and associated meanings, expressed and sense-checked by the participants. 
This approach has the potential to respect, value and engage with the participants’ own 
situated meaning-making activities, without placing potentially unrealistic demands on 
them to make connections between events or to remember what they discussed with 
me over a period of several months.  
 
Finally, Ricoeur’s (1984) concept of ‘refiguration’ lends philosophical moorings to the 
revelatory and transformative potential of the narratives of people with dementia. I 
find in threefold mimesis important resources for the study, notably recognition of the 
pre-narrative qualities of action and articulation of the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between action and narrative in a way that does not simply equate the 
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two. While this was the extent to which I anticipated using narrative theory within the 
study, as above, during my early meetings with the participants I experienced a need to 
connect with the notion of ‘having lived a good life’. This connection is forged through 
the medium of ‘narrative identity’. 
Going Deeper: The Mediating Role of Narrative in Configuring Identity 
Ricoeur (1992) proposes that narrative functions not simply to configure our 
understanding of our existence, buts also structures existence itself. In many ways, 
what he called the pre-narrative quality of action and experience anticipates the move 
from narrative understanding to the narrative configuration of identity. The manner in 
which fictional characters are related to their actions in the construction of the plot 
offers some purchase on the way in which personal identities are narratively 
configured in life. Over the course of a fictional story we come to recognise the 
characters as persons with certain personality traits and ways of dealing with 
situations and events. The identities of the characters are themselves discrete synthetic 
entities within the synthesis of the plot (Hall, 2007). They develop as the plot develops: 
‘The person, understood as a character in a story, is not an entity distinct from his or 
her “experiences.” Quite the opposite: The person shares the condition of dynamic identity 
peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can 
be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of 
the story that makes the identity of the character’ (Ricoeur, 1992:147). 
 
Ricoeur (1992) devotes his attention to questions of personal identity and its narrative 
and ethical configuration in Oneself as Another. Engaging with his argument first 
requires consideration of his account of the person, not as a character in a narrative, 
but as a human agent in practical life, and how acting and suffering in the world relate 
to personal identity.  
The human agent and competing understandings of personal identity 
Ricoeur’s (1986) account of the human agent is that of an embodied capability, ‘human 
will’ is an incarnate freedom and therefore limited. He recognises the needs, desires, 
capabilities and fragility of the body, and acknowledges passivity and finitude as part of 
the human condition (ibid). Human understanding is also located in the perception of 
the body (Ricoeur, 1986). Ricoeur (1992) makes ‘a point always to talk about the 
human being as acting and suffering’ (p145) and uses the term ‘suffering’ in broadest 
sense possible, from violence through the inability to control all effects that issue from 
our actions, to incapacity inflicted on us (ibid). Further, human persons do not only act 
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and suffer, but also strive to make sense of their own existence and receive affirmation 
(Ricoeur, 1992). Countering Cartesian accounts of reflexivity, he asserts that the self 
cannot come to know itself and its world through introspection. Rather, the self comes 
to know itself through the Other. Selfhood is attested to in the capacity to act in the 
world and to leave traces on the course of events in the world (ibid).     
 
When considering the identity of the human agent, Ricoeur (1992) engages directly 
with the confrontation between the two accepted philosophical understandings of 
personal identity: on the one side, identity as sameness over time (idem), on the other, 
identity as selfhood (ipse) which allows for diversity and change. Sameness refers to 
both numerical and qualitative identity; to those dimensions of our identity that can be 
described in third-personal terms, such as our bodily attributes, dispositions, personal 
values, traits of character and temperament, social roles and so on (Mackenzie, 
2008:10). It helps establish permanence of being. Selfhood refers to the first-person 
phenomenological perspective of an embodied subject, both at a given time and 
extended over time; to ‘the sense of “mineness” or “belonging” that characterizes one’s 
own experiences, memories, body and characteristics’ (ibid). The ipse identity is the 
self that gives humans the capacity to initiate meaning-making interpretations of ideas 
and experiences that have not been experienced before, and create brand new things. It 
frames our potential as human beings (Ricoeur, 1992).  
Narrative identity: A solution to the problem of identity as sameness and diversity  
Ricoeur (1992) argues that personal identity should be understood as both a 
unification of and ongoing dialectic between the two understandings of identity. He 
considers personal identity as a practical category: ‘[T]o state the identity of an 
individual or a community is to answer the question, “Who did this?” “Who is the agent, 
the author?”’ (Ricoeur, 1988:246). He highlights that the person of whom we are 
speaking and the agent on whom the action depends have a history and also change 
through their actions (Ricoeur, 1992). Personal identity can therefore be articulated 
only in the temporal dimension of human existence. Given the role attributed to 
narrative in configuring the human experience of time (Ricoeur 1984) it follows that 
the unity of identity is constituted by a narrative: ‘To answer the question “who?” […] is 
to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the “who”. And the 




As with the configuration of time, narrative serves as a mediator between a need for 
concordance and the admission of discordance (Ricoeur, 1984) in reconciling the 
temporal dimension of the self. Narrative relates the sameness and selfhood 
dimensions of identity through the two operations of emplotment, ordering and 
creativity (Ricoeur, 1992). The ordering function facilitates an understanding as to how 
someone can remain the same person despite changes in the course of his or her life 
without the need for recourse to an unvarying substantial self. Creativity allows for 
future possibility and change through the imaginative space opened up by the fusion of 
the two horizons. In Ricoeur’s (1992) view, selfhood is recognised in its possibility as 
much as its actuality.  
 
Ricoeur (1992:116-124) concludes by illustrating the dialectic between the two 
dimensions of identity with the relative terms of character (caractere)12 and self-
constancy. Character includes the habits, lasting dispositions and acquired 
identifications suggestive of sameness, of permanence in time, but which have a history 
and once required innovation. Self-constancy is a form of initiative that reveals a mode 
of permanence in time that cannot be inscribed, such as the ability to intend oneself 
into the future and make good on a promise given in the present. While accounts of 
character dispositions are not unfamiliar in the dementia literature (e.g. Kontos, 2004), 
I see new possibilities in the notion of self-constancy. Indeed, this concept chimes with 
the intuitions alluded to at the start of this chapter, based on my initial engagements 
with the participants and their aspirations to continue to fulfil commitments, 
responsibilities and valued roles by intending themselves into the future and resisting 
ascribed deficient identities. Self-constancy may of course present significant 
challenges where the capability to lay down fresh memories is impaired. The role of 
emplotment in creating the spaces for working through future possibilities, or lack 
thereof, assumes fresh salience in light of this observation, together with the cyclical 
connection between acting, narrating and seeing possibilities. 
The dialogic self: narrative identity, the ‘Other’ and co-constructed narratives 
Ricoeur (1992) attends closely to our social nature, understanding the relation of self 
and Other as primordial or ontological – we are relational beings. As we live with and 
for others, our identities are the construct of social engagement and demonstrate that 
we are not independent, but intricately connected with the Other. He provides a rich 
                                                          
12 Ricoeur (1992) highlights the distinction, often lost in English, between the French terms ‘personnage’ 
(character in a novel) and caractere (character, qualities or nature of a person)  
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account of ‘Otherness’, which encompasses interpersonal relations, institutions and the 
self-as-other. Our narratives are co-authored and the narrative unification of the self 
and the Other therefore consists of an identity that exists to be responsive to and act in 
ways that generate responses from others.  
Of relevance to studies of ageing and dementia in general, Ricoeur (1992:180-194) 
offers an extended meditation on interpersonal solicitude. He considers the scenario 
where the ‘Other’ is placed in a situation of vulnerability through an exploration of 
reciprocity. This account involves others progressively facilitating, holding13 and 
preserving the ipse identity of the person as his or her own grasp on it weakens. 
Additionally, consistent with Baldwin’s (2008) account of the dialogic self and the 
expansion of ‘Otherness’ to encompass institutions, Ricoeur (1992) acknowledges that 
living well is not limited to face-to-face encounters, but extends to the life of 
institutions. Justice presents qualities that are not present in solicitude, notably the 
requirement of equality. Friends and just institutions are both necessary to protect 
against suffering and self-destruction. 
 
Ricoeur (1992:320) recognises that there may be some forms of suffering that go far 
beyond mishaps and adventures which cannot be made meaningful through 
emplotment. There is scope to enrich this observation with insights from established 
bodies of literature on selfhood in dementia (e.g. Sabat 2010) which highlight 
difficulties in reconciling past and present self-understandings. Ricoeur (1992) also 
insists that narrative identity is not simply descriptive, but requires action and has to 
reconnect with the non-narrative components in the form of the acting and suffering 
agent. Ricoeur’s narrative theory ‘is not a downward spiral of solipsistic interpretation. 
It is a hermeneutical circle that erupts into action’ (Blosser, 2012:207). Becoming a 
valuable selfhood is not only the result of an act of imagination, but of an act of will 
(Ricoeur, 1992). Significantly, as the unified identity exists to be responsive to and act 
in ways that generate responses from others, the self in action is a social preserving 
rather than an autonomy preserving self. Becoming a valuable selfhood requires ethical 
                                                          
13 Radden and Fordyce (2006) question the ethical demands of such an approach on those tasked with holding, 





engagement, reconnecting with the human need for recognition. This return to 
practical life in the public realm with the aim of living a good life is considered below. 
The ideal of the narrative unity of life and the aim of a good life  
Upon returning to the level of practical life, Ricoeur (1992) revisits and considerably 
extends his account of the narrative pre-figuration of action, as provisionally set out in 
Time and Narrative, to enable identity to be configured in meaningful ways.  In so doing, 
he characterises action in terms of a nesting of constitutive levels of praxis, which can 
be presented in terms of relative levels of complexity (ibid). Reflecting that in many 
narratives the self seeks its identity on the scale of an entire life, Ricoeur (1992:153-
157) proposes that narrative lends itself to an understanding of identity through the 
configuration of the ‘practices’ that direct individual, intimate, shared and public lives, 
and in terms of the ‘life plans’ one constructs, composed within the horizon or guiding 
ideal of a ‘narrative unity of a life’. These concepts introduce important interpretive 
possibilities to the study and I consider each below. 
Practices 
Ricoeur (1992) explains that the concept of ‘practice’ is more widely used in France 
than in English speaking countries, offering more commonplace examples of games, 
arts and professions to facilitate understanding. His thinking in this respect is similar to 
continental philosophers such as Bourdieu (1977). Using the example of moving a 
pawn on a chess board, Ricoeur (1992) establishes s that practices are comprised of 
basic actions configured by ‘constitutive rules’ (pp154-155) that give a basic action its 
meaning. These are not moral rules, but internal rules that offer meaning within the 
practice. As the rules are agreed, constitutive rules signal the ‘interactive character 
belonging to most practices’. A practice is ‘based on actions in which an agent takes into 
account, as a matter of principle, the actions of others’ (p155). Drawing upon the work 
of Weber (1978), he goes on to advance an understanding of action that: 
‘[I]ncludes all human behaviour when and in so far the acting individual attaches a 
subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be overt or purely inward or subjective; it may 
consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from such 
intervention or passively acquiescing in the situation’ (Ricoeur, 1992:155). 
This expanded definition of (inter)action has important consequences, establishing that 
‘omitting, enduring and suffering are as much data of interaction as data of subjective 
understanding. Not acting is still acting, neglecting, forgetting to do something is also 
letting things be done by someone else’ (p157). As such, the theory is explicitly 
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extended from acting to suffering beings. In a further development of this argument, he 
highlights that, over time, interaction becomes an internal – internalised - relation:  
‘[I]n the relation of learning as it shades, little by little, into an acquired competence; 
one can, therefore, play alone, garden alone, do research alone…These constitutive rules come 
from much further back than from any solitary performer; it is from someone else that the 
practice of a skill, profession, game or an art is learned’ (Ricoeur, 1992:156). 
 
This temporal relation further enriches our understanding of identity, revealing aspects 
where selfhood has been eclipsed by sameness -habits, dispositions and identifications 
that have become part of the stable identity were once acquired through action in 
associations with others and the connectedness of human life.  
 
Life plans  
At the higher level of praxis, ‘life plans’ refer to a set of ideals related to the vast 
practical units that make up family life, working life, leisure, community and so on, and 
which concern the things we care about and aspire to (Ricoeur, 1992). However, far 
from being grounded in linear assumptions that suggest a presumed capacity to 
colonise the future, ‘life plans’ take a shape that is necessarily mobile and changeable. 
Moreover, in depicting life plans as sitting at a higher level of organisation, Ricoeur 
(1992:157) is keen to establish that the practical field is not constituted from the 
ground up, but is ‘formed through a back-and-forth movement between more and less 
distant ideals’.  Nevertheless, the suggestion that existence is narratively configured in 
terms of ‘life’ plans opens onto the final level in the hierarchy, the ‘narrative unity of a 
life’. The literature on temporal orientations in later life, notably more generative 
imagined futures (e.g. McFadden and Atchley, 2001) is salient in this respect.  
The guiding ideal of the ‘narrative unity of a life’ 
While ‘practices’ and ‘life plans’ are inherent in action, the concept of the ‘narrative 
unity of a life’ serves as a limiting ideal towards which the human agent aims (Hall, 
2007). Ricoeur (1992:158-163) considers in some detail the differences between 
literary fiction and ‘real life’ narratives, and problematises the notion of ‘the narrative 
unity of a life’ proposed by MacIntyre (1985) on several counts, reasserting his 
understanding of narrative as rooted in life, but a poetic imitation.  
 
First, Ricoeur (1992:160) highlights ‘the equivocalness of the notion of author in real 
life’, stressing that we may be the narrator of, or character in the life narrative, but we 
are co-authors at best. Ricoeur (1992:160) then turns to ‘the narrative incompleteness 
of a life’, whereby the constraints of being within time preclude the possibility that a 
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life can be grasped as a unity; birth and early memories, death and the final stages of 
life exist only in the narrating activities of others. To this he adds the observation that it 
is possible to weave several plots or recount several stories from the same events, 
detracting further from the notion of an ending in the absolute sense (p161). Next, he 
draws attention to the ‘entanglement of life histories’, such that huge parts of a life are 
part of the life history of others, and he contrasts this with the enclosed world of the 
fictional narrative. Finally, he questions the inclusion of seemingly entirely 
retrospective life histories within the ‘dialectic between remembrance and anticipation’ 
(ibid). It is problematic to draw a sharp opposition between living and telling as this 
lowers the stakes and ‘loses sight of the complex existential significance of narrative’ 
(Meretoga, 2014:90-91). It is equally problematic to equate narrative and experience 
with each other as this undermines critical reflection on how cultural and historical 
narratives shape our (self-) understanding and regulate our being in the world. 
 
Ultimately, Ricoeur (1992:161) retains the notion of the ‘narrative unity of a life’ as an 
ideal, a mixture of fabulation and actual experience, yet practically useful. Indeed, it is 
precisely because of the elusive nature of real life that we need the help of plots, 
borrowed from history or fiction, to articulate narratively retrospection and 
prospection. He emphasises the connection the narrative makes between estimations 
applied to actions and the evaluations of persons themselves. While the notion of ‘life 
plans’ places an accent on the voluntary or even wilful side of existence, the notion of 
‘narrative unity’ underscores the organisation of the mix of intention, causes, 
happenings and chance that we find in all stories (p178). Against the ‘narrative unity of 
a life’ lived so far, he posits the possibility or aim of the good life, which comprises ‘the 
nebulus of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which life is held to be 
more or less fulfilled. It is the plane of “time lost” and “time regained”’ (p179). 
Narrative configuration and the ethical aim of a good life  
For Ricoeur (1992), the ethical aim of the good life is self-esteem14, where ‘good’ is an 
evaluation informed inter-subjectively. Self-esteem means being able to attest to 
oneself as being the worthy subject of a good life. It can fail and depends upon the 
words and actions of others. Between the aim of a ‘good life’ and everyday practices, 
                                                          
14 For Ricoeur (1992) self-esteem is tied to the teleological (ethical aim of a good life). Self-respect is tied to the 
deontological (duty-bound / obligatory evaluation of the moral worth or rightness of specific actions). The latter 
relates to equality in law, legal rights, constraints and moral norms. While tensions can arise between ‘the two 
faces of just’, the good and the right, both are important, can be integrated, and together provide an overall 
sense of the worth of a life. 
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Ricoeur (1992) identifies a sort of hermeneutical circle by virtue of the back and forth 
movement between the nested levels of praxis. It is this two-way movement between 
practices and their constitutive rules, more flexible ‘life plans’ and the guiding ideal of 
the ‘narrative unity of a life’ that creates conditions ripe for narrative configuration, 
through the desire to bring concordance from discordance. This can be likened to a text 
in which the whole and the part are to be understood each in terms of the other. Once 
again, Ricoeur (1992:162-163) emphasises that the plot is not fixed. As the agent 
continues to act and suffer, new events take place and new episodes are added, each 
folded back into the fabric of one’s individual and shared narratives, harmoniously or 
discordantly. Old events may also be removed or assume new meanings, opening up or 
closing down possibilities for future action.  For the human agent, interpreting the text 
of action is interpreting himself.  
Applicability of narrative identity to the study  
Ricoeur’s (1992) conceptualisation of narrative identity appears, I suggest, to offer vast 
potential to the study, providing a theoretical mechanism for interpreting the ways in 
which disparate actions and events enacted and recounted within time, and the in-
between happenings that occur over time are, or are not, incorporated into the 
unfolding narratives of older people living with dementia. It does so by facilitating an 
exploration of the relationship between everyday activity and identity via the 
mediation of narrative, and in ways that challenge the philosophical construction of 
personal identity as sameness, engaging directly and dialectically with diversity and 
change over time. Additionally, his dialogic account of selfhood and dialectic between 
self and an expanded account of the Other ensures that (narrative) identity is rich with 
intersubjective elements and provides for a nuanced understanding of forms of 
recognition and misrecognition. 
 
The implications of Ricoeur’s (1992) dialectic between identity as sameness and 
selfhood, and between self and Other, have been considered in the literature on people 
with advanced dementia, where the ability to speak of the person remaining 
themselves in as much as ‘being another’ was valued (e.g. Radden and Fordyce, 2006). 
Ricoeur’s (1992) attention to the co-authored nature of all narratives and to shared 
memories, particularly through the phenomenon of growing older together (Ricoeur, 
2004) lends support to mechanisms seeking to sustain the narrative agency and 
identity of people as the effects of dementia increase. Through his meditation on 
interpersonal solicitude, this notion is extended from informal turn taking by couples 
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(Beard et al, 2009) through purposeful co-construction of narratives by people with 
dementia and researchers (Keady and Williams, 2007), quilting narrative fragments 
(Moore and Davis, 2002) to actively holding the story of a loved one until death 
(Purcell, 2013; Randall, 2009). It also extends the narrative agency of people with 
dementia as they continue to shape the narratives and lives of others (Baldwin, 2008; 
Purcell, 2013). This allows not only the mere sameness of the person, but also aspects 
of selfhood to be retained for longer. It also affords the possibility for new experiences 
to be woven into the still unfolding and increasingly co-constructed and interconnected 
narratives of the person and those involved in the person’s life.  
 
Throughout this discussion, I have sought to ensure that the theoretical resources and 
underpinning concepts I deploy do not inadvertently discount people with advanced 
dementia from the category of person. For the purposes of the present study, 
engagement with the dialectic between stability and uncertainty at the level of a given 
acting situation may be extended to engagement with the identity configuration of 
older people with dementia who are striving to continue to go about their everyday 
activities, to demonstrate self-constancy and continue to be recognised by inter-
personal and institutional Others. While this opens up positive opportunities, there is 
also the risk that narrative identities may be co-opted by known others, dominant 
narratives or cultural metaphors, or that deficient identities may be ascribed (Beard, 
2016). Alongside this is the existential threat of illness producing narrative wrecks 
(Dworkin, 1993). In addition, extension may be facilitated from imagined possibilities 
for action within a given situation to the ideal of narrative unity and the possibility of a 
good life, underscoring that dementia is only one aspect of experience and it is 
important not to lose sight of the longer and broader narrative. In this respect, insights 
from the field of narrative gerontology can enhance the relevance and applicability of 
Ricoeur’s theorising to an older population. 
Narrative Identity Development and Insights from Narrative Gerontology 
While the study is not concerned with ‘life stories’ per se, Ricoeur’s (1992) perspective 
nevertheless appears salient in light of the emphasis within the ageing and dementia 
literature on sharing spontaneous memories, more purposeful social reminiscence and 
life review. The meanings of time, time’s passing and time’s tenses shift as we age 
(Achenbaum, 2001). Older people also have a lifetime of experience to draw upon, 
‘biographically accrued capital’ (Mader, 1996:43). The notion of ‘lifetime’ underscores 
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the temporal nature of human existence in the sense that it is finite, and narrative is the 
means by which we try to make meaning and find unity in our lives as a whole 
(Ricoeur, 1992).This imperative may be stimulated by the anticipation of an ending, 
increasing the relative importance of emotion-related over knowledge-related goals 
(Carstensen, 1992; Carstensen et al, 1995; Erikson, 1980; Frankl, 1986; Randall, 2008) 
consistent with Bartlett’s (2012) findings in her study involving dementia activists. It 
may also result in broader temporal horizons through generativity (Tornstram, 1996).  
 
Revisiting life fragments, bounded episodes or previous life chapters can constitute 
highly valued everyday activities for older people, particularly when the laying down of 
new life episodes is no longer feasible or a priority. Reviewing previous life episodes 
can forestall narrative foreclosure (Bohlmeijer et al, 2011; Freeman, 2000) whereby no 
new meanings can be found in the future, present or past. This has important 
implications for both dimensions of identity and the dialectic between them. Overall, 
Ricoeur’s perspective holds promise to facilitate the study aim of exploring how 
ordinary, everyday life is accomplished by older people living with dementia. By 
engaging directly with the constitutive function of narrative, it may also enrich current 
conceptualisations of narrative citizenship. Finally, anchored by a relational, dialogic 
self, it addresses Fisher’s (2012) demands to preserve the complexities of identity and 
facilitate a nuanced understanding of forms of recognition and misrecognition, 
augmenting the application of citizenship-as-practice in dementia studies. 
Reflections and Way Forward 
This chapter first highlighted the potential of Ricoeur’s (1984) concept of mimesis to 
situate the everyday activities of older people living with dementia within the physical, 
socio-cultural and temporal world. It facilitates exploration and interpretation of the 
various relationships at play within a given acting situation through its articulation of 
the semantics of action, symbolic resources of the practical field and temporal 
dimension of action. By depicting these resources as the ‘pre-narrative quality of 
action’, and introducing the ordering and creative functions of emplotment, Ricoeur 
(1984) makes explicit the relationship between narrative and practical life. This 
introduces interpretive and methodological possibilities, notably by facilitating 
differentiation of the various layers of meaning-making. 
 
Ricoeur’s (1992) conceptualisation of narrative identity also provides a comprehensive 
mechanism for exploring the relationships between practical and ethical life, narrative 
86 
 
and identity, both within time and over time. This perspective provides a robust 
theoretical basis for moving back and forth between the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday 
activities within the exigencies of a particular acting situation, the ideal of the ‘narrative 
unity of a life’ and the aim of a good life, with and for others in just institutions. 
Importantly, he advances a notion of identity that permits diversity over time, 
preserves complexity, offers future possibilities and may facilitate nuanced 
understandings of forms of (mis)recognition.  Given this potential, and mindful of the 
importance of framing research questions in ways that open up rather than close down 
possibilities for complex and radical self-representations through research 
participation (Fisher, 2012), I now set out the following research questions: 
 
1. How do people (living with dementia) variously: 
 Construe ‘everyday activity’ and ‘everyday life’? 
 Enact the activities that comprise everyday life? 
 Make meaning in and through these activities? 
 
2. How do people (living with dementia) variously negotiate and make sense of the 
obstacles, dilemmas and possibilities of everyday life through time? 
 
3. How is memory loss / dementia incorporated into the unfolding narratives and 
narrative identities of people living with dementia? What part does ‘dementia’ play, or 
not play, within these narrative configurations? 
 
4. How might the narrative-in-action methodology enhance future understandings of 
the (narrative) citizenship of people living with dementia?  
 
5. What are the theoretical and societal implications of the study from a social 
citizenship perspective? 
 
Moving forward, the above discussion and resultant research questions suggest the 
need for engagement with everyday activities and the small stories of everyday life as 
they are enacted and recounted within the flow of actions and also with events and 
happenings over time. It also suggests the need for analytical attention to way in which 
events, happenings and associated meanings are incorporated into unfolding narratives 





Carving a Path to the Domain of the Possible  
Overview 
This Narrative Inquiry study is grounded in the narrative theories described in the 
previous chapter. Ricoeur’s (1992) narrative theorising understands selfhood as lived 
in the mode of possibility and the research questions seek to open up rather than close 
down possibilities for complex self-representations through research participation. In 
this chapter, I seek to further develop my aspiration to enter ‘the domain of the 
possible’ (Taylor, 2008:324) by creating an appropriate methodological pathway.  
 
The study is located within the ‘fourth moment’ (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010) in 
dementia studies and employs a social citizenship value lens. This lens not only 
requires appropriate theoretical underpinnings and research questions, but also 
demands new ways of conducting research with and for older people living with 
dementia. At a minimum, research studies must recognise the diversity of older people 
with dementia, remain attentive to possible power imbalances within relationships, 
facilitate meaningful participation and engage deeply with ethical research practice 
issues (ibid). In this chapter, I describe how these imperatives were built into the study 
design. I reflect upon the success of their application in Chapter Nine. 
 
Narrative Inquiry seeks to understand life as lived and as expressed in practice by 
embodied persons (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). In Chapter Four, I identified the 
need to engage with the everyday activities and the small stories of everyday life as 
they are enacted and recounted within time, and also with events and happenings over 
a period of time in order to address the research questions. Ethnographic methodology 
takes seriously the fact that experience takes place in real time and uses participation 
in everyday life as its main source of acquiring knowledge.  
 
In the sections that follow I summarise the features of ethnography that are, and are 
not, of relevance to this study, before outlining the study design and the various stages 
of recruitment. I then summarise my experiences of creating data with the participants, 
which are elaborated upon in Chapter Six. I detail the process of narrative analysis, 
drawing upon Ricoeur’s concepts of mimesis, emplotment and narrative identity. I also 
reflect upon the criteria for determining the trustworthiness and authenticity of the 
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narrative configurations and the accompanying interpretations presented in Chapters 
Seven and Eight, underscoring the role of reflexivity throughout. 
Locating Ethnographic Methods within the Narrative Inquiry 
As described above, a social citizenship value lens requires research studies to remain 
attentive to power imbalances within research relationships and facilitate meaningful 
participation (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010). Participatory research is concerned with 
‘how’ research is carried out rather than which data creation methods are used. 
Nevertheless, thinking carefully about data creation can help to promote a sense of 
citizenship (p104). At the outset, I was determined to ensure sufficient elasticity in my 
approach to respect the varied lifestyles, circumstances and distinctive attitudes to and 
ways of ageing for each participant. I was keen to be able to respond to participants’ 
understandings of and varying abilities to engage in everyday ‘activities’, avoiding 
ageist assumptions. I also recognised the need to work with different degrees of 
willingness to involve me in activities, should they take place in different social 
contexts. In short, I wanted to start where people are at (Beard, 2016) and I recognised 
the necessity of designing flexibility ‘in’ from the outset. 
 
Ethnographic research is an emergent endeavour wherein the ‘planning process is 
begun but not completed before the researcher enters the field’ (Whyte, 1984:35). 
Although a skeletal framework for the study is likely to exist prior to beginning 
research, the study only fully takes form upon entering the field. The emergent nature 
of ethnographic research therefore held the capacity to facilitate the complexity, 
heterogeneity, and uncertainty of older people’s everyday experiences without 
restricting the range of phenomena that might be explored through the study. 
Ethnography is fundamentally about culture (Van Maanen, 1998). Culture in turn can 
be defined as the ‘production and consumption of everyday life as well as how 
everyday life is accounted for and storied into meaningful orders of persons and things’ 
(Goodall, 2000:86). This sat comfortably with the original study aim and Alsaker and 
Josephsson (2010) highlight that studying a person engaged in everyday activities will 
make visible his or her connections to culture and its claims of ordinariness.  
 
Traditionally ethnography requires that the researcher immerses herself in a social 
situation and the lives of participants to generate real world observations about actions 
and events in a pragmatic, reflexive and emergent way, (Greenhalgh and Swinglehurst, 
2011; Prus, 1996). While ethnography has been used successfully in the ‘local cultures’ 
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of care homes for forty years (e.g. Gubrium, 1975; Cook, 2003; Watson, 2015), I 
considered ‘immersion’ in people’s daily lives in their own homes and local 
communities too intrusive. The notion of mini-ethnography allows for an approach that 
shares the same ethos, but does not study a whole culture (Hastrup, 2003 in Alsaker et 
al, 2009).  
 
The narrative-in-action methodology developed by Alsaker et al (2009) is an example 
of a mini-ethnography that directly accesses ongoing action in an everyday context. 
Ricoeur’s (1984) understanding of action illustrates the process quality of everyday 
activity and the concrete connection to meaning.  (Clandinin, 2007) suggests that it is 
the concreteness of activities that makes human action accessible to research. The 
immediate situation, nested in a particular culture, allows for participation, coaction, 
observation, description, and interpretation (ibid). The possibilities for participation, 
coaction and observation turn attention to data creation methods, as considered below. 
Thinking about Possible Data Creation Methods 
Narrative-in-action was developed by Alsaker et al (2009) to facilitate research with 
women with chronic rheumatoid conditions.   Studying daily life among older persons 
with dementia requires particularly careful methodological consideration (Clarke and 
Keady, 2002) and the translation of the narrative-in-action methodology raises a 
number of issues. While the methodology has been used in a study of older people with 
depression (Nyman et al, 2012), it has not, to my knowledge, been used with older 
people with dementia. I therefore turned to empirical research in the field of dementia 
to ascertain if I could find support for or barriers to its application. 
 
The subjective experiences of people with mild and moderate dementia have been 
accessed in research for many years (Wilkinson 2002, Hellstrom et al 2007) and, with 
the advent of earlier diagnosis, many people living with dementia can and do provide 
coherent accounts of their experiences (Beard, 2016). Nevertheless, as the condition 
progresses, persons increasingly have problems constructing a verbal narrative that 
connects various events together into a coherent story (Herman, 2009). Hulko (2004; 
2009) has highlighted the dominance of more articulate and multiply privileged voices 
within dementia research and reflecting the heterogeneity of people with dementia 
within this Narrative Inquiry was a key consideration. As I was interested in experience 
as expressed in practice, the potential of engaging with observations, actions, meanings 
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and stories of the moment, together with less effortful recollections and spontaneous 
memories, as suggested by Ricoeur’s (1984) mimetic theory, was attractive.    
 
I drew encouragement from studies employing similar data creation methods, but 
without the application of mimetic theory. Specifically, ‘in-situ conversations’ have 
proved particularly beneficial in supporting people with dementia to participate in 
research (Bamford and Bruce, 2000). This approach dispenses with the need for recall 
and can help to foreground multi-sensory experiences. More recently, there has been 
an increasing interest in the use of ‘walking and talking’ methods across the social 
sciences (Emmel and Clark, 2009) and it has been suggested that they could fruitfully 
be used with people with dementia (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010) subject to physical 
abilities.  These methods shift the emphasis from telling to showing or enacting, 
reducing verbal communication demands, although placing events and experiences in 
their spatial context can help participants to articulate their thoughts and add detail to 
the researcher’s understanding (Emmel and Clark, 2009). They also provide 
opportunities for the serendipitous and the unanticipated.  
 
The above methods afford participants a greater degree of control over the research 
process, fitting in with their daily lives. It appeared that offering a choice or 
combination of these methods would offer greater scope to respect the capacities and 
preferences of the participants. Employing different data creation methods not only 
helps to ameliorate problems that may arise with people who have diminished 
cognitive or communicative abilities (Rowles and Reinharz, 1988), but also affords 
participants different means and opportunities to express themselves (Ikels, Keith and 
Fry, 1988).  Drawing upon mimetic theory to access meaning-making-in-action held the 
potential to enhance these methods by increasing the transparency of analyses.  
Piloting the methods 
The suitability of the proposed methods was lightly tested through an informal pilot 
with older family members, former neighbours and the parents of friends, progressing 
from people well known to me to persons largely unknown, including two people with 
dementia. Alsaker et al (2009) advise that the enacted narrative facilitator must make a 
deliberate choice to position herself as ‘actively passive’ and refrain from bringing in 
topics from outside the actual ongoing activity, consistent with the theoretical intent. 
Piloting proved important in understanding the practicalities of doing so (it did not 
come naturally) and in balancing this ‘active passivity’ with both strengths-based 
91 
 
engagement and more traditional participation observation approaches. It also became 
apparent that different types of activities, from the routine or mundane to the more 
socially or culturally significant, presented different possibilities for contextualising 
experiences and required different levels of participation on my part. The pilot also 
underscored the benefits of sustained involvement over time. The implications of this 
were incorporated into the study design, and I sought to spend time with participants 
as they enacted a blend of mundane and slightly more significant activities, proposing 
to meet with each participant up to seven times over a period of approximately six 
months. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Data Generation Methods 
Thinking about Recruitment 
When it came to thinking about participant recruitment, I sought to recognise the 
heterogeneity of older people living with dementia.  Although aware that my task 
would be more a case of trying to find a small but diverse group of people who might be 
willing to take part, rather than to ‘draw a sample’, I did have to come up with a 
‘sampling frame’ from which people with ‘certain characteristics’ could be ‘selected’ 
and then invited to take part. For logistical reasons, I also had to plan for a certain 
number of participants, with the understanding that the actual number might be lower, 
or indeed higher, than this figure. I noted that other Narrative Inquiry studies generally 
featured between three and eight people, depending on their purpose. My interest in 
diversity pulled me towards the higher end of this range, my interest in developing 
nuanced understandings towards the lower end. I kept an open mind. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Following close reading of the Adults with Incapacity Act (Scotland) 2001, particularly 
Part 5 Section 51, I concluded that the study aims could be achieved without the 
inclusion of persons unable to consent and therefore I should not seek to include them. 
The data creation methods and overall study aim also did not lend themselves to a fully 
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inclusive approach. From the outset, my interest has been the experiences of older 
people with dementia living at home and the ‘parent population of interest’ for this 
study was provisionally defined as ‘older people (aged 65 years and over) with a 
diagnosis of a dementia sub-type who live at home and are able to give consent’.  
 
Literature review indicated that participation in research studies by people with 
dementia has largely (although not purposefully) been confined to the more articulate 
and privileged voices (Hulko, 2009). I therefore hoped to facilitate the participation of 
older people with dementia with diverse ‘social locations’, with a particular interest in 
including socially and economically disadvantaged persons. With these parameters in 
mind, my attention turned to thinking about how best to gain access to people to invite 
them to take part. This proved challenging.  
 
Turning again to previous studies, I determined that the most fruitful recruitment sites 
tended to be memory clinics, “D (dementia) cafes” and Alzheimer Society community 
initiatives. As the research study is concerned with people’s experiences as 
stakeholders in everyday life, I did briefly consider the latter options as I initially felt 
that a social setting was preferable to access through a clinical facility. However, I was 
interested in exploring everyday life away from dementia, in the realm of the ordinary. 
As described in Chapter Three, a dementia diagnosis does not necessarily take centre 
stage in older people’s lives and I was keen to try to include people who do and do not 
identity with the diagnosis. The materials later prepared for potential participants 
referred to ‘people with memory problems or dementia’ to facilitate this aspiration.   
 
As the limitations of restricting the search to locations or social groups with a 
dementia-specific orientation became apparent, I identified GP records as the optimum 
‘sample frame’.  I thought that I would need to recruit people from across multiple sites 
because of the participatory demands of the study design. General Practices are 
classified according to the deprivation category of their patient population and I 
determined that they represented a potentially useful initial means of accessing older 
people with a diagnosis of a dementia sub-type with varying socio-economic statuses. 
The ‘population of interest’ was therefore further restricted to ‘older people with 
dementia living at home who are able to consent and are registered with a GP practice’.    
 
The use of GP records allows exclusion criteria to be applied before approaching 
potential participants, such as where the person has recently been diagnosed with 
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dementia or has another terminal illness. People who have recently taken part in 
studies and those who have asked not to be contacted can be automatically excluded. I 
recognised the benefits of avoiding an insensitive or unwanted approach and identified 
the importance of giving GPs discretion to use their personal knowledge to exclude 
people on grounds over and above those discernible from categories in the GP records, 
including recent significant life changes, such as a family bereavement, or potential 
future changes, such as moving to a care home.  
Provisionally identifying Participant Identification Centres 
GPs have a duty of care to their patients and need to balance risk with empowering 
people to take part in research. I appreciated that it would be important for GPs to 
receive a clear and transparent explanation of the research objectives, notably the 
commitment required of participants (McKillop and Wilkinson, 2004; Dewing, 2007).  I 
therefore prepared an Information Sheet for Participant Identification Centres 
(Appendix II). This included process details to ensure there would be no breach of 
confidentiality and to facilitate agreement and mutual adherence to the highest 
standards of research practice and best practice guidelines (Wellcome Trust, 2009). 
 
At this point, my background working in health and social care service improvement 
proved useful and I was able to draw upon the assistance of former colleagues. One 
Primary Care lead sent out a favourable letter of introduction to his colleagues in three 
General Practices with populations with diverse deprivation statuses (percentage of 
practice patients living in data zones marked as the 15% most deprived in Scotland). 
The GPs indicated that they would be willing to act as a Participation Identification 
Centre (PIC) in principle, subject of course to my securing a favourable ethical opinion. 
All three practices were located within a single health board area (NHS Lothian), 
achieving logistical benefits in terms of their familiarity and proximity to me. The final 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for the study are set out in table 5.1 overleaf. The 
decision to recruit through GP records introduced some specific ethical stipulations, as 








Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
Men and women who: 
- have a diagnosis of a dementia sub-type 
- live at home  
- are able to provide informed consent  
- are aged 65 years or over 
- are registered with (one of three pre-
defined) GP practices in NHS Lothian 
People: 
- diagnosed with ‘dementia’ within the 
previous 3 months (to allow time for 
adjustment)  
- with a terminal illness who are expected 
to live for less than one year  
- who have experienced recent significant 
life changes 
 
Table 5.1- Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Seeking a Favourable Ethical Opinion  
My decision to recruit through GP surgeries in NHS Lothian meant that ethical approval 
was legally required through the NHS Scotland South Scotland Research Ethics 
Committee before I could begin the fieldwork.  I found completing the ethics 
application helpful, forcing me to think through issues that simply did not arise when 
working in a service improvement context. I believe that I have always practiced in an 
ethical way and have favoured participatory and inclusive methods that participants 
have invariably found enjoyable and often beneficial and even empowering. It was 
instructive to consider scenarios from the perspective of possible harms.  
 
As discussed above, in designing the study I sought to ensure maximum flexibility for 
participation and to remain open, alert and responsive to emergent opportunities. 
However, this openness does not sit comfortably with traditional notions of research 
planning, where authorising bodies, understandably, want to know in advance exactly 
what you will be doing with potentially ‘vulnerable’ adults. Three of the guiding 
principles of the NHS REC are that research participation should be voluntary, that 
informed consent should be obtained prior to beginning the research, and that no harm 
should be done. It has been argued that the bureaucratic anticipatory nature of NHS 
RECs makes ethnographic research almost impossible (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007). 
The difficulties are attributed not only to the emergent design of studies, but also to the 
extended period of time that researchers spend developing trusting relationships and 
negotiating participation, where consent is understood as a relational process rather 
than a contractual agreement.  The public and semi-public nature of the settings 
typically studied in ethnographic research may also be deemed risky (Murphy and 
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Dingwall, 2007). Given these concerns, my experience of obtaining a favourable opinion 
from the Research Ethics Committee (REC) proved less problematic than anticipated. 
 
During the meeting with the REC, the one question that I was grilled on concerned the 
sensitive management of ending research relationships, given my intention to meet 
with participants over several months. In a way, I was pleasantly surprised that the 
potential for emotional harm was a priority and I drew some reassurance from my 
ability to address the Committee’s concerns. The study received ethical approval from 
the University of Edinburgh, School of Health in Social Science (ISSH004 – Appendix III) 
and met with a favourable ethical opinion from the South of Scotland Research Ethics 
Committee (15/SS/0076 - Appendix IV). I also submitted a substantial amendment 
shortly after entering the field to counter an initial oversight. Specifically, I had not 
made provision to enable the spouse of the person with dementia to participate fully in 
the study, where this was consistent with the couple’s preferences and the nature of 
their relationship. This important corrective also met with a favourable opinion 
(15/SS/0076-AM01-S1-1 - Appendix VI). 
 
The REC review is a form of preventative ethics, which serves to anticipate and divert 
potential problems and is only a first step. A social citizenship lens also demands a 
more far-reaching assessment of the ethical issues underpinning research in the area of 
dementia (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010) and I reflect upon the ethical dilemmas 
encountered in the ‘small moments of doing’ the research (Stern, 2004), the 
management of endings and the type of participation afforded in Chapter Nine. 
Encountering Delays: Losing Hope 
As I was seeking to recruit through General Practices, I also had to obtain a Clinical 
Research Access Letter and NHS Research Passport. This required undergoing relevant 
disclosure, occupational health checks and vaccinations. It was a long and drawn out 
process, which proved frustrating and resulted in the loss of several months of study 
time. The core issue was a difference of opinion as to the type of disclosure statement 
that I required. Disclosure Scotland maintained that the research required basic 
disclosure, whereas the NHS felt standard disclosure was appropriate as I would be 
working alone with older people with dementia. I agreed. For a while it seemed that a 
stalemate had been reached, which I was powerless to influence. I would make a 
revised submission to Disclosure Scotland only to have my application form returned, 
rejected, several weeks later. I became very disheartened over this period. The 
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situation was eventually resolved when NHS Lothian took the pragmatic decision to 
accept the basic disclosure and supporting chain of email correspondence. I secured the 
necessary Clinical Research Access Letter and NHS Research Passport from NHS 
Lothian Research and Development (2015/0265 -Appendix V). 
 
Prior to this, I had stepped back from the research study for a few months to help out 
with teaching and research in the University, which was necessary due to the 
coincidental long-term sickness of two staff members, in effect front-loading the 
contributions to the School that were expected under the terms of my Career 
Development Scholarship. The combined delay had further ramifications – by the time I 
obtained my NHS Passport, two of the three GPs who has provisionally agreed to 
support me had taken early retirement. At this point I began to feel that the study was 
doomed. My hopes rested on the one remaining GP. 
Moving to Recruitment: Silver Linings  
When I anxiously explained my predicament to the remaining GP, he could not have 
been more helpful. He took the time to have a long telephone conversation with me out 
of hours to better understand the study aims. The GP asked if it would compromise the 
study design if the mix of participants that I hoped for were all recruited through his 
practice. Thinking about this, I recognised that this could actually strengthen the study 
by situating the research in one small town. The GP also fully understood and endorsed 
the issues I was grappling with, as set out in Chapter Two. Although I had stipulated 
persons over the age of 65 years on the research materials, he recognised that I was 
interested in the experiences of his ‘core demographic’ when it came to dementia, 
namely people closer to 80 years of age. He also embraced my desire not to restrict 
study participation to more affluent, educated persons, and to recruit men and women 
with different living situations, educational or employment histories, and who may 
have other long-term conditions. He identified with my aspiration to recruit people 
who had responded in different ways to their diagnosis and indeed people with 
different attitudes and approaches to ageing generally. He was confident that 
recruitment would not be problematic. Hope was restored. 
Identification of potential participants 
The GP undertook to mail information about the study (Participation Information 
Leaflet (PIL) – Appendix VII and Invitation Letter - Appendix VIII) to people meeting 
the study inclusion criteria. In order to maintain patient trust, it is best practice for the 
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invitation to come from the GP on practice headed paper (Wellcome Trust, 2009) and 
the GP elected to personalise the invitation. I sent him an electronic copy of the letter 
and then posted a batch of stamped blank envelopes and copies of the Participant 
Information Leaflet to him. I printed the leaflet onto yellow card and it became known 
as ‘the little yellow leaflet’.  
 
The ‘little yellow leaflet’ and letter both invited potential participants to contact me 
directly if interested, either by email or by phone. This approach avoided disclosure of 
potential participants’ details to me and offset the need to involve the GP in the actual 
recruitment to the study. In addition, potential participants must be contacted in a way 
that avoids possible worry or embarrassment, and the Letter of Invitation and 
Participant Information Sheet both stress that the person is free to choose whether or 
not to participate in the study, and that the decision will not affect the quality of their 
care or their relationship with the GP. It also offers the opportunity to discuss the study 
with me before making a decision as part of the informed consent process, described 
later in this chapter.  
Response to the invitation to participate 
A batch of ten letters was initially posted out, eliciting a favourable response from four 
people, three men and one woman, all of whom lived with their spouse. (Three other 
people made contact to offer reasons for not taking part and wishing me well). A 
second more targeted batch of letters was sent out in a bid to recruit another woman 
and someone living alone to the study and this resulted in one further person making 
contact. Initially I sought to recruit people with a diagnosis of a dementia sub-type to 
the study. However, it soon became apparent that some participants wished to take 
part with their spouses, consistent with their continuing sense of ‘couplehood’. A 
substantial ethical amendment was raised to accommodate their preferences. This 
resulted in eight people being recruited to the study (three couples, one man and one 
woman) aged between 78 and 85 years. While the participants had the mix of ‘social 
locations’ and ‘characteristics’ that I hoped for, as Clandinin and Connelly (2000:141) 
rightly assert ‘[w]hen participants are known intimately as people, not merely as 
categorical representatives, categories fragment’.  In Chapter Six, I introduce the 
participants, allowing the uniqueness, particularity and complexity of their lives and 




The study draws upon the concept of process consent (Dewing, 2007), which 
supplements the more conventional formal consenting process. This approach 
addresses concerns that cognitive and individualistic assumptions may deny people 
with dementia opportunities to participate in decision making. Instead, consent is 
revisited and renegotiated on an ongoing basis and is dependent upon the experience 
of involvement rather than participant recollection. Bartlett and Martin (2002:51) 
suggest that the continuous nature of qualitative research, which stresses the 
negotiated and relational processes between researcher and respondent, lends itself to 
a continual process of consent. 'Process consent' is particularly appropriate in research 
where there is reflexivity between data to be collected and data already collected, and 
where participants may wish to place limits on the information that is available as 
research data.  
Careful consideration was given to the consent process throughout the study. 
Information about the study was presented in a format that each person was able to 
engage with. At least 48 hours lapses were allowed between providing information 
about the study and the commencement of data creation. Formal consent from the 
person with dementia was obtained during the initial visit, using the Participant 
Consent Form (Appendix IX). Following the acceptance of the substantial ethical 
amendment, an explanatory letter was given to the three couples who sought to 
participate jointly (Appendix X) and consent was obtained from the three spouses 
using the Consent Form for the Spouse of an Existing Participant (Appendix XI).  
 
Each participant was asked for permission to notify the GP practice of the decision so 
that this could be recorded in their medical records and all agreed. While participants 
unable to give consent at the outset were excluded from the study, provision was made 
to allow for the possibility that participants might lose capacity to consent during the 
study. Specifically, the Participant Consent Form (Appendix IX) included a statement to 
the effect that should the person lose mental capacity during the study, they agree to 
any anonymised data collected prior to the loss of capacity to be used in data analysis. 
In practice, all participants were able to provide written consent and no one lost 
capacity during the study period. Had I had any doubt about the participant's continued 
capacity to consent, I would have spoken to a family member or approached the GP, 




Confidentiality is of paramount importance and every attempt was made to ensure this 
was respected. All data created were securely stored in locked drawers or on 
password-protected computers. My laptop was kept in a locked cabinet when not in use 
and was regularly backed up to the University server. I paid particular attention to the 
storage, handling and use of personal data, which I stored only on the University 
computer. With the notable exception of my named contact, I was the only person who 
had access to personal addresses. I conducted all transcription and deleted audio files 
from the server immediately afterwards.  
 
Anonymity was negotiated with participants and all selected their own pseudonym, 
which proved a source of great amusement in some cases. Transcripts were 
anonymised in that all personal details and names of significant others were codified, 
together with data that risked identity disclosure. When using thick descriptions, 
anonymity cannot be guaranteed, and this possibility was discussed with and accepted 
by the participants.  
Minimising Harm 
While the study primarily concerns what people achieve as they go about their 
everyday activities, and how people live a good life (with dementia), I was also 
interested in understanding what gets in the way of such efforts. There was therefore 
the risk of confronting participants with potentially painful issues such as frailty, loss 
or stigma. I have prior experience of working with older people with dementia using 
participatory and creative methods in service improvement and applied research 
contexts, adopting an appreciative, strengths-based approach. I undertook to remain 
alert to any signs of distress and to ensure that participants knew where they could 
seek further local support, should they wish to speak in confidence to an external 
person in relation to any issues arising. Contact details were included on the 
Participant Information Leaflet. 
 
Alongside this, there was also the possibility that participants might disclose details to 
me or that I might become aware of potentially harmful situations that required action. 
Participants were informed of the limits of confidentiality through the inclusion of 
appropriate statements in the Participant Information Leaflet and we discussed this 




Researchers too must consider the emotional risks that they face. I was mindful of the 
emotional effects of the research, discussed any concerns during regular supervision 
and also contacted a former researcher / counsellor to talk through the ending of one 
particular relationship, which I reflect upon in Chapter Nine. A further risk relates to 
the issue of lone working, as much of the research entailed meeting with people in their 
own homes, and potentially confronting unpredictable situations. This was managed in 
accordance with University protocols, notably ensuring that an agreed named person 
knew where and when each visit was taking place and when it was expected to finish. 
Data Creation: Doing Everyday Activities Together 
My aspiration was as far as possible to put dementia on the back burner when I entered 
the field. I tried to engage with each participant in the context of his or her whole life 
rather than through the filter of the diagnostic label, enabling the participant to 
determine the part ‘dementia’ played in our discussions and shared activities. 
The initial meeting 
Once someone contacted me to express an interest in participating in the study, I made 
an appointment to visit the person in his or her home, together with a spouse, family 
member, or friend, where preferred by the person. The option of meeting at a preferred 
location was offered, but not taken up. The purpose of the visit was to sense check the 
person’s understanding of the study and the full implications of involvement and to 
allow plenty of time for any questions to be asked. This introductory visit was critical in 
establishing rapport and as described in Chapter Six, very much set the tone for the rest 
of the study and the types of relationships developed. It served as an opportunity for 
the person and family member to get to know me and also enabled me to learn more 
about the person's daily routines and interests (McKillop and Wilkinson, 2004) and 
how ‘everyday activity’ was understood.  
 
The formal aspect of the informed consent procedure was followed. Once written 
consent was given, the person was recruited onto the study and arrangements for the 
first data creation session made. Participants’ were asked at the outset of the meeting if, 
should they decide to take part, they would be happy for me to write up notes about 
this introductory meeting. All were happy for this to take place, with some indicating 
they would be disappointed if I didn’t. These introductory meetings without exception 
proved rich sources of data, with my notes providing the foundational content for 
Chapter Six.  
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Two participants with busier diaries gave early consideration to dates for the 
subsequent data creation sessions, with other participants preferring not to plan too 
far ahead and ‘play it by ear’. I planned to allow a period of least 48 hours between 
providing information about the study and the commencement of any data collection, 
and in practice at least seven days elapsed between the initial contact and the 
introductory meeting.  
Co-participating in everyday activities 
During each of the subsequent meetings, I followed the natural stream of activity that 
the participant would engage in ordinarily and as chosen and initiated by them, 
consistent with the narrative-in-action methodology. The complete list of activities is 
documented for each participant in Chapter Six, but included chatting over a cup of tea, 
gardening, shopping, pottering around, taking part in an aquarobics class, ‘raking 
round’ charity shops, meeting ‘the boys’ at the local golf club and visiting sites of 
historical interest. Each of these sessions was expected to last between thirty minutes 
and two to three hours, as negotiated with the participant, with the actual duration 
adjusted in response to the way the participant felt on the day. Most sessions lasted 
around three hours, in line with participant preferences. 
  
What’s ‘special’? 
My original intention was to intersperse three data creation sessions co-participating in 
more mundane activities with two sessions doing activities that held slightly more 
personal, social or cultural significance for the participant. In practice, the mix of 
activities did happen, although not necessarily in accordance with the rather formal 
sounding pattern that I had proposed. In one case, all meetings took place within the 
couple’s home, with events such as family popping in or looking through rediscovered 
letters transforming these data sessions into occasions with greater significance for 
them. Participants inevitably had different understandings of ‘special.’  
 
Accounting for my presence 
During these data creation sessions, I interacted with others present or encountered 
along the way, engaging in conversations, participating in activities, helping out or 
trying not to get too much in the way as appropriate.  Where encounters with others 
were pre-planned, how best to account for my presence was negotiated in advance 
with the participant and relevant others. For instance, ‘the boys at the golf club’ were 
told that I was a researcher before I joined them, although the nature of the research 
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was modified to ‘wellbeing in later life,’ as the participant did not identify with his 
Alzheimer’s diagnosis. There were inevitably some incidental encounters with 
neighbours or known others that required the more spontaneous management of 
introductions. In most instances, I had previously established how the participant 
wished to account for my presence, with two participants in particular not wanting 
people to think I was their ‘minder’ or ‘social worker’ and it fell to the participant to use 
their preferred descriptor. One participant did deviate from the ‘script’, introducing me 
in various ways including ‘a younger model I’ve traded the wife in for’ or ‘she’s helping 
me out with a wee photography project, wink, wink’. This was entirely consistent with 
his tactical use of humour to avoid answering questions and was readily accepted.  
 
In for the long haul 
By meeting with participants on different occasions over time, I was able to be part of 
the ongoing process of engaging in everyday activities. This gave me access to stories 
that extended from past experiences to prospective future events and happenings, 
through times of loss of friends, and their struggles to create meaning around different 
everyday situations. Sustained engagement facilitated the chance to discover whether 
possibilities considered were actualised, sustained, constrained, discounted or denied. 
Over the course of the study, I also spoke with participants by phone in between 
meetings and my relationship with each participant developed in different ways, as 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
The wrap-up meeting 
A final meeting was arranged, intended to take the form of a review and thankyou 
session. This was an opportunity to sense check emerging ‘findings’ in the form of loose 
possible plotlines. In one case, the final meeting did not happen as the participant’s wife 
was taken seriously ill and he was simply too distraught to think about the research 
study. I sent him a card. Otherwise, it was important to close the research relationship 
in a validating manner and I gave the participant a handwritten thankyou card and 
small token of appreciation. 
Writing and Reflexivity  
 
Field notes  
A key focus of this research study is action – what people do as well as the 
conversations that take place in the course of the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday life. Field 
notes about what transpired are therefore critical. Collecting this kind of research 
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material requires that notes from the encounters must be written afterwards, together 
with reflections and emergent analytic propositions. Collecting data by means of video 
recording could give a more accurate access to real-time action, but it is difficult to 
capture situational moves, especially where driving or walking are part of the 
participant observation. After each encounter, field notes were immediately recorded 
digitally. I built in time after each meeting to do so and I would drive to a quiet spot, put 
my seat back and then try to replay the scenes in my head, frame by frame, narrating 
my recollection into the recorder. The average length of time it took me to complete 
this exercise was just over one hour. This follows the approach outlined by Holloway 
and Wheeler (2010).  
 
Although the methodology developed by Alsaker et al (2009) does not stipulate the use 
of an audio recorder to capture conversations, I found this useful and audio recorded 
my face-to-face meetings with the participants wherever it was practical and 
unobtrusive to do so. For instance, I clearly could not use the recorder when I took part 
in an aquarobics class with one participant and it would have been inappropriate to do 
so while walking through a supermarket. When I was outside, the noise of traffic or the 
wind made transcription difficult and I tended to use these recordings more as an aide 
memoire to make sure that my own recollections were complete. On other occasions, 
such as when chatting to participants in their homes, using the recorder did not feel 
uncomfortable and I recorded the entire session. I then transcribed the recording, 
annotating my own thoughts in italics. 
 
The typed record for each meeting was between 12 to 17 pages in length. Phone call 
records varied from less than half a page to six pages. The research material consisted 
of approximately 750 pages of written text from a total of 45 face to face meetings and 
58 telephone conversations. Sanjek (1990) suggests that the writing of field notes is 
indistinguishable from analysis as the process of writing contributes to the process of 
making sense. Thus, writing is a research tool in its own right (Speedy, 2005). My own 
experience aligns closely with these suggestions and I often began to make connections 
between evens and happenings as I typed. Example field notes are provided at 
Appendix XII. 
Reflexivity and keeping a journal 
As alluded to in the opening chapter of this thesis, Narrative Inquiry features to varying 
degrees the interplay between the researcher’s own subjectivity and the subjectivities 
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of those whose lives and worlds are in view (Gubrium and Holstein, 2009). Reflexivity 
in qualitative research in general is a ‘continuous endeavour’ (Gough 2003), whereby 
the researcher turns a critical gaze on herself at all stages of the research process, to 
examine and make transparent how she, and intersubjective elements, influence and 
transform the research process and its outcomes (Etherington, 2007) in both subtle 
and more explicit ways (Doucet, 2008). It is particularly critical in Narrative Inquiry, 
where the data are not simple descriptions of sense-impressions, but dialogical 
productions resulting from interactions between participants and the researcher 
(Tierney, 1993). 
 
The reflexive process is intended to ensure that research can be understood not only in 
terms of ‘what’ has come to be known but also ‘how’ it has come to be known, 
(Etherington, 2007) making visible and demystifying the construction of knowledge. 
Given the importance of reflexivity, throughout the study I maintained a reflexive log to 
keep a record of my evolving thoughts and feelings. This included both periods of 
writing at my desk to purposefully try to get my thoughts in order and more 
spontaneous reflections. I carried a notebook with me wherever I went in case I had 
any sudden thoughts, such as while on a bus. Much of the content took the form of 
reflections on what happened during my encounters in the field, how I felt after or 
before meeting with a participant and how I felt I should act on those thoughts and 
feelings.  
 
Other entries were written as I tried to make sense of the academic texts that I was 
reading. For instance, as I tried to make sense of Ricoeur’s (1984) description of the 
dynamic circular relationship between narrative and life, I was taken back in time to a 
school Chemistry class and ending up doodling the structure of Benzene. I remembered 
my teacher telling me the story of Kekule’s daydream about a snake swallowing its own 
tail as he sat on a London omnibus. After years of struggle, he finally made the 
breakthrough from thinking about alternating double bonds to a dynamic circular ring 
of electrons, ‘dancing mockingly before his eyes’. When I looked at my doodles 
(Appendix XIII) I realised I too had been thinking too rigidly; I had been thinking about 
the hermeneutic process as phased rather than continuous.  
 
Events and happenings in ordinary life also proved instructive and several experiences 
had a significant influence on my thinking. These included attending a play at the 
Edinburgh Festival called ‘Spilliken: A Love Story’, which was about a woman with 
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dementia and a robot built by her husband to look after her when he died. Despite this 
unlikely premise, it was the most heartbreakingly beautiful production I’ve ever seen. I 
cried big, fat, snow-like tears which fell slowly from start to finish. It made me think 
about shared memory in a completely different way and influenced my decision to 
favour narrative over thematic analysis.  
 
Another important moment took place during a book reading by my favourite 
contemporary author, Maggie O’Farrell. When asked why she favoured non-
chronological narration, she responded that she thought chronology was ‘a bit over-
rated’, she didn’t think about experience linearly, it’s ‘more like geography’. I found that 
analogy a useful concept to hold on to when thinking about the Narrative Inquiry 
landscape. I likened my forays onto it to ‘going for a walk in the country’, the path 
chosen through hills and valleys explaining why some things were in or out of plain 
sight, past events either sedimented in the layers of soil underfoot or still visible 
through traces, like a tiny glove caught upon a fence. 
 
Reading Elvis Costello’s (2015) autobiography entitled Unfaithful Music and 
Disappearing Ink triggered another significant shift in my thinking. The book details the 
end of his father’s life after he developed dementia with Lewy bodies, including 
poignant accounts of the final days. I purposefully engaged with this as a break from 
Ricoeur’s theorising, which I was making pretty heavy weather of. ‘Elvis’ hadn’t spent 
much time with his father and their shared memories were few, yet something more 
important lay between them that ‘couldn’t be measured in time’. It was an important 
piece in the jigsaw, helping me to understand the limits of memory and that human 
connectedness does not depend upon it. In many respects, these experiences were as 
critical in shaping my thinking as my engagement with the academic literature and field 
notes. I include a selection in Appendix XIII. 
Narrative Analysis 
The next step was a big one. It entailed moving from field text and reflexive notes to 
research text, making sense of the different data sources through narrative analysis. 
The analysis drew upon the theoretical concepts of mimesis, emplotment and narrative 
identity. I also utilised the different levels of meaning-making set out in Ricoeur’s 
(1984) conceptualisation of triple mimesis to differentiate my own interpretative 
activity (emplotment) from the meaning-making activities of the participants accessed 
within the flow of actions. The configured narratives are based on the empirical data, 
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my reflections and theoretical resources, and are also shaped by the things I learned 
from the literature reviews summarised in Chapters Two and Three, my 
preunderstandings and experiences. 
 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) highlight that whereas paradigmatic knowledge is 
focused on what is common among actions, narrative knowledge focuses on the 
particular and special characteristics of each action. Narrative reasoning operates by 
noticing the differences and diversity of people's behaviour. It attends to the temporal 
context and complex interaction of the elements that make each situation remarkable. 
The search is for data that will reveal uniqueness of the individual case and provide an 
understanding of its idiosyncrasy and particular complexity. Rather than reading 
across participant accounts to identify common elements and themes, in Narrative 
Inquiry the analysis moves from elements to stories.   
 
The analytical process not only revealed the understandings that underlie the storied 
outcomes and associated interpretations presented in Chapter Eight, but also prompted 
me to reflect on the interpersonal processes that were crucial to developing and fully 
contextualising those understandings. Working through the field notes, I gained a 
deeper understanding of how each participant’s understanding of and possibilities for 
enacting everyday activities shaped the possibilities for data creation, from the solitary 
to those conducted as a larger group. I also became aware of the way in which my 
relationship with each participant developed over the study, how this was related in 
part to the types of activities engaged in, and how each relationship fostered the 
various understandings. As relationships deepened, rather than posing a threat to 
‘rigor’, this methodological sensitivity seemed to facilitate genuine understandings of 
the participants’ experiences (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland, 2006). It struck 
me as important to incorporate this learning in the research text. 
 
Polkinghorne (1995) remarks that to understand the person, we must try to grasp the 
person's meanings and understandings. Experience is always in excess of language and 
felt meanings about a situation are always greater than what can be said about them. 
Participants are able to articulate only that portion of meaning that they can access 
through reflection. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962 cited in Polkinghorne, 1995) 
described it, it is as if participants are asked to shine the light of reflection into a well. 
The light only carries so far, and the well is deeper than the light can penetrate. This 
deeper portion remains in the dark and cannot be observed. Following each meeting 
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with a participant, through the application of mimetic theory, the different possibilities 
for engaging with meaning-making processes presented by the different types of 
activities in different environments also became apparent, as did the limitations. Again, 
it seemed important to capture this in the research text.  
 
My approach to the narrative emplotment was guided by Polkinghorne (1995) who 
draws directly on Ricoeur’s (1984) narrative theorising. Specifically, Polkinghorne 
considers narrative analysis to be a hermeneutic task; trying to grasp the interplay 
between the actions, the social context, and the interpretation of what is said or 
communicated in other ways. The procedure can be compared to the principles 
described in the hermeneutic circle, involving a back and forth movement between the 
parts and the whole. The process began with close reading of the field texts to try to 
comprehend each participant’s story as a whole. Approaching the text, I asked 
analytical questions to understand how the participants negotiated and created 
meaning in relation to different events and experiences, and concerns, hopes, desires 
and possibilities connected to them.  I was particularly attentive to the possibilities for 
participation and contribution, and the everyday practices of citizenship. I kept typed 
notes for each participant to capture any developing ideas, including lists of events that 
the participant had underscored as significant, plus events that struck me as significant 
and why they seemed significant. 
 
Preliminary interpretations were drawn in an attempt to understand how different 
events contributed to the development of plots. Importantly, the story constituted by 
narrative configuration allows for the incorporation of notions of purpose and choice, 
both through their presence and absence, as well as chance happenings, dispositions, 
and environmental pressures. In this analysis, I attended to the temporal and unfolding 
dimension of human experience by organising the events extracted from the data along 
a continuum. I also looked at the welcome and less welcome possibilities that 
participants contemplated, and whether these were actualised within or persisted 
through the study period. I made use of post-it notes that I could move about, add to or 
remove. An example of these notes and a photo of my ‘post-its wall’ is provided at 
Appendix XIV.  
 
The analytical process was not straightforward. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) 
highlight that it is in the construction of research texts and associated dialogue, 
imagined and desired, with the reader that narratives rub up against reductionist and 
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formalistic terms. The authors add that these terms are part of everyone’s intellectual 
world. I found they were very much part of my world and at times it was tempting to 
think of the participants’ unfolding stories simply as exemplars of structural categories 
such as gender or class (see Appendix XIV). Adding events and attending closely to the 
details caused these categories to fragment and enabled the nuances of different 
experiences to be preserved. 
 
As each plot began to take form, the events and happenings that seemed most crucial to 
the story as a whole became apparent, with each event taking its meaning from its 
contribution to the whole. Not all events and data elements were needed to configure 
the narrative. Spence (1986) suggests that elements which do not contradict the plot, 
but which are not pertinent to its development, do not become part of the storied 
narrative, a process called narrative smoothing. In determining which events were and 
were not needed, I was keen to preserve not only continuities and concordance, but 
also some of the discontinuities, uncertainties and contradictions that were very much 
part of the participants’ experiences. Each narrative is my interpretation and 
represents just one possible interpretation. Because of this, it was not appropriate to 
ask the participant to verify it as the ‘real’ or ‘true’ story (Polkinghorne, 1995). 
Authenticity and Trustworthiness  
Like all narrative researchers, I undertook this inquiry to have something to say to 
readers about the human condition. The knowledge claims produced are intended to be 
taken seriously. This requires provision of sufficient justification for the claims I make. 
Internal validity and external validity are key considerations in quantitative research, 
but the relevance of the concept of ‘validity’ in qualitative research is contested. 
Certainly, generalisability was not was a goal in this study and is not the purpose of 
Narrative Inquiry. Equally, representativeness was not sought, but participant diversity 
was an aspiration and was achieved in part, as described in Chapter Six. Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) have developed alternative criteria for qualitative research, suggesting 
trustworthiness, authenticity and transferability are critical, as discussed below. 
 
The use of theory to guide narrative analysis and interpretation provides scope, 
direction and concepts, and can enhance the transparency of research results. The 
provision of thick descriptions of the context and the way in which conclusions are 
reached, including reflexive accounts, should allow readers to critically reflect on and 
make judgements about the authenticity and trustworthiness of the narratives. The 
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question of ‘authenticity’ was at the forefront of my thinking throughout my time in the 
field as well as during the analysis and I offer an extended account of my reflections in 
support of this in Chapter Nine.  
 
In judging the quality of a single narrative, a distinction should be made between the 
accuracy of the data and the plausibility of the plot. The evaluation of the configurative 
analytic work is based on the resultant narrative’s explanatory power, namely the 
production of coherence among the situated, contextual, and particular elements of the 
data (Connelly and Clandinin, 1990). That said, the narratives are not intended to be 
too neat and tidy and Crites' (1986:168) cautionary phrase is to be aware ‘the illusion 
of causality’; narrative explanation derives from the whole. 
 
Unlike other forms of qualitative research where transferability of thematic findings to 
other contexts is a key consideration, with appropriateness of the transfer aided by 
thick description of the context, the evaluation of each narrative has a pragmatic 
dimension. Ultimately, the value of a narrative depends on its capacity to provide the 
reader with insight and understanding. Narratives function as arguments in which we 
learn something essentially human by understanding an actual life as lived (Clandinin 
and Connelly, 2000). This relates directly to Ricoeur’s (1984) concept of ‘refiguration’ 
and the potential for revelation of what has previously remained unseen and unheard, 
in this case in the realm of the ordinary. It also holds the potential for transformation, 
through an invitation to act differently. I consider this potential in Chapter Nine. In 
presenting the narratives as a set, the main purpose of the subsequent commentary is 
to highlight differences and nuances among the cases (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). 
Although striking similarities are also noted, paradigmatic analysis is inappropriate. 
Reflections and Way Forward 
This chapter detailed the methodological approach I employed in the study to facilitate 
an exploration of how everyday life with dementia is accomplished, drawing upon the 
narrative theories set out in Chapter Four. I considered the alignment of the selected 
methods with the principles and ethos of citizenship-as-practice. I also reaffirmed the 
central place of reflexivity within Narrative Inquiry and established the importance of 
trustworthiness, authenticity and analytical transparency. Mindful of the importance of 
transparency, and using the research questions as a guide, I present the results of the 
analysis in a way that ‘shows my working’. Specifically, I describe the development of 
relationships with each participant in Chapter Six, together with the implications for 
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reaching understandings. To illustrate the different meaning-making possibilities 
presented by the different types of activity engaged in, I describe and interpret one 
particular experience of joining a participant or couple on the Narrative Inquiry 
landscape in Chapter Seven. I then present the five emplotted narratives which 
contextualise and expand upon these experiences in Chapter Eight, together with 
interpretations. Finally, in Chapter Nine I reflect upon the experience of doing the 






Opening Doors: Introducing the Participants  
Overview 
In this chapter, I introduce the older people who took part in the study and describe the 
sorts of interactions and activities that took place when we spent time together.  I also 
consider the implications of the different forms of co-participation for the development 
of our respective research relationships and for gaining insights into the situated and 
unfolding nature of each person’s everyday life. The chapter thus lays the ground for 
the more interpretive accounts of particular experiences, the ongoing narratives and 
the implications for identity presented in the subsequent chapters. 
As soon as I entered the field and each person or couple invited me to step through the 
door into their lives, my thinking changed. The ‘research participants’ that I had been 
desperate to ‘recruit’ became real people, and the ‘diverse characteristics’ that I had 
sought didn’t begin to scrape the surface of their varied life histories or current 
situations. Clandinin and Connelly (2000:63) describe entering the field as ‘beginning 
in the midst’. Just as I come to the inquiry field in the midst of my story, the participants 
enter the inquiry field in the midst of theirs. Or perhaps they are nearing the end. Their 
lives however do not end the day I leave and they do not begin the day I arrive. The 
places in which they live, the families and communities they belong and contribute to 
are also in the midst of their stories. As a narrative inquirer, I enter lives in motion, pre-
narratives, the (re)telling still to come via the inquiry. In this chapter, I hope to convey 
a sense of this ‘beginning in the midst.’  
Distilling the uniqueness of any one person or couple into a short summary is of course 
reductive and challenging. The pen portraits that follow include the biographical details 
the participants emphasised to me during the fieldwork, together with the sense of 
their individual characters that I formed, through dialogue and interaction, during our 
initial meetings. Each pen portrait is followed by a brief account of the various 
interactions and activities engaged in, complementing the more in-depth and 
necessarily selective extracts and emplotted narratives provided in the subsequent 
chapters. In these brief accounts, I reflect upon the introductory meeting with each 
person or couple, and its role in setting expectations and influencing future research 
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undertakings. This includes consideration of motivation for taking part in the study, 
interpretation of ‘everyday activity’ and the extent to which this concept was discussed 
or problematised. I also summarise the key changes that took place within and outside 
of the research encounters during the study period and the implications for possible 
narrative configurations.    
Research is relational and the quality of data generated and interpretations are 
predicated on the quality of relationships. I therefore explore the way in which each 
research relationship developed, including the importance of first impressions, 
sustained engagement, attending to previous experiences and the place of reciprocity. 
Finally, I draw conclusions about the sorts of interpersonal processes that proved 
crucial to developing and fully contextualising my understandings, bringing together 
my learning from doing everyday activities and developing relationships with the 
participants across the study as a whole.   
Hector 
Hector is a tall man in his early 80s who sports a thick mane of wavy silver hair. He 
appears physically fit, although quite a few health problems are alluded to. The 
biographical details that he is most keen to impress upon me are his previous inter-
related interests in politics, travel and jazz. He taught himself to play the clarinet and 
tenor sax, enabling him to join the band when he did his National Service. Hector is at 
his most eloquent and relaxed when talking about former adventures and 
accomplishments, particularly those that required self-determinacy and initiative. He 
tells me that he is uninterested in the ‘bland politics of today’ and volunteers the 
information that he is an atheist. I learn that he has been a keen sportsman throughout 
his life and is the oldest playing member at the local golf club. 
Hector is married to Gina, a small, bustling woman who he met at a dance hall when he 
was twenty and Gina was ‘sweet sixteen’. They have enjoyed many shared interests over 
the years, especially their passion for jive, jazz and travel. Hector worked in one of the 
mills close to his parents’ home when he left school and again following National 
Service, working ‘from the very bottom up to the role of manager’. He was later ‘head 
hunted’ by another mill close to his current home, which he and Gina moved to nearly 
fifty years ago. About ten years after this move, Hector sensed that the mills were 
coming to an end and secured a place on a University course, enabling him to embark 
on a different career path in education, which he pursued until he retired.   
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Hector has made many alterations to the house over the years, which are a source of 
pride. The detached house is located at the top of a steep hill and is about a fifteen-
minute walk from the nearest bus stop. It has a sizeable, sloping garden, which a 
gardener now maintains. Neighbours have come and gone and Hector doesn’t know 
them well, with the exception of one couple directly opposite. Hector and Gina have one 
son, Chris, who lived abroad for many years, but recently returned to Scotland with his 
wife and family because Hector and Gina are ‘getting on a bit’. Chris’s wife has since 
moved away with the children to be closer to her own parents and Chris is living with 
Hector and Gina ‘for the time being’.  This development is described as ‘very welcome’. 
Hector frequently refers to problems with his memory and becomes frustrated when 
he can’t recall names of people or places. He repeats one or two anecdotes, and checks 
with me to see if he has already told me others before beginning. During our 
introductory meeting, he tells me he may not remember much of our conversation and 
that his memory is getting worse. When going through the consent process, after 
reading the text ‘people with memory problems or dementia’ he scores through the 
words ‘or dementia’ with a pen, saying ‘I think dementia is a terrible word, it makes you 
think about someone gaga and drooling’. Gina is more forceful in her rejection of 
Hector’s diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, informing me that his memory loss is due to 
an earlier urinary infection which resulted in a lamentable hospital admission. She 
insists that things are improving, emphasising that she ‘knows him better than anyone’. I 
learn that Hector was discharged from the memory clinic after three visits, once she 
‘cleared things up’.  As Hector recently resat his driving test and ‘passed in the A 
category’ Gina has processed this as further evidence that ‘his original diagnosis was 
clearly wrong’. 
Doing everyday activities together: ‘Hoping to get the kick start I need’  
Hector is the first person to contact me about taking part in the study. He is articulate 
and coherent when we speak on the phone and demonstrates a sound understanding of 
the nature of the research, telling me he thinks it will be mutually beneficial. 
Specifically, he understands that the research is in support of a PhD and suggests that 
helping me to complete this (rather than contributing to knowledge or helping 
unknown others) is his reason for taking part, regarding this as consistent with his 
former role in education. In terms of the benefits for himself, Hector tells me that he is 
withdrawing and recognises the dangers of staying in bed late or watching TV all day, 
but finds his motivation is waning. Hector’s understanding of ‘everyday activity’ is 
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something that he should be doing more of and by taking part in the study he is ‘hoping 
to get the kick start’ he ‘needs’.  
 
I am excited about meeting Hector, but when I arrive outside his house I am intercepted 
by Gina whose first words are ‘I don’t think he’s going to go through with it’. She speaks 
hurriedly, but her key issue appears to be that the letter about the study and Hector’s 
appointment to re-sit his driving test arrived at the same time. I am told that the 
driving test had been a source of anxiety and Gina has put the study letter in the same 
category. She tells me that Hector has been ‘doing great’ since he passed the driving 
test, seems to think I am going to be ‘testing him’ and that this will ‘upset him’. I stress 
that I don’t want to upset Hector, ask if I can try to reassure her that there will be no 
testing, or if she would prefer me to leave. She replies that Hector is looking forward to 
my visit and goes ahead of me through the door, calling out his name and shouting 
‘that’s Karen here’.  
 
On entering the house, I am assuming that Hector will not be taking part in the study. 
When I go into the kitchen, Hector is on his knees and in the process of defrosting the 
fridge. He looks up and the first words he says to me are ‘you can help me with this’. At 
first, I think he is joking, but Gina says ‘let her take her coat off first’ and takes my coat 
from me. At this point I am wondering what I have walked into. I question whether 
Hector has understood the research leaflet after all and perhaps thinks I am there to 
help with household tasks. I also notice that Hector looks a bit dishevelled. This face to 
face encounter does not tally with the impression I formed during our phone 
conversation. I am mulling all this over when Gina says ‘I told him not to be starting that 
when you were coming’ and Hector responds crossly that ‘the whole point is that I just do 
what I would normally be doing’. He asks ‘is that right?’ and I agree, adding that there 
are a few things I have to chat through to check that the leaflet explains things properly, 
to answer any questions that he or Gina might have, and to make sure that he is happy 
to go ahead.  
 
I note that Hector still thinks he is taking part in the study and try to think on my feet 
how best to manage the situation. Also, of all the ‘everyday activities’ I thought I might 
end up doing with people, defrosting the fridge was not one of them. Hector has a pile 
of ice in each hand, there doesn’t seem to be a receptacle for it and he seems uncertain 
what to do next. I ask if I can make myself useful, take the ice from him and empty it 
into the sink. For the next five minutes or so I help him to remove ice from the freezer 
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compartment while Gina looks on. It is a bit of a palaver and I warn them that I am no 
domestic goddess. When we finish I ask if they would like to have a chat about the 
research and Gina offers me a cup of tea, nodding and smiling, and I accept.  
 
I am taken through to the living room and make small talk with Hector until Gina 
returns with a tray. When she says she’ll ‘leave us to it’, I stress that it’s important to 
know how she feels about Hector’s involvement in the research too, still a bit thrown by 
our doorstep encounter. Gina tells me she thinks ‘it’ll all be fine’ and that she is going to 
sort through some washing and will join us afterwards. I chat with Hector for quite 
some time and detect a marked difference in his demeanour when talking about his 
past accomplishments versus the present day. He attributes his current apathy to the 
weather, but also tells me that part of the problem is that he has ‘been everywhere and 
done everything’ and has no remaining ambitions. I remind him about re-sitting his 
driving test and how well he performed and this results in a lengthy account of the 
importance of driving to the golf club, which he still tries to do a couple of times each 
week to meet with friends, even if the weather is too bad to play. When he suggests that 
I accompany him to the golf club as part of the study, I say that sounds great and ask 
how Gina feels about him taking part. He goes off to find her.   
When Gina returns she appears very animated, saying how much he’s enjoyed my ‘visit’, 
adding ‘and he’s been telling you all about our jiving’. At this point Hector grabs hold of 
her and they perform an impromptu dance. Suddenly I see a devoted couple that have 
been together ever since Hector plucked up the courage to ask a bubbly sixteen-year 
old girl to dance over sixty years ago, each trying to process the experience of ageing 
and memory loss in a different way. I reflect with shame on the uncharitable thoughts 
that I was entertaining in their kitchen a short time ago. When we discuss the idea of 
my accompanying Hector to the golf club and then taking it from there, Gina rubs her 
hands together and leans toward Hector saying, ‘oh that would be good, wouldn’t it’.  
Before leaving, I follow Gina when she goes to get my coat to ask her about her initial 
concerns, but she assures me that she thinks ‘doing the research will be good for him’. 
This initial meeting in many ways proves defining. It sets the expectation that Hector 
will be helping me personally, drawing on skills acquired through his former 
professional role. Gina’s endorsement is based on her belief that taking part in the 
study may be good for Hector and she is ‘happy for it to be Hector’s thing’. The research 




Table 6.1 - Summary Record for Hector 
 
Date Description 
17/12/2015 Chilly start: Introductory meeting, consent process and getting to know 
each other after defrosting the fridge. 
January January blues: Series of telephone calls to try to arrange for me to 
accompany Hector to his golf club, but he has not been going due to snow 
or heavy rain and a series of health problems such as a leg strain and 
inability to hear due to ear wax. 
08/02/2016 Retracing steps: Rather than making the weather dependent trip to the 
golf club we agree to meet at Hector’s home and spend the afternoon 
chatting and sorting through memorabilia from his various trips abroad. 
09/03/2016 Paying my dues at the golf club: I join Hector on his Wednesday lunch 
time trip to the golf club. A man in his mid-90’s goes for lunch everyday 
with his son and Hector is one of a group of men who take turns to pop in 
on different days to provide them both with some company.  
02/04/2016 The best medicine - meeting the boys at the golf club: I accompany 
Hector and his friend Bill on their Saturday trip to the golf club. I join a 
group of seven very companionable men and observe their use of humour 
to make light of their respective ailments. 
02/06/2016 Sunshine after the rain: Hector is doing some light gardening when I 
arrive and I help him for a while. Gina has had a ‘turn’ at her keep fit class. 
She joins us and we spend the afternoon sitting in the garden as they chat 
about their forthcoming travel plans.  
03/07/2016 End of the line: I had arranged to meet up with Hector to hear about his 
railway trip following the West Highland Way, but when I phone to confirm 
I am shocked to learn that Gina is seriously unwell. 
 
Hector’s desire to present himself in a favourable light persists when thinking about the 
ways we might spend time together and I tend to see Hector on his ‘brighter days’, 
interacting with people he feels comfortable with. As the golf club plays a major role in 
structuring Hector’s week, it also features prominently in the chapters that follow.  
Over the course of the study there are several call-offs, attributed to the weather or to 
Hector’s health ailments, and these call-offs in themselves prove insightful. The study 
duration also means that I have the opportunity to observe Hector’s mood change with 
the seasons. Then a dramatic change in Gina’s health turns Hector’s world upside down, 
bringing his involvement to an abrupt end. 
Developing relationships: Old habits die hard 
The development of my relationship with Hector is heavily circumscribed by our initial 
meeting. I find myself treading carefully to begin with, often slipping on my 
professional hat and drawing upon strengths-based conversational techniques. 
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Hector’s own former profession is another important factor and he still enjoys 
educating people. He delights in sharing public speaking tips and words of wisdom, his 
traveller’s tales inspire me to visit Nepal one day and he frequently repeats his life 
motto ‘this is no rehearsal’. I guess old habits die hard for both of us. When I observe his 
friends from the golf course jibing him for boasting or name dropping, this accentuates 
the entirely different quality of our own relationship, which maintains a distinctly 
inter-generational flavour. The nature of our relationship influences what Hector 
chooses to show me or tell me about his situation and how I respond, and thus shapes 
and informs my understanding. This is consistent with my aim of encouraging each 
person to guide the depth and breadth of our interactions, but Hector introduces me to 
the practical consequences of this aspiration. I try to keep sight of the nature of these 
choices as I document the inevitably partial understandings that I co-construct with 
Hector, and indeed with each person or couple, in the chapters that follow. 
Tommy and Grace  
Tommy is a highly affable man in his mid-80s who likes to talk! He is a bit of a joker 
who uses humour to field questions. Physically he remains very fit and is a keen walker. 
Tommy is quick to tell me that he never knew his father, that his mother died when he 
was just two years old and, most poignantly, that he has ‘no memory of her’. He was 
raised by his grandmother in the main, occasionally being ‘passed round’ a series of 
aunts when he ‘got too much for her’. He later makes a point of showing me his birth 
certificate and mother’s death certificate as if to confirm his account. Tommy tells me 
that he struggled at school and developed a bad stutter. He grew up in the countryside 
and despite descriptions of real hardship in his early life, particularly during the war 
years, he enjoys recounting tales of various scraps, scrapes and odd jobs working on 
the land. He sounds like a bit of a handful. 
Tommy is married to Grace, who he refers to as ‘the secretary’.  She is a delightful, softly 
spoken lady in her early 80s with a terrific (and necessary) sense of humour and an 
aura of calm. She strikes me as very capable and organised and although she enjoys a 
busy life, she doesn’t share Tommy’s love of walking and has a bad back. Grace and 
Tommy are active members of the local church and their faith is important to them. 
They grew up in the same rural community and met at a dance in the church hall. They 
have a son, ‘number one son’ who ‘has done very well for himself’ and lives with his wife 
about a thirty-minute drive away. Their daughter lives in a remote area with her 
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husband and it is suggested that ‘their lifestyle’ makes visiting difficult. Tommy and 
Grace talk fondly about their several grown-up grandchildren, none of whom live 
locally. One lives in Australia and they keep up with the progress of his son, their first 
great grand-child, via skype and various phone apps, which Grace demonstrates that 
she has mastered. 
Tommy was as a tradesman for most of his working life and Tommy and Grace moved 
to their current modest home almost forty years ago when Tommy got a job with the 
maintenance department for the council in the nearest city, finding the daily commute 
preferable to city life. The house is traditionally furnished, orderly and has a small, well 
maintained front garden and larger back garden, which Tommy insists he ‘keeps on top 
of’. Most of their neighbours have lived in the street for many years too, and they all 
look out for each other. Tommy calls one neighbour ‘the Captain’ due to his deportment, 
and another ‘the Sheriff’ as he ‘has keys for everyone’s houses and knows everyone’s 
business’, but there is a fondness behind the jibes.  
Tommy’s memory difficulties do not seem to frustrate him and he compensates well 
through his use of humour. He speaks fluently and quickly, only occasionally searching 
for names of people or places, but has a tendency to ‘jump tracks’, reminding me of a 
scratched vinyl LP record. He accepts his diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and tells me 
he knows it is there, but tries not to think about it. Grace has signed up with the 
Alzheimer’s Society and finds the newsletters helpful. She and Tommy have taken 
advantage of tickets for the theatre, but when we first meet, she is disinclined to attend 
anything more dementia-specific.  
Doing everyday activities together: ‘Whatever’s best for you’ 
When I meet with Tommy and Grace it is apparent that they have considered the study 
Participant Information Leaflet carefully and are keen to do ‘whatever’s best’ to meet 
my requirements, rather than raising their own concerns or restrictions. The fact that 
the leaflet was posted out by their GP has carried considerable weight, but they create 
the impression of people who enjoy exploring whatever opportunities come their way. 
Their understanding and enactment of ‘everyday activity’ is consistent with the 
examples offered in the leaflet and the concept is not contested.  
 
Tommy is keen ‘to be part of a study’ and demonstrates a good understanding of what 
the research will entail. He immediately asks me if I am a walker, telling me that he 
goes out for walks most days, so I ‘best dig out my hiking boots’. He reveals that he’s 
119 
 
interested in history too, particularly of the area where he grew up and spent his early 
adult life, and suggests maybe I could have a look through his history books with him ‘if 
the weather’s not so good’. His main social activity is a weekly men’s group at the 
church, which ‘of course’ I won’t be able to attend. Tommy understands the planned 
duration of the study, telling me ‘if you want to get to know all about me and what I get 
up to, it’ll take you more than seven meetings’. While at this early stage I am comfortable 
pointing to the description of the REC in the leaflet, emphasising that the Committee 
agreed to a maximum of seven meetings as this is a rather big ask, this is the first clue 
that I might need to remain alert to the sensitive management of ending Tommy’s 
involvement in the study.  
 
Grace demonstrates a firm grasp of the purpose of the different types of ‘activity’ that I 
had set out in the leaflet, and she is keen to help Tommy think of ways to satisfy the 
suggested mix of routine and more socially significant activities. I admire her no-
nonsense approach when asking me questions about her anticipated role. I am also 
struck by Grace’s pragmatism and discretion in helping to compensate for Tommy’s 
difficulties. She informs me that there have been ‘a few incidents’ when Tommy has 
been out and about on his own, but her approach is to find ways to manage risks rather 
than avoid them. For instance, when Tommy did not meet up with his son as arranged, 
resulting in seventeen missed calls, this was attributed to Tommy putting his mobile 
phone on silent as a result of being left-handed, and a new DORUS phone has since been 
purchased.  
 
The summary record of my meetings with Tommy and Grace is provided in table 6.2 
overleaf. All meetings take place as scheduled during the previous session, although 
Grace’s involvement is reduced due to her own health issues. We establish a pattern 
where I go out with Tommy for a few hours, giving Grace some time to herself, and we 
generally come back to the house and spend time together chatting, pottering around 







Table 6.2 - Summary Record for Tommy and Grace 
Date Summary Description 
 
07/01/2016 Introductions: Consent process and getting to know each other through a 
long chat with both Tommy and Grace in the lounge. 
14/01/2016 Setting off on a sure footing ~ a walk in the snow: Tommy and I walk (quite 
a complex but clearly familiar route) to the church café, have a bite to eat and 
then get the bus home and spend time with Grace on return.   
28/01/2016 Running errands: Tommy and I take the bus into town, go to the charity 
shop, post a parcel and buy stamps at the post office, drop off a repeat 
prescription at the GPs and go to the supermarket. We have a coffee in a new 
Italian café before catching the bus home and chatting with Grace in the 
lounge. 
11/02/2016 Lost in the woods? Tommy and I walk to an old house of historical interest 
that is being renovated and he takes his new camera. We learn the route is cut 
off, forcing Tommy to make a spontaneous change to our plans. Time with 
Grace on return. 
03/03/2016 Countdown: Tommy is finishing up in the garden when I arrive and we start 
off there before going for a short walk. On return we have an extended chat in 
the lounge with Grace and also watch a bit of TV together.  
12/04/2016 Carved in stone, disappearing ink:  I had planned to accompany both 
Tommy and Grace to Roslyn Chapel, but Grace is recovering from flu. Looking 
at the carvings together seems to prompt a very different type of conversation 
and I experience concerns about ending Tommy’s involvement.   
11/05/2016 Can we still be friends? Tommy and I take a tour of an old cove that he has 
told me about and then walk to a nearby café where we meet Grace for tea and 
cakes and talk through the study and ways of keeping in touch before 
wrapping up. 
 
The resultant mix of activities enables me to be with Tommy and Grace as they sit 
together in the comfort of their own home, shrieking with laughter at Tommy’s one-line 
quips while watching his favourite TV programme, ‘Wanted Down Under’ or his 
improbable solutions to the Countdown conundrum. I am also privy to some difficult 
conversations about an uncertain future. I am with Tommy as he walks confidently 
along well-trodden woodland paths and the snow-covered streets around his home. 
And I am there as he negotiates getting on and off buses and as he takes pains to 
complete transactions in cafes, shops, the post office, chemist and GP surgery. These 
activities entail interacting with different and changing places, technologies, people he 
knows well, less well, is unsure if he knows or not, strangers, an extraordinary number 
of dogs and other situational elements. During the study period, a number of changes 
take place outside of the research encounters; some activities cease, the continuation of 
others is questioned and new activities commence, many directly related to Tommy’s 
diagnosis. Together we generate a huge volume of material and the analytical 
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possibilities are potentially overwhelming, demanding transparency about the 
selections made in subsequent chapters. 
Developing relationships: Breaking up is hard to do 
Throughout the study period, Grace is very relaxed and open, and when I spend time 
with her and Tommy together I feel like a true ‘participant observer’. However, I am 
seldom alone with Grace, most of our one-to-one interactions take place by phone and 
often revolve around Tommy. This inevitably skews my understanding. In contrast, I 
spend a lot of time on my own with Tommy and the solitary nature of many of his 
interests means that I change the situation simply by being there. During our earliest 
meetings, Tommy does most of the talking, often at speed, jumping from one topic to 
another without pausing, skipping decades. I have read much about people with 
dementia struggling to keep up with the pace of conversations, but initially I find I 
struggle to keep pace with Tommy as he travels through time. I wonder what relevance 
much of the content has for the research purpose and even whether I should transcribe 
everything. I am glad that I do as I am able to piece together many of the different 
fragments and the significance of many of the biographical revelations later becomes 
apparent. Importantly, I am able to demonstrate to Tommy that he has been heard.  
As the study progresses, the dynamic changes; the pace of Tommy’s talk slows, 
becoming more coherent, firmly anchored in what we are experiencing together, and 
the transcripts start to take the form of a relaxed, informal dialogue. Tommy often 
confides in me, I begin to feel that I know him, that we understand each other. I carry 
this understanding forward when interpreting the data presented in the chapters that 
follow. However, through this understanding I also realise that participating in the 
study has itself become a valued activity for Tommy and that I may be altering his 
future path. He tells me that meeting me is ‘the best thing that’s happened’ since his 
diagnosis. In turn, I come to care about him a great deal. It is Tommy who first alerts me 
to the parallel processes that are taking place in each of the research relationships, 
albeit in different ways, and to the reciprocal and ultimately mutual nature of the 
research endeavour. And it is my relationship with Tommy that raises the greatest 
number of ethical moments and that I become most anxious about ending. It is 
therefore my relationship with Tommy that I choose to focus upon in Chapter Nine as 
part of my reflection on the research methodology.  
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Jim and Mary 
Jim is a very tall, quietly spoken and private man in his eightieth year who retains an 
athletic build. His father ran a small business and Jim helped out from a young age, then 
worked there full-time ‘straight from school’. He later went into business for himself 
against his father’s wishes and, to his regret, they became estranged. Jim worked hard 
to build his business into a highly successful enterprise over the years, eventually 
selling up to a multinational company. In his younger days, a family friend sparked an 
interest in cycling and Jim became a cycling champion. This stood him in good stead 
when he did his National Service as he was able to continue training and competing. In 
later years, he became a low handicap golfer and proficient curler. He tells me that he 
loved sports and is ‘paying the price now’ as he sorely ‘misses the buzz’. Upon retiring, 
Jim’s business expertise resulted in numerous invitations to sit on various local 
committees. While his involvement has decreased in recent years, when we first meet 
he is still volunteering at a local stroke club that he helped to establish.  
Jim met his wife Mary when she worked in the bank used by his father’s business. Mary 
is small, very trim, physically fit and a keen sportswoman. They have a son who lives 
locally, plus a daughter and a son who both live further afield, but telephone frequently 
and visit when they can. They enjoyed staying with their daughter and her children for 
an extended period over Christmas. Jim and Mary live in a large, perfectly maintained 
home with a vast garden and while not isolated, there are no immediate neighbours. 
They have a few very good friends who visit quite often or they go to the golf club with 
for a bite to eat. 
When we first meet, Jim has been diagnosed with mixed dementias and Parkinson’s 
disease, but the latter is later revised to a more rapidly progressive form of 
Parkinsonism that doesn’t respond to treatment. Jim doesn’t have a tremor, walks 
stiffly but without shuffling, and while registered blind retains some blurred vision. He 
refers to his memory problems and has difficult holding onto the thread of 
conversations, but is much more concerned about his ‘tiredness’, as he struggles to keep 
his eyes open and often falls asleep. Mary has always enjoyed driving and initially Jim 
manages in and out of the car without too much difficulty. Her key concern is the 
frequency with which Jim has been falling. He had a bad fall the previous year when 
walking to the post office with her and broke his femur. This resulted in hospitalisation 
for two months, during which he declined significantly. 
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Jim remains fiercely independent. He had a particularly nasty fall in the shower a few 
days before our initial meeting, which has further rocked Mary’s confidence and Jim 
admits ‘it plays on me, mentally’. Jim can no longer venture beyond the garden alone 
and while Mary will ‘nip to the shops’, she can’t leave Jim any longer than that. Jim 
attends a day centre twice a week and Mary has recruited someone to ‘sit with Jim’ one 
additional afternoon each week until the end of the curling season.  
Doing everyday activities together: Will your anchor hold? 
When I first meet with Jim, he tells me that he struggles because of the lack of things he 
can do and that he is delighted to be doing the research because he ‘feels useful’. Mary 
adds that if they can help, why wouldn’t they? Jim suggests that I ‘can have open access’, 
but makes me smile when he asserts that ‘the day centre doesn’t really come under the 
category of day to day life’; it is something he accepts as ‘necessary’ to give Mary a break, 
adding ‘I can’t say I enjoy it’. Although reluctant to complain because ‘the staff are all 
very good people’, he will admit that he finds the activities on offer ‘a bit unimaginative’. 
He is also the first person picked up and last person dropped off and finds the bus 
journey difficult, particularly being ‘strapped in’, ‘driven all through the town’ and 
‘having to watch everyone struggle on and off’. Due to his former prominence within the 
local community he also feels that everyone knows him, although he doesn’t always 
know them, and finds this ‘awkward’.  
In contrast, Jim is emphatic that ‘the thing that helps most’ is volunteering at the stroke 
club each week, describing it as his ‘anchor’. Although he knows that he is unable to 
help the way he used to, he finds the club gives him a different perspective on life, 
particularly as many of the members are much younger than him, and it brings him 
‘down to earth’. Having helped to establish the club, he also finds it ‘very gratifying’. Jim 
suggests that I accompany him to the club to ‘see for myself’ what it gives him and, to 
Mary’s surprise, he makes the necessary arrangements with the organiser. It transpires 
that this is to be Jim’s last contribution to the club due to mounting concerns about him 
falling. Appreciating what the club means to Jim and experiencing the ending of his 
involvement first hand is critical in shaping my understanding of the overall situation. 
In the chapters that follow it becomes my anchor too. The summary record of my 





Table 6.3 Summary Record for Jim and Mary 
Date Summary Description 
06/01/2016 Introductions: Consent process and getting to know each other 
13/01/2016 Practice makes perfect: Walk to the post office with Jim and Mary as they 
practice a new hand grip suggested by the physiotherapist. Mary goes out 
to the shops and Jim chats to me while he potters around the kitchen and 
practices his chair exercises. 
27/01/2016 Fault lines: I accompany Jim to the stroke club where he has volunteered 
for years; this transpires to be Jim’s final input due to concerns about his 
frequent falls. 
22/02/2016 Forever rescheduling: Mary phones to reschedule the meeting planned 
for the following afternoon as Jim has another medical appointment and 
she remarks that she is ‘forever rescheduling these days’. 
26/02/2016 Fish on Friday: Jim is late in getting back from the day centre, is very tired 
and uncharacteristically irritable. The customary Friday fish tea with 
friends has been called off and I keep things short. 
30/03/2016 Still listening:  Jim is finding talking very hard and apologises for being 
unable to keep his eyes open, insisting ‘he’s ‘still listening’. I’m shocked to 
see how quickly his condition has deteriorated. Mary looks exhausted. Jim 
has had another bad fall and his GP has referred him to the day hospital, so 









Over the months of April and May, I have eight phone conversations with 
Mary, which convey how prophetic the words ‘waiting game’ were. Each 
time she is waiting for an appointment date, to accompany Jim to an 
appointment, for news of results, about respite, from the hospital or finally 
about a care home placement.  
Filling the void: Mary phones to let me know that Jim has moved into a 
care home. She is buying him his own wheelchair as she finds him too 
heavy to push using the chairs provided by the home. She is accepting 
every social invite on offer as her life ‘suddenly seems so empty’. 
22/06/2016 Not the old Jim: Jim appears to have settled in. He is finding it very hard to 
talk or to open his eyes. His large athletic frame has bulked up a bit. He 
seems quietly content. Mary is struggling to cope with events and says 
often ‘he’s not the old Jim’.  
 
Over the course of the study, I observe Jim and Mary’s lives being increasingly 
structured by medical appointments and care services, then shattered by each 
successive fall. I spend time with Jim as he struggles to talk about how everything is 
slowing down, and ultimately when he is unable to say anything at all. In parallel, I 
observe Mary’s daily occupation take the form of confronting the rapidity of Jim’s 
decline and frantically searching for solutions. Along the way, ‘everyday activity’ takes 
the form of a waiting game.  
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Developing relationships: ‘Not telling a very good story’ – ‘It’s good to sound off’  
My relationship with Jim is influenced by my first impression, his strong handshake, 
friendly welcome and broad smile. I instantly feel comfortable with Jim and sense an 
ability to put people at ease refined over his working life. I appreciate his dry sense of 
humour and he is aware of this. As Jim finds it difficult to talk or to keep his eyes open, I 
have to rely on my observations, intuitions and emotions. Jim has so much to contend 
with, yet never complains and exudes a quiet contentment. When we first meet, if Mary 
is present he defers to her but otherwise, if I wait, sometimes he will complete what he 
set out to say, other times he drifts off. Being with Jim, everything slows down, but I 
don’t find the slowness awkward. What I get from being with Jim is a rare feeling of 
calm. Although I know that his thought processes are supposed to be slowing too, I get 
the sense that the effort it takes for him to speak causes him to think very carefully and 
prioritise what to say. When he remarks ‘I’m not telling a very good story’, I respond 
sincerely ‘on the contrary, I think you’re making my job easier, doing a lot of the work for 
me, telling me only the most important stuff’.  Jim smiles, takes a deep breath and thanks 
me and I think we have an understanding. I like Jim enormously and I admire his 
graciousness and his candid reflections on life. He can be a bit stubborn, but is aware of 
his shortcomings as a man and seems able to accept them for what they are. For 
instance, he was a strict father who at times prioritised his business over family life, but 
acted for the best and in the only way he knew how. His favourite expression is ‘in 
hindsight’.  
Then suddenly Jim disappears from my view – he is declining in hospital and all 
updates take the form of telephone conversations with Mary. My relationship with 
Mary is inevitably shaped by the dramatic nature of the events that she’s experiencing. I 
am deeply concerned about pestering her when she has so much to contend with, but 
she says she is glad to receive my calls and also phones me several times. We often 
speak at length and she says ‘it’s good to sound off’.  The more obviously reciprocal 
nature of my relationship with Mary seems natural to me, forcing me to think again 
about the place of reciprocity within my other research relationships too. As our 
interactions are mediated by phone, they take the opposite form to those with Jim, with 
listening proving critical. In the absence of visual distractions, I find I can listen more 
deeply, hearing what’s not said, feel her emotions. As with Jim, silences feel less 
pressured. I realise that this is a different but equally effective route to understanding. 
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It forces me to consider the possibility that perhaps when we have multiple 
communication channels available to us, we lose something.  
Jim and Mary’s involvement ends when Jim moves permanently into a care home. His 
condition has deteriorated markedly and conversation is no longer possible, but he 
continues to exude a quiet contentment. Mary draws comfort from this and from the 
happy atmosphere of the home. Nevertheless, I can’t stop myself from howling. Perhaps 
inevitably, I find working with the ‘data’ generated with Jim and Mary an emotionally 
charged experience and am often paralysed by the weight of responsibility when 
making selection choices, configuring their narrative and advancing my interpretations. 
Ann and John 
Ann is in her eightieth year. She is a former teacher and one of life’s ‘good all-rounders’, 
having proved academically high achieving and sporty at school. When admiring a 
rather lovely mother and child painting, I discover that she is also ‘an artist’, although 
Ann thinks this description is ‘rather overstating’ her abilities, adding ‘an unstructured 
primitive at best’. She looks exquisitely beautiful in the wedding photograph proudly 
displayed on the mantelpiece and is still in possession of a wonderful creamy 
complexion and captivating blue eyes. While her voice suggests privilege (she lived in 
India with her own Ayah when her father was a ‘through the ranks’ major in the army), 
her early life was also characterised by trauma (narrowly escaping by boat during the 
fall of Singapore), upheaval (frequently changing school and attending several 
detestable boarding schools) and hardship (when her father retired and, unable to 
commute his pension due to ill-health, the family moved to a house with an outside 
privy and no electricity on a smallholding in the English countryside).  
Ann is married to John, a highly personable and intellectual man who she met through 
the University Maths Society during her fresher’s week as John was commencing his 
final year. Ann and John openly demonstrate a rare and genuine devotion to each other. 
They have five very successful and supportive children, and fourteen diversely talented 
grandchildren. I am informed that their children say they have always thought of Ann 
and John as ‘a unit’ and I quickly find myself doing likewise. They make initial contact 
about the research using a joint email account and the email is also signed jointly. 
There is talk of old shared friends from their university days, now deceased or in rather 
poorer health than Ann and John and so seldom seen. 
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‘Ann and John’ now live downstairs in their large, cluttered family home, which has an 
absent-minded professor quality to it and at first, I suspect that it has remained 
unchanged for the last fifty years. In fact, this is only partly true, and I discover that 
John has been recovering memorabilia from trunks in the attic and distributing them 
through the various rooms in a bid to conserve Ann’s memory. This is something he 
also strives to achieve through nostalgic holidays, road trips to old haunts and extended 
family gatherings, plus everyday conversations, often looking through photo albums. 
When Ann said to John "I can't now remember the unforgettable time when we first met” 
John set about typing up his account of how they met and fell in love, a copy of which is 
taped to the inside of their wedding album. This undergoes constant revision as a result 
of his conversations with Ann. (John emails me a copy of each version). He is also trying 
to rekindle Ann’s more aesthetic interests, particularly gardening and painting, but to 
no avail. Ann now walks with a stick, is unsteady on her feet and I am informed that she 
has had ‘one or two tumbles’. 
Ahead of our introductory meeting, John emails me to say: 
 ‘Ann and I have just re-read your research description, with an immediate reaction on 
her part that "I don't have Alzheimer’s" which, given the sharpness of her mind in several 
directions, is a justifiable statement; she is willing to accept the memory loss aspect while 
pointing out that my memory is not always as secure as it might be... She is quite resolute about 
this and I seldom press the issue, except when she berates one of our daughters for meddling’. 
The sharpness of mind that John refers to is immediately evident and Ann 
demonstrates a particularly impressive retained capacity for critical thinking. In the 
past, Ann has found medicine over-reaching and demonstrably fallible (e.g. she refused 
a prescription for Thalidomide when expecting her second child) and I interpret her 
rejection of the Alzheimer’s label as consistent with this mode of thought. John has 
prostate cancer, an intermittent stomach complaint and experiences chronic hip pain. 
Despite their respective ‘depredations of old age,’ they are content. Sitting alongside 
each other in their matching Riser recliner chairs, Ann is a delightful, fluent, articulate 
and extremely quick-witted conversationalist, with John ever-ready to supply ever so 
subtle cues.  
Doing everyday activities together: Searching for the ‘apposite word’ 
When I first meet with Ann and John they are very keen to help with the study if they 
can, but wonder if they will be ‘suitable’. During my tour of the downstairs of the house, 
John reveals that Ann really ‘doesn’t do anything now’, apart from making the occasional 
128 
 
cup of tea, which he then carries through on a tray. She will very occasionally help John 
with simple tasks such as folding laundry, but quickly loses interest. Ann is quite 
content to have visits from the family or to sit and ‘talk about old times’ with John. 
However, she does not seem to be aware how much John is doing. John admits he 
‘rather misses her contribution’ and gets very tired, but ‘simply couldn’t bear outside 
help’. 
Ann asks me directly about the reason for my ‘particular interest in activities’ and when 
I state that I don’t really mean activity in a physical sense, she responds ‘oh, what do you 
mean’? Good question - and an interesting discussion ensues. Ann agrees with me that 
switching to ‘how you spend your days’ or ‘pass the time’ sounds terribly passive or 
possibly insulting. ‘Coping’ is suggested, but Ann quickly argues that ‘it rather 
presupposes not coping, or that there’s something that has to be coped with. There’s 
something slightly negative about it’. She offers ‘managing’, adding ‘that’s not quite right 
either – negotiating perhaps’. John then comes to the rescue by reaching for the 
dictionary.  He reads out the definition of coping as ‘to deal with successfully’ and we 
conclude that ‘dealing successfully with the daily round in later life’ best encapsulates my 
research interests. Thus, the tone is set for our future meetings. 
Each meeting takes the form of ‘chatting in the small sitting room’, but despite its 
seemingly passive connotations, Ann and John have developed a distinctive style of 
‘chatting’ that blends mutual support and challenge. This encompasses gentle teasing, 
shared reminiscence, playfully provocative life review, fiery intellectual debate, 
discussing the study’s progress and ‘actively searching for the apposite word’, as 
summarised in Table 6.4 below. 
My understandings develop on the basis of co-participation in Ann and John’s 
interactions with each other within the confines of the small sitting room, their 
accounts of events in the outside world and the occasional opportunistic encounter 
with a family member, nuisance caller or delivery man, yet there are very strong 
temporal and cultural transactions. Over the study period, inevitably some changes 
take place outside of our encounters and John sends me regular words of 




Table 6.4 Summary Record for Ann and John 
Date Summary Description 
13/01/2016  Introductory meeting: Consent process and getting to know each other. 
Extended conversation about the meaning of ‘activity’ before agreeing that 
meeting at their home will be just fine for study purposes 
20/01/2016 Every picture tells a story: Spend the afternoon looking through old photo 
albums and chatting about the past and how it relates to the here and now. 
26/01/2016 Phone call: to reschedule our planned meeting on the 4th Feb as they will be 
travelling down south to attend a friend’s funeral. 
10/02/2016 Managing expectations: Discussion about trip south, changing family 
dynamics, the importance of family unity and how their hopes for the future 
have been displaced onto their grandchildren. 
02/03/2016 Good fortune and making vows: We explore the role of ‘luck and 
happenstance’ in life, particularly their good fortune in their own parents and 
their youngsters and the importance now attached to their wedding vows. 
06/04/2016 Place integration: John has been sorting through some old letters he 
exchanged with a mutual friend and is sharing the contents with Ann. There is 
extended discussion about the effort of ageing in place, including dealing with 
nuisance calls, technology and the saga of the matching Riser recliner chairs. 
05/05/2016 Phone call: During my customary courtesy call ahead of our meeting John 
advises that there has been a shift in Ann’s condition in that she can become 
disoriented when he is not in the room. 
06/05/2016 A series of surprising developments: Interesting and far-reaching 
conversation. The meeting follows on from John’s birthday party, a rather 
exhausting affair that has caused a rethink of Ann’s 80th birthday plans and 
travel plans later in the year.  
11/07/2016 Wrap-up and thank you meeting ~ I bring cakes, John has made biscuits and 
cheese  
 
Developing relationships – We feel that we’ve known you for years 
From my very first meeting with Ann and John I feel quite at home. They are incredibly 
welcoming, delightful company and truly interested in the study. As with Tommy and 
Grace, when I spend time with Ann and John together I feel like a true ‘participant 
observer’, I am sure that there is no pretence on their part and I also feel that I can be 
‘myself’. Indeed, it is the one setting where I find the ‘different selves’ that the 
researcher takes into the field most integrated. They tell me ‘it feels like we’ve known 
you for years’ and I feel the same. That said, their devotion to each other is such that I 
feel reassured that I am not altering the situation unduly by being there (although John 
sends me some rather lovely personal correspondence suggesting their involvement 
has had positive affects).  
That I spend little time alone with either Ann or John introduces some limitations, but 
as I am concerned with the situation as a whole and the various relationships at play, 
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rather than individual perspectives, this is less problematic. Moreover, it is Ann and 
John who are directly responsible for my raising the significant amendment with the 
REC to extend formal participation to the spouse or family member of the person 
diagnosed with dementia, discussed in Chapter Five. They are also responsible for my 
foray into the literature on ‘couplehood’ and in the following chapters, I relate to them 
very much as a couple, engaged in an enacted togetherness, their narrative co-
constructed.  
Chrissie 
When Chrissie answers the door, I am immediately surprised, as she looks much 
younger than I had anticipated. She is wearing skinny jeans, a pink mohair jumper, blue 
pumps, silver dangly earrings and matching necklace, has her blonde hair cut in a 
modern style and sports a pair of trendy Gok Wan glasses. She also seems incredibly 
youthful in demeanour. She informs me that she has arthritis, but she is very bubbly 
and from the way she darts in and out of the kitchen and swings her feet as she sits on 
the sofa, you would never know. I am genuinely astonished when she tells me that she 
is 78. 
The fourth of nine children, Chrissie recounts a tough upbringing, which she thinks it’s 
important for me (and the reader) to understand. Her mother left home when she was 
four and was quickly replaced by a step-mother. Chrissie later discovered that her dad 
was not her real dad, ‘so I wasn’t related to either of my parents’. In her early teens, she 
learned that her birth mother had died and she used to spend her weekends ‘raking 
through the cemetery looking for her grave’. When she eventually found the small, plain 
stone (now in her garden) she thought “is that all she was worth”?’ As soon as she could 
afford to, she replaced it with ‘a beautiful big white angel – that’s how I used to imagine 
her’.  
Chrissie’s own domestic life has been equally troubled. She married young, her 
husband had a drink problem and her married life was a catalogue of domestic 
violence.  She got divorced, remarried ‘too quickly’, had a few happy years, got divorced 
and later got back together with her first husband, which was ‘a mistake’. She came 
home one day and found him dead on the floor, but swiftly adds that she ‘wasn’t sorry’. 
When I say to her that it sounds as though she’s had some tough times, but looks 
remarkably well on it, she replies ‘oh, but there have been some great times too, lots of 
laughs, and more good times than bad. No, I’ve been very lucky. Life’s what you make it’.  
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When we first meet, Chrissie lives alone in a terraced house in a former council housing 
estate, which is furnished in a very modern style. Three of her ‘great neighbours’ are in 
their 90s, and she delights in recalling how she put balloons and banners up to mark 
their 90th birthdays and ‘had a wee party for each of them’. Chrissie has three children, 
eleven grandchildren and six-great grandchildren, ‘all less than a stone’s throw away’ 
and she stresses that they are all ‘really close’. ‘We’ve all had our share of heartache, but 
it’s kept us together’. This heartache includes the death of a son to alcoholism when he 
was in his late twenties. When I say that I’m so sorry, she tells me directly ‘if I could 
wish him back to life, I wouldn’t’. Chrissie worked as nursing assistant in what she refers 
to as a ‘mental hospital’ for most of her working life and absolutely loved it. Her 
daughter has a few cleaning jobs and Chrissie helps out with a couple of the bigger 
houses for ‘a bit pocket money’.  
Chrissie fully accepts her diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, but adds that she tells 
people ‘on a need to know basis. I’m not advertising it’. She informs me that she is on 
Aricept15 and that it must be working as her ‘scores haven’t really changed much’. Her 
son noticed that something wasn’t right early on, ‘he just came out and said to me, I 
think you’ve got Alzheimer’s’. She adds, ‘but I knew myself’. When she went for tests, the 
doctors said ‘let’s leave it for six months and see’, but her son said ‘look, we all know she’s 
got it, she knows, she doesn’t need time to get used to it, and in six months she’ll be worse 
and you won’t be able to undo it, so let’s just start it now’. She goes on to say that she is 
very glad that she did, as her brother had Alzheimer’s too, but he was ‘too far gone’ for 
the medication to make a difference and died three years ago. He was ‘really bad at the 
end, so I know what could be around the corner’. Chrissie adds ‘there’s no point worrying 
about the day that might never happen. A lot of worse things could happen, like the twin 
towers. All those folk, going off to work and never getting to say goodbye to their families. 
That’s cruel. No, there’s worse things in the world than Alzheimer’s’.    
Doing everyday activities together ~ you won’t make me feel like a performing 
monkey? 
When Chrissie first contacts me to say that she’s interested in taking part in the 
research, she adds that she isn’t sure that she’ll be suitable. Specifically, whereas Ann 
and John questioned their suitability due to Ann’s lack of activity, Chrissie advises ‘I 
have Alzheimer’s, but I’m still quite good’. We discuss this when I meet with her and she 
                                                          




explains that she thought maybe I was looking for people who were worse than her, 
because she can still do most things. She goes on to say ‘the leaflet says things like 
tidying up and gardening, and I can do that no bother. Like I just steam cleaned my hall 
carpet yesterday. But then it says shopping and I thought well that is a problem, well ….it 
can be’. She immediately goes on to tell me about various problematic experiences at 
the supermarket, concluding ‘so maybe that’s something you know, where I’m not as 
good as I like to think I am, where I probably make mistakes’.  
I am struck by the reference to ‘making mistakes’ and explain that I wouldn’t be looking 
to see how well she is performing. I add that it is more about all the stuff that she is 
doing, the things that matter most to her day to day, and what makes things a bit 
trickier, drawing on her own examples. After a long pause Chrissie says. ‘I think that’s 
good. I mean I can see how it would be useful’. She adds ‘what you said about performing, 
see you’ve been listening to me, but when I tell this sort of stuff to my consultant, he just 
says ‘I know, I know’. He doesn’t listen’. Chrissie then tells me that she said to him at her 
last appointment ‘No, you don’t know, you don’t know what it’s like. You haven’t got a 
bloody clue. How could you? If you knew, you would not make me feel like a performing 
monkey’.  
Having established that I will not make Chrissie feel like a performing monkey, we 
discuss the sorts of things that we might spend time doing together. She says she’s ‘not 
short of ideas’, but most things she does with other people and she will need to check it 
out with them first. She is also very clear about ‘just seeing how we get on’ rather than 
thinking too far ahead, and ‘not letting it take over my life’. When I ask about checking 
things out with her family she says, ‘Oh you’ll meet them, you’ll meet all of them. If you 
spend any time at all with me, they’re never far away’. And indeed, they are not! The 
summary table of my interactions with Chrissie is provided in Table 6.5 overleaf. 
The mix of activities that we engage in enables me to spend time with Chrissie as she 
takes the scenic route to avoid traffic and tries to find a parking place where she will 
see her car when she returns. I observe her as she negotiates transactions in the leisure 
centre and in various cafes and shops, including witnessing a masterclass in returning 
damaged goods. Yet it is the ‘hanging about’ at home with Chrissie that is most 
insightful. I experience the incessant phone calls, the requests for help and advice, her 
‘in and out’ interactions with family members, friends, friends of friends and unknown 
others and I come to see Chrissie’s role in their lives. I am there when she cleans, sweet 
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talks the boiler repair man, makes soup for neighbours, replenishes their planters, fills 
Christmas boxes for Africa, bakes cakes for the school fete, secures a good home for 
puppies and gives shelter to a homeless girl. Over the course of the study period, I begin 
to discern patterns and rhythms in what I initially perceived to be a chaotic lifestyle 
and to understand the significance of the stars on Chrissie’s calendar. There are 
distinctions between term-time and school holidays, mornings and afternoons, and it is 
these distinctions that I focus upon in the following chapters.  
Table 6.5 Summary Record for Chrissie 
Date Summary Description 
24/02/2016 Introductory meeting: Getting to know each other and consent process – 
boiler repair man arrives one of her younger grandsons pops in with a pal 
and offers some suggestions 
30/03/2016 Piccadilly Circus: Selling puppies, offloading wardrobes, receiving phone 
calls and various family members and friends come in and out. Chrissie 
tells me it’s always like Piccadilly Circus 
05/04/2016 Sink or swim: Meet Chrissie at home, we drive to her aquarobics class, 
spend some time in the Jacuzzi /steam room and then have coffee back at 
her house where she receives several phone calls. 
21/04/2016 Everything changes: Spend time in the garden, go to the shops and then go 
to the garden centre. Back at her house I help to put her settee covers back 
on and her son pops in to borrow the hoover –conversation around 
changing family and neighbourhood dynamics. Her daughter is moving in. 
20/05/2016 In for a penny: Trip to the sports shop and the pound shops to get some 
stuff for the Christmas boxes and then go to a café. Phone call from an 
acquaintance who needs Chrissie’s advice on selling a pram – she says ‘I’ll 
come’ 
15/06/2016 Open house: Chat to Chrissie as she packs for her holiday in Turkey – a 
homeless friend of her grand-daughter will be staying while she’s away. 
She’d been out in the pouring rain earlier to buy a huge a cream cake for 
me. She’s looking after one great grandson who is off school and pops in to 
see her nonagenarian neighbor, Elsie, with a cake. 
16/08/2016 Bargain hunters: Drive to nearby town to have a ‘rake round the charity 
shops’ then go to a café to wrap up and say thank you. Back at her house we 
sort through her cake decorations and a few family members pop in. 
Developing relationships – There for the long haul 
My relationship with Chrissie is undoubtedly the one that grows the most over the 
study period. Initially I expected that I would struggle to relate to a person whose life 
differed so markedly from my own, but that has not been the case. For that Chrissie 
must take full credit. She is neither boastful nor modest, but tells it like it is and she’s 
smart. She has a completely different set of priorities to me and different expectations. 
She does not conform to any of the established theories of ageing, but she has her own 
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‘rules’. She doesn’t take herself too seriously. She is the most generous person I have 
ever met, yet is no soft touch. Her concept of ‘family’ differs from mine, but her ‘family’ 
absolutely adore her and she would do anything for them. There is a lot of laughter in 
her life, a lot of parties and a lot of love. Over the study period, she smashes many of my 
middleclass assumptions - and she knows this. There has also been a shift in Chrissie’s 
relationship with me. While she was staggeringly open about various tragic events in 
her life from the outset, they were relayed in a very matter-of-fact way. Her willingness 
to show me a chink in her emotional armour was deferred until our later meetings. This 
relationship and the resultant understandings unquestionably benefited from my being 
there for the long haul. 
Reflections and Way Forward 
This chapter introduced the unique persons who took part in the study. Their diversity 
presents opportunities to explore the implications of the different place that dementia 
occupies within their lives and in particular situations. The chapter also considered the 
different understandings of ‘everyday activity’ at play, plus the implications of the 
different forms of activity desired, available, imposed, discounted or denied and those 
the participants were willing or able to share with me. The fieldwork took place 
between December 2015 and August 2016. When it commenced there was a thick 
carpet of snow on the ground and it concluded on a warm summer’s day. Being able to 
experience seasonal variations and key calendar events introduced further possibilities 
for enriching my understandings, as did simply being there through the passage of 
time. I look closely at one particular encounter in Chapter Seven and present the 
narrative that unfolded over the course of the study in Chapter Eight. 
 
The different types of interactions and activities experienced with each person or 
couple were circumscribed in various ways and also spoke to the nature of our 
relationships. Each relationship was qualitatively different and developed in a different 
way and at a different pace. This difference went beyond making the study 
arrangements sufficiently flexible to acknowledge the varied abilities and distinctive 
preferences of the participants, requiring trust, attentiveness and responsiveness at the 
outset and in the small moments of doing (Stern, 2004). The contribution of each 




Spending time together over several months helped to strengthen our connections and 
the type of relationship developed depended in part on the sorts of moments enacted 
and experiences shared together. Being permitted to share emotionally heightened 
situations perhaps unsurprisingly brought closeness, but more unexpectedly, 
familiarity and understanding were also achieved as a result of experiencing the more 
mundane aspects of people’s lives with them. The degree of closeness achieved varied. 
Quite apart from my wishes on the matter, participants sometimes draw the researcher 
in and sometimes hold her at a distance (Bateson 1994). Closeness, where present, 
served to increase the profundity of our conversations, the depth of my observations 
and my understandings. It also raised issues of boundary management and the nature 













Walkways: One Day on the Narrative Inquiry Landscape 
Overview 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the people who took part in the study and gave an 
overview of the various activities that I undertook with them. In this chapter, I provide 
a more in-depth account of one particular experience of ‘walking’ out onto the 
Narrative Inquiry landscape and spending time with each person or couple, following 
their lead along the ‘walkway’ through everyday life that they chose to share with me.  
Like a geographical landscape, the narrative landscape is familiar to the participants, 
well-trodden, but unknown to me. I try to strike a balance between following their lead 
and staying curious, without steering them into areas of particular interest to me.  
 
Each initial description takes the form of an extract from field notes recorded 
immediately afterwards, documenting issues encountered in the flow of actions and the 
naturally occurring conversations that took place. In broad terms, each extract 
describes the enactment of an activity that the person or couple identified as important 
to them, giving structure and meaning to everyday life. A more nuanced rationale for 
the selection is offered in each case. The actions and the concurrent dialogue open up 
communicative and interpretative spaces and each description is followed by an 
interpretation, drawing upon narrative theory. The theoretical perspective facilitates 
an interpretation as to how meanings are configured and connections between past, 
present and future forged in the flux of actions, engaging with envisaged possibilities, 
welcome and less welcome. I conclude the chapter with some summary reflections.   
Tommy and Grace: A Walk in the Snow 
The time I spend with Tommy and Grace together generally takes the form of 
conversation in their living room. In contrast, I spend time ‘alone’ with Tommy 
engaging in diverse activities in multiple settings. When it comes to selecting a 
particular experience, the process is made easier as, from the outset, Tommy 
emphasises the importance of walking (literally) in his daily life. Of the many walks that 
I take with Tommy, our first best illustrates the familiarity of the routes around his 
home. It also surfaces a plotline that develops over the course the study and that I 




It is a beautiful, crisp morning and a thick blanket of snow has transformed the 
landscape. I am due to accompany Tommy on one of his daily walks and as I drive to 
Tommy and Grace’s house I note that all street names are obscured, the boundaries 
between the roads, pavements and gardens concealed.  Tommy is finishing clearing the 
driveway when I arrive, having made sure that he’d cleared the snow from the stretch 
of pavement in front of the house before setting off. We go inside and chat with Grace, 
who is expecting some visitors to discuss the Church Malawi fund. It is proposed that I 
accompany Tommy on a walk into town, refuel in the church café and catch the bus 
back. Before we set off, Grace ties Tommy’s scarf and tucks it inside his jacket, insists he 
wears his woolly hat and checks that he has his phone, bank card and bus pass. She 
discreetly lets me know that Tommy remembers his pin number, but now finds using 
cash too confusing and makes sure I know which buses we can catch.  
You just put your coat on and go 
I follow Tommy as he’s takes a complicated but clearly familiar route, trudging through 
wooded short cuts, carving our own path in the thick snow. I sense that Tommy could 
do this walk in his sleep. I learn that the house’s proximity to woodland was a key 
factor in the decision to move there nearly 40 years ago, and although he ‘still misses 
living out in the country’, being able to go for a walk every day is ‘a big compensation’ 
and does him ‘the world of good’. Tommy tells me that he has ‘always gone out in all 
weathers’ because he and Grace were dog owners. They thought about getting another 
one, ‘an older dog obviously’, when their last dog died a few years ago, in the end 
deciding not to. He concludes: 
‘Some folk that have this thing that I’ve got, they just sit in a chair staring at the TV 
all day, maybe they cannae help it. If Grace is watching some of that rubbish she likes, I’ll 
say to myself, get your coat. You don’t need a dog as an excuse, you just put your coat on 
and go’. 
Giving up the driving 
As we walk, Tommy tells me various stories about his life, jumping from one era to 
another. The stories are fascinating, but unrelated to the ‘real-time’ context. Although 
mostly depicting hard times, they are recounted fondly. When we pass an isolated row 
of buildings, now home to a tanning parlour and small gym, he reconnects with the 
scene, telling me ‘there used to be some nice wee shops there’. I’m informed that the 
shops were the only option when he and Grace first moved to the area, but eventually 
the supermarkets forced them to close. He remarks ‘they’d be right handy now that I’m 
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giving up the driving’ and I discover that Tommy has decided not to re-sit his driving 
test. He has heard that you have to park inside the white lines of the narrow parking 
bays at the supermarket and ‘if you even touch the line you fail’, so he’s not going to 
bother because he ‘was getting too uptight about it’.  
As we continue, I learn that the decision to stop driving has been made easier as he ‘can 
walk most places’, the ‘bus stops right outside our door’, he and Grace have always taken 
the bus into the nearest city, and ‘the Sheriff’ and ‘number one son’ have offered to drive 
them to appointments. However, although there is a good bus service to the 
supermarket, they are limited in how much they can carry as ‘Grace isn’t supposed to lift 
anything because of her back’. Tommy tells me: 
‘We were going to sell it (the car), but Grace is going to give it a go... She’s murder 
to be truthful hen, but I’m just … making all the right sounds let’s say, because she’s lost her 
confidence. She used to drive all over the country selling Tupperware, but once we stopped 
working, I did all the driving… She was a good enough driver, it’s just the way it happened’.  
I’d have been none the wiser 
Tommy immediately goes on to recount an anecdote that he repeats several times: 
‘And if I hadn’t gone to the doctor I would have been none the wiser. I went, nothing 
to do with what’s going on in my brain, but I must have said something strange because he 
brought out a wee piece of paper and asks me, ‘do you know what date it is’? No idea. ‘The 
year’? Not a clue.  Anyway, four crosses. He says ‘we’ll see you again’ and when I went back, 
I didnae remember what we’d talked about. So, I get sent for tests, they get me drawing all 
sorts, then an x-ray, no, what’s … the thing, och when they put you in the sexy box’?  
Me: ‘An MRI scan’?  
‘That’s the boy, the box of doom! Anyway, was a woman I saw, very nice, and she 
says to me what it was I had. And asks ’so how do you feel about that’? And I says, well I 
feel like a sixteen-year old. If I hadn’t gone to the doctor I’d be none the wiser’. 
The driving’s just the start 
When I ask if he would have preferred to remain ‘none the wiser’, Tommy thinks about 
this before saying ‘well, she shows me a picture of this thing that I’ve got and says ‘see it’s 
there, but it’s no too bad’. Tis but a touch of frost, aye’. He adds that he’s been told the 
medication is ‘slowing it down, so maybe best to know, but… He goes on to explain: 
‘Well the driving’s just the start…Once they’ve gotten hold of you. Back and 
forth…more tests. The full works… you never know what they’ll find next… I’m trying to put 
it to the back of my mind, hen. No use worrying. God’s looking out for me. But, dare say, I 
mean... if they keep at it long enough… they’ll find something else’. 
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He’s lucky he has a wife who will look out for him 
When we get back to the house, Grace is upstairs on the phone and Tommy rummages 
through the sideboard for some photographs he wants to show me. Grace comes 
downstairs and explains that she was talking to a friend whose husband has Lewy body 
dementia. She reports that ‘he’s been having terrible hallucinations, and getting all sorts 
of ideas’ and recounts the conversation, which sounds like a catalogue of 
mismanagement. She concludes by saying that her friend has finally managed to 
arrange for someone to come and sit with him for a few hours, because ‘obviously he 
can’t be left with just anyone’. Tommy says to me ‘you’ll be right glad you stayed to hear 
that cheery tale.’ Grace adds, ‘He’s lucky because he has a wife who will look out for him’. 
She goes on to compare his situation with another friend who has dementia and who is 
now in a care home because ‘his wife died a few years ago’. Tommy looks glum and says 
nothing.  
Interpretation of ‘A Walk in the Snow’ 
The above extract begins with Tommy clearing the snow in the vicinity of his house 
before going for a walk, consistent with his commitment to being a good neighbour and 
thus living a good life with and for others. Tommy grew up in the country and feels at 
home walking in the woods, connecting him with past times. As a responsible dog 
owner, he previously had to walk in all weathers, establishing walking as a habit that, 
over time, has been reinforced as beneficial; Tommy walks daily because it does him 
‘the world of good’.   
More recently, walking has assumed a new function, providing Tommy with distance – 
from rubbish TV and from ‘other people who have this thing that I’ve got’, but who ‘can’t 
help’ but sit and stare at the TV. In Ricoeurian terms, Tommy’s power to be is manifest 
in his power to do. Tommy rehearses different possibilities in his imagination, entering 
the kingdom of ‘as if’; if he can continue his daily walks, he can maintain a distance from 
the image he holds of a person with dementia; an image perpetuated by dominant 
cultural representations. This possibility is facilitated by Grace, but it comes at the price 
of a new activity, ‘checking’. Grace checks that Tommy has everything he needs and 
Tommy submits to this; Tommy walks and Grace endures the uncertainty this brings. 
They are both are active and passive.  
The extract also underscores that the walk into town is so familiar to Tommy that the 
masking of the usual boundary lines by the snowfall presents no difficulties. 
Consequently, for some time the ‘actual doing’ of everyday activity does not ‘generate 
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authentic dialogue… embedded within the flow of actions, as predicted by Alsaker et al 
(2009:131). Instead, the small stories16 Tommy recounts are divorced from the ‘actual 
doing’ of walking; they are complete, purposefully configured or selected from a 
practiced repertoire with a particular audience (a researcher) in mind. Few convey 
personal accomplishments and my impression is that Tommy is keen to convey that he 
has led a hard, eventful but good life and has lots of stories to tell. 
On walking past a row of former shops, Tommy reconnects with the immediate 
surroundings and switches narrative modes. Through the lens of mimetic theory, in the 
course of doing one concrete activity (walking into town), images of another everyday 
activity (shopping) are created, setting in motion a chain of connections with past 
experiences and future possibilities, stirring the ongoing mimesis and connecting with 
Tommy’s situation as a whole. A potential storyline is verbalised and constituted 
through communication with me; things could have been different, if not for people’s 
preference for supermarkets. This in turn conjures images of going to the supermarket 
and the future alternatives that must be considered as a result of Tommy’s decision not 
to re-sit the driving test. This narrative ending is up for grabs. The possibilities 
imagined and communicated include taking the bus; this is feasible because of an 
earlier decision to buy a house with a good bus service, but now presents its own 
difficulties, for Grace if not for Tommy, emphasising their interdependence. Another 
option is to become a passenger, generating a need for Grace to re-learn how to drive. 
This possibility displaces Tommy’s anxieties onto Grace, requiring Tommy to assume 
responsibility for restoring Grace’s confidence. Here again, the situation could have 
been different, if Tommy had not formed the habit of ‘doing all the driving’, a habit 
deemed the right thing to do by men of Tommy’s generation and class.  
In the course of communicating these events to me, the image of parking between the 
lines at the supermarket introduces into the nascent story an activity that is playing an 
increasing part in Tommy’s life – ‘testing’. Tommy’s anxiety about re-sitting his driving 
test, with its exacting requirements and risk of failure, forges a connection with the 
‘four crosses test’ that culminated in his diagnosis. If not for this this test, he would be 
‘none this wiser’. Tommy is confronted in a concrete way with another competing 
storyline, one pertaining to a health system that has ‘gotten hold of’ him and appears to 
                                                          




have the power to determine what is wrong with him and apply a label of otherness, 
irrespective of how well he is feeling. In this unfolding narrative, Tommy has limited 
authorship, yet he anticipates the ending – eventually the testers will find something 
else and in so doing will further restrict his everyday activities; the driving is just the 
start.  
 
Finally, Ricoeur’s (1984) concept of ‘distanciation’ facilitates the following 
interpretation of the scenario that unfolds when we return to the house. A phone 
conversation with a friend offers Grace an opportunity to talk about issues relating to 
the caring responsibilities of a wife at a distance, using the stories of others as a safety 
filter. Her friend’s situation is similar to her own, but not the same – Grace emphasises 
that the man has a different form of dementia than Tommy. Through the vehicle of her 
friend’s situation, she is able to express anxiety about her own future and anticipate the 
demands of caring. In considering the alternatives, Grace first communicates to me, a 
researcher, that the future could be different if better support were available to women 
whose husbands have dementia. She then connects with the situation of a second set of 
friends, expressing strong emotions about their different fates. By asserting that the 
second man would not be in a care home if his wife were still alive, Grace conveys that 
she expects to look out for Tommy ‘til death do us part. ‘Distanciation’ establishes an 
interpretative space where both Grace and Tommy can try out images of relevance and 
also contrary to their own experience. Tommy’s reference to ‘this cheery tale’ followed 
by an uncharacteristic silence may suggest that he is contemplating a plot where he, a 
man who has done all the driving and clears the driveway, becomes increasingly 
dependent on Grace. The driving is just the start.  
Hector: Meeting the Boys at the Golf Club 
When I first meet with Hector, he tells me that he goes to his golf club a couple of times 
each week and it is his primary source of motivation. However, he cancels planned 
outings to the club several times, attributing this to the weather or various health 
ailments. Although he goes to the club to meet briefly with an older man called Hamish 
and his son one Wednesday, he remains disinclined to meet with the larger group on a 
Saturday.  The extract below is selected as it describes Hector’s return to an activity 
that has played a huge part in his life and illustrates the mediating role of all environing 
conditions. This experience plays a significant part in the unfolding narrative presented 
in the next chapter.  
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Back in business 
I plan to accompany Hector to the golf club and telephone on a beautiful Saturday 
morning to check the arrangements. He answers and tells me ‘we’re back in business.’’ 
He advises me when to come to his house so that we can get a lift from Bill, who is 
married to Gina’s cousin. When I arrive, Hector sees me coming through the gate and 
comes to the door. He is outlandishly dressed in grey loafers, smart trousers, boldly 
checked shirt, V-neck sweater with a flamboyant golfer motif and a mustard linen-look 
jacket. I say that he is looking very dapper and he holds out the bottom of his jacket in 
mock fashion model pose. Bill arrives shortly afterwards and Hector makes the 
introductions. Before setting off, Hector sifts through a vast assortment of keys in a box 
near the door. His son Chris is working on his bike and tells him that he won’t need 
them as he’ll be there all afternoon.  When Hector gets to Bill’s car he tries to open the 
door, but it is still locked. He tries again just as Bill is pressing the electronic key. The 
process is repeated a couple more times and eventually completed successfully. As we 
are driving off Bill says ‘belt up my good sir’ and Hector responds ‘oh, right oh’, I’m still 
trying to get used to these new, fangled things’.  
The last of the Mohicans 
Once on our way Hector visibly relaxes, telling me about his extensive involvements 
with the club, having been a member for fifty years. I remark that the club must have 
seen some changes in that time and Hector replies ‘not half’. He advises that people 
used to stay on after a round for a couple of pints, but that changed when they revised 
the driving alcohol limit. The club had to make many changes to remain viable, 
‘attracting a new chef and more lady and young members, but the manager still gives us 
old boys our place’. For Hector, the oldest playing member, this ‘place giving’ has taken 
the form of the recent award of honorary life membership. Hector remarks that his 
annual membership was up for renewal and ‘I’d been in two minds about paying it, 
because I’ve hardly been out on the course, but Gina thought I’d regret it come the 
summer’. He tells me a little about the men we’ll meet and I learn that they served on 
various committees that helped safeguard the future of the club. I’ve met Hamish and 
his son Donald before. Martin is ‘a quieter chap’, whereas Fraser and Duncan ‘are 




Good to have the full gang together again 
When we arrive, Bill has to use the overflow car park. Hector remarks ‘there must be a 
medal on, but Hamish will have grabbed our table’. We cross the road and Hector heads 
round the back way. Three chaps that he ‘plays with sometimes’ are teeing off, spot him 
and wave enthusiastically. Bill points out some new golf buggies, informing me that 
they cost £25 per round to hire, but Hector has been given free use as part of his 
membership. He adds ‘how to make friends and influence’ and Hector chuckles.    
Once inside, we make our way through to the lounge bar.  Hector waves across to ‘our 
table’, where Hamish and Donald are sitting with another man. Bill asks ‘Do you know 
these scoundrels?’ and I am introduced to Duncan. We are joined shortly by Martin, who 
gives Hector a manly back pat and says ‘good to see you again’. There is some 
speculation as to where Fraser has got to and when he eventually arrives there are 
cries of ‘here’s the very man’ and they all look delighted to see him, ‘to have the full gang 
together again’. Several people wave across to ‘our table’ and one man who has been 
playing in the medal comes over and tells Hector ‘we missed you out there’.  
The expert gallery 
The conversation is wide-ranging and includes Scottish and American politics, 
pensions, education and lots of golf stories. I learn that Hector and Hamish were the 
only two committee members or ‘old stuff shirts’ to oppose the relaxation of the club 
dress code and the significance of Hector’s stylish jacket becomes apparent. The 
conversation is peppered with commentary on players’ shots - the ‘tricky lies’, 
‘shockers’, ‘terrific crop of young players’ and ‘strange club choices’ and they describe 
themselves as ‘the expert gallery’. The men appear comfortable in each other’s 
company, speaking in unison or taking turns. No one dominates the discussion.  
If it’s not one thing it’s another 
Hector takes his turn in the storytelling circle. Typically, he can’t remember the name of 
the chap he was playing with or which course it was, but memory lapses are brushed 
over and, in this company, he seems relaxed about the slippages. The others also 
struggle with some of the details. For instance, Martin tells a story about a chap he used 
to play with who ‘had no peripheral vision, good golfer mind’ and how he used to have to 
stand behind him to tell him where the ball had gone, adding ‘his name escapes me’. Bill 
quips, ‘It’s like the old joke about two old men on the golf course. One takes shot and says 
to the other ‘did you see where it went?’ to which the other replies ‘I did, but I can’t 
remember’. They all laugh and Fraser says ‘true, if it’s not one thing, it’s another’. 
145 
 
This one’s for your benefit 
The stories are very jovial and self-deprecating. At one point however, Hector starts to 
tell a story about the time he caddied at St. Andrews. As soon as he says ‘the Open’, 
Duncan says to me ‘this one’s for your benefit’. Hector goes on to recount that he was up 
early, sitting outside when an American golfer whose caddy hadn’t turned up asked ‘do 
you caddy?’’ and he replied ‘aye’, adding ‘I had a book with the yardage’. Before Hector 
gets the chance to continue, he is heckled, leaving no space for boasting: ‘Oh, you had a 
book’? ‘You mean you blagged your way into it’! ‘Where did he come, last’? ‘Did he make 
the cut’? Hector admits, ‘no’ and they all laugh loudly. 
Still got some damage to do 
Donald and Hamish are the first to leave and everyone starts to move on. On the way 
out, Hector points to a panel on the wall plaque listing former champions, saying ‘most 
of these chaps are dead’. I see that Hector’s name appears a couple of times on the panel 
in question. He looks wistful. When we go outside, Hector has forgotten that we parked 
across the road and that we came in Bill’s car, but Bill makes light of it and Hector does 
not seem perturbed. When Bill drops us off, he asks Hector ‘Same time next week’? 
Hector responds ‘if I’m still here’ to which Bill replies ‘oh, I think you’ve got some 
damage to do yet’.  
Interpretation of ‘Meeting the Boys at the Golf Club’ 
The extract begins with an outlandishly attired Hector waiting to make a reappearance 
at the golf club after an absence of several months. As we set off, family friend Bill 
overlooks Hector’s difficulties getting into the car, more concerned with ‘who’ Hector is 
than ’the what’ of his condition, helping Hector to relax. Hector’s declining health is 
contributing to a loss of motivation, especially when the weather is bad. Playing golf 
has been central to Hector’s conception of a good life, but he now plays so infrequently 
that it would be difficult to justify paying the annual membership fee. The award of an 
honorary lifetime membership opens up the possibility of playing a little longer. Hector 
can still strike the ball sweetly, but walking the course is challenging. Being granted 
free use of the golf car enhances the possibility of playing a few holes and perhaps 
extending this opportunity to his peers.  
Ricoeur’s (1984) narrative theorising emphasises the pre-narrative quality of ongoing 
action and the complex temporal nature of experiences as they are lived. The enduring 
experience of going to the golf club connects Hector to his past, present and imagined 
future. In conversation, he moves seamlessly from being the oldest playing member at 
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present, through recollected days, to the renewed possibility of still being able to play 
in the days to come. The future that Hector imagines is an uncertain one however. He 
had thought perhaps his playing days were over and while seeing renewed possibilities 
for continuation, there is an awareness that one outing will be his last. 
Hector’s advancing years are also impacting upon his social involvement with the club. 
His closest friends have died and whilst Hector’s relationships with former committee 
members have come to assume greater significance as a result of their respective 
losses, there is a bitter-sweetness to these connections; a good life is lived with and for 
others, solicitude underscoring our need for friends (Ricoeur, 1992:192). Ricoeur 
(1984) illuminates the semantic function of memories, recounted by the men as small 
stories with dramatic structure, underscoring their emotional significance and 
poignancy. The history of the club and personal histories are entangled and the scene in 
the lounge bar is already charged with echoes of what has gone before.   
A consciousness of life and its finitude permeates the discussion and a more generative 
future is alluded to. Many of the men whose names are etched on the trophies and 
plaques are deceased. Having won competitions and held office, Hector is assured his 
place in club history. The men also delight in the number of youngsters coming 
through. Forging connections with, and finding fresh meaning in past events, they 
recognise that changes to the club constitution that they helped to oversee will ensure 
the club persists after they have gone. For Hector, a traditionalist, the relaxation of the 
dress code is regrettable, but he continues to demonstrate his particularity, wearing his 
bold mustard jacket with pride. 
Ricoeur (1992) depicts the field of action as composed of a hierarchy of units of praxis. 
At the level of practices, games are excellent models, enabling parallels to be drawn 
between the game of golf and informal group membership. Each practice is comprised 
of basic actions governed by constituent rules, developed over time. The shared 
meanings enable evaluative (and subsequently normative) appraisals to be attached to 
precepts of doing something well and each practice has its own standards of excellence.  
The group of men that Hector belongs to enjoy a homogeneity of interests and 
experiences that are the core constituents of their conversations, namely a shared love 
of golf and the shared experience of men growing older. As a collective, the men are 
equipped to critique the shots and club choices of those who are playing, constituting 
‘an expert gallery’.   Their discussion draws on individual as well as shared memories, 
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but the content of their talk is made meaningful through their experiences as 
accomplished practitioners of the game of golf, and of life.  
The informal group’s mode of interaction is similarly governed by its own ‘rules’, the 
stories told in accordance within the established norms of this narrative environment 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 2009). Each man is expected to take a turn, to monitor his own 
input and, critically, to be ‘good company’. Humour, tales of mishaps on the course or 
the achievements of others are well received, but blowing one’s own trumpet is not. 
Breaches are subverted through humour; Hector’s caddying yarn is instantly identified 
as ‘being told for my benefit’, the subtext being that there is no need to impress the 
group. Deficits in turn are accepted, brushed over, normalised as part of ageing. 
Memory loss is treated in the same vein as impediments such as failing eyesight, an 
inability to walk the course or swing a club - ‘if it’s not one thing it’s another’.  
Ricoeur (1992:184) highlights that friendship exists between those of equal rank, 
adding that friendship is an activity and thus requires exercise. These men originally 
held different positions within club committees and have become friends over time. 
The informal dialogic conventions cooperatively developed now contribute to this 
sense of equality; they must be upheld. The group has also established an expectation 
of attendance. When Fraser is late, the men wonder where he is, he is missed. Hector 
was missed during his absence. If he stops going, the others will miss him too. The men 
make the effort to attend each week in part because it is mutually beneficial and there 
is a sense of responsibility to each other, to the group as a whole.  
Finally, Ricoeur’s (1992) hermeneutics of the self extends beyond a good life, lived with 
and for others to encompass considerations of ‘just institutions’ in the social as well as 
the legal realm. Changes in societal attitudes, demographics and legislation have been 
reflected in the constitution and daily running of the club, and the habits of members 
have changed. Of necessity, ‘the club’ has adapted to appeal to a more diverse 
membership comprising men and women of all ages, whilst ensuring the older men, 
‘the expert gallery’, retain their status. Awarding Hector an honorary lifetime 
membership is consistent with this shift, recognising his unique achievement and 
placing a value on his ongoing contribution to the social fabric of the club. Within the 
informal group and within the club, memory loss does not define him, Hector 
experiences solicitude and equality, enhancing self-esteem and self-respect (Ricoeur, 
1992).    
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Ann and John: Managing Expectations 
Each of my meetings with Ann and John takes the form of ‘chatting in the small sitting 
room’. ‘Talking together’ and ‘contributing to family life’ are the activities that Ann and 
John identify as most important to them at this time in life. John is certain that their 
daily exchanges not only stimulate Ann’s memory, but also contribute to the 
preservation of her remarkable intellectual abilities. For both, looking back on their life 
together and thinking about the ongoing achievements of the family increases feelings 
of self-esteem, mutual respect, intimacy and love. The dialogue between Ann and John 
takes centre stage, although unannotated transcripts could create the impression of 
adversarial exchanges, quite contrary to the warmth and joviality of my own 
experience of being with them. The following extract from our third meeting is chosen 
because it is fairly typical of the discussions in both subject matter and style, touching 
on several themes that we revisit and develop over the study period. 
Unpredictability and happenstance: how does your garden grow? 
Looking through the sitting room window, I admire the mature garden surrounding the 
house, which boasts an untamed beauty, typified by the remarkably early primroses 
emerging through the cracks in the paving. Ann is first to respond to:  
Ann: Yes, it retains a certain loveliness and I’m still surprised by the way things have of 
finding their own preferred places to grow.  I used to spend hours in the garden. I still 
potter, more a case of pointing out the weeds than anything; very important to people 
like John who have never really understood what a weed is. My father was very fond of 
the garden. He was a countryman and then when he was in the army in India he was 
always longing to get back and to have his garden. So, I grew up believing that a garden 
was something rather magical and a source of great joy, a paradise - and one that was 
eventually realised. It was very much his area and later I came to understand the 
importance of having your own space.  
John: For some years now I’ve been threatening to build Ann a greenhouse and I’ve got 
everything for it. I just haven’t had the time. 
Ann: But then if you did that, instead of being able to go out to play, I’d have to go out to 
work. (Jestingly) There’d be that expectation that I’d grow things. 
John: I think that was one thing that Ann was rather disappointed about, that I didn’t 
have much interest in gardening. 
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Ann: No, I didn’t mind at all. In fact, I think I rather preferred it because it was my thing. 
And besides you were always so good at things, I would not have enjoyed the 
competition. And I could make my own mistakes without worrying about it. I think one 
of the nicest things about gardening and growing things, like all livings things and life 
generally, is that you never really know what’s going to happen.  
Staying with the flow of the conversation, as required by the methodology, I remark 
that ‘never really knowing what’s going to happen’ is an interesting reflection on life. 
Ann: Perhaps that’s why I always preferred a country garden, I never liked things that 
were terribly neat, terribly planned. 
John: And when we first came here we used to grow enough potatoes to feed the family 
over winter. Well, when I say we, the boys did the bulk of the digging. 
Ann: Yes, they remember and they accuse us of slave labour (laughter). 
John: Our daughter had a pony that provided manure as well as keeping the grass 
down. And we used to have midnight games of hide-and-seek in the garden and things 
like that.  
Ann: A reward for all the heavy spade work - give a boy a torch (more laughter). 
Talk of their children moves the conversation on to the subject of parenting. John 
describes Ann as ‘a truly wonderful mother’ and extolls the benefits of her University 
education in terms of what this meant she was able to give to their children. I notice 
that Ann looks contemplative and when I ask rather clumsily if she feels her time at 
University prepared her for her ‘role’ as a mother, she responds diplomatically: 
Ann: That’s a difficult one in that on the whole I’ve never really thought of it as being a 
role; I was there and they were there. I have thought about it in the past and realised 
how much of it related to how my mother was. She wasn’t a well-educated woman, but 
very astute and I always felt that her attitude was to give everyone a chance to have 
their say or make their feelings known. It’s very difficult when you try to analyse why 
you do things or where the ideas have come from, they are just there. I didn’t have a 
plan. I didn’t ever think about the sort of mother I wanted to be. It just happened. An 
awful lot of things in life do. 
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The changing nature of relationships within the family: seeing and not seeing 
As we chat, Ann hears a knock a rather faint knock at the door that neither John nor I 
detect. A package is expected for one of their fourteen grandchildren, a budding tennis 
player who ‘requires rather a lot of equipment’. Ann has been listening out as the 
doorbell has been out of commission for some time. John congratulates her and goes to 
take receipt of the delivery. This opens up a discussion about the changing nature of 
contributions within the family.  
John: This is something we can do, practically. One aspect of getting older is managing 
expectations, both our expectations of the family and their expectations of us. More and 
more we are going to have to learn to become passengers as they do more things for us, 
but there is a unity within the family that we can and should contribute to. Our children 
have their own lives, they are on their way, so we concentrate now on our 
grandchildren and try to help them.  
John gets up and takes down a framed copy of a poem written by the budding tennis 
player. It sets out the rather different contributions that each grandparent makes:  
Grandpa ‘sets hard maths questions ‘cos he thinks they’re fun and takes five sentences 
where others use one’, whereas Gran ‘comes out to be my goalie when she’d much rather 
rest and sees the best in me when I’m not at my best’. Together ‘they shiver on touchlines 
but really don’t mind, they’re my gran and grandad and they’re one of a kind’. 
I think it captures their distinctive, complementary qualities and coming together 
through their shared commitment to the family beautifully and say so.  
Ann: Yes, it’s a rather lovely insight, although the opportunity - to be able to do things - 
seems to be less and less.  
Me: Opportunity? To be able to do things (struck by the ‘goalie’ reference) ~ is that 
physically? 
Ann: Yes… and also not being able to do things because – well, they are not around as 
much. Before they were always around. 
I ask how frequently they see their grandchildren and John explains that they see some 
less often than others through a combination of parental divorce, living further afield, 
or simply growing up, with the older ones now working or studying across the country. 
Ann is such an engaging conversationalist that I ‘forget’ about her memory loss. My 
question is too direct, an unintentional memory test, but Ann responds masterfully, 
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‘there can be quite a long gap between seeing them, but the memory of when you saw 
them last is so strong, you forget how long it is’.  
John continues, admitting ‘when we are not going to see them for some time, well there’s 
a disappointment, so we have to cope with that in various ways’. He explains both the 
difficulties and importance of getting everyone together, adding that he and Ann 
organise extended family gatherings to mark special occasions. He hands me a beautiful 
photo album commemorating his 80th birthday party, which brought together his 
brothers and sister and their children and grandchildren. John indicates that they will 
be doing something on a smaller scale shortly to mark his 81st birthday, but his 
brothers are keen for a repeat and he is trying to arrange this to celebrate Ann’s 
forthcoming 80th. Ann’s actual birthday falls in the winter, but John has ‘had the 
brilliant idea of having a sort of Queen’s official birthday the following year’ once the 
weather is better. When I ask Ann what she thinks about John’s brilliant idea she agrees 
that it will be lovely to see everyone again, but ‘can’t quite understand how it came to 
pass that I will be eighty years old’.  
The nature of inquiry and the significance of the final years 
After talking about the various things that the grandchildren do that add to the 
difficulties of getting such a large number of people together, John reflects ‘it strikes me 
that we ask what they are doing and what they want to do, but there is very little by way 
of inquiry that comes back the other way’ before catching Ann’s expression: 
John: ‘You’re looking quizzical love’ 
Ann: Yes, I’m just thinking about that. It’s not something that surprises me or that I’ve 
even really thought about.  
Still looking quizzical, she continues: 
Ann: I suppose it’s a case of curiosity. We’re curious about them, but they are not the 
least bit curious about us because we’re just gran and grandad and they know all about 
us, as far as they’re concerned. We’ve always been there. 
John heads across the room to a desk area covered in papers and instantly retrieves the 
latest version of ‘how we first met’, suggesting that he suspects they will be interested 
one day and so he’s set it all down for them, to which Ann ripostes jestingly ’whether 
they want it or not’.  
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John: Quite; but we often talk about how we wish we’d spoken more to our parents. 
They were marvellous people.  I would love to have spoken more to Ann’s father about 
his time in the army.  
Ann: Yes, and I can think back to times with our mothers too, things we should have 
asked. We didn’t think of it at the time. I think there were just so many other things to 
think about. 
John: I think this is my point love, that the significance of things often only becomes 
apparent with advancing years… Now, looking back, I can see so much of that magical 
year at University when we had no responsibilities to anyone but ourselves is reflected 
in the way that we are now. Later, what with the honeymoon baby and having five 
children, well, we did a lot as a family, but our ability to do things as a pair was very 
much curtailed, so we tended to do things separately for a while, but there was always a 
wish to be doing things together. Well, on my part I have to say. 
Ann: Oh yes, and if the opportunity ever arose we seized upon it, didn’t we? We’d go 
and do things together or go off somewhere together. Now, we are always together, 
there’s no escape (Laughs). 
John: And the glory of it is, is that love we felt for each other back then has lasted until 
now and the love that I feel for Ann still grows. 
Interpretation of ‘Managing Expectations’ 
The above extract documents the place of conversation in Ann and John’s everyday life 
and illustrates the blend of fresh topics, personal and shared memories that 
characterises their talk. There is a continuity to this practice, as Ann and John have 
delighted in discussing and debating things since they first met, extending the temporal 
depth of their shared memories and the possibilities for the stories to be co-
constructed, bringing together their different ideas. Taking turns when narrating 
common experiences, they fall into a pattern, John supplying the bulk of the detail, 
‘taking five sentences where others use one’, Ann following up with the witty one-liner.  
Ann and John are seasoned reflectors and engage in personal and joint meaning-making 
processes. Ann, a former teacher, demonstrates a strong affinity with the naturalism of 
John Dewey, highlighting the inherent uncertainty in life, the place of happenstance and 
the nature of inquiry. John identifies strongly with the notion that the significance of 
past happenings often only later becomes apparent and recognises the benefits of 
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‘reading our lives’ (Randall and McKim, 2008), attributing considerable value to the 
different perspective acquired with advancing years.  
The complex temporal nature of human existence is not only manifest in their talk, but 
the connections between past, present and future are often articulated explicitly. The 
extract begins with the enduring experience of looking out of the window and admiring 
the garden that Ann has cultivated over the last fifty years, a scene redolent with scents, 
sounds and images of the past. Ann moves from the retained loveliness of the garden in 
the present and its ongoing source of wonderment, through times she previously spent 
in this garden and back to her current limited efforts, making light-heated reference to 
John’s persistent inability to differentiate weeds from plants. Ann’s personal time travel 
continues to a temporal destination when there was no such view, when a garden was 
something imaginary and magical, reconnecting Ann with her father and her formative 
years growing up in India. She goes further, explaining what the garden meant to her 
father and identifying with his meaning, namely the importance of having your own 
space, a place to experiment and see what happens, a place to make mistakes 
unobserved, without worrying.  
John, keen to rekindle Ann’s interest in gardening, sees and suggests future 
possibilities, but the proposed greenhouse is a contrived, functional space, too 
constraining for Ann and charged with expectations of work rather than play. Ann 
resists these expectations. The garden has served many different ‘functions’ in the past, 
providing potatoes for the family, a pasture for a pony and space for children to play, 
but these functions are no longer required, discontinued. Meanings however are not 
confined to functions and their outcomes, but should also be understood as flowing 
from the aesthetic, imaginative, creative and emotional modes of interaction with the 
world (Ricoeur, 1984). With little coaxing, the memories and meanings the garden 
holds for Ann find their way through, like the unexpected winter primroses, out into 
the light. For Ann, ‘gardening’ may have been reduced to pointing out the odd weed, but 
the ‘garden’ is an unbroken source of aesthetic delight; it continues to surprise and 
holds future possibilities, ‘like all living things’. 
The parallels that Ann draws between nurturing a country garden and life itself persist 
throughout the discussion, particularly in her remarks about motherhood and the 
limitations of rational planning. Instead, she emphasises the influence of her own 
mother’s cherishing ways, which were not learned from a book. It is also evident in her 
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conversation with John about the evolving nature of relationships and the management 
of expectations within the family in the here-and-now and going forward; a narrative in 
the making (Ricoeur, 1984). Both functions of narrative, namely ordering and the 
creation of spaces for imagining future possibilities are evident.  
Once again, Ricoeur’s (1992) expansion of the field of action is instructive, 
characterised by a two-way movement between different levels of praxis. The notion of 
mobile and necessarily changeable ‘life plans’ supports consideration of the vast 
practical unit of ‘family life’ and the importance of fluidity. Interdependence is not 
disputed and there is an acceptance that more help will be needed in future, with Ann 
and John actively preparing for that time. Alongside this sits the concern that they must 
continue to be afforded the opportunity to contribute to family life in different ways. 
Traditionally John has set challenges and offered advice, Ann has looked beyond 
shortcomings to appreciate good qualities ‘seeing the best in me when I’m not at my 
best’. With opportunities increasingly limited as the grandchildren grow, thoughts turn 
to practical and unifying alternatives, from taking in parcels to celebrating life together, 
replacing fading photographs of extended family with new ones. 
An explicitly generative sense of the future is communicated through concern for their 
grandchildren. John is preparing for a time when he will not be here and questions may 
be asked by setting his version of events down on paper, Ann by modelling ways of 
being, letting people find their own preferred places to grow. Both recognise the 
influence of their parents, extending their temporal horizons into the past. Ricoeur’s 
(1992) higher level of praxis, the narrative unity of a life, also serves as a guiding ideal. 
The past is revisited and new meanings found, whether in a magical year or snatched 
moments together, helping them to make sense of their togetherness in the present and 
sustain them going forward. Reading the past is a shared source of wonderment, much 
like the garden is for Ann, a midnight game of hide-and-seek by torchlight the reward 
for the heavy spade work conducted over a lifetime. 
Jim and Mary: Fault Lines ~ an Afternoon at the Stroke Club 
When I first meet with Jim he is still volunteering each week at a local stroke club that 
he helped to establish more than a decade ago. Jim tells me that the club is the one thing 
he looks forward to each week and describes it as his ‘anchor.’ He suggests that I 
accompany him there, checks this out with the members and makes the necessary 
arrangements with the organiser. It transpires that this is to be Jim’s last week ‘helping’ 
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at the club due to mounting concerns about the frequency of his falls. Experiencing the 
ending of this involvement with Jim and Mary proves critical in shaping my 
understanding of the complexity of their situation and the various relationships at 
stake. It proves pivotal in the unfolding narrative set out in the next chapter. 
This is going to be his last week 
I telephone to check that it is still convenient for me to accompany Jim to the stroke 
club. Mary answers the phone and sounds hesitant, going on to explain that Fiona (one 
of the organisers) phoned earlier to express concerns about Jim’s continued 
involvement. Mary sounds as though she is struggling to make sense of this 
development. I learn that ‘Jim has had quite a few falls’, including a very public fall at the 
golf club and another ‘bad fall’ a couple of nights before in the bathroom. She adds ‘he’s 
fine and you know what he’s like, he’s trying to carry on regardless’, before concluding 
that ‘Fiona said they don’t have the numbers to cope with him and because he hasn’t had 
a stroke he’s not covered and... Anyway, he’s not able to help anymore, so this is going to 
be his last week.’ Having been reassured that Jim is still expecting me to accompany him, 
I drive to their house. 
We’ll see… 
On arrival, I see that Jim has a black eye and the top of his head is grazed. I ask him 
what he’s been up to and he replies that he was at a Burns Supper, which was 
‘smashing’. Mary says, ‘Speaking of smashing, I think Karen’s meaning what you’ve been 
up to get your black eye. She’ll be thinking I’ve been hitting you with the rolling pin’, and 
Jim laughs ‘no, no, self-inflicted wounds. When we prepare to leave, Mary tells Jim that 
he’ll need to take his stick. He tuts irritably, but takes it. He tells me that he’s glad I’m 
coming along and thinks I’ll see why he ‘finds it very gratifying’. Mary reminds him that 
this is going to be his last week, to which Jim responds defiantly ‘maybe, we’ll see’. He 
walks briskly to the car, gets into the passenger side without any real difficulty, but 
struggles with the seat belt, which Mary eventually clicks into place.   
An extra pair of hands is always welcome 
When we arrive at the venue, Jim unclicks his seat belt and gets out of the car. He takes 
his stick from Mary and starts walking towards the entrance. Mary tries to take his 
other arm but he jerks it away and lets his hand swing free. As we walk, I learn that 
Mary usually drops Jim off outside and waits for him in the car park when the club 
finishes. Fiona however has asked her to accompany Jim into and collect him from the 
meeting room. Mary sighs after telling me this. Once inside the room Jim takes off his 
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jacket, putting it and his stick on the back of a chair. Once he is seated ‘safely’ Mary 
heads off. Jim says to me ‘you’ll soon see I am not the only helper’. In addition to Fiona 
and her husband Alan (the ‘organisers’) there are several ‘ordinary helpers’ like Graham 
and Jackie who are first to arrive and Eddie’s wife, who is ‘just Eddie’s helper’. They are 
all most welcoming and I’m told ‘it’s a very informal group’ and today will have a Burns 
Supper theme. When I offer to help, Jim says ‘an extra pair of hands is always welcome’ 
and Graham explains that they set up a large table in the middle without any chairs 
round it, as most of the ‘members’ use wheelchairs.  
Are you going to let this stop me from coming? 
While I am helping to arrange the furniture, Jim gets up and starts moving one of the 
chairs. Fiona spots him, shouts ‘Alan’ and nods in Jim’s direction. Alan approaches Jim, 
touching his arm in a mock punch. He pulls up a couple of chairs, sits down and 
encourages Jim to sit beside him. I hear him tell Jim that he’s ‘some man’, pointing to his 
eye, and adding that he ‘can’t be helping with the chairs and things anymore’. Jim then 
asks about Fiona’s phone call, saying ‘I hope you know me well enough to know I’m not 
the sort to sue’. Alan agrees, but states that some of the members are worried about 
him, and they need to think about them too. Jim then says ‘Mary says I’ve not to come 
any more. Are you going to let this stop me from coming’? Alan shakes his head, puts his 
hand on Jim’s shoulder and responds, ‘No one is stopping you from coming, but you can’t 
be helping out the way you used to’. Jim says ‘good, that’s good –I don’t want to stop 
coming’ and his shoulders rise in relief.  
It’s difficult not to help when you are used to being a worker 
The bus bringing the members arrives and as the helpers make their way to the 
entrance, Jim heads out to the toilet. A short while later Graham re-enters the room, 
announcing that ‘Jim was trying to push one of the wheelchairs’. Alan escorts Jim back 
into the room, holding his arm very tightly and sits him back in his chair. Jim tells me 
that he had ‘forgotten’ adding slowly ‘it’s difficult not to - help - when you are - used to 
being - a worker’. When the meeting kicks off, each of the helpers, with the exception of 
Jim, has a pre-selected piece of poetry to read. Jim laughs and cheers after each recital, 
but doesn’t contribute to the subsequent discussion. He looks very relaxed and happy 
just to be there.  
 
At one point, I become aware that Jim is reaching out with his hand, very slowly and 
uncertainly, towards the lady to his left’s arm. She is wearing a black jacket made of a 
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padded material and the sleeve is lying in folds. Jackie is sitting directly across from Jim 
and looks unnerved. I touch Jim’s arm and ask if he’s alright and he replies, ‘It’s just a 
coat, it looked like it was floating and I couldn’t make out what it was’. The afternoon 
concludes with a quiz, which Jim struggles with. While the prizes are being handed out 
to the winners, Jim calls Mary using the speed dial on his phone to tell her they are 
finishing up.  He has to shout over the announcements and applause, drawing one or 
two stern looks from his fellow helpers.   
It would be better all-round if he didn’t come back 
While the clearing up is going on, Jim makes his way to the toilet again and Fiona goes 
after him saying over her shoulder ‘He can’t be walking about on his own’ and takes his 
arm. Alan follows her and takes over. When Fiona returns she tells me that ‘nobody 
wants to upset Jim or stop him from coming’, but it is a ‘very difficult situation’ for them. 
She explains that he doesn’t qualify as a member as he hasn’t had a stroke, but he isn’t 
able to help any more, now needs more help than any of the members, and there are 
not enough helpers to manage his risk of falling. She adds that the members are 
worried about him and every week he comes in and he’s had another fall, another 
bruise. It would be ‘very upsetting for the members if he had a bad fall during a meeting’, 
plus they are not covered for him and every year it gets more difficult to secure 
funding. Fiona concludes that he could come back if he didn’t keep getting up and 
walking about, or if someone stayed with him, but ‘Mary seems to think it would be 
better all-round if he didn’t come back’.   
Changing of the guard 
Jim reappears with Alan, who walks him back to his chair at a painfully slow pace and 
stands over him until Mary comes to take him home. When Mary arrives, there is a brief 
exchange of pleasantries, but no conversation as to whether this is to be Jim’s last week. 
Jim is stiff and slow getting out of his chair and it takes him several attempts to stand 
up. He tells me, ‘Treacle feet. I’m always worse when I’ve been sitting. At home, I like to 
get up and walk about every now and again, but I’ve had to stay in my seat all afternoon 
so I’ve seized up’. Jim walks with his stick out to the car, more stiffly than before, but still 
quite briskly and Mary simply walks alongside him. He gets into the car unassisted and 
promptly falls asleep. 
Interpretation of ‘Fault Lines’  
The above extract illustrates the ways in which everyday action connects to practical 
and moral dilemmas in a social situation where there are multiple, competing interests 
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at stake. Mimetic theory affords the following interpretation. Mimesis1 concerns those 
aspects of action that have a pre-narrative quality and is the means by which acting and 
suffering rise to meaning at a pre-reflective level within a particular situation. Some 
moments and events possess greater narrativity than others, they are ‘lit up with the 
qualities we take to belong to finely wrought narrative’ (Mattingly 2000:189). The 
scene that unfolds possesses many of the attributes of a Greek tragedy.  
The extract begins with Mary struggling to make sense of the latest happenings, to 
bring concordance from discordance. The pre-narrative quality of action does not mean 
that the plot is always clear. It falls to Mary to explain to Jim why he can no longer help 
out at the stroke club. Yet she herself cannot grasp how the club that Jim was 
instrumental in establishing, where he has volunteered for many years and which 
caters for people with diverse physical and cognitive impairments, cannot 
accommodate him in his hour of need – ‘on top of everything else’. She feels that Jim’s 
input is not being recognised. For Mary, this event takes its meaning, not from itself as a 
single occurrence, but from the contribution it makes to the narrative as a whole; 
ending Jim’s involvement with the club means pulling up his anchor.  
 
In addition to ordering and giving meaning to events, the mediating operation of 
emplotment can create the space for considering other possibilities for action. The plot 
of this unfolding story is not fixed and Jim envisages alternatives.  Ricoeur (1992) 
stresses the importance of the ‘ending’ in any given narrative, and acknowledges that in 
real life we are more like the characters in the story than the narrator, as we are unable 
to see ahead to consequences and unable to read the eventual meaning that actions and 
experiences will acquire. However, he also highlights that we have experience, however 
incomplete, of what is meant by ending a course of action. With Jim’s words ‘we’ll see’, 
the ending of this particular ‘slice of life’ (Ricoeur, 1992:162) is suspended, paving the 
way for him to try to convert his act of imagination into an act of will. The action that 
follows is thus charged with the dramatic question ‘Is this to be Jim’s last time?’ and the 
knowledge that the different actors have shared histories but different endings in sight.  
 
Ricoeur’s (1992) consideration of the relation between narrative and action in terms of 
a nesting of constitutive levels of praxis is again instructive. The inherently interactive 
practice of volunteering is comprised of basic actions and configured by constitutive 
rules that give each action its meaning. Actions can be appraised as appropriate or 
inappropriate. The notion of practice also assumes capability and competence, which 
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can be evaluated by others. Jim is no longer deemed competent. In addition, despite the 
professed ‘very informal’ nature of the club, it has its own hierarchy and is bound by 
constitutions, rules, norms and other symbolic resources, both internally derived and 
externally shaped. To be a member you must have had a stroke, to be a helper you must 
be judged capable of helping. Jim does not meet the criteria for either category.  
Jim’s lack of capability is largely attributable to the increasing fragility of his body. It 
has become an uncivilised body, an embarrassing body (Elias, 1978) that falls over and 
will not stay seated, that bruises badly, shouts out during prize giving and reaches out 
uncertainly during group discussions. Jim has helped at the club for many years and 
helping has become habitual, unthinking. He forgets that he is no longer permitted to 
help, but his body remembers how.  The past is in his behaviour, habits wear grooves 
and enforced changes may be difficult to make – ‘It’s hard not to help when you’re used 
to being a worker’. Basic actions previously evaluated as helpful are now judged to be 
risky or disruptive. For Ricoeur, (1992) action takes its meaning - ‘as helping’, as ‘work’ 
– only from others, underscoring ‘the extraordinary precariousness of the relation 
between work and its author, the mediation of the other being so thoroughly 
constitutive of its meaning’ [Ricoeur, 1992:156]. 
At the next level of praxis, Jim’s ‘life plans’ have undergone major revisions since the 
onset of his condition. Taking part in the stroke club is the last vestige of an enduring 
commitment to put something back into the community.  It is a legacy, a source of 
gratification and keeps him grounded. Rather than constituting ‘a fluid intermediary 
zone of exchange between determinate practices and guiding ideals’ (Ricoeur, 
1992:172), his aspiration to participate has become resistant to change. While Jim 
refuses Mary’s discreet attempts to support him, to continue volunteering he is 
prepared to submit to a vice-light grip as he is escorted back to his seat at an 
exaggeratedly slow pace.  He tries to remain seated knowing that it will cause him to 
seize up. The nested levels of basic actions, practices and life plans are however on a 
collision course and, like a tectonic plate, the fault lines expand each time Jim shifts. 
Jim’s body is the primary source of his perceived vulnerability, but his fatal error is that 
he has ‘misread’ the situation – another pair of hands is not always welcome. The club 
needs a safe pair of hands and Jim now constitutes a risk.  
Ricoeur (1992) highlights that situational interpretation requires judgement and we 
aspire to plausibility in the eyes of others. Jim’s efforts to achieve continuity are 
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perceived by others as implausible, creating discontinuity, upsetting the order of the 
club that he co-founded to provide its members with a haven from distress. The 
interpersonal relationships and friendships at play within the situation compound the 
difficulties. The organisers know who Jim is, they recognise his uniqueness, but what 
Jim has become places him on the wrong side of the moral gateway. No one wants to 
disesteem Jim, no one wants to deliver the message: you have fallen, literally and 
metaphorically, into the category of ‘Other’; do the ‘right thing’. The organisers perceive 
making a dignified exit to be the right thing, Jim clings to the stroke club as the last 
remnant of a good life; his ethical aim cannot pass through the moral sieve (Ricoeur, 
1992). Mary is trying to support Jim to persevere but the avenues of possibility are 
closing and she too is judged more unfavourably with each successive fall, ‘He can’t be 
walking about on his own any more’. As they leave the club together, Mary does not even 
try to take Jim’s arm, but walks alongside him, matching his own pace. 
Chrissie: Sink or Swim / Piccadilly Circus 
I struggle to choose a single meeting with Chrissie because each encounter is so 
different and there is no obvious storyline opening, anchor, turning point or reversal. 
During school term-time, Chrissie goes swimming every weekday morning and takes 
part in a twice-weekly aquarobics class. This perhaps appears to be a strong candidate 
to focus upon and it offers important insights into some of the practical difficulties that 
age-unfriendly environments can present. However, this focus is too one-dimensional 
and the meticulous planning that it entails is completely at odds with what I initially 
perceive as the chaos of Chrissie’s private world, where paradoxically, she seems more 
certain. I therefore recall two contrasting experiences below. 
Sink or Swim 
I arrive at Chrissie’s house around 9:30 a.m. and as she answers the door I spot her 
swimming bag in the hallway. She has a checklist to make sure she has everything she 
needs, including £2, £1 and 20p coins for admission, locker and hairdryer respectively, 
which she takes from the ‘swimming jars’ that her sons keep topped up for her. Chrissie 
tells me that, growing up as one of nine children, she was ‘really lucky’ to learn to swim:  
 ‘My dad never had much money, but he handed over his wages. He wanted us out 
from under his feet on Saturday mornings and we’d go to the baths for hours. The wee ones 
got in free, but me and my older brothers always had bus fares and money for a swim. My 
oldest brother got lessons at school, but the rest of us taught ourselves, it was sink or swim’. 
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The main road through town is the most direct route to the leisure centre, but Chrissie 
goes ‘the top way’ because it is less busy. The journey takes around five minutes. On the 
way, I learn that Helen, Chrissie’s daughter is struggling to learn to drive. ‘She never 
bothered before because she couldn’t have afforded to run a car and never needed one’. 
Chrissie has stopped driving Helen to work so that she has more of an incentive, 
adding, ‘My son has told them all they can’t keep using me like a taxi. I’m fine just now, 
but I’ll need to stop some time’.  
Chrissie initially looks for a parking space close to the entrance of the leisure centre, 
which would require tight manoeuvring, before continuing to a less occupied section of 
the car park. I learn that when she comes alone she parks as close to the door as 
possible so that she can see the car when she comes out, otherwise she won’t 
remember where she left it and starts to panic. She remarks that she would like a 
disabled badge, but if she asked, they’d say she’s not fit to drive, adding ‘but driving and 
remembering where you park are two different things’. 
I’m not that bad 
Before leaving the car, Chrissie opens her purse and puts her season pass and the three 
coins in her jacket pocket. She tells me she shouldn’t need her pass as she told the 
woman at the desk that she had Alzheimer’s ‘when it was quiet’. ‘I had to because I was 
getting flustered unzipping my bag, opening my purse, taking my pass out, putting it back, 
especially when there was a queue. I said to her ‘I come every day, you know I have a 
pass’’. Having lost her purse a few times, Chrissie is anxious about leaving it at the desk. 
She keeps hold of it until she has locked the car, hooks her keys onto a keyring attached 
to the purse and places them in her bag. As we walk she tells me ‘I didn’t like telling her 
as there’s still not that many people know I have it. I don’t want folk knowing cos they 
start looking for faults and that’s the beginning of the end. I’m fine as long as nothing 
panics me. If I start to panic, I can’t think’. She informs me, ‘You’ll see her when we go in, 
with her big sympathetic face. She speaks to me as though I’m not the full shilling. I mean, 
I’m not that bad’. When we step inside, sure enough, I see ‘the big sympathetic face’ 
behind the desk saying very slowly ‘Hello, how are you today’? She has a self-adhesive 
pink band for the steam room ready for Chrissie and says ‘there you go dear’.  
Strategy deployment 
When we go through to the changing area, Chrissie tells me that she always takes a 
locker as close as to the showers as she can.  She points to the lower row of lockers and 
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says ‘People usually go for the top ones, but I always take one in this block, first from the 
end if I can get it’. She then removes the wrist band and locker key from the door, 
saying ‘See, the numbers have faded. I can’t read them without my glasses. I won’t 
remember my number, but I can remember where my locker is’.  I notice Chrissie touch 
her ears, I think checking that she has taken her hearing aids out. She has. We each 
attach the pink wristband, which proves a bit awkward (and a nightmare to remove 
afterwards). 
The class is badged as ‘50+’ but most participants are considerably older. A few people 
wear inflated armbands around their wrists instead of using the foam weights, Chrissie 
suggests because ‘their arthritis is worse than mine’. I also overhear a conversation 
indicating that the instructor sticks to the same programme to make things easier for 
the oldest participants. Chrissie has told me in advance that without her hearing aids 
she can’t hear the instructions and initially she looked to see what the instructor was 
doing. However, she soon discovered that it looks different on dry land, advising me 
that it’s better to watch people in the water. When the class starts I look around, but no 
two people are doing the same thing. I watch the instructor instead and think I’m doing 
well when Chrissie points out that I need to keep my arms under the water. Ah, it’s 
actually quite hard work. 
Plenty more fish 
The exercise programme comprises a mix of star jumps, spot running and frog leaps, 
with the instructor constantly shouting ‘Listen to the beat team, try to move to the beat, 
to the beat team’. The ‘beat’ is surprisingly pacey and the programme runs for an hour. 
Some of ‘the team’ leave after 40 minutes as the pace picks up, but Chrissie manages to 
‘keep to the beat’ and is really working her arms, which I notice are remarkably toned. 
When it comes to the 10-minute cool down, Chrissie indicates that she prefers to go for 
a swim at this point and I follow her to the other end of the pool. She starts doing 
widths, including ‘a couple of the crawl, cos it’s better for your arms’. When I ask about 
this as we later relax in the Jacuzzi she explains, ‘I’ve always been vain; I can’t kept help 
it. I’ve never had any problem attracting men, pigs mostly, but that was my talent’. She 
adds, ‘I still get a few hook ups on PlentyofFish17’. Catching my stunned expression, she 
asks if she’s shocked me. Initially I say ‘No, just pleasantly surprised’, but I know how 
well she can read people and admit ‘well, maybe a bit’.  She laughs, telling me that she’s 
                                                          
17 Plentyoffish is an internet dating site  
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not really looking, but it’s nice to see who she could get and promises to show me her 
profile page later. She quips ‘It’s alright, I’m in the silver pond, not the naughty pond’ and 
we both dissolve into hysterics.  
Back in the labyrinth of the changing room, I notice several women anxiously trying to 
locate their lockers, like participants in a macabre version of the ‘Crystal Maze’, none 
having adopted Chrissie’s winning strategy of using the lower row. When Chrissie 
advises me to use the middle hairdryer ‘cos it runs forever’, I conclude that she’s quite a 
catch. 
Piccadilly Circus 
Visiting Chrissie at home during the school holidays offers a marked contrast to the 
anxiety fuelled trip to the swimming pool. When I knock on the front door, Craig 
(Chrissie’s ‘adopted’ grandson) answers and asks me excitedly, ‘Have you seen the 
puppies?’ He has a friend with him called Neil. When I go inside I discover that Poppy, 
Helen’s Yorkshire terrier, has had two puppies, one of which is about to be sold. Helen 
is working and it has fallen to Chrissie to oversee proceedings.  Two young girls are 
sitting in the lounge. I notice some furniture in the corner of the room and Chrissie 
explains that Helen put an old wardrobe on e-bay and a man who has just moved into 
an unfurnished flat is coming to take it away later that afternoon. Chrissie says, ‘It 
sounded as though he has nothing, so I’ve looked out a few bits and pieces for him too’.  
Free to a good home 
Chrissie asks the boys to take Poppy for a walk so she isn’t there when the girls take her 
puppy away and they oblige. A photo shoot follows and there are promises to keep in 
touch via Facebook. The boys come running back in at this point, saying they want to 
take photos too. Chrissie asks them to hurry as they need to take Poppy away before 
the girls leave. As soon as the girls depart, Chrissie uploads the photos to her Facebook 
page, showing me a photo of her dog, Stanley, who I learn has ‘gone free to a good 
home’. Chrissie asks me to follow her upstairs, where she shows me a shredded carpet 
outside her bedroom door. Stanley had been scratching at her door all night, but she 
hadn’t heard him because she didn’t have her hearing aids in. Eventually she got up and 
discovered that she had left the patio doors unlocked and they had blown open. 
Chrissie’s unsure if Stanley was frightened or trying to warn her, but concludes ‘I’m too 
old to be looking after him’. She continues, ‘I grew up leaving the doors unlocked because 
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we didn’t have anything worth nicking, but I’ve already had a couple of break-ins, so my 
son’s been coming around at night to make sure they’re locked - for the insurance’.   
It’s like Piccadilly Circus 
At that point Craig comes back in through the offending patio doors with Neil and 
Bethany, Neil’s twin sister. Bethany has the longest hair I’ve ever seen. Poppy is not 
with them and when Chrissie asks where she is, Craig says ‘at Natalie’s’. No further 
explanation is required. They go back out and Chrissie tells me that she’s very fond of 
Bethany, explaining that her classmate had leukaemia and she’s going to donate her 
hair to make children’s wigs. I chat with Chrissie as she makes tea in the kitchen. As we 
move back to the lounge a woman comes through the patio doors with Poppy in tow 
and gives Chrissie a kiss. I deduce that this must be Natalie, one of Chrissie’s grand-
daughters. She is looking for Stephanie (her daughter) who had been at Chrissie’s 
house earlier. Chrissie says she can’t remember where Stephanie said she was going, 
but thinks Craig will know.  Natalie does not seem too concerned where Stephanie is, or 
who I am. She heads back out without Poppy. Chrissie comments, ‘It’s always like this, 
folk in and out all the time. It’s like Piccadilly Circus, but that’s the way I like it’. Right on 
cue, Craig comes through the much-used patio doors and asks if they can go and get 
lollies. Chrissie replies ‘of course’. She asks him if he knows where Stephanie is, but he 
says ‘no’ and heads out again. As he leaves, Helen phones to ask how Poppy is. 
In safe hands 
When Chrissie comes off the phone she tells me how lucky she is to have a daughter. 
She adds that it looks as though her neighbour, Jessie, will not be coming home from 
hospital following her recent fall and Jessie’s sons are looking for a care home. Elsie, 
another neighbour is really upset about it. I’m told that Elsie’s son is good to her, but 
he’s seventy. Elsie’s grandson is a lovely man too and comes to see Elsie every night on 
his way home from work, but neither of them would think about taking Elsie to see 
Jessie and Elsie would never ask; ‘Men don’t think that way’. Elsie has carers and her 
son makes sure she has her meals, ‘all the essentials, but no wee treats’. Chrissie takes 
Elsie a cake every day, ‘something fresh, over the counter and we have a good blether’. 
While there she often gives the place a quick run over with her hoover, ‘because Elsie’s 
hoover is done. It’s a museum piece. She stresses again, ‘Men don’t think about that’.  
Chrissie continues this account by telling me that last night she popped in with a couple 
of cartons of soup and Elsie asked her to put one in the freezer; ‘Now I don’t know when 
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that freezer was last defrosted. Last century. There’s stuff in there her son must have put 
in recently, nice stuff mind, but he wouldn’t think to defrost it. I’m not saying he wouldn’t 
do it, just he wouldn’t think about it. I’ve offered to do it tonight and Helen will help ‘cos 
it’ll be a job and a half, but Helen would never let it get to that state’. Chrissie emphasises 
that her own sons are very good to her. James always goes with her to her 
appointments, ‘He knows how to talk to doctors’. And Frank got her banking sorted ‘cos 
he’s on top of all that stuff. But when it comes to the niceties, that’s when you need a 
daughter’. The conversation is interrupted as the remaining pup makes an appearance 
and poops all over the carpet. Chrissie, unfazed, deals with it efficiently. 
Later, as I am saying cheerio at the front door, an old van pulls up outside the house 
and a painfully thin and what I perceive to be troubled-looking man steps out. Chrissie 
remarks, ‘That’ll be the guy for the wardrobe’ and waves to him warmly. At that moment 
Craig, Neil and Bethany burst through the patio doors and Chrissie says ‘Here’s my boy’ 
as Craig comes to see what is going on and puts his arms around Chrissie’s waist. I 
conclude that she is in safe hands.  
Interpretation of ‘Sink or Swim / Piccadilly Circus’ 
In the first encounter, drawing upon mimetic theory, the ‘swimming jars’ full of coins 
connect Chrissie to childhood memories of having enough money to go by bus to the 
public baths with her large family of brothers and sisters. She considers herself 
fortunate and imagines that things could have been different. Further, she is ‘still lucky’ 
in having sons who keep the jars topped up, essential ingredients in a carefully 
coordinated plan that enables her to continue swimming into the future. Chrissie’s 
imagined possibilities also include a time when she will not be able to drive, but she 
and her family are preparing for that. They are acting in concert; her sons are alerting 
younger family members to the demands made of Chrissie and her daughter is learning 
to drive, having previously had neither the need nor the means to do so. Despite these 
apparent hardships, through the guiding ideal of the narrative unity of a life, Chrissie is 
able to frame her health conditions and the changes they may bring within what she 
perceives to be a good and lucky life. 
Chrissie would like a disabled badge and although clear that being able to drive and 
remembering where you park are unrelated, she won’t apply as she feels this would be 
misrecognised as a sign of unfitness. Chrissie’s concern with being identified as 
incapable extends to face-to-face encounters in public spaces and her fear of people 
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finding fault is tainting the pleasure of swimming. Being with Chrissie illuminates the 
steps taken to negotiate the situation, including telling the woman at the desk about her 
condition. While this has the desired effect of no longer needing to produce her season 
pass, it comes at the price of being spoken to as if she is ‘not the full shilling’. Here 
cultural assumptions about dementia take priority over Chrissie’s particularities; she’s 
‘not that bad’. Once inside, the practice of swimming presents no difficulties to Chrissie, 
but the physical environment constitutes a direct threat to dignity and self-esteem. 
Ostensibly hosting a class for older people, embodied needs are neglected and 
participation requires the successful completion of an obstacle course before entering 
the water.  
Spending time with Chrissie, I come to more fully appreciate the importance of 
attending to the ‘non-substitutability’ of persons in considerations of inter-subjectivity. 
Unlike Chrissie, I was taken to swimming lessons and did not consider this a privilege; I 
was never left to sink or swim. Our worlds are very different, as highlighted by our 
amusing exchange about continued fishing expeditions in the silver pond. These 
differences become more apparent when I enter Chrissie’s private world, where her 
anxieties evaporate and I find myself on shaky ground. I become aware of our different 
perceptions of risk and Chrissie’s family’s more ‘forgiving’ attitude, such as towards her 
‘failing’ to lock doors, to invite ‘strangers’ into her home, or to ‘remember’ where her 
great grand-daughter has gone. Moreover, while ‘routine’ is often privileged for people 
with dementia, what I initially perceive as chaos Chrissie regards as standard. She likes 
living in Piccadilly Circus and doesn’t want the surprises to stop.  
Chrissie is not only able to contextualise her Alzheimer’s diagnosis within a narrative 
unity, but the aim of living a good life with and for others also persists. Chrissie and her 
family are part of a network that extends into their local communities. There is an 
openness to complexity and interdependence indicative of a broader understanding of 
citizenship (Fisher, 2008). This openness to others causes me to engage with the 
concept of ‘corporeal generosity’ (Diprose, 2002), whereby people make a gift of 
themselves. This extends quite literally to Chrissie’s appreciation of Bethany making a 
gift of her hair. Chrissie’s particular contributions are recognised and sustained by the 
social group to which she is closely affiliated, enhancing her self-esteem.  
Elsie’s situation also causes Chrissie to ‘refigure’ (Ricoeur, 1984) her own life and how 
different her life might have been ‘if’ she had not had a daughter. In the future 
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imaginary, should Chrissie’s abilities deteriorate, her house will be hoovered, her 
freezer defrosted, her daughter and grand-daughters will take care of the niceties. 
There are strong gendered assumptions within this account; Chrissie would not expect 
a man to engage in treating her, hoovering or defrosting fridges (activities John, Tommy 
and Hector routinely undertake). The positive sense of self Chrissie gains through 
caring activities could be attributed to working-class women’s reliance on femininity in 
the absence of other opportunities, particularly given her continued concern with 
appearance (Skeggs, 1997). Yet it may also be easier to accept care from others, when 
the time comes, in a local culture where care is valued (Barnes, 2012). Such 
understandings could easily be undermined by an absence of recognition of Chrissie’s 
particular enactment of citizenship in the wider public sphere, where contractual 
relationships and biomedical assumptions dominate.  
Reflections and Way Forward 
The study participants respectively prioritised solo undertakings, activities enacted 
with friends, as a couple, in an organised group setting, and a blend of individual leisure 
and informal ‘family’ activities. The different priorities in themselves offer insights into 
the diverse lifestyles of the participants, the things they value, their possibilities for 
continued participation in and contribution to everyday life and the extent to which 
this depends on others. The differences also shape my level of participation in the 
activities and in the co-production of meanings. The selected encounters, albeit in 
different ways, establish narrative meaning-making processes within the flow of 
actions.  
In each case, temporal considerations are key. The importance of attending closely to 
biography in the experiences of people living with dementia is not new; it underpins 
Kitwood’s (1990; 1997) philosophy. However, as the above accounts illustrate, in the 
continuity of time, situated actions often connect not only with past experiences, but 
also extend into imagined futures. Each person or couple’s situation is fluid and 
embedded with welcome and unwelcome possibilities. Each enactment of an everyday 
activity alludes to ongoing challenges and contingencies and reveals how everyday 
activities connect to moral dilemmas. It is this aspect of narrative, as an interpretive 
possibility, that yields a view of human narrative as being constantly in flux rather than 
a mere ordering of past events.  
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Each account introduces possible storylines. For Tommy, it appears to be just a 
question of time until the medical profession finds something else wrong with him and 
his activities are further curtailed, while Grace is preparing for a time when she takes 
care of Tommy. Hector wonders if there is still enough time to do some more damage 
and contemplates his own finitude. Ann and John’s account underscores the importance 
of their relationship standing the test of time as they face old age together, and their 
thoughts also turn to a more generative future, contingent upon their family’s busy 
lives. Jim is trying to buy time, making compromises to continue with a valued activity 
for a little longer, while Mary is wondering how Jim’s investments over time seem to 
count for so little in the present. Chrissie in a sense is defying time, entertaining the 
possibility of dipping once more into the silver pond, the fullness of her daily life 
ensuring future decline is but a footnote in a good and lucky life.  
Ricoeur’s (1984) narrative theorising indicates that the plot constantly undergoes 
change, as new information is accrued, new events take place or previous 
understandings are altered. Having considered how meanings and connections were 
made within a specific acting situation for each person or couple, the next chapter 
contextualises and expands upon these experiences, looking at how the narratives 
unfolded over the course of the study. It also considers the implications for identity 





Fallen Fruits: Five Emplotted Narratives of Everyday Life  
Overview 
The previous chapter engaged with situated action and meaning-making processes in 
the everyday lives of the participants, drawing upon a specific scenario for each. In this 
chapter, I consider how the participants variously negotiate the obstacles, dilemmas 
and opportunities of everyday life over the course of study period. I present the fruits 
of the analysis, using the process described in Chapter Five, in the form of five 
emplotted narratives. The narratives emanate from the real-time enactments of events, 
accounts of imagined futures, together with small stories (Bamburg, 2004) of past 
events told by the participants in the midst of doing everyday activities on the 
Narrative Inquiry landscape. Each narrative was configured upon conclusion of my 
time in the field and is thus detached from its life source, the ingredients selected by me 
from a bounty of fallen fruits. The narratives and the lives of the participants in 
contrast continued to unfold. 
 
The configured narratives are my interpretation of how various events and happenings 
deemed significant by participants connect, taking their meanings from their respective 
contributions to the whole. I also ask what part ‘dementia’ does or does not play within 
the different configurations and consider how ‘memory loss’ or ‘dementia’ is 
incorporated into the participants’ unfolding narratives and identities. In each case, I 
identify an overall plot to represent various processes of transformation related to a 
development in the person or couple’s life. Meanings shift and assume new dimensions 
as changes and unpredictability regarding both bodily ageing and being good enough 
citizens are negotiated, integrating past, present and implied future. The narrative 
analyses illustrate how the study participants variously communicated their 
uncertainty regarding being able to continue to participate in and contribute to society 
in ways that they find meaningful, and are socially valued. They also illustrate the 
extent to which participation in everyday activities in local cultures opens or forecloses 
possibilities for being themselves, as unique and particular persons, rather than being 
defined by dementia. As such, the narratives represent ongoing struggles for 
recognition.   
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Tommy and Grace: Deciding what to do with the Garden  
The narrative below expands upon the events and meanings identified through ‘A Walk 
in the Snow’, as set out in the previous chapter. Keeping on top of the garden is part of 
everyday life in the local culture in which Tommy and Grace live. It speaks to their 
enduring commitment to being good citizens by participating in and contributing to 
society, which includes being responsible neighbours. The garden however is a source 
of ambiguity, associated with the progression of Tommy’s condition and Grace’s 
chronic back problems, which together constitute a threat to keeping on top of it. 
Something has to be done. In emplotting the narrative, I use ‘deciding what to do with 
the garden’ as a structuring device.   
During my first meeting with Tommy, he stuns me with tales of his impoverished 
childhood. As we walk the snowy streets surrounding his home, I come to appreciate 
the extent of the stigma surrounding his illegitimacy. He recounts various efforts to 
make himself ‘useful’. Tommy tells me that he had to earn his keep from a young age, 
delivering milk, mucking out stables, straightening nails for the local undertaker and 
later working as a groomsman, before eventually persuading a large firm to take him on 
as an apprentice plasterer. His employment was almost short-lived when they 
discovered Tommy was left handed, but he’d pleaded for one week to prove himself 
and found the means to work with the tools. He adds, ‘I had to’. As our walk continues, I 
learn that a fence has come down in Tommy’s back garden due to the weight of the 
snow and he confidently tells me he’ll fix it later. He attaches great importance to being 
‘a handy man’, advising that he ‘keeps on top of things’.  This is followed by a statement 
that peppers our conversations throughout the study, ‘You can’t be looking like an old 
fool’.  
When we get back to the house, Tommy goes to inspect the damaged fence as I chat to 
Grace who looks on from the kitchen. She tells me, ‘A few people have said ‘have you not 
been to the “D café” yet, oh you should go’, but I’m not sure. The theatre visits are one 
thing, but the café? Maybe it’s for the future’. She informs me that they already know 
quite a few people who are ‘further down the road’ and a couple ‘at the end stage’ and 
she is keen to protect Tommy from ‘any more of that’ for as long as possible. 
Tommy has repaired the garden fence by the time we next meet. We catch the bus into 
town as he has a few errands to run, including dropping off some bags at the charity 
shop. Grace’s back has been troubling her, she’s exhausted and plans to have a nap. 
However, the neighbourhood ‘Sheriff’ lives up to his name by pounding on the door to 
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report that he has just seen Tommy getting on the bus with an unknown woman with 
two carrier bags containing electrical goods. Was Grace aware of this? She invites him 
in for a cup of tea.  
In town, Tommy chats and jokes with staff everywhere we go, creating queues but 
otherwise working his way through his to-do list admirably. We stop off in a new 
Italian café before returning home, where Tommy impresses me with his knowledge of 
history, an interest that didn’t originate in school: ‘They couldn’t teach me anything to be 
truthful. I never could write very well, so I got moved in with the useless lot. Twelve of us 
got put together to keep us in order’.  When I ask if he needed to be kept in order he says 
‘I suppose I did’. I learn that Tommy grew up with up with his grandmother in ‘a house 
full of women.’ All the men were at war, apart from the old farmers and they taught him 
‘all the wrong stuff, like how to draw naked women. Used to say ‘good lad’ and laugh’. He 
recounts an early experience when his teacher asked him to draw a picture and he 
reproduced the only thing he knew how. He continues ‘I showed it to her and she asks 
‘what’s this’? I said ‘a naked lady, Miss’, and she says ‘come with me’’. Tommy was taken 
to the headmaster, thinking he’d say ‘good lad’, but instead was told ‘roll back your 
sleeve and hold out your hand’. Tommy illustrates, ‘and from here to here, I got the strap. 
Twice. He concludes ‘I never learned anything at school. I had a right bad stutter an’ all’. 
Tommy suggests an extended walk in the woods when I next catch up with him, 
explaining ‘I’m needing to burn the fat off’. I say ‘you’re as fit as a fiddle, Tommy,’ but he 
replies ‘I was back at that place for this thing I’ve got and the nurse says I’ve put on two 
pounds. That was all they found, this time, but she told me to burn some of the fat off’. He 
goes on, ‘I tell you, I feel like a sixteen-year old now that I’m back on the fives’. Initially I 
think he means five-a-day, but when I say ‘fruit and veg’, Tommy exclaims ‘my, you’re 
awf’y daft, no my tablets, for this thing, in my brain. S’no for fixing it mind, just slows it 
down’. Of course, Aricept. I am ‘awf’y daft’! Tommy continues ‘they’d put me on the tens 
(10mg dose) but I couldnae stand it. It says on the packet what you can get - cramps, not 
sleeping and needing to be near a damn toilet all the time, so it’s not just me that 
couldnae cope’.  
We return to the house and while chatting, Grace asks if Tommy told me about a recent 
bus trip into town. I learn that Tommy had been forced to run home to the toilet, didn’t 
make it and had to change while Grace waited at the bus stop. They got home after 
being out all afternoon to discover Tommy had left the door wide open. Tommy says, 
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‘Well, I don’t think those tablets are helping’ to which Grace replies ‘They were never 
going to make it better or stop it, only slow it down, but now you’ve halved the dose’. 
Tommy retorts, ‘Aye and I feel much better since I went back on the fives’. Grace sighs, ‘at 
the moment, but it’s only half the dose’.  
Tommy’s ‘going back on the fives’ coincides with Grace’s decision to increase their 
involvement with the Alzheimer Society. She visits the “D café” on her own to check 
things out, concluding that it might be okay.  They start going to the cafe and then 
Alzheimer Society meetings, some proving more useful than others. Grace advises that 
some people questioned having separate discussions for ‘carers’ and ‘people with 
dementia’, so they’re thinking of changing the format. She also starts to think ahead, 
which includes exploring options for replacing the lawn in the back garden, but Tommy 
isn’t keen. 
When we next meet up, Tommy is working in the back garden when I arrive. I remark 
that the front garden is looking very tidy and Grace says ‘it him took all morning, every 
dog in the neighbourhood was across to see him’ and shakes her head light-heartedly. 
She adds, ‘we’re getting the back done’ and Tommy grumbles, ‘The Ayatollah has spoken’. 
Grace continues undeterred, ‘We’ve been trying to decide whether to get slabs or 
artificial grass’, she looks at Tommy who is raking some leaves then concludes ’but 
we’re no further forward’. Tommy tuts and Grace explains that when he isn’t able to do 
the grass, she won’t be able to either. Tommy volunteers ‘It’s not difficult to use a lawn 
mower, I can teach you’, but Grace responds, ‘I’m not starting with a lawnmower now. 
You know I can’t even use the hoover’. She later divulges that she now has to ask Tommy 
to hoover and although he does it without complaining, he has stopped noticing things. 
She has to point them out. He used to notice things, notice how she was and she misses 
that. 
I accompany Tommy on his daily constitutional, during which he expresses concerns 
about the cost of doing the garden. It seems Grace had her heart set on new settees, but 
the garden would have to be instead. He thinks they should go for slabs, then he could 
pave it himself. I remark that slabs must be really heavy and he tells me, ‘The average 
weight is 70lbs, but you don’t lift them, you walk them into place. It’s easy if you know 
how’. He insists again that he feels like a sixteen-year old.  
When we get back to the house, we all have a cup of tea together. Grace is reading a 
book written by a younger woman with dementia, which is ‘interesting, but her issues 
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are very different’. Tommy and Grace have also been back to the Alzheimer Society. ‘The 
last meeting was, well it was all about our rights. Grace glances across at Tommy, adding 
‘the day to day stuff is useful though’. Tommy agrees, ‘Aye, it’s amazing, you wouldnae 
know who had it and who’s the carer’.  
Towards the end of the study, I visit Roslyn Chapel with Tommy to share in his love of 
history. Grace isn’t feeling up to it, informing me there have been ‘a few more mix-ups’. 
Tommy alludes to this too as we walk down the path, saying he’s ‘been back in the bad 
books again’ and that Grace is becoming his ‘minder’, adding ‘dare say I’m lucky’. Inside, 
when the chap at the desk asks Tommy if he’s likely to be back, Tommy surprises me by 
saying, ‘Well son, I’ve got Alzheimer’s, so likely I’ll no remember what I’ve seen. Dare say I 
could come back a few times’.  
There are a few more surprises in store. I read out the description of a carving 
depicting the acts of mercy and when I come to ‘helping the needy’ Tommy quips ‘It 
cannae be that Osborne fellow.’ He reveals that, despite saying he ‘cannae stand the 
man’, he’s been a lifelong Conservative voter, having been instructed to do so as a 
youngster by a local Tory MP and landowner. ‘Right clever man. Said we had to or we’d 
be out of a job. You did as you were told’. When I ask why he still votes for them, he 
answers, ‘Habit, I suppose’. During the visit Tommy refers to ‘Alzheimer’s’ several times 
and there is no suggestion that he’d be ‘none the wiser’. Instead, I learn that on a recent 
trip to the dentist he realised he’d forgotten how to write his signature; ‘It hit me hard - 
this is what it’s going to be like’. He also breaks my heart describing his helplessness 
upon witnessing Grace’s distress when a character with dementia in her favourite soap 
no longer recognised his wife.  
During our wrap-up meeting, I learn that Tommy and Grace plumped for the more 
expensive artificial lawn. Tommy says he’s ‘relieved, truth be told’, admitting to falling 
over while working in the front garden when his ‘feet stopped working’. Grace adds that 
Tommy had been sitting out in the garden and asked her to come and join him. She 
continues, ‘When I said I had too much to do, he said ‘no, please, just sit here with me, let’s 
enjoy it while the sun shines’. He would have never have said anything like that before’.   
Interpretation of ‘deciding what to do with the garden’ 
I come to understand the meanings Tommy attaches to ‘keeping on top of the garden’ 
early in the study. The garden is bound up with anxiety about relinquishing his status 
as a ‘handy man’ and becoming a burden to Grace. These anxieties are nestled within a 
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deeper concern about making himself useful more broadly, something instilled as a 
young boy and reinforced through a protestant work ethic and the rhetoric of active 
ageing. His reasoning for preferring slabs to the artificial lawn is tied up with being 
productive and providing for Grace; if he could lay the slabs himself, perhaps Grace 
could still have the new settees she had set her heart on. ‘Keeping on top of’ is also 
consistent with Tommy’s desire to maintain things and not think too far ahead. 
 
‘Deciding what to do with the garden’ holds strong meanings for Grace. When I first 
meet Grace, I am struck by the busyness of her life as an active church member, her 
organisational skills, desire to embrace fresh opportunities and commitment to mutual 
decision making. As a caring wife, deciding what to with the garden lends a practical 
focus to her need to prepare holistically for ‘the big test ahead’. It is emblematic of the 
daily dilemmas she experiences between protecting Tommy from what lies ‘further 
down the road’, needing to prepare for that point in ‘the journey’, and her commitment 
to making decisions jointly with Tommy ‘while he still can'. This includes decisions 
Tommy doesn’t want to make and that bring an unwanted future and equally 
unwelcome echoes of Tommy’s past into the present.  
‘Deciding what to do with the garden’, like many facets of ordinary life, is accompanied 
by frustrations and misunderstandings, requiring negotiation and compromise. It is one 
of many rivers to cross. Once the decision is reached jointly, there is a shared relief and 
also a new sense of possibility; having relinquished his identity as ‘a handy man’, the 
garden is transformed into a place where Tommy might sit quietly and enjoy spending 
time with Grace, at least for a while. Grace initially resists this as ‘just sitting’ is 
incompatible with her ethos of ‘keeping busy’. Tommy however persuades her to stop 
and enjoy some precious moments together ‘while the sun shines’. In the dialectic of 
sameness and selfhood, roles shift, some are surrendered and Tommy and Grace adopt 
new and expanded roles. The AD diagnosis is incorporated, but other critical elements 
of identity prevail (Bohlmeijer et al, 2011) and the longer and broader narratives do 
not disappear. Tommy is still contributing, albeit in different ways and he is still a co-
author of their marital biography. 
The narrative is dominated by ‘testing’, the particular test of reaching a shared decision 
about the garden, the ‘big test’ ahead and everyday tests of patience, competence, 
stamina and communication. As with ‘A Walk in the Snow’, there is another author at 
work, bringing testing more sharply into relief. This author introduces a subplot, which 
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concerns the interplay between Tommy and Grace’s notions of a good life and 
biomedical norms. As a physically fit man, Tommy is troubled by the realisation that 
the medical profession can brand him as diseased, even though he ‘feels like a sixteen-
year old’. The inadequacy of his drawings in the memory clinic transports Tommy back 
to another time when he was labelled deficient and ‘put in with the useless lot’. The 
delivery of his diagnosis generates the same stinging shock as the headmaster’s strap. 
The institution seems unjust.  
 
When Tommy questions his diagnosis by insisting he’d be ‘none the wiser’, his 
narrative is co-opted through the presentation of ‘indisputable’ evidence to the 
contrary. The plagues and tangles are ‘not too bad’, ‘a touch of frost’, but Tommy is 
unlikely to directly challenge the authority of his diagnosis further. He learnt early in 
life to do as he was told and carried this into adulthood, as exemplified by his voting 
habits. He also does not question the judgement that he needs to lose a couple of 
pounds, instead duly increasing his walking. Aged eighty-five, his body however puts 
up its own form of resistance to another test, the ability to withstand a higher 
medication dose. Grace follows medical advice too. The short-term physical health 
benefits Tommy experiences as a result of ‘going back on the fives’ come at the price of 
Grace’s disappointment. With the hype and hope of delay compromised, ‘further down 
the road’ seemingly draws nearer, causing Grace to step up her preparations. The 
subplot thickens. 
 
Tommy and Grace follow Beard’s (2016) ‘pendular trajectory’ from receiving a 
diagnosis through ‘accepting’ the diagnosis all the way to its third stage, joining a 
subculture in the form of a support group that reinforces memory loss as pathological 
through socialisation. Joining the group can be interpreted as a display of self-
constancy, consistent with Tommy and Grace’s willingness to test out every 
opportunity that comes their way. Intending themselves into the future as a couple, 
group participation begins as a means to an end. They seek ways to maintain mutual 
self-esteem and to make Alzheimer’s ’a manageable disability’ (Beard et al, 2009) so 
that they might continue to participate in and contribute to ordinary social life. 
However, this ‘thing that I’ve got’ gives way to ‘Alzheimer’s’ and Tommy increasingly 
self-identifies as a person with Alzheimer’s in his talk. In parallel, Grace becomes 
Tommy’s ‘minder’.  
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Heavily circumscribed and not without consequences, the identity shifts are not 
straightforward. They encompass resisting, testing the waters, reflecting, delaying, 
trying again and re-evaluating the pros and cons of membership as unique persons and 
as a couple. The group offers Grace practical information and support. There are 
benefits for Tommy too, whose prior understanding of dementia has been shaped by 
personal contact with people at ‘the end stage’ and the demise of a character in 
Emmerdale whose condition deteriorates at the rate of knots, soap time, to satisfy the 
demands of an audience indisposed to go the distance.  Meeting people who are ‘living 
well with dementia’ is eye-opening, ‘you wouldn’t know who had it and who’s the 
carer’. That said, calls to champion their rights are questioned and despite the ready 
adoption of polarising language, other dichotomising practices do not land well with 
the group. The pendulum swings. As the study concludes, the narrative has become 
what novelist Nigel Watts (1996) calls a two-headed monster; two plots compete and it 
is unclear which will prevail.  
Jim and Mary: Doing Whatever Is Necessary  
The narrative below contextualises the events and meanings set out in ‘Fault Lines’ in 
Chapter Seven. ‘Doing whatever is necessary’ is a phrase that Jim and Mary use 
frequently. I borrow it to represent their efforts to negotiate everyday life. The phrase 
is a source of contradiction as it speaks to Jim and Mary’s aspirations to maximise Jim’s 
independence, to preserve valued ways of life as a couple, to manage Jim’s condition as 
best they can and to follow professional advice. There are different understandings of 
‘what’s necessary’ at work and the meaning of the phrase alters over the course of the 
study. I employ ‘doing whatever is necessary’ to structure the following narrative.    
When I first meet Jim and Mary, they tell me they are happy ‘to do whatever is necessary’ 
to help with the study. Both quickly point out that Jim’s dementia is not the worst of it, 
rather ‘falling’ constitutes the biggest problem. Jim and Mary enjoy an affluent lifestyle, 
which they worked hard for, Jim investing time and energy in the business, Mary 
supporting Jim’s decisions and raising the family at home. They employed only the best 
service providers and took some big risks. They did whatever was necessary to 
succeed. Jim quietly accepts his condition, whereas Mary expresses sadness that they 
aren’t able to enjoy the fruits of their endeavours. 
When we next meet, I accompany Jim and Mary on a short walk.  Mary wants to 
practice a new grip suggested by the physiotherapist. I learn that Jim fell while out 
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walking with Mary a couple of years ago, culminating in a debilitating stay in hospital. 
As Jim is much larger than Mary, she couldn’t stop him from falling or get him up. Jim 
stands exceptionally straight and walks briskly. He was always darting about when he 
ran the business and walking slowly ‘feels unnatural’. Mary sought professional advice 
because she wasn’t sure how best to grip Jim’s arm in a way that is supportive and yet 
still meets Jim’s needs; he doesn’t want to appear as though Mary is ‘propping him up’. 
Mary comments that ‘He’s very plausible with the physio, but it’s a different story when 
it’s just the two of us’.  
When we return, Mary goes to the supermarket and Jim chats to me while he potters 
around in the kitchen and practices his chair exercises. He has an ongoing bladder 
complaint, necessitating getting up at speed, which he ‘isn’t supposed to do’. He also 
walks up and down the hall ten times periodically because he seizes up if he sits too 
long. In between, Jim tells me that when they sold the business the plan was to spend 
more time at their house in Spain, but they never made the most of it because he got 
involved in various committees. When I ask why he accepted the offers he replies 
candidly, ‘vanity mostly’.  The stroke club that he co-founded however is something 
different. A lot of younger people attend, some quite severely disabled and ‘seeing them 
enjoying themselves’ helps Jim ‘withstand anything’. He is keen for me to see for myself 
and undertakes to ‘make the necessary arrangements’.  
As we chat, Jim reflects, ‘There’s more to me than this; people forget. I’ve had a good life. 
This isn’t the whole story. I’m realistic’. He adds, ‘I have no strategies, apart from not 
thinking about it too much’. The key thing is ‘to be allowed to keep doing the things I can 
do’. He takes pleasure in making the lunch, heating up some soup and getting a 
sandwich together. He can do it, he likes to take his time. He enjoys shaving and has 
‘come to appreciate the feel of a nice, clean shave’. He has no concerns about cutting 
himself, having done it for so long, ‘I don’t need to see my face’. When Mary returns Jim 
starts to nod off. He says ‘falling asleep is a gift’ and Mary jokes ‘You’re maybe too gifted’, 
adding, ‘He’s always been able to, even when business was hanging in the balance’. Jim 
opens his eyes and quips, ‘Worrying is wasted energy’.  
I accompany Jim to the stroke club as planned. Jim’s submission to the tight arm grips, 
slow walking pace and his attempts to remain seated other than to relieve his failing 
bladder strike me forcefully in the wake of our previous meeting. Following Jim’s exit 
from the club, I arrange to meet with Mary and Jim on a Wednesday, but they receive 
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word of a medical appointment and we reschedule for the Friday. This is one of Jim’s 
days at the day centre, which he can’t say he enjoys, but ‘accepts as necessary’. He tells 
me ‘don’t let that get in the way’ and assures me that he won’t be too tired to meet 
afterwards.  
In the event, the day centre bus is very late. Jim and Mary’s daughter-in-law, Denise, 
drops in ‘to see how Mary is doing’. There has been a deterioration in Jim’s condition 
and he now has carers morning and night. Mary tells me, ‘The family are pulling out all 
the stops’, but she has ‘to watch Jim like a hawk’ as he remains fiercely independent. 
Denise remarks how surprised she is that Jim never complains. Mary suspects it is 
sleepiness and apathy as a result of his condition rather than serenity; ‘The old Jim 
would be climbing the walls’. She later reflects ‘I wish he would complain, I wouldn’t feel 
it’s just me who’s fighting against the unfairness of it all’. Mary and Jim usually go with 
friends for a fish tea at the golf club on a Friday, but their friends are attending a social 
function.  Last time out Jim had a fall, but the staff were fabulous. Mary reports ‘Jim’s 
having more difficulties eating. He keeps missing the plate. He’s stabling away at his chips, 
but it’s hit or miss. He won’t be helped. He can’t see what he’s eating. When I looked, he 
was eating his lemon’. Mary adds that it’s important to still do things as a couple, with 
other couples. ‘They’ve been good friends, to both of us’. 
When the bus finally arrives, it takes a long time for Jim to get off. Jim has previously 
told me that he resents being strapped in and driven through the town and he is 
irritable on entering the house. I learn that he is going for a procedure to inject Botox 
into his bladder on Monday, the following Monday morning he has to be at eye pavilion 
by 7:30 a.m. for a cataract procedure, followed by an afternoon appointment with a 
specialist consultant about an eyelid procedure. He also has to see his Parkinson’s 
consultant because his medication isn’t working. When I ask how he feels about the 
various appointments, he replies, ‘It’s necessary’. 
The next time I meet with Jim and Mary, I’m dismayed by the change in Jim’s condition. 
He struggles to speak or keep his eyes open. He says to me ‘I’m still listening’ and smiles 
when I talk about football, but drifts in and out of sleep. He had another bad fall and 
Mary is beside herself. She reports, ‘The GP came right away, spent a long time with Jim 
and referred him to the day hospital, so it’s now a waiting game’. The day centre is also 
questioning whether it can continue to meet Jim’s complex needs. Jim has been getting 
up at night with his bladder problems, the Botox didn’t work. Mary is sleep-deprived 
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and feels she can’t turn her back for a second. It now takes three people to help Jim into 
the car. Their daughter bought a wheelchair, but Mary struggles to lift Jim over the 
front step and can’t push him far. She tells me that the family are concerned that 
something will happen to her. Together they have found a care home for visually 
impaired people, which has a waiting list and they’ve put Jim’s name down. Mary 
accepts that Jim will need professional care and Jim also accepts this as ‘necessary’.  
Mary lets me know when Jim gets an appointment at the falls clinic. She is finding 
things increasingly difficult. I phone her to see how the appointment went and learn 
that Jim’s diagnosis is being queried. When we next speak she tells me, ‘They’ve decided 
Jim has a form of Parkinsonism that doesn’t respond to treatment’. Mary freely admits 
that things are fraught, saying ‘We end up shouting at each other’. She tells Jim he’s so 
stubborn, he retorts that he doesn’t want her to care for him. She has never shouted at 
Jim before and feels wretched. She says ‘I have been praying every night, please let me be 
better, please let me be good’, then something else happens. ‘He won’t listen to me. He 
only listens to the professionals’. She concludes that she is waiting for a date for respite.  
I check to see how things are, learn that respite is fixed up in a week’s time and arrange 
to meet Mary and Jim a couple of days beforehand. Jim has been using a urinary sheath 
and Mary has had a couple of nights’ sleep. She’s starting to think maybe it’s not so bad, 
maybe she can cope. Then just a few days later, Jim has another fall; he decides to get 
up, washed and shaved before his carer comes. Mary tries to stop him but can’t 
dissuade him. She turns her back for a second to get some towels in case he falls and 
down he goes. She can’t get Jim back up. The carer arrives and can’t get Jim up either. 
Once again Mary waits, this time for the rapid response team. Mary says, ‘They are quite 
bossy’, telling her crossly that Jim has no balance whatsoever, shouldn’t be on his feet, 
needs to be in bed and see a doctor. Jim stays in bed, he responds to bossiness.  The GP 
comes as soon as surgery finishes and Mary does what everyone has been telling her is 
necessary, she admits ‘I am not coping’. The GP arranges for an ambulance to take Jim 
to hospital and he is admitted after a lengthy wait in A&E. He never returns home. 
Once again Mary waits, first for a care home assessment, then for the result; the 
specialist home can’t meet Jim’s complex needs. Mary finds a care home nearby and 
waits for a place. She feels Jim is deteriorating by the day in hospital and worries about 
his mobility. She waits. Eventually Jim moves into the home. The physio tries hard, but 
is unable to restore any mobility. Mary buys Jim his own wheelchair as she finds him 
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too heavy to push using the chairs provided by the home. Jim exudes a quiet 
contentment. He enjoys his meals and Mary hopes he doesn’t lose his swallow, she 
thinks he’s suffered enough. She reflects ‘I wish it was just normal dementia. You see 
some of the people here, they are up dancing. They might not remember it or know who 
they are dancing with, but they look happy. Jim, I don’t know, I think his emotions are 
frozen too’. Mary visits Jim every day. She says ‘People keep telling me I don’t have to, but 
he’s still my husband. They say I can get my life back. What life? This life is all I know’. 
Mary accepts every social invite on offer to try to fill the void. She does whatever is 
necessary. 
Interpretation of ‘doing whatever is necessary’ 
‘Doing whatever is necessary’ is initially situated within a timeframe when Jim worked 
hard to provide a good life for his family, ‘good’ taking the form of providing financial 
security. Mary’s role was to look after the home and family and support Jim’s decisions. 
They worked independently towards a shared aim and took risks together. This 
‘couple-specific way of working’ (Beard et al, 2009) persists into their day-to-day 
approach to managing Jim’s condition. Jim and Mary continue to ‘do whatever is 
necessary’ to participate in everyday life, as represented by finding a way of walking 
together in the street. Mary wants to protect Jim from falling. At the same time, she is 
attentive to Jim’s need to retain the appearance of what he perceives as a capable man. 
She seeks a solution that will not look as though she is ‘propping Jim up’, drawing upon 
the established habit of employing a professional that Jim will listen to. The physio is 
able to come up with a grip that satisfies on both counts, but resolving the ethical 
dilemma of respecting Jim’s autonomy and protecting him from actual bodily harm 
proves less straightforward when extended to other areas of their life.  
Jim tries not to think about the future. Of necessity, he is focused on getting through the 
day, literally one step at a time. The thing that matters most to Jim is ‘being allowed to 
keep doing’ the things he can do’. Mary is attentive to this and strives to support him, 
but there is considerable ambiguity surrounding the things Jim can do safely. Jim is 
prepared to ‘accept as necessary’ various inputs from and the restrictions of service 
providers, including attending a day centre to give Mary a break. Jim and Mary 
historically have been shared risk takers and Mary has backed Jim’s decisions. When 
Mary’s roles and responsibilities veer towards protection, Jim resists. He responds only 
to the firmer voice of authority. Jim’s various submissions to enable him to participate 
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at the stroke club are in stark contrast to his determination to do things independently 
at home.  
As Jim’s condition deteriorates, he ‘accepts as necessary’ a host of clinical investigations 
and interventions, but refuses to stay seated; he will be confined to a chair soon 
enough. Mary cannot turn her back, their enforced togetherness suffocating, not 
because she cannot purse her own interests (Vikstrom et al, 2008), but because her 
role is transformed into watchful hawk. Inevitably, one fall proves fateful, perhaps 
fittingly as Jim seeks to indulge in the remaining pleasure of shaving the familiar 
contours of his face. When Jim moves into a care home, it is Mary who is left ‘doing 
whatever is necessary’ to fill the void in her life.  
Testing assumes a leading role in this narrative too. Jim and Mary actively seek out 
medical expertise and submit to a barrage of clinical tests in a bid to get to the bottom 
of and find solutions to Jim’s condition. When it comes to the inescapable realities of 
ageing and death, what medicine can do often runs counter to what it should (Gawande, 
2014) and at times there is a risk of confusing care with treatment. Life is increasingly 
structured by services and Jim’s final months at home are dominated by tests and 
assessments, followed by anxious periods waiting for results. As Jim would say, ‘in 
hindsight’.  
The narrative also highlights some tests of friendship, one couple in particular 
continuing to see Jim and Mary as old friends, rather than foregrounding Jim’s 
condition, sitting together as Jim stabs his plate, misses his chips, eats his lemon and 
then falls over. They pass with flying colours. However, testing assumes a more 
insidious form, in that Mary feels she is failing as a wife. Here interpersonal and cultural 
forces align. She experiences a variant of courtesy stigma (MacRae, 1997), her actions 
subject to scrutiny, judgement and reprimand; ‘Jim shouldn’t be walking on his own 
any more, he shouldn’t be on his feet’. Mary is powerless to stop him. Tronto’s (1993) 
distinction between care and protection.is instructive. Mary is trying to meet Jim’s self-
identified needs, but others assert that Jim requires round-the-clock protection from 
self-harm. Mary is placed in the impossible position in that whatever she does, 
someone will judge her unfavourably. Each successive fall harms Mary too. Jim’s pride 
and resistance to her attempts to protect him from falling may have been more 
bearable had she not been branded incapable by those whose arms he was prepared to 
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accept - ‘as necessary’. Mary receives little recognition for her actions, her self-esteem 
sacrificed in her bid to preserve Jim’s.  
Medicine is a central organising framework in Jim and Mary’s life. They both receive 
and accept Jim’s diagnosis, Beard’s (2016) ‘pendular trajectory’ on this occasion 
attributable to the oscillations of the medical profession. The couple tell me at the 
outset that dementia is not Jim’s biggest problem and falling is the greatest concern 
throughout. The rapidity and nature of Jim’s decline is devastating, Mary’s wish that it 
was ‘normal dementia’ bringing a whole new twist to the normal – pathological debate.  
Jim’s condition does not simply bring unwelcome changes that can be resolved through 
narrative emplotment, it is a massacre (Gawande, 2014). Jim expresses no sense of 
injustice about his fate and it is tempting to interpret aspects of his response as 
indicative of positive narrative closure, his pleasure in the simple act of stirring soup a 
sign of the serenity of gero-transcendence (Tornstram, 1996). Or perhaps it is Scottish 
stoicism, ‘I am realistic’. Mary however has known Jim intimately for nearly sixty years 
and attributes this acceptance to the apathy symptomatic of his condition, 
unrecognisable. In contrast, Mary struggles against the unfairness of being denied the 
chance to enjoy together the things they worked hard for. She feels alone in this fight 
and initially wishes Jim would complain, ‘the old Jim’ would be climbing the walls. Later 
she comes to see Jim’s ‘frozen emotions’ as a comfort, affording him their own form of 
protection.  
The narrative also underscores the contradictory dimensions of life and in other 
respects, ‘the old Jim’ persists. He may be prepared to lose the war, but for a while he 
continues to fight the battles of daily life. He takes risks, the steely determination once 
deemed admirable in business circles recast as an obstinate act of will (Ricoeur, 1992). 
Jim has never worried about the future, his ability to sleep construed as a gift.  In the 
dialectic of sameness and selfhood, shifts in roles and responsibilities within the 
marriage are resisted, however problematically, and the dichotomisation into care-
giver and care-recipient does not occur. Mary engages in her own continued resistance 
against the expectations of others, that she should constrain Jim, that she should 
somehow reclaim her life. Jim is powerless in the face of nature (Hoggett, 2000) and 
Mary is ‘still Jim’s wife’.  
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Hector: Paying My Dues 
The previous chapter presented the events, happenings and associated meanings 
identified through ‘Meeting the Boys at the Golf Club’. The narrative that follows 
connects them with other events and happenings enacted or recounted over the course 
of the study.  ‘Paying my dues’ speaks to Hector’s traditional values and understanding 
of the good life as one whereby status, respect and benefits are earned through service 
to others and hard work; recognition is subject to continued participation and 
contribution. ‘Paying my dues at the golf club’ is a particularly strong thread. Hector’s 
declining health is however impacting significantly upon his levels of motivation and 
contributions, creating tensions. The plot sets out how ‘paying my dues’ comes to 
assume deeper meanings within the broader context of life itself.  
I first meet with Hector just before Christmas and we chat about his early life. I learn 
that family finances forced Hector to leave school to start work ‘on the bottom rung’ in 
the local mill. Hector reached the position of manager through his own endeavour, 
earning the respect of the workforce by ‘staying connected with issues on the floor’, then 
taking the hard route to University in his forties when he foresaw the demise of the 
mills. His work achievements were the result of paying his dues. His parents were 
Labour councillors and while his initial formal education was cut short, Hector grew up 
listening to the political debates that took place around his kitchen table. This political 
interest developed into a passing fascination with Communism, which he needed to see 
for himself, resulting in extensive travel through Eastern Europe before the Iron curtain 
was lifted, to Costa Rica and to Cuba ‘to hear Fidel speak’.  
Hector’s reason for participating in the study is attributed to ‘needing a kick-start’. He 
tells me that he lacks motivation, having ‘been everywhere and done everything’ he 
aspired to. While Hector is fully aware of and frustrated by his memory loss, he rejects 
the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. This rejection is reinforced vigorously by Gina, 
who is adamant the original diagnosis was wrong. To Hector’s ineligibility for 
medication, dismissal from the memory clinic and ‘passing his driving test in the A 
category’, Gina adds her own assessment that he is ‘getting better’ following a 
regrettable episode of delirium in hospital. The latter tops the evidence hierarchy as 
she ‘knows him better than anyone’. Both express the hope that passing his driving test 
will enable Hector to put his recent illness behind him in the New Year. We 
provisionally agree that I’ll accompany Hector to ‘pay his dues at the golf club’, which he 
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indicates he tries to do at least a couple of times each week, ‘seeing the boys, even if the 
weather is too bad to play’.  
The New Year arrives, but Hector informs me he is ‘suffering from the January blues’ and 
calls off our planned meetings several times. On one occasion, this follows a heavy 
snowfall and he’s unsure who will be at the club, and a second time there is a blizzard. 
The next time I phone the snow has cleared, but Hector reports ‘I’ve not been good at 
all’. He strained his leg at the driving range and can’t drive. He won’t be going to the 
club and hasn’t paid his dues for several weeks. My offer to drive is declined as he is ‘in 
pain and wouldn’t be good company for the boys’. When he insists that he is ‘needing a 
kick-start more than ever’, I remind him how much I enjoyed hearing about his travels 
when we last met, and we agree to look through his travel memorabilia instead.  
 When I arrive, Gina is attending a keep fit class. In contrast, Hector advises that he’s 
been finding it difficult to get out of bed most mornings. The weather plays a huge part, 
‘If I hear the wind or rain battering down, I’ll just turn over and pull up the covers’. 
Previously he was ‘up with the lark in all weathers’. He continues, ‘I always said, this is 
no rehearsal’ – a slogan he saw written on a wall when he holidayed in France. ‘You 
can’t be sleepwalking your way through life. This is it’. Hector tells me that he’d said this 
to motivate himself to go to the driving range, but because he hadn’t been for so long, 
he overdid it.  
 
Noticing that he has looked out some travel books, I say ‘Speaking of France, shall we 
have a look at these’? There are assorted postcards, maps, tickets and photographs 
between the pages. Hector thinks it might be an idea to put something together to show 
his grandchildren when they visit during the school break. Having grown up on the 
other side of the world, ‘they don’t know much about me’. It is an impressive collection 
and he delights in retracing the steps of a solo expedition to India to see the Taj Mahal, 
then to Nepal. While on safe ground in the foothills of Annapurna, the terrain soon 
becomes more precarious and ghosts from the past surface from the pages of his books, 
photographs of ‘the four musketeers’ on a golfing trip, like all frozen moments, testifying 
to ‘time’s relentless melt’ (Sontag, 1978:15). 
 
Hector selects one particularly emotive photograph where the camaraderie between 
the four men is palpable. He points to his closest friend, Archie, who was ‘first to go’. 
Archie had gone about fifty yards ahead of Hector up a hill on the local golf course and 
‘his hands went up and then he dropped like a stone’. At first Hector thought Archie must 
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have had a hole in one and was joking, but he didn’t get up. He was in a deep coma for 
two days and never regained consciousness. ‘I wept, I knew he was as good as dead. The 
coma was a buffer for his wife, who had been ill for thirty years’. It fell to Hector to tell 
her. ‘I used to go on a golfing holiday twice every year with Archie when she went for 
respite care. I was allowed to go because it was Archie and Gina adored him. Everybody 
loved Archie, he attracted people like bees round the honey pot’. Hector delivered the 
eulogy.  
 
Hector then points to Dougie, who died just over two years ago and was in a care home 
for about two years before that. ‘I went to see him a couple of times every week. Dougie 
would pull me and whisper that he wished he was away. Then he didn’t whisper anything 
at all; I would come out in tears. It was no life’. Ten months later, Malcolm died. He 
looked after his wife, but it took its toll and she had to go into care. Malcolm never got 
over it and died a couple of months later. Hector concludes, ‘I’m the last man standing, 
the last musketeer’.  
 
When I next meet with Hector on a Wednesday, he intends to go to the golf club. One of 
the boys, Hamish, who is in his mid-90s, goes each day for lunch with his son Donald, 
and Hector and the other boys try to take it in turns to go on different days to provide 
them with company, usually coming together on a Saturday. We set off, but Hector 
seems anxious, saying he is ‘forcing himself to go, but can’t hear a thing’. His ears need 
syringed but the wax is too hard. He has drops to put in twice a day to soften it, but it 
has knocked him off. The car park is quiet and as we walk towards the club house, 
Hector stops and points to a small crest on the golf course, telling me, ‘That’s where 
Archie fell’. His eyes are teary and he reflects emotionally, ‘If he were alive, he wouldn’t 
be lying in bed. He’d be out on that course’. He continues, ‘Whenever I take a shot, I know 
exactly what he’d say, exactly. We knew each other that well’. After a moment, Hector 
says ‘Right then, let’s go and pay our dues’. We go inside to find Hamish finishing his 
lunch. Donald didn’t think Hector would be coming, so they’d arrived earlier than usual. 
Hector struggles to hear what Hamish is saying, becomes exasperated and the visit is 
brief. He suggests that I accompany him to the golf club on a Saturday next time, after 
he has had his ears syringed, otherwise ‘it’ll be a total waste of time’. 
The next time I telephone Hector his ears are still bothering him, then Bill is on holiday. 
It is over four months since he has been to the club on a Saturday and I wonder if he 
will ever go back, but we provisionally fix up a date early in April. Hector’s morale lifts 
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with the change of season and his hearing returns. It is a glorious day and when I 
phone, Hector tells me ‘we’re back in business.’ Inside the club, I observe that Hector is 
held in high regard, has been missed, his memory problems are normalised or 
overlooked, and there is a strong sense of equality among the men, who are ‘good 
company’ and enhance each other’s self-esteem. They are ‘the last of the Mohicans’. 
Hector has also been formally recognised by the club for ‘paying his dues’. This 
encourages him to resume his Saturday routine and even to venture back out on the 
course a couple of times.  
 
When I catch up with Hector the following month, he is in the garden. He is tanned, 
relaxed and looks well and when I say so he chuckles ‘There’s life in the old dog yet’. 
Gina meantime had ‘taken a bad turn after overdoing it at her keep fit class’, but she has 
since bounced back. Hector reports this has been ‘a wake-up call’. He tells me 
enthusiastically about their plans to take the train up the West Highland Way. Hector 
says, ‘To think I’ve never done it, when it’s meant to be one of the most beautiful railway 
journeys in the world, on my own doorstep’. When I next phone I’m staggered as Hector 
informs me ‘Things have changed since I last saw you. Gina is … seriously ill’. He sounds 
distraught and ends ‘I’m sorry, I can’t help you anymore’.  
Interpretation of ‘paying my dues’ 
During out introductory meeting, Hector impresses upon me that his former work 
achievements were the result of paying his dues, an inquiring mind and a willingness to 
adapt. He also uses the phrase ‘paying my dues’ in an active sense, suggesting 
something ongoing, that privileges must still be earned. Hector is however facing a 
major life change in the form of bodily and mental decline, raising doubts about his 
ability to intend himself into the future and honour his existing commitments. He 
indicates that he is lacking motivation and ‘needs a kick-start’, but having ‘been 
everywhere and done everything’, no new meanings or experiences seem possible. He 
hopes to pick up where he left off before the disruption of illness and the form of 
contribution he attaches greatest importance to entails ‘paying his dues at the golf 
club’. However, apathy, lingering ill health and the winter weather are all conspiring 
against him.  
Our conversation is permeated with a consciousness of the finitude of life. Hector’s 
concern is not meaning-making through specific actions or events, but rather the bigger 
task of making meaning of life itself. Hector’s continued absence from the golf club 
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impacts upon his self-esteem as he feels he is letting others down. He believes that he 
needs to ‘keep going’ and berates himself when he stops, the golf club becoming a 
metaphor for life. Hector forces himself to go to the club out of a sense of responsibility 
to others, but his hearing loss impacts upon his ability to participate meaningfully and 
ends in frustration. As the study progresses, Hector increasingly talks about his absent 
friends, particularly his best friend Archie, who died on the golf course ‘just fifty yards 
ahead of him’. At this point, ‘paying my dues’ assumes new meanings, and I come to 
appreciate that Hector is motivated as much by ‘a responsibility to those who have 
gone before’ (Ricoeur, 2004) as to the men in the club house.  
‘Paying his dues at the golf club’ earns Hector the status of honorary life membership, 
the respect of fellow club members, and the benefits of new friendships, all of which 
require ongoing effort and serve as a source of motivation. The golf club and the group 
of men he meets with offer favourable mediating conditions. His expertise and 
enduring contribution are recognised and his competence is not questioned. Yet Hector 
is forced to re-evaluate his life plans, weighing up his continued capacity to contribute 
to the group meaningfully, to provide the boys with good company and to satisfy his 
own standards of excellence. The life membership extends possibilities, but the 
accompanying weight of expectation, of ‘paying his dues', is a double-edged sword, an 
important source of motivation but also a source of self-reproach.  
While the issue of formal testing, which featured prominently during my introductory 
meeting with Hector, does not resurface, there are other more implicit forms of testing 
at play. Some days, simply getting out of bed is a test of Hector’s resolve. In the spring, 
he resumes his old routine, but there is a delicacy to his return. It was inclement 
weather and then temporary hearing loss that previously prevented him from 
attending the golf club rather than memory loss. Hector doesn’t know what will stop 
him in future, more aware now of the defenceless thing-like fragility of the body, 
experienced in opposition to our purposes and values (Bowden, 1997:112). Then, when 
Gina overdoes things at her keep fit class, testing her body to its limits, the meaning of 
‘paying my dues’ alters once again. Hector is awoken from his sleepwalk and his 
commitments change. He visibly relaxes and a holiday is planned, ‘there’s life in the old 





Hector’s narrative initially appears to be at risk of foreclosure (Freeman, 2000). The 
very notion of dementia is an anathema to Hector and he does not take the second step 
in Beard’s (2016) trajectory ‘of accepting’ the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. Instead, 
a counter-narrative of erroneous diagnosis is advanced and reinforced by Gina. The 
subject is closed. The risk of foreclosure is in contrast to Hector’s earlier life narrative, 
which boasts a balance of continuity and flexibility. Hector’s retirement is recounted as 
a time of adventure then, having reached a stage where he was content with his 
commitments and achievements, he had come to view life mainly in terms of continuity, 
inclined to make meaning through already established identity structures (Bohlmeijer 
et al, 2011).  
 
The life changes he experiences constitute a major biographical disruption (Bury, 
1982), challenging the narrative which has sustained him in recent years and which 
normally undergirds his identity commitments. Hector, a lifelong critical thinker, is in 
the unfamiliar position of being unable to provide meaningful answers to the questions 
raised. Ricoeur (1992:320) highlights the need to take account of deeply concealed 
forms of suffering that ‘go far beyond mishaps and adventures that can be made 
meaningful through the strategy of emplotment’. Hector’s situation provides not only 
new experiences, but also questions his underlying narrative schemes (Bohlmeijer et al, 
2011). 
 
Narrative foreclosure is invariably more than the result of a personal interpretation of 
one's life (Randall, 2008). People we grow old alongside often co-author the stories we 
live by. Hector’s memory loss is refuted by Gina and normalised by his peers. Co-
authorship can also extend to those who have gone before (Ricoeur, 2004) and Archie 
continues to co-author Hector’s narrative, whispering encouragement from the wings. 
Despite, or perhaps because of the positive messaging, Hector remains anxious that his 
memory loss is worsening, possibly indicative of an underlying ‘paradox of acceptance 
and denial’ (MacQuarrie, 2005). Hector’s emotional reflections on his personal 
encounters with dementia, notably the fates of Dougie and Malcolm’s wife, suggest the 
diagnosis would simply be too painful to think about, even with the support and 
solidarity of others.  
 
Cultural narratives may also shape our narratives and self-understandings, but as 
above, Hector’s fear of dementia cannot be attributed solely to cultural representations. 
Moreover, Hector and his peers do not depict old age per se as a life phase that lacks 
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meaningful roles. There is no indication that Hector is living out the cultural narrative 
of decline and lack imposed on older persons in general. Rather, his narrative 
environment is one that promotes a light-hearted yet optimistic attitude. Hector 
identifies strongly with his age-based male cohort and he is a traditionalist, resisting 
club reforms. He distinguishes the superior ways of the past and of his peer group, who 
he refers to as ‘the last of the Mohicans’, a dying tribe, set apart from the rest of society.   
 
In his talk, Hector consistently maintains the distinction between ‘the last of the 
Mohicans’ and ‘the four musketeers’. The musketeers are famed for their rallying call, 
‘all for one and one for all, united we stand, divided we fall’18. United, Hector, Archie, 
Dougie and Malcom stood like a band of brothers. Without Archie, one by one they have 
fallen, leaving Hector ‘the last man standing’. He misses his friends and for all his 
accomplishments in life, reviewing the past can be as painful as looking to the future. 
Through all the changes and emotions Hector experiences during the study period, he 
sustains his identity as ‘the last musketeer’. It looks as though Hector may be living in 
‘epilogue time’ (Morson, 1994), the important story over, nothing essential will change, 
when a narrative opening is suddenly crafted, ‘a wake-up call’. Then, as quickly as this 
chink of light appears, the likelihood of an entirely unforeseen ending serves up a 
further reminder of the pervasiveness of chance and vulnerability as inherent 
structures of our lives (Bowden, 1997). 
Ann and John: Going Back to Place Manor 
The following narrative revisits, amplifies and animates the themes identified in 
‘Managing Expectations’ in Chapter Seven. Place Manor is the scene of Ann and John’s 
first holiday together, they revisited it as part of a recent nostalgia trip and we journey 
back there, down memory lane, many times during the study. The meaning of ‘Going 
Back to Place Manor’ alters over time, connecting with their extended temporal and 
familial horizons, declining health and the ongoing management of family expectations. 
‘Going back to Place Manor’ is consistent with Ann and John’s notion of the good life, 
unifying their commitment to each other and their continuing contribution to family 
life. I use ‘going back to Place Manor’ as a device to explore the negotiation of various 
obstacles, dilemmas and possibilities over the study period. 
                                                          
18 The Three Musketeers is a well-known novel by Alexandre Dumas, first published in 1844. The ‘fourth 
musketeer’ was D’artagnan. 
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When I first enter Ann and John’s home, John’s efforts to keep their memories alive are 
evident. John tells me the photos dotted around are there ‘to remind us of what we had 
in the past’. Ann offers lightly, ‘Some of us need reminding.’ Having forcefully rejected 
her diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, Ann accepts her memory loss and it is not a 
source of frustration. John does not force the issue of diagnosis and it never comes up 
in our conversations. During our early meetings, talk often turns to the past, especially 
‘the magical year’ when they met and fell in love, culminating in their first holiday 
together to Place Manor shortly after John graduated. It is the setting where John 
confessed his love for Ann and Ann declared her love for John, ‘confess versus declare’ 
constituting an ongoing point of contention typical of the fiery but friendly debates they 
routinely engage in. John was overwhelmed by the enormity of this ‘confession’, 
marring the final days of the holiday and it ended uncertainly. It was Ann who reached 
out, suggesting by letter that she would be pleased to see John should he ‘ever want to 
visit these parts’. Thereafter they always talked through their difficulties.   
The difficulties include John’s nervous breakdown when Ann was about to enter her 
final year at University. John reflects that Ann was instrumental in his recovery, holding 
his hand and talking to him. Ann remembers ‘little of the actual occasions’ when she 
visited John, but can recollect feeling that she had nobody to talk to about it, certainly 
not her parents ‘who would have been very upset about the idea of someone being 
mentally ill’. Ann and John married immediately after Ann graduated and she briefly 
took up a post as a teacher, leaving on account of ‘a honeymoon baby’. Another four 
children followed. When asked about her decision to decline Thalidomide during her 
second pregnancy, Ann comments, ‘Medicine can be marvellous, but can also overreach. 
I’ve never thought it particularly wise to interfere with things that are just part of life. I 
knew morning sickness was a natural part of the pregnancy and would pass’.  
The recollections encompass Ann and John’s move to Scotland with their young family 
when John accepted a civil service post. Unaware of protocols, Ann wrote to a 
broadsheet newspaper to criticise the ‘four-plus test’ employed at that time by grant-
aided Scottish schools. When her letter was published, John was informed that he 
couldn’t be political and one’s relatives really shouldn’t enter the fray either. John was 
‘supposed to tell Ann off, but would never dream of it’.  
Ann and John tell me that revisiting the past helps them to cope with their current 
difficulties. There are days when they don’t want to get up in the morning, when one of 
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them is not feeling up to the mark. They often have a lie in. After family visits or trips 
away, they spend three or four days in bed recovering. Going to bed at night is also 
‘quite a trial’, John getting Ann undressed, ‘nightie on wrong way round’, before clearing 
up which can take over half an hour.  The thing that John looks forward to is getting 
into bed and giving Ann a cuddle. They also talk about their demise, ‘whenever that may 
be’ and know ‘the one of who dies last will have a hard time’. Thoughts of their demise 
are alleviated by thinking about the family and their hopes for their grandchildren.  
During subsequent meetings, talk turns to their hopes for the family and shifting 
expectations. Anticipating that the family may have questions after he has gone, John 
develops his reflections on how he and Ann first met into an extended written account 
of their life together. One son points out an inaccuracy in an early draft and John 
determines to get his facts straight. He emails me a copy following each revision. John 
also attaches considerable importance to the marriage vows that he and Ann made to 
each other, although the Christian significance was not relevant. He expresses a sadness 
that so many of their grand-children have live-in partners, but have not subscribed to 
the same sort of vows.   Ann quickly asserts that it doesn’t worry her at all, and that 
their grandchildren have thought it through. She states firmly ‘I think it is very much up 
to each person. They may do things that I don’t think are quite right, but unless I thought 
that it was something that was really bad, I just don’t think I have the right to impose my 
way of thinking or my feelings or my ideas’. John persists that the vows that they made 
have such importance and relevance in the circumstances in which they now find 
themselves. He’s ‘sad that our grand-children may not have that very important peg 
when they come to the age of 80’. Ann responds, ‘It is something that we’ve needed, but 
they may not. It has been and continues to be very important to us, but it’s not necessarily 
something that they will miss’. John concludes this discussion, ‘When I think back to what 
we were like on our wedding day, my heart just overflows with love for Ann. It’s almost a 
resurrection of the love and affection that we had in those early days’. 
As the weather improves, Ann continues to resist John’s efforts to rekindle her 
aesthetic interests. His suggestion of digging out all the artist’s stuff that he bought for 
her meets with the same response as the proposed greenhouse, Ann would ‘be expected 
to produce something’. The finer detail of John’s plans for celebrating Ann’s 80th 
birthday is also revealed. John had been looking something up online to include in the 
nostalgia trip write-up and discovered that you can rent Place Manor itself, the main 
house, so they could have a big family party there. He retrieves an old photograph of 
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himself and Ann sitting on the breakwater that stops the water flowing up to the door 
of the house, which ‘we’d love to recreate, sixty years on’. Ann quips, ‘I’m not sure we’ll 
improve upon the original’.  
When we next meet, John has experienced some health problems. The family stepped 
in, but he realises they need an alternative plan going forward. He is also having to 
manage what he perceives to be a rather heavy-handed response; the family would like 
Ann and John to access care services now, whereas they couldn’t ‘tolerate the intrusion’ 
and are actively seeking more of a contingency plan. The planned trip to Place Manor is 
also being called into question, because there is no sleeping accommodation 
downstairs and one son has ‘started to get a bit hot under the collar about us climbing 
the stairs’. John maintains, ‘We have our own ways of managing’, but their son thinks it’s 
too much. 
We talk a little more about their own ways of managing day to day. John has invested in 
software to block nuisance calls.  Ann thinks ‘it may be working rather too well’. John 
also describes his frustration at having to go through various loops of automated 
telephone services and Ann observes, ‘John is very capable but, looking on, one senses 
there are so many obstacles to overcome’. John adds, ‘We have youngsters who can help 
us to deal with the modern world, but others must feel very disfavoured by society’. John’s 
hearing aids add to the difficulties of speaking on the telephone. He thinks he’s ‘fairly 
clued up’, but the second time the person who sold him his hearing aids visited, his son 
appeared coincidentally and rather took the lead. John reflects ‘He doesn’t think I’m 
competent and that rather arises from the saga of our Riser Recliner chairs’. John gets up 
and produces a very fat folder documenting the saga. Ann remarks with a mischievous 
grin, ‘They didn’t know who they were taking on’.  
When we meet again, John has rediscovered some correspondence with a Dutch friend 
charting their early family life and is busy re-establishing chronological order. He 
delights in reading the letters to Ann and is surprised that he has misremembered a few 
things and forgotten other details. Ann is unfazed, commenting, ‘So much is lost in the 
mists of time’. I learn that it has taken Ann and John rather a long time to recover from 
the exertions of his recent birthday gathering. Some of the family stayed over and he 
attributes the exhaustion to ‘being taken out of our comfort zone’. He reveals that he and 
Ann often happily stay in bed until two in the afternoon chatting and watching 
television, so ‘we were quite worn out as a result of having to follow the … what’s the 
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word? The discipline of others’? Ann volunteers “regime”, adding ‘I think it gets more 
tiring each time, doesn’t it love’?  
John goes on to explain that they have reconsidered holding Ann’s 80th birthday party 
at Place Manor because ‘though I could certainly drive there, we got so exhausted after 
this blessed birthday party, we decided to cancel’. He continues that he hadn’t yet 
mentioned it to Ann, but he just happened to look something up online the day before 
yesterday and discovered they’ve had a cancellation in the summer for a cottage that 
would sleep six. Ann asks if he’s trying to tell her something and John floats the idea of 
going there with one or two of the family. Ann looks as though she is loath to crush his 
enthusiasm, but responds softly ‘I’m not sure they would want to come’, to which John 
offers, ‘Free holiday’? Ann continues, ‘They don’t get terribly many holidays, love. I’m not 
sure that’s how they would choose to spend them’.  
Although a physical return to Place Manor is taken off the agenda, Ann and John 
continue to revisit it through their memories. As we are wrapping up the study, John 
returns once more to ‘the magical year at University’, describing the ‘wonderful 
atmosphere, lots of green, lovely campus.’ Ann tells him blithely that she thinks he’s 
‘idealising it a bit’. John pleads, ‘Not idealising, romanticising’, but Ann stands by her 
word choice, teasing ‘I think you are rather presenting it as ideal. I can remember far 
more times worrying about the maths. Maybe you found it easier’. John is undeterred and 
insists, ‘Oh it was magical, I wouldn’t pick any other time –and I was disposing of another 
girlfriend too,’ at which point Ann interjects humorously, ‘There, you see, the truth will 
out’.  
Interpretation of ‘going back to Place Manor’ 
The meaning that Place Manor holds for Ann and John is immediately apparent. It is the 
place where love and the prospect of married life first surfaced, and where it almost 
ended on account of John’s idealism. Life could have been very different had it not been 
for Ann’s practical intervention and had they not developed the ability to talk through 
their difficulties. ‘Going back to Place Manor’ and the challenges faced prior to their 
marriage through conversation and photographs serves to keep Ann’s memories alive 
and fosters new meanings that help them to cherish the present moment and sustain 
them both going forward (Molyneaux et al, 2012). Ann and John are able to ‘live off the 
past’, and draw upon not only their memories, but also their reflections upon them as a 
kind of ‘biographically accrued capital’ (Mader, 1996:43) enriching their inner worlds. 
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They identify as a unit, equal partners, co-dependent, working together to co-construct 
their unfolding narrative. They follow a pattern established over many years, each 
appreciating and respecting the other’s distinctive qualities and often gender-specific 
contributions in a way that maintains mutual self-esteem.  
‘Going back to Place Manor’ assumes a more literal meaning, with Ann and John making 
the long road trip back there, rekindling old feelings and generating fresh memories. 
The memories and associated meanings are so important to John that he wishes to 
entrust them to successor generations, keeping them alive into the future and passing 
along whatever wisdom they may embody (Randall and Kenyon, 2000). This is a very 
distinctive type of contribution to family life grounded in a different mode of 
citizenship, namely an aspiration to help the next generation on their way to being 
good citizens. John captures his reflections in writing and this is connected to the 
shared wish that they’d spoken more to their own parents, further stretching concepts 
of time. Revisiting the vows that Ann and John made to each other also holds 
significance, strengthening the commitment to love and to cherish ‘til death do us part. 
While John wishes more of their grandchildren would make similar vows, Ann accepts 
that the vows may not hold the same significance for their grandchildren and they may 
not miss them in future. In so doing, she draws on her own mother’s influence, 
replicating her commitment to giving people space to find their own meanings, thus 
demonstrating a different way of passing things on.  
The meaning of ‘going back to Place Manor’ alters again when John conceives of the 
idea of celebrating Ann’s 80th birthday there with the extended family. They have a 
large family who lead busy lives and have their own commitments and it is difficult to 
get everybody together. John thinks it is right that they assume this responsibility, 
helping the family to appreciate that they are part of something bigger, identifying as a 
different type of unit. Holding the party at Place Manor speaks to the forging of an 
increasing sense of connection with the broader horizons that border our existence 
(McAdams, 2006) characteristic of life review. John, the romantic, is enthused by the 
plans, while Ann, the pragmatist, remains cautious, aware of the necessary mobility in 
life plans involving the family on account of their busy lives. She remembers being a 
busy mother too.  
The decision not to go back to Place Manor is a response to family expectations of Ann 
and John and concerns about their capabilities. John initially resists anxieties about 
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managing the stairs, but later comes to acknowledge the limits of their energy levels. 
When John suggests making the trip to a single-storey cottage with just a few family 
members, it falls to Ann to highlight the need to manage their expectations of the 
family, who have limited holidays and may have other aspirations. Once again, John is 
the romantic idealist, Ann the practical realist. This pattern persists when they revert to 
going back to Place Manor and the past that surrounds it in their memories, John 
waxing lyrical about the magical year, Ann wrapping up with a witty one-liner rooted in 
the practical matter of passing exams.  
Formal testing plays an unusual part in this narrative, cognitive testing three years 
earlier proving an affront that ‘didn’t touch the surface of the changes in Ann’s 
intellectual reasoning’.  Rather, the narrative serves up a reminder of the enduring 
nature of our hyper-cognitive culture (Post, 2000) in the form of Ann’s letter of 
complaint about the testing of four-year olds in the 1960s. John faces daily tests of 
stamina and competence, admitting to finding the modern world intellectually 
demanding. Competence is also scrutinised and called into question by family members 
and although John jests that perhaps they have grounds, the shift in his positioning is 
hurtful. Alongside the family’s expectations of Ann and John and their expectations of 
the family, Ann engages in her own management of expectations. Always a high 
achiever, Ann’s resistance to her diagnosis finds parallels in her resistance to 
engagement in activities where there might be an expectation that she ‘produces 
something’ that could be evaluated. Most significantly, the narrative is dominated by 
the ability of the marriage, and the love on which it is based, to stand the test of time.  
There is little space for memory loss let alone dementia in this narrative. Ann never 
takes the second step in Beard’s (2016) trajectory of accepting the diagnosis and it 
simply doesn’t arise within the flow of conversation, other than through the occasional 
nonchalant remark ‘some of us need reminding’, or ‘so much is lost in the mists of time’. 
In the past, Ann has been prepared to question authority, not only challenging the 
appropriateness of standardised testing in schools, but also highlighting the 
demonstrable overreaching of the medical profession into the natural course of life. I 
would like to interpret her response to her AD diagnosis in a similar light, but Ann grew 
up in a time where strong family resistance to mental health issues left her feeling 
isolated. Her response is perhaps more complex.  
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John accepts the diagnosis, occasionally swinging on Beard’s pendulum to question it 
on account of the acuteness of Ann’s observations, but day to day it is of little 
consequence. John’s concern is Ann’s happiness and keeping the conversation going. 
‘Whatever biological substrate may have existed in her brain’, since John was ‘focused 
on her mind and her consciousness and her pleasures’, he ‘did not know and did not 
care’ (Gullete, 2014:132). This reaffirms that partners do not need to react the same 
way to a diagnosis to be coping “well” as a couple (Beard et al, 2009). 
The active ageing discourse is also resisted jointly, and although both Ann and John 
were previously heavily involved in civic work, they are now quite prepared to stay in 
bed until the afternoon or watch TV all day when they are tired. They form a united 
front against the regimes of others, shirking the idea of formal care services and taking 
steps to exclude nuisance callers. Perhaps the greatest act of resistance however is 
demonstrated by Ann as she engages in conversation. A terrific wordsmith, Ann’s wit 
and gentle curbing of John’s romantic idealism call to mind Gullette’s (2014) account of 
her mother churning up ‘the wisdom – dementia binary’.  
Chrissie: Doing the Christmas Boxes 
The following narrative contextualises the themes identified in ‘Sink or Swim’ and 
‘Piccadilly Circus’ in Chapter Seven, expanding upon the contrast between Chrissie’s 
experiences in the private and public spheres. ‘Doing the Christmas boxes’ is an activity 
that exemplifies Chrissie’s particular brand of citizenship, which I interpret as a form of 
corporeal generosity (Diprose, 2002). The deeper meaning of ‘doing the Christmas 
boxes’ is only revealed to me towards the end of the study and I use ‘doing the 
Christmas boxes’ to symbolise the deepening of my understanding as the boxes fill up 
with little delights over the study period. 
The first time I visit Chrissie, I am struck by the array of shoe boxes wrapped in 
assorted Christmas paper neatly stacked against one wall of her lounge. She informs me 
that she makes up Christmas boxes for the ‘orphans in Africa’ every year, starting in 
January. She’s ‘got the whole family doing them’. Whenever she goes to the shops she 
picks something up and loves watching the boxes gradually fill up over the year. 
Chrissie shows me a photo of the beneficiaries on her ipad, saying it makes her realise 
how lucky she is. ‘Being lucky’ is a recurring theme in Chrissie’s talk, despite what 
strikes me as a lifetime of hardship.  
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During our initial meeting, I am introduced to Craig, who Chrissie treats as one of her 
own large family, having assumed responsibility for him as a baby when his mum was 
battling alcoholism nearly eleven years ago. She confesses, ‘He’s the special one’. I’m told 
that Craig is needing her less as he gets older, but there’s still the odd time when she 
thinks, ‘What would he do if he didn’t have me’? I wonder. Craig is also present during 
our second meeting. On both occasions, it’s clear that he adores Chrissie, who he calls 
‘Granny2’. All Chrissie’s great-grandchildren do.  
As we are driving back from the leisure centre, Chrissie announces that she’s going on 
holiday to Turkey with Helen; the hotel accommodation came free when she had her 
gutters done. She’s aware of the terror threat, but shrugs, ‘Life’s too short. It’s ‘a bonus 
ball’, as she’s already booked to go to America in September with James, Frank and 
Helen. Chrissie can’t wait for the trip to the States, as this will be the first time they’ve 
holidayed together. They’ve decided to ‘go for it’ while Chrissie’s still able to enjoy it.  
Chrissie reflects, ‘I don’t think I’m getting worse, but you never know when it will kick in’. 
She adds that her GP doesn’t think she’s getting worse either, but that’s because she 
practices the ‘100-7’ test every day. ‘I’m faster now than when I was at school. 100-7 is 
93, 93-7 is 86. When I get to 30 I relax’. She laughs, ‘If she changed it to ‘100-6’ I’d be 
snookered’, adding ‘Mind you, last time she drew a pillar and I had to copy it and overlap 
her drawing. I drew it okay, but it didn’t overlap. She asked me to draw the 50p shape too, 
but I missed a corner. I knew straight away that I’d made a mistake, but it was too late’. I 
learn that the GP is ‘great’, not that bothered about the scores’, unlike her consultant. 
The GP is ‘more interested in me and how I’m getting on’. Chrissie has been practicing 
both tests and is confident she’ll get them right next time: ‘I don’t worry if I can’t do it 
the first time, if I can get it right when I go back then I know I’m winning’.  
It is a beautiful spring morning when I next meet with Chrissie and she takes me out to 
see what’s she’s being doing in the garden. Her borders are immaculate and she claims 
they’re ‘the best they’ve ever been’. As we look at the plants, she tells me that Helen is 
moving in and Natalie (Helen’s daughter) and her new partner are moving into Helen’s 
house with the baby. Chrissie says ‘Helen was always going to move in with me, we’re 
just doing it a bit sooner to give Natalie and her new fella a chance. He’s fair away with 
her. She’s never had anyone like that’. I remark that it must be a big change for both of 
them. Chrissie replies, ‘Well things are always changing. Like Craig, he used to come to 
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me every day, but he doesn’t any more. He loves his mum and that’s right. She’s been 
better. But, well he’s number one, I can’t help it’. 
We drive to the garden centre where a purple flowering plant catches Chrissie’s eye. 
The label advises to protect from frost and Chrissie checks the weather forecast on her 
phone. It doesn’t sound good for the weekend, so she decides to leave it. She has 
however spotted a mixed box of plants that will be perfect for Elsie’s tubs. Chrissie 
thinks Elsie needs cheering up as Jessie, two doors down, has moved permanently into 
a care home. Elsie thinks she’ll be next, but Chrissie hopes not, admitting ‘I’d be lost 
without her’. Chrissie reports that she’s ‘splashing the cash’ as she won £140 at the 
bingo and split it with her friend. We are going to Chrissie’s favourite discount store 
later, the bingo win enabling Chrissie to ‘go to town’ with the Christmas boxes. She says, 
‘That reminds me, I’ll need to get my lottery ticket. If I won, I said to Frank I would give it 
all to Africa for one of the water projects. He said, oh no you would not, because we’d say 
you had Alzheimer’s and didn’t know what you were doing, and we’d put you in a home’. 
She laughs, concluding, ‘He probably would’.  
I’m informed that going into a home doesn’t worry Chrissie, ‘I’ve worked in them, just 
hopefully not too soon’. She points her finger, adding ‘although’.  The ‘although’ relates 
to forgetting to collect Jackson, her great-grandson, from school, only realising this 
when his mum, Gillian, phoned to see how he had got on. ‘I ran. It’s just five minutes in 
the car, but I was more than fifteen minutes late’. Jackson wasn’t worried, suggesting 
maybe granny2’s car wouldn’t start and she’d had to walk. Chrissie told his teacher 
about her Alzheimer’s. She found that hard, as she doesn’t want everyone at the school 
knowing her business, but didn’t want them to think she didn’t care. She concludes, ‘I 
was just cleaning my cupboard. I need Gillian to remind me’. 
Chrissie drives on to the shopping complex, taking us through the small town where 
she used to live to avoid a busy roundabout, telling me ‘I much preferred living here. 
James says you can’t turn back the clock. He’s right’. She describes watching the kids 
getting dressed in front of the coal fire as ‘happy memories’, adding ‘rose tinted’. I learn 
that Chrissie left her first husband for several months after an episode of domestic 
violence when the kids were young. Helen had told an old neighbour that Chrissie left 
him because she couldn’t stand it, but left her and her brothers with him. That was fed 
back to Chrissie and it hurt, but they’ve talked about it recently. The family know why 
she did it, ‘they don’t hold it against me’. 
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We head into a sports shop to buy some joggers for Craig. Chrissie is unsure about the 
labelling – what is a medium boy? Eventually a lycra-clad woman appears and Chrissie 
approaches her to check she has the right size. The woman confirms this, instructing ‘If 
you wait there I’ll bring the card reader’. She disappears for quite some time and I note 
there is no queue at the cash desk. Eventually she returns, asks Chrissie for her card 
and Chrissie enters her pin hesitantly. The woman asks Chrissie if she wants a paper or 
email receipt. Chrissie asks for both, which is met with a grunt. Chrissie supplies her 
email address effortlessly and is advised that she needs to go to the cash desk to collect 
her paper receipt. As we walk across Chrissie says, ‘See that confused me, that’s the sort 
of thing that would get me in a flap if you weren’t here’. I admit that I’m confused too. 
Chrissie puts her paper receipt in her bag, remarking, ‘Usually I’d get uptight thinking 
about where to put this in case I need to take them back, but if I get the email, that takes 
the pressure off’.  
I meet Chrissie just before her trip to Turkey. She had thought we might go for a drive 
to the charity shops, but James has her car for a few days. It’s been raining heavily all 
day and she admits that she’s not that keen on driving in the rain anyway, plus she’s 
agreed to look after Jackson. She invites me into the kitchen to see the cream cakes 
she’s bought for us, and I realise that she must have walked to the bakers in the rain. 
There is one for Elsie too. While the kettle is boiling she says ‘come and see what you 
make of this’ and we go through to the lounge. I notice that the Christmas boxes are 
filling up nicely, but Chrissie points to some bedding, a collection of carrier bags and a 
small suitcase. It transpires that one of her grand-daughter’s friends is homeless, 
having walked out on an abusive relationship and is going to stay at Chrissie’s while 
she’s on holiday. Chrissie tells me she’s been in that position, ‘I wouldn’t see her on the 
streets’.  
Jackson is desperate to go to the newsagents and keeps asking, ‘When is the lady going?’ 
Chrissie replies ‘If you’re cheeky, we’ll not go at all’. She shakes her head, grumbling 
‘They’re all like that, the only one I don’t get cheek from is Craig’. She goes on to say that 
Craig’s not around as much. ‘That’s fine. It’s good that he’s got more of his own pals and 
wants to spend time with them. I need him more than he needs me now’. She adds that 
Natalie will be pleased, explaining that she had hung photographs of herself, Helen, 
James and Frank in her bedroom, but ‘felt there was a gap’. She put Craig’s photograph 
up but when Natalie saw it, she was furious, found a photo of Kevin and put that up 
instead. Chrissie concludes, ‘She thinks I’m trying to replace him’.  
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Chrissie hasn’t spoken about Kevin since telling me about his death in a very matter-of-
fact way when we first met. Today she surprises me by telling me that Kevin was ‘the 
nicest natured’ of her children, ‘he was special to me too’. She goes on to talk about Kevin 
at length, concluding with a heart-breaking account of the day he died, ‘we’d been 
waiting on it happening for years. He was a tragedy in the making. I think about him 
every day’.  
I catch up with Chrissie when she returns from Turkey and she’s already looking 
forward to her holiday to America, telling me she’ll stock up on Halloween stuff when 
she’s there and then she’ll need to start ‘gearing up’ for Christmas. I have seen 
photographs of Chrissie dressed in her elf costume hosting the annual children’s 
Christmas party, which has ‘grown arms and legs’ - this year, she’s hiring the 
community centre. Chrissie asks if I’ve seen her cake photos and produces an album. 
They are the Christmas cakes of my youth, wrapped in paper frills, covered in snow-
peak icing and topped with an array of plastic decorations.  Chrissie opens a cupboard 
and digs out an old shortbread tin where the decorations are stored, telling me they’re 
not expensive, but as she makes six cakes, she asks for them back, but doesn’t always 
get them.  We look through the assortment of Santas, snowmen and reindeer before 
Chrissie finds her favourite, a glittery Christmas tree with a yellow present nestled in 
the branches.  
The discovery of the tree prompts Chrissie to tell me that she never saw much of her 
real dad when she was young as he had his own family and his wife wasn’t keen, but 
she went to his house one Christmas. Chrissie was wearing a hand-me-down dress that 
was too big and white socks. Both socks had the same pattern, but must have been 
different sizes as one was shorter than the other. She recalls walking into the hall, 
which had a thick red carpet and a ‘Christmas tree with fairy lights that went all the way 
to the ceiling. Her eyes glisten like the glitter on the tree as she continues, ‘In the tree, 
was a present, wrapped in paper with baubles on it and a sticker that had my name on it. 
I’d never had a wrapped present before’. The others were playing games in the living 
room, but Chrissie just stood there, looking up at this present. She smiles, concluding ‘I 
couldn’t believe my luck’. 
Interpretation of ‘doing the Christmas boxes’ 
The importance Chrissie attaches to ‘doing the Christmas boxes’ becomes apparent 
during our initial meeting. Chrissie identifies strongly with others less fortunate than 
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herself and giving to others reminds her of her own good fortune in life. A more 
generative future is also alluded to, as Chrissie is delighted that ‘the whole family’ are 
now doing the Christmas boxes – the pleasure to be derived from giving to others is 
something that she has passed on.  
As the study progresses, the boxes start to fill up and so does the well of examples of 
Chrissie’s generosity to others. Their association with her own good fortune becomes 
increasingly apparent. Chrissie’s account of receiving her first wrapped Christmas 
present as a small child is framed equally positively. There are different ways of looking 
at situations and Chrissie’s reflections, by her own admission, are ‘rose-tinted’.  The 
practical value of the notion of the ‘narrative unity of a life’ is evident. Like all life 
narratives, Chrissie’s story is a mixture of fabulation and actual experience (Ricoeur, 
1992:161). Ricoeur (1992) emphasises the connection the narrative makes between 
estimations applied to actions and the evaluations of persons themselves. While his 
notion of ‘life plans’ places an accent on the voluntary side of existence, the notion of 
‘narrative unity’ underscores the organisation of the mix of intention, causes, 
happenings and chance that we find in all stories (p178).  
 
Ricoeur (1992) also stresses that we need the help of plots to articulate narratively 
retrospection and prospection. Chrissie borrows the plot of a good luck story and her 
AD diagnosis and future are contextualised within this. By narrating a life ‘of which I am 
not the author as to its existence, I make myself its co-author as to its meaning’ (p162). 
Against the ‘narrative unity of a life’ lived so far, Ricoeur (1992) posits the possibility of 
the good life, which comprises ‘the nebulus of ideals and dreams of achievements with 
regard to which life is held to be more or less fulfilled. It is the plane of “time lost” and 
“time regained”’ (p179). Chrissie is aware that ‘you can’t turn back the clock’ but she is 
fully committed to making the most of the time that remains ‘while she’s still quite 
good’. 
 
Ricoeur (1992) also draws attention to the ‘entanglement of life histories’. The many 
interdependencies in Chrissie’s life result in numerous narrative threads. In particular, 
Chrissie’s relationship with Elsie forces me to revisit my understanding of reciprocity 
in light of the notion of ‘corporeal generosity’ (Diprose, 2002). Chrissie indicates that 
she’d be lost without Elsie. Chrissie enjoys Elsie’s company, Elsie isn’t lucky enough to 
have a daughter, Chrissie never knew her own mother; there are layers of complexity. It 
isn’t simply that Chrissie’s contributions are recognised by others, her own self-esteem 
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is intertwined with her esteem of others. This extends Ricoeur’s (1992) consideration 
of solicitude to engage with the notion of similitude.  
 
One particular narrative thread that develops late in the study concerns Chrissie’s son, 
Kevin. For Chrissie, thinking about Kevin is an everyday activity, but it is not an activity 
that can be observed. And it is not an ‘activity’ that she was initially prepared to share 
with me. There are regrets within Chrissie’s story, notably leaving her children with her 
violent first husband when they were young. She has had the chance to make amends to 
the three that remain, on the plane of “time regained”, and they are holidaying together, 
replenishing the cupboard where happy memories are stored, like cake decorations. 
But there has been no opportunity to make amends with Kevin. Instead, it is another 
small boy who came into her life when he was in need who has become ‘the special 
one’. Craig, if not taking Kevin’s place, allows Chrissie to make amends in a different 
way.  Chrissie can see that Craig is becoming increasingly less reliant on her and, while 
admitting that she’ll miss him, she accepts this as right – he loves his mum and he has 
friends. Chrissie has contributed to these developments enormously. It is another form 
of citizenship. 
 
Testing features in Chrissie’s narrative too. Whereas the formal cognitive testing 
conducted by her consultant was resisted because he made Chrissie ‘feel like a 
performing monkey’, the regular testing by her GP is not unwelcome. Chrissie practices 
the tests daily and uses them to gauge her own performance, to see if she is ‘winning’. 
Another point of departure is that while other participants have found technological 
advancements testing, Chrissie embraces them. She is adept in the use of social media 
and finds the emailing of receipts reassuring. When situations in everyday life do prove 
testing, she seeks ways round them rather than withdrawing; she learned to sink or 
swim at an early age and is a graduate of the school of hard knocks.  
 
Dementia plays its part within the narrative. Chrissie variously accepts, negotiates, 
exploits, hides and resists the AD label and its connotations in strategic and tactical 
ways. She experiences anxiety when she is away from home and there is a tendency to 
attribute uncertainties to the condition. She is upset that she forgot to collect Jackson 
from school and didn’t want his teacher to think she doesn’t care; Chrissie cares a great 
deal. She reveals her diagnosis to people outside her social circle reluctantly, to explain 
omissions or to make life easier going forward. In so doing, Chrissie generally finds 
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creative ways to navigate around the AD label in response to the exigencies of the 
situation.  
 
In Beard’s (2016) terms, Chrissie takes the second step of incorporating the AD label 
into the complex folds of her identity, but does not take the third step of joining a 
support group. There is no need for one. Chrissie has an extended support network. 
Further, memory loss is practically problematic, but not a personal disaster. AD does 
not dominate her life, a life characterised by turbulence since birth. Chrissie’s life plans 
have always had a degree of fluidity. There are references to an uncertain future, but 
the AD diagnosis is just the latest stone cast into the pond, a pebble rather than a rock, 
sending out a few ripples, but not enough to stop her fishing.  The many 
interdependencies that characterise Chrissie’s life ensure that she has other ongoing 
concerns and the future holds welcome possibilities too; ‘Life’s what you make it’. 
 
At times, I look at Chrissie and I can still see that little girl staring up at the Christmas 
tree. Things I have taken for granted throughout my life have always been just out of 
her reach. Yet, when she says that ‘there have been more good times than bad, a lot of 
laughs too’, I sense this to be true; I’ve experienced a lot of laughs with her. Her 
extended family adore her and they co-create the narrative, but Chrissie remains first 
‘author’ of its meaning. They constitute a different kind of ‘unit’. There is a real respect 
for what she’s done and who she is, who she continues to be. Her contributions and 
achievements are recognised and she recognises the contributions of others. She is still 
Granny2 and Chrissie still cannot believe her luck.  
Reflections and Way Forward 
The five narratives presented in this chapter seek to preserve complexity and diversity, 
providing nuanced accounts of the negotiation of everyday life in storied ways. The 
configured narratives depict the part that ‘dementia’ does or does not play in the 
participants’ lives. Consistent with the wider literature, they articulate different ways of 
responding to and living with dementia in later life. In this study, ‘ordinary’, everyday 
life and the ongoing achievement of a ‘good life’ were not associated with whether the 
person integrates dementia-as-disease into their identity, or construes dementia as 
forgetfulness or part of ageing. Nor were they dependent on both members of a couple 
responding the same way. However construed, diagnosis in itself was not necessarily 
beneficial and post-diagnostic supports were not always appropriate. Where taken up, 
the supports proved helpful, but were not without issue. Diagnosis also did not 
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necessarily constitute a (or the) major disruption in the person or couple’s life. 
Together the narratives lend support to my overarching argument that the different 
ways of responding to and living with dementia require equal consideration and the 
suspension of assumptions.  
 
The risks of making normative assumptions about what people need or what should be 
important to them include neglecting other aspects of the person’s life that they are 
seeking to maintain or improve, and overlooking their particular contributions. 
Baldwin (2005:1027) has argued that to challenge the disabling master narratives of 
dementia, counter-stories that are individual, enabling and meaningful need to be both 
constructed and realised. The study sought to enter the domain of the possible and the 
configured narratives depict shifts over time, engaging with both construction and 
realisation. They do so through the ordering and creative functions of narrative, 
charting possibilities considered, and who and what people are actually able to be and 
do.  In different ways, the participants seek to make and make contributions to their 
own lives and the lives of others, in line with their varied life priorities and retained 
capabilities, by being and doing. There are diverse ways of practising and realising 
social citizenship.  
 
The narratives highlight difficulties where dominant Western assumptions about what 
constitutes a capable man prove hard to sustain. For women, while Chrissie and Ann 
have very different backgrounds and capabilities, both underscore the place of luck and 
chance in life and their self-esteem has been closely associated with appearance and 
caring capabilities, which again can be hard to sustain. The narratives also depict forms 
of citizenship-as-practice that are relational, creative and generative, from honouring 
those who have gone before, leaving a legacy, actively passing on traditions, knowledge, 
values and practices, to quietly modelling ways of being, for the benefit of partners, 
family, friends, associates and unknown others. Many of these practices are located in 
the mundane spaces of daily sociability (Neveu, 2015) and in the private realm. The 
narratives in themselves constitute a form of resistance to dominant cultural 
representations that valorise independence and public life, and catastrophise dementia 
as a ‘horror story’.  
 
The narratives also convey other diverse forms of resistance to the ascribed, deficient 
identities of ‘old’ and ‘impaired’. These include the development of meticulous 
management strategies, active and purposeful management of the expectations of self 
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and others, rejecting the diagnosis and developing counter-rationales, deploying 
humour, carrying on regardless, selective withdrawal and disclosure, churning up the 
wisdom – cognitive impairment binary, quietly questioning authority and forcefully 
pointing out why specific reductive practices are problematic.   
 
The narratives do not however replace the dominant narrative of decline with 
exclusively positive counter-narratives that might risk inadvertently perpetuating the 
‘action bias’ that has questioned the inclusion of people with more advanced dementia 
in the category of ‘person’. Rather, they attend to the mix of acting and suffering, 
activity and passivity, strength and vulnerability, joy and sadness, love and loss, luck, 
intention and happenstance that characterise all human lives, with or without the 
phenomenon called dementia. Often bodily impairments such as imbalance, hearing 
loss, visual impairment, chronic pain, continence issues coupled with an inability to 
move at speed are as, if not more problematic than cognitive ‘dysfunction’. Together the 
narratives have something to say about the human condition and are offered as a 
response to the urgent need, identified in Chapter Two, to bring humanity back into 
considerations of ageing and dementia.  
 
By choosing to conduct a Narrative Inquiry, I did not want the participants to fade into 
support roles to illustrate particular themes. I set out to look for patterns within the 
accounts rather than across them. Yet the spectre of testing cast a shadow across all 
narratives, albeit in different ways, that could not be ignored.  The initial cognitive 
testing that culminated in diagnosis is a common point of anchorage, which all 
participants with dementia found reductive and demeaning. However, another 
commonality is the more implicit testing in the form of informal evaluations embedded 
in the various ‘practices’ in each person’s everyday life and the local cultures in which 
they are enacted. In different ways, such testing plays a part in the co-construction and 
conditionality of future expectations, especially with regard to the continued capability 
to contribute to ordinary social life. Some environments and practices offer more 
accommodating constituent rules and expectations than others. In this study, Chrissie’s 
family challenged my perceptions of risk, and the local golf club, characterised by a 
purposeful commitment to appeal to men and women, young and old in order to 
survive and flourish, fared better than environments designed with the needs of 




Within the narratives, there are also accounts of testing across the life course, ongoing 
tests of love, friendship, endurance, patience and commitment, and specific tests passed 
and failed, recollected in light (or in the shadow) of testing in the here and now, aiding 
understanding of each person’s situation as a whole, and playing a part in the ongoing 
construction of narrative identity. Memories are not only purposefully recollected, but 
are often evoked spontaneously in response to present stimuli. The memories triggered 
can impact upon or detract from the larger task of making meaning and constructing 
positive understandings of the value of life as a whole. I look again at the narratives 
through a critical lens in Chapter Nine as part of a broader reflection on the 
contribution of the study and then consider the translation of the research outputs into 




The Personal is Political  
 
Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well 
and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we all prefer to use only the good 
passport, sooner or later each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to 
identify ourselves as citizens of that other place. (Sontag, 1978:3) 
Overview 
In this concluding chapter, I bring together the different elements of the thesis, 
recapping briefly on the story so far before reflecting upon the research questions 
through a social citizenship value lens and drawing conclusions. Through this 
discussion, I add different layers to the overarching argument of the thesis, namely that 
the many alternative ways of understanding and responding to ‘dementia’ or memory 
loss in later life require equal consideration and the suspension of assumptions. In so 
doing, I demonstrate that the thesis makes new contributions to knowledge in several 
respects, empirically, by bringing fresh and more nuanced understandings of the 
everyday lives of older persons living with dementia, and also theoretically, 
methodologically and with potential societal implications.  
The story so far 
In Chapter One, I expressed the concern, based on practice observations, that 
assumptions regarding what older people living with dementia need, or what should be 
important to them, can obscure other aspects of life that they may wish improve or 
maintain and thus restrict their opportunities. Such assumptions may overlook the 
material circumstances of their lives and can also result in their contributions not being 
recognised. Further, I observed that persons resisting the diagnostic label of dementia 
or departing from the narrative of loss were often doubly-labelled as lacking awareness 
or in denial. My engagement with the literature in Chapters Two and Three heightened 
my concern and my resolve to address it. Particular influences included fresh critiques 
of the biomedicalisation of ageing and the rapid expansion of its technologies into the 
domain of cognitive impairment, empirical studies examining the complexities of so-
called ‘acceptance and denial’ and theoretical arguments for extending considerations 
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of citizenship-as-practice into the realm of ordinary social life and attending more 
closely to forms of misrecognition. Responding to persistent pleas for ordinariness 
from older people living with dementia and detecting a growing interest in ‘ordinary 
doing’ across disciplines, the study set out to explore how older people accomplish an 
ordinary, everyday life with dementia. Employing the narrative-in-action methodology 
developed over Chapters Four and Five, I addressed the following questions:  
1. How do people (living with dementia) variously: 
 Construe ‘everyday activity’ and ‘everyday life’? 
 Enact the activities that comprise everyday life? 
 Make meaning in and through these activities? 
 
2. How do people (living with dementia) variously negotiate and make sense of the 
obstacles, dilemmas and opportunities of everyday life through time? 
 
3. How is memory loss / dementia incorporated into the unfolding narratives and 
identities of people (living with dementia)? What part does ‘dementia’ play within 
these narrative configurations? 
 
In responding to the above questions in Chapters Six to Eight, the study makes a 
preliminary contribution to new knowledge by bringing fresh and more nuanced 
understandings of the ordinariness of the everyday lives of older persons living with 
dementia. In the sections that follow, I employ a social citizenship value lens to review 
and build upon this contribution to address the remaining research questions:  
4. How might the narrative-in-action methodology enhance future understandings of 
the (narrative) citizenship of people living with dementia?  
 
5. What are the theoretical and societal implications of the study from a social 
citizenship perspective? 
EXPECT: Bringing a Social Citizenship Value Lens to the Study 
To facilitate the discussion, I utilise the EXPECT framework purposefully developed by 
Bartlett and O’Connor (2010:95-119) as a heuristic device for locating social citizenship 
in research practices in the area of dementia studies. The authors begin with the 
premise that ‘we must EXPECT that men and women with dementia can and should be 
actively involved with the generation and translation of new knowledge’ (p95). The 
application of the framework facilitates consideration of how key components of social 
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citizenship, notably freedom from discrimination and having opportunities to 
participate and grow, might be realised in different phases of designing and conducting 
social research, from debates as to what constitutes evidence through to the translation 
of research into practice, as set out in Figure 9.1 below.  
Figure 9.1 EXPECT Framework for locating social citizenship in research 
Evidence-based practice reconsidered: privileging people’s stories 
eXtended research agenda: beyond health and social care quality 
Participatory and creative methods 
Ethical debates and dilemmas 
Critical Lens 
Translation of research into practice 
Bartlett and O’Connor (2010:95) 
Following this framework, I first consider the contribution of the study to 
(re)consideration of what we regard as evidence. In particular, I revisit the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study methodology, namely Ricoeur’s (1984; 1992) 
comprehensive narrative theorising, and underscore its capacity to elevate the status of 
narrative as a valued form of evidence with ontological, epistemological and ethical 
significance. I also reflect upon the study’s use of insights from narrative gerontology to 
underscore the value of narrative in later life and summarise the ways in which the 
study responds to the distinctive challenges that narrativity can present in dementia 
studies.  My attention then turns to the study’s contribution to extending the research 
agenda, first by purposefully framing the research questions to ask how an ordinary life 
is accomplished, suspending assumptions of difference and bracketing biomedical 
labels to counter the occlusion of everyday life and its meanings. I then consider the 
insights gained through the study’s sustained attention to temporality.  
 
The application of the EXPECT framework then focuses on the narrative-in-action 
methodology and I look closely at choices made in planning and conducting the 
research and the extent to which these choices created participatory possibilities for 
citizens of that other place, the ageing and dementia landscape.  The review of the 
methodology encompasses ethical considerations and entails ‘care full deliberation’ 
(Barnes, 2012) about the creation, ongoing negotiation and ending of uniquely 
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constructed relationships with the research participants, including questions of power, 
reciprocity, mutuality and authenticity.  
 
I extend the application of the EXPECT heuristic to the fruits of the Narrative Inquiry, as 
set out in Chapters Six through Eight, through a critical lens. I reflect on the study’s 
aspirations to challenge the assumed homogeneity of ‘the dementia experience’ and to 
enter the domain of the possible. I consider the opportunities for and barriers to 
participation, contribution and growth in ordinary social life and reflect on particular 
forms of misrecognition.   
 
Finally, I present my conclusions, drawing upon the recent developments in dementia 
studies reviewed in Chapters Two and Three to consider the societal implications of the 
study. I offer recommendations for the translation of the study outputs into practice in 
a manner consistent with Narrative Inquiry principles, including consideration of the 
limitations of the study.  In considering how I hope the narratives will be received, I 
return to Ricoeur’s (1984) narrative theorising and his notion of ‘refiguration’. I end by 
considering how the opportunity to spend time with the older persons who took part in 
the study prompted me to ‘refigure’ my own thoughts about ageing and time.   
The Evidence Base Reconsidered: Securing a Place for Narrative  
The first aspect of the EXPECT framework calls for evidence-based practice to be 
reconsidered if research practices are to be more consonant with social citizenship 
values. Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) highlight the need to challenge the continued 
privileging of methods that limit or discount the voices and experiences of people with 
dementia, asserting that personal stories are a valuable form of knowledge within a 
continuum of evidence. The authors also draw attention to narrative techniques that 
locate subjective experiences within a socio-political and cultural context. Baldwin 
(2008:223) brings narrative and citizenship together, calling for a ‘narrative citizenship 
that is given structural and organisational form’. In connecting narrative to the 
everyday social practices of citizenship, Baldwin (2005, 2008) refers to narrative as a 
way of being, constitutive of human existence, but focuses primarily on the stories we 
(try to) tell and that are told about us, consistent with his commitment to highlighting 
and countering the narrative dispossession of people with dementia.  This thesis 
extends these important arguments by engaging more directly with the constitutive 
function of narrative in general, recognising its indispensability in empirical studies of 
ageing, and acknowledging and responding to the challenges that narrativity can 
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present in the specific context of dementia research. I summarise each contribution in 
turn below. 
Ontological, epistemological and ethical functions of narrative 
In general terms, I establish the importance of narrative through the study’s 
articulation and exploration of its mediating role in configuring not only our 
understanding of human experience, but also in structuring existence itself. This 
extension is in itself significant, as perceived limitations of forms of knowledge that are 
dependent on narrative often concern the question of the relationship between human 
existence and narrative, between living and telling. Polarised distinctions are drawn 
between theorists who equate narrative with life (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985) and those who 
conceive of narrative primarily as a cognitive instrument for imposing meaningful 
order onto the disorder of human reality or experience (e.g. Mink, 1978; White, 1981). 
It is instructive to better understand the ontological assumptions underlying different 
approaches to narrative, as they provide ‘the crucial impetus for different 
epistemological and ethical perspectives in the debate on narrative and human 
existence’ (Meretoga, 2014: 89-90). Integral to this debate are tacit assumptions 
concerning what is counted as ‘real’ in general and the ontological status accorded to 
narrative interpretation of experience in particular.  
 
Ricoeur’s (1984, 1992) comprehensive narrative theorising, located in the 
phenomenological hermeneutic tradition, overcomes the impasse between the 
polarised views and disentangles the above ontological assumptions, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. In brief, starting with the narrative pre-figuration of everyday actions 
and practices, he depicts both human experience and narrative as phenomena 
constituted by interpretative activity, and interwoven with one another in a complex 
movement of dynamic reciprocal determination. His concept of triple mimesis sets out 
different levels of meaning-making and the ongoing intertwinement of personal, 
cultural and historical narratives. Ricoeur (1992) thus sees narrative as deeply rooted 
in life, but this does not mean that life should be equated with narrative. It is 
problematic to simply identify narrative and experience with each other as this 
undermines critical and ethical reflection on how cultural and historical narratives 
shape our (self-) understanding and regulate our being in the world. However, it is 
equally problematic to draw a sharp opposition between living and telling as this 
lowers the stakes and ‘loses sight of the complex existential significance of narrative’ 
(Meretoga, 2014:90-91).  
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Narrativity in later life  
Building on this general position, I advance additional arguments in support of 
narrative in the specific context of ageing into old age by engaging with temporality. In 
particular, I highlight that hermeneutics rejects the idea of reality as a series of point-
like experiences, not simply because experience is always culturally and historically 
mediated, but also on account of its fundamental temporality. Human existence is 
understood as a temporal process of interpretation which involves a constant 
intertwinement or comingling of the past, present, and future in the here-and-now 
(Ricoeur, 1984). Human’s wrestle with time and the time in question is not objective 
clock time, but human time. In Chapter Four, I summarise Ricoeur’s (1984) argument 
that narrative is the means by which we make sense of the temporal nature of our 
existence. Narratives not only convey what it is to live in the world, but also what it 
means to live in time(s).  
 
The meanings of time, time’s passing and time’s tenses shift as we age (Achenbaum, 
2001). Older people also have a lifetime of experience to draw upon, ‘biographically 
accrued capital’ (Mader, 1996:43). The notion of ‘lifetime’ underscores the temporal 
nature of human existence in the sense that it is finite, and narrative is the means by 
which we try to make meaning and find unity in our lives as a whole (Ricoeur, 1992). 
This imperative may be stimulated by the anticipation of an ending (Carstensen, 1992; 
Frankl, 1986; Randall, 2008). Narrative studies appear to be indispensable for 
empirical research on ageing, as evidenced by the development of the specialist field of 
narrative gerontology. This field privileges narrative due to its capacity to facilitate 
engagement with fundamental aspects of the experience of ageing. The study calls 
particular attention to identity development in later life, life review, the risk of 
narrative foreclosure, the possibility of connecting with broader temporal horizons 
through generativity and shifts in the relative importance of knowledge-related and 
emotion-related goals. These insights are of value alongside the cultural dimensions of 
narrativity, indicating that the experience of later life and the anticipation of its ending 
may be halting, disruptive or redemptive.  
Holding on to narrative in dementia research 
In this thesis, I consider the importance of narratives in the specific context of dementia 
research, first by emphasising that dementia is only one aspect of experience and it is 
important not to lose sight of the broader and longer narrative; in Jim’s words, ‘there’s 
more to me than this; people forget’.  I also develop arguments to establish the 
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continued place of narratives in this field by acknowledging and responding to the 
implications of the temporalising function of memory and the capacity to intend oneself 
into the future (Ricoeur, 2004). In developing the methodology for this study, I draw 
upon Ricoeur’s (2004) phenomenological distinction between abstract, effortful 
recollections and more spontaneously evoked memories to increase possibilities for 
participation. I also utilise the different levels of meaning-making set out in Ricoeur’s 
(1984) conceptualisation of triple mimesis to differentiate my own interpretative 
activity in the form of emplotment from the various events, happenings and associated 
meanings, as expressed and sense-checked by the participants. This approach respects, 
values and engages with their own situated meaning-making activities, without placing 
potentially unrealistic demands on participants to make connections between events or 
to remember what they discussed with me over a period of several months.  
 
The people taking part in this study were able to recall, evoke and articulate memories 
and imagined futures within the flow of actions, but I also allude to the capacity of 
Ricoeur’s theorising to sustain the narratives of people who can no longer do so and to 
embrace these narratives as vital forms of knowledge. Specifically, Ricoeur’s (1992) 
attention to the co-authored nature of all narratives and to shared memories, 
particularly through the phenomenon of growing older together (Ricoeur 2004) 
introduces important support to a range of mechanisms seeking to sustain the 
narrative agency and identity of people as the detrimental effects of dementia increase. 
In addition, Ricoeur’s (1984) concept of ‘refiguration’ lends philosophical moorings to 
the revelatory and transformative potential of the narratives of people with dementia, 
enriching Baldwin’s (2008) account of monastic reading. Together these contributions 
strengthen the case for narrative as an important form of evidence, generally, for older 
people and people living with dementia through all its ‘stages’. They enhance the 
concept of ‘narrative citizenship’ by making explicit the connections between narrative 
and the everyday practices of citizenship. 
Extending the Research Agenda  
The second aspect of the EXPECT framework argues for a broader vision and 
understanding of experiences of dementia that looks beyond the health and social care 
landscape where most research has been conducted. In so doing, the intention is not to 
detract from the importance of research that has the improvement of care quality as its 
goal, but rather to expand the research agenda to recognise people with dementia as 
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participants in ordinary social life and as equal citizens. I discuss the study’s response 
to this appeal, first through its purposeful framing of the research questions to ask how 
an ordinary life is accomplished by older people living with dementia, then 
summarising the insights gained through the study’s sustained attention to 
temporality. 
Extending the research agenda into the realm of the ordinary 
Through this study, I seek to contribute to the growing body of research dedicated to 
enabling older people with dementia to live positive lives as citizens. In conducting a 
review of the dementia literature, I was struck by persistent calls for ordinariness from 
older people judged to have crossed the ambiguous threshold of ‘ordinary forgetting’ 
(Lock, 2013). I was also struck by the force of the dementia label, becoming 
increasingly mindful of its pervasiveness as the review continued. In particular, I was 
alerted to the capacity of a biomedical diagnostic label not only to easily occlude the 
everyday lives and meanings of people so labelled, but also to shape research questions 
and influence the knowledge produced (Alsaker and Josephsson, 2011). The framing of 
identities within qualitative studies can either open up or close down possibilities for 
complex and radical self-representations (Fisher, 2012). Such observations resonate 
with Baldwin’s (2008:25) discussion of the constraining force of ‘stories in the wider 
world’, whereby some voices are capable of framing the questions and setting the 
agendas, restricting the stories that can be heard. By focusing on ‘older people living 
with dementia’ in this study, I recognise that, inevitably, I am part of the labelling 
process.  In view of this, I consider the careful framing of the research questions in a 
way that does not foreground dementia or presume difference a small but important 
step towards enhancing narrative citizenship.  
 
In progressing the study, I attempt to bracket dementia for as long as possible, in 
essence putting dementia on the back burner as I enter the field. I try to engage with 
each participant in the context of his or her whole life rather than through the filter of 
the diagnostic label. In so doing, my intention is not to wish away impairment, but 
rather to enable each person to determine the place that dementia, or memory loss, 
occupies within his or her unfolding narrative and identity. I find strong support for 
this approach in the mounting challenge to the growth of the biomedicalisation of 
ageing and memory loss for philosophical (Hughes, 2013), epidemiological (Brayne, 
2007), anthropological (Lock, 2013) and sociological (Beard, 2016) reasons.  Since 
commencing the study, I have been further encouraged by recent arguments to extend 
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considerations of citizenship-as-practice into ordinary life within citizenship studies in 
general (Neveu, 2015) and within dementia studies in particular (Bartlett, 2016).  
Extending the research agenda into the temporal realm 
The study’s engagement with temporality not only underscores the indispensability of 
narrative in studies of later life, but also illuminates the need to see the actions, events 
and people that comprise these narratives in time. As such, every event is perceived as 
happening not in some point-like instant, but rather through the dialectical thickening 
of a past and an implied future. Equally, people at any ‘point’ in time are in the process 
of becoming and they are historical beings retaining their previous experiences as part 
of themselves. This attention to the temporal nature of existence enables me to connect 
with shifting temporal horizons encountered in the field in response to the exigencies 
of different situations, to the spontaneous forging of connections between events 
separated by space and time, and to the unfolding nature of people’s narratives and 
lives.  Crucially, it adds an often overlooked third dimension to the people taking part in 
the study. 
 
Past experiences manifest in the present as embedded habits, not only as bodily 
movements and acquired personal and cultural dispositions, but also as patterns of 
thought. They are also partially available through recollections and spontaneously 
evoked memories. By connecting with the habitual and recollected past and imagined 
futures, I develop a deeper understanding as to why the things the participants strive to 
be and do are important. I become more aware of the depth, complexity and thickness 
of their lives.  I also observe that although things may get a little ‘fuzzy’ around ‘the 
pivotal present’, the participants’ temporal horizons are broad, in some cases extending 
beyond their own childhoods to draw upon ancestral memories and often a more 
generative future is envisaged. 
 
Additionally, sustained engagement over several months and thus through different 
seasons facilitates an understanding of the ongoing quality of everyday life. This 
includes attending to the ways in which disparate actions and events, enacted, 
recounted or imagined within time, and the in-between happenings that occur, are 
recalled or envisaged over time, are incorporated into the participants’ narratives. 
There is also the chance to discover whether possibilities for participation, contribution 
and growth considered are actualised, constrained, denied, or discounted in the 
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imagination. I learn that the diagnosis of a dementia sub-type need not constitute the 
major disruption in life that participants are striving to make meaningful.  
 
Following the EXPECT heuristic, I look more closely at the fruits of the Narrative 
Inquiry through a critical lens later in this chapter to ascertain what they add to the 
field of dementia research. First, I reflect upon the study design and conduct through a 
social citizenship lens, with particular emphasis on the possibility and actuality of 
participation, authenticity and mutual recognition.  
Enhancing (Narrative) Citizenship by Facilitating Participation in the Study  
Research that employs a social citizenship value lens demands new ways of conducting 
research with older people living with dementia that recognise their diversity, are 
attentive to power imbalances within relationships, facilitate meaningful participation 
and promote authentic human engagement (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010). In this 
section, I consider the process of doing Narrative Inquiry, drawing upon the 
participatory dimension of the EXPECT framework. I first recap briefly on the level and 
nature of participation facilitated by the methodology, as discussed in Chapter Five and 
then assess the success of the participatory principles that informed the initial study 
design and guided its ongoing conduct. 
Building in participatory principles from the start 
Participatory research demands that attention to power and participation ground the 
entire research process (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010:103). Within dementia studies 
generally, fostering genuine participation presents distinctive challenges; within the 
confines of this doctoral research study, participatory principles serve as a guiding but 
distant ideal. However, while recognising that participatory research is concerned with 
‘how’ research is carried out rather than which data generation methods are used, 
thinking carefully about data creation can help promote a sense of citizenship (p104).  
 
As detailed in Chapter Five, the study design aimed to ensure sufficient flexibility to 
respect the varied lifestyles, circumstances and distinctive attitudes to and ways of 
ageing for each person or couple taking part. I was keen to work responsively to 
participants’ understandings of and abilities to engage in everyday ‘activities’ and their 
willingness to involve me in these activities in different social contexts. At a minimum, I 
hoped to give the participants some degree of control over the research process by 
fitting in with their daily lives and preferences. I had to stipulate the maximum number 
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and duration of meetings with each participant or couple so that the likely demands on 
their time were clear before they consented to take part, but within these limits the 
participants were able to choose where and when to meet with me, what we did 
together, for how long and how often. All participants report that engaging in activities 
as part of the study is a source of enjoyment. 
Selecting methods to facilitate participation 
To my knowledge, narrative-in-action has not previously been used with older people 
with dementia. However, I drew encouragement from other research studies exploring 
‘what older people with dementia do as they are doing it’, typically through the use of 
methods combining participant observation with interviews or ‘in-situ conversations’ 
(e.g. Bamford and Bruce 2000; Boyle 2013; Phinney et al 2010; Ward and Campbell, 
2013). Through these studies I anticipated that shifting the emphasis from telling to 
showing or enacting will reduce verbal communication demands. All participants in the 
current study were able to articulate their thoughts and feelings verbally, although this 
became more difficult for Jim as the study progressed. Jim’s abilities to show and enact 
deteriorated in parallel with his speech and the anticipated benefits did not materialise. 
The previous studies also showed that engaging with situated activity increased 
opportunities for participation by reducing the need for recall and helping to 
foreground multi-sensory experiences. Emmel and Clark (2009) further observed that 
placing events and experiences in their spatial context helped participants to articulate 
their thoughts.  
 
Within this Narrative Inquiry, I am able to add to the above understandings by 
engaging with Ricoeur’s (2004) phenomenological sketch (italics in original) on 
memory. I find that in this study, rather than anchoring participants in the present, 
engaging with familiar surroundings and taking part in routine activities often 
prompted or even spontaneously evoked episodic autobiographical memories. The 
memory prompts varied from artefacts already purposefully distributed through Ann 
and John’s home and the echoes of midnight games of hide-and-seek from their garden, 
through Tommy’s retrieval of his mother’s death certificate and Hector’s digging out of 
travel memorabilia ahead of my visit. They include not unexpected encounters with 
Chrissie’s mother’s former headstone in her garden or the place on the golf course 
where Hector’s friend Archie dropped like a stone, and the less direct associations with 




Although not a central feature of this study, I am also able to observe the ways in which 
different types of memories (declarative and procedural) are variously recollected 
depending upon the prevailing circumstances, as illustrated by the following extract: 
 
  We leave the church café and go to catch the bus home. As we walk along the road, I 
remark that the numbers on the bus stop are hidden by the snow. Tommy tells me ‘It could be 
like that every day for all they mean to me now’.  (Grace told me before we set off that we can 
catch the 24 or 86A, adding ‘Tommy won’t remember’). I ask what he would do if I wasn’t with 
him and he retorts, ‘When were you last on a bus hen? They have drivers – you can ask’. I think 
fair enough, but when the 24 bus pulls up Tommy says ‘This’ll do us’ and goes to get on. I ask 
how he knows that it’s the right bus and he says ‘My you’re awf’y daft, it says up there’, 
pointing to and reading out the name of the bus destination. I decide to dispense with the daft 
questions. Once on board, we are chatting about the scenery and I comment on how nice the 
bus route is. Tommy agrees and tells me ‘It doesn’t matter which bus you get from the church 
back home, but if you’re going into the city you’re better to get the 24, because the 86A goes all 
round the houses’. [Field note, M1_01] 
 
This extract highlights the contrast from Tommy declaring in the abstract that he had 
no idea what number of bus we could catch home, suggesting he would just ask the 
driver once standing at the bus stop, stepping forward when the bus arrived because he 
recognised the destination name and finally seamlessly threading the numbers of the 
two buses that ran past his front door within the flow of a relaxed conversation. While 
Sabat (2001) has highlighted that people’s ability to recollect in artificial test situations 
can differ markedly from actual practice situations, the above example highlights 
variations within the situated practice of catching a bus, subject to levels of abstraction, 
temporal distance and the degree of relaxation. While I’m primarily interested in the 
implications for participation, this observation suggests possibilities for further study.  
Discovering participatory possibilities together 
When I enter the field, the participants play a significant part in shifting the shape of 
the research study. As described in Chapter Four, although attending to ‘context’ is 
always central to my research aims, I set out with an aspiration to locate the experience 
of living with dementia within a broader socio-political context. As I spend time with 
the participants, it soon became apparent that ‘context’ matters at two levels: the 
immediate contexts in and through which they enact their daily lives and the changing 
contexts that form the ‘backdrop’ of their biographies, framed by the guiding ideal of 
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the narrative unity of a life. This set me off on a journey down the long road that 
eventually brought me back to recognition (illustrated in Appendix XIV). The 
participants also sense check my research aims, for instance Chrissie decides to take 
part because she sees the value of the study, while others think carefully about the 
sorts of activities I should take part in with them to provide the best possible 
understanding of the challenges and joys of everyday life.  I also process a substantial 
ethical amendment as soon as I realise that some participants wish to take part as a 
couple and am forced to reflect on the assumptions underpinning this oversight.  
 
The participants are well aware of the evolving direction of the study. Just as I observe 
them, they observe me. They ask about my progress and provide helpful assessments. 
Ann and John’s intellectual interests prove particularly useful in this respect.  When 
John calls attention to the limitations of the ‘little yellow leaflet’ in conveying my 
evolving interests, an interesting discussion ensues. Ann is delighted by the change of 
direction, remarking that ‘It’s so much more interesting for us, and more useful I 
imagine’. As mathematicians, they found the rejection of objectivity and the idea that a 
change in focus was to be expected intriguing. Ann states ‘It’s all rather organic, and 
more honest I think’.  She does not simply participate in the discussions, but asks 
decidedly tricky questions, ‘What do you mean by activity?’ and invariably comes up 
with ‘the apposite word’. She also offers critical insights such as ‘an awful lot of things in 
life just happen, luck plays a part too’. In so doing, she drives a coach and horses through 
stereotypical representations of the ‘Alzheimer’s sufferer’ and hierarchical awareness 
level models.  
 
I conclude that while planning for participation is absolutely necessary, remaining 
open, alert and responsive to emergent opportunities is equally critical. While 
established ethical procedures do not necessarily lend themselves to the levels of 
responsiveness I desire, a degree of flexibility within the study design is tolerated by 
the Research Ethics Committee and when a strong rationale for change is put forward, I 
find it receives a favourable opinion.    
 
The methodological attention to meaning-making in action also extends participant 
involvement to the initial stages of the narrative analysis. Although the emplotted 
narratives presented in Chapter Eight are my interpretations, the constituent parts, the 
events, happenings and associated meanings are co-constructed with the participants. 
Chrissie is very clear that participation in the study offers an opportunity to resist 
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reification and pursues recognition by representing the complexities of her life and 
identity; ‘People need to know (the detail), it’s what’s made me who I am’. 
  
The study’s flexibility also gives rise to different possibilities for me, as a researcher, to 
co-participate in aspects of everyday life as lived. For instance, seeing the maze of 
lockers in the swimming pool changing room through Chrissie’s eyes proves 
particularly enlightening, and I am staggered when I realise just how many process 
steps are involved from leaving her house to entering the water to take part in an 
aquarobics class conducted with older people in mind. Equally, when I join Hector and 
his friends at the golf club I discover that he has a longstanding reputation for 
boastfulness, calling into question an interpretation of his recollected past 
achievements as compensatory mechanisms. This notion of co-participation highlights 
the mutual nature of the research, the importance of the mutual construction, ongoing 
negotiation and ultimately the ending of research relationships and the necessary 
interplay between participatory and ethical research principles and practices. I 
therefore look at the interconnections and potential tensions more closely.   
Engaging with Ethical Dilemmas on the Narrative Inquiry Landscape 
In Chapter Five, I considered the main ‘desk based’ ethical issues that I debated when 
designing the study.  A social citizenship value lens also demands a more far-reaching 
assessment of the ethical issues underpinning research in the area of dementia 
(Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010). I therefore reflect upon my experience of entering and 
exiting the unfolding stories of the participants with care, and the many ethical 
dilemmas, potential role conflicts and moments of emotional compassion experienced 
during those in-between days on the Narrative Inquiry landscape. I do so in some detail 
because this process of reflection forces me to see afresh the limits of rational planning 
and the value of ongoing reflexivity. It also adds an invaluable experiential layer to my 
understanding of everyday life with dementia and the meaning of intersubjective 
recognition. This understanding, together with the critical appraisal of the narrative 
findings that follows, has important implications for how we relate to older people 
whose lives are affected by dementia.  
 
I first engage in ‘care full’ deliberation (Barnes, 2012) about the research relationship 
by drawing on ethic of care principles, before setting out the ways in which the 
participants helped me to appreciate the research study as a mutual endeavour. I then 
discuss the various ethical issues encountered in the ‘small moments of doing’ (Stern, 
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2004) research and consider the concept of mutuality in the context of the sensitive 
management of ending the research relationship. I finally draw conclusions about the 
enactment of social citizenship values within research practices and the doing of 
(research) relationships. 
Engaging in ‘care full’ deliberation about the research relationship  
On entering the field, I am keen to conduct the study within relationships embodying 
principles of care ethics (Barnes, 2012; Tronto, 1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998). The ethic of 
care framework positions ‘care’ as both a form of practice and a set of sensitising moral 
principles that can guide conduct within diverse contexts and relationships, and I 
consider them a useful starting point in helping me to pay attention to, try to 
understand and respond carefully to the particularities of uniquely constructed 
research relationships, which I anticipate will change and deepen over time.  
 
Ward and Gahagan (2012) consider how an ethic of care framework, based on the 
interconnected principles of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness 
and trust, can be applied to develop participatory research practice. Specifically, trust is 
identified as a condition for and outcome of careful research practice, developed 
iteratively throughout the study rather than established once and for all at the outset. 
Attentiveness applies to all involved in the research, the political context, 
methodologies and types of and access to knowledge. This includes understanding 
participant motivations for contributing to research and sensitivity to their previous 
experiences. Importantly, the authors highlight that it encompasses attentiveness to 
temporal dimensions of relationship building, including an appreciation of former 
relationships and setting a new path forward for those involved. Responsibility entails 
thinking through who needs to be consulted and involved in all stages of the research 
and the ensuing practicalities. Competence addresses the question of aptitude to do the 
research, which in my case requires, at a minimum, an initial understanding and 
experience of relating to an older person with dementia. Finally, responsiveness 
involves recounting experiences of data collection and ongoing sense-checking to care 
for all participants. 
Worrying away at the edges  
This elaboration of the ethic of care principles is useful in supporting me to think 
through my responsibilities as a researcher, which seem rather daunting, and 
underscores the need to bring the perspective of all participants to the fore. I 
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understand recognition as prerequisite to empowerment. A sense of equality is also 
particularly important in Narrative Inquiry, together with the mutual construction of 
the research relationship (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).  I am mindful from the outset 
that the study is not simply a matter of involving the participants in a set of research 
activities, rather I am asking them to allow me to co-participate in the activities that 
constitute their everyday lives. Barnes’ (2012) elaboration of the principle of 
responsiveness to include detailed consideration of the place of reciprocity within 
relationships causes me to approach the question of power imbalance from both 
perspectives, and to acknowledge my own discomfort in asking so much of participants 
yet, beyond honouring this, being unable to offer much, if anything, by way of return.  
There are some reciprocal acts embedded within the doing of everyday activity, for 
instance, helping Hector with domestic tasks and sorting through his travel 
memorabilia or assisting Chrissie to put the cushions on her sofa, but they seem very 
small when set against the generous giving of the participants. Acknowledging this 
discomfort is one thing, but I am unsure how to address it. I find myself worrying away 
at the edges of these disparities. I am also uncertain what this aspirational ‘mutual 
construction’ of the research relationship should ‘look like’ and how to shrug off my 
deeply ingrained assumptions based on an economy of exchange. The participants 
show me the way. 
Coming to understand the study as a mutual endeavour 
As described in Chapter Six, each research relationship is qualitatively different, 
dependent in part on the sorts of activities enacted and the types of experiences shared 
together. For instance, Ann and John cause me to engage with couplehood and Chrissie 
alerts me to the notion of ‘corporeal generosity’ (Diprose, 2002) through her openness 
to others. However, it is Tommy who first alerts me to the parallel processes that are 
taking place within each of the research relationships, albeit in different ways, 
underscoring the mutual nature of the research endeavour. It is also my relationship 
with Tommy that casts a practical light on process consent issues, presents the greatest 
number of ethical dilemmas and boundary conflicts, and that I become most anxious 
about ending. It is therefore this particular relationship that I reflect upon in order to 
give a sufficiently in-depth account of the issues encountered. Drawing on my field 
notes and reflexive logs, I call attention to the assumptions that I make, and illustrate 
the sorts of difficulties that can arise while doing research of this nature, expressed in 
practice by relational, emotional and embodied persons.  
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Mutual construction of the research relationship 
“Good morning my sweet angel, aren’t you a sight for sore eyes. The way you described 
yourself on the phone I was expecting some old crone”. These are the first words that 
Tommy says to me when I arrive at his door for our introductory meeting.  As I step 
inside, he bends down to continue winding up the cable of the hoover he had been 
‘running around with’ in preparation for my visit. I realise that, much as I had set the 
expectation that I was a rather more ‘mature’ student, in case he anticipated someone 
much younger, Tommy had also engaged in manging my expectations, having told me 
on the phone that physically he was still quite fit for a man of his years. I am struck by 
the parallels. Also, just as I had wanted to strike the right note, arriving bang on time to 
demonstrate that I was a punctual, reliable woman, he too wanted to show me that he 
was not only a fit man, but a responsible and modern man to boot, unashamedly 
contributing to domestic life.   
The similarities do not end there. I had thought very carefully about what to wear, 
appreciating that participants often adjust their responses depending on the 
researcher’s clothing and appearance (Mishler, 1996). I did not want to appear too 
formal, stuffy or overly professional, but also didn’t want to look too casual or, heaven 
forbid, like mutton dressed as lamb.  I smile when Grace reveals that Tommy had 
decided to wear his ‘new Christmas jumper and good cords’.  
There are further equivalences.  I am attentive to Tommy and Grace’s motives for 
contacting me and agreeing to take part in the study, and they are attentive to mine. 
They assume responsibility to meet my needs as a researcher and do so competently, 
coming up with the mix of mundane and more special activities exactly as set out in ‘the 
wee yellow leaflet’. As I spend time preparing for each visit, Tommy, with Grace’s help, 
is busy digging out materials he thinks might be useful to me, such as the birth 
certificate confirming his illegitimacy, his mother’s death certificate dated two years 
later and a handful of photographs testifying to the poverty of his youth.  
Responsiveness is also a two-way affair, and my transcripts and field notes reveal that 
we constantly check things out with each other – How is this going for you? Are you still 
happy to be involved? I’m glad it’s useful to you hen, but what are your professors saying 
about it? Are ‘we’ doing alright? 
Synergies are not confined to the conduct of the research, but are evident in the mutual 
construction of our relationship more broadly. I try throughout to tune into Tommy’s 
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mood, purposefully avoiding probing for details of various mishaps and things he’d 
‘gotten wrong again’ whenever I sense that he doesn’t want to dwell on them. This 
tuning in is also reciprocal. We take turns. On one occasion when I have been burning 
the midnight oil, battling with philosophical texts, Tommy tells me ‘You’re looking awf’y 
tired hen’. He then asks ‘Is it this study, or is there something else’? When I reply that I 
have probably bitten off more than I can chew with some of my reading material, he 
advises, ‘We can only do our best’, underscoring that the study is a joint endeavour, 
reminding me gently that I need to conserve my energy levels for the field work, and 
restoring a much-needed sense of perspective.  
Another day, while we are on our way to visit the chapel, I note that Tommy seems very 
subdued after telling me that Grace is becoming ‘his minder’. I am aware that I am 
trying, and having some success, in cheering him up and conclude that, ethically, this is 
acceptable. Once inside, at one point I step back to look up at a carving of the seven 
deadly sins. There is a steep stairwell leading to the crypt just a few feet behind me. 
Tommy warns me ‘mind you dinnae step too far back, or you’ll be down that stair’ and I 
thank him, adding ‘looks like you’re my minder today’.  I had actually forgotten about the 
stairs and although I am a safe distance from them, I’m touched that Tommy is looking 
out for me. Glancing up at the carving he jibes ‘pride comes before a fall’ and we laugh, 
equally delighted by his quick-witted remark. 
Ethical issues encountered in the small moments of doing 
I experience many ethical dilemmas over the course of the study. While some are 
addressed at least in part through anticipatory planning before entering the field or 
ahead of a given meeting, most issues are thrown up in the midst of doing the research 
and require more spontaneous responses. The main issues take the form of 
determining how to adhere to research protocols without compromising authentic 
engagement, enacting responsibility and deciding whether to observe or intervene in 
the flow of action. They also include the development of intense relationships and the 
implications for blurring the boundaries between care and protection, altering the 
future course of events, managing boundaries and role conflicts and attending to the 
emotional self. I consider each in turn. 
Adhering to protocols, engaging authentically 
As Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) highlight, much of the discussion about the ethical 
conduct of dementia research has been concerned with informed consent issues, 
although even within this sphere further work is required to ensure a sufficiently 
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sophisticated approach capable of facilitating citizenship and providing the necessary 
protection. The importance of process consent (Dewing, 2002) within dementia studies 
is now widely recognised, but in practice I experience uncertainty as to how to 
implement this appropriately for each person without appearing patronising. I worry 
about how to strike the right balance, only to discover that Tommy will point out if I am 
rather laying things on with a trowel. For instance, when I ask somewhat clumsily at 
the start of one of our meetings, ‘So Tommy, before we set off, can I just check that you 
are still happy to be involved the study’, he cuts me off stating ‘Well I wouldnae be here if 
I wasnae’. Good point, but I am aware of various mix-ups in Tommy’s day to day life and 
the potential for misunderstanding is real. I realise that I need to find a means of 
checking things out within the natural flow of conversation. Tommy refers to my audio 
recorder as my ‘wee James Bond gadget’ and taking his lead, together we find more 
informal ways of ensuring that he understands that I will be recording and reporting on 
specific conversations and observations, often by bringing ‘James Bond’ into the mix.    
Determining whether to observe or intervene in the flow of actions 
The narrative-in-action methodology stresses that, as a researcher, I must try to enter 
the person’s way of living, talking, and acting in an open-minded fashion, and at the 
same time must carefully consider each response to avoid bringing in topics from 
outside the actual ongoing activity (Alsaker et al, 2009). There is therefore a tentative 
quality in these situated communications at times, in that I am aware that the emergent 
storylines could develop in another way if I respond differently. While mostly I am able 
to refrain from introducing topics of interest to me, the same does not hold for the 
requirement to alternate between actively refraining from intervention and being 
passively led through the stream of actions (Lawlor and Mattingly, 2001). On several 
occasions, I am uncertain whether to observe this stream of actions or intervene. 
 
For instance, on one of our outings, just as Tommy is ordering his ‘soup and roll combo’, 
a small sign stating ‘no card transactions under £5’ catches my eye. The combo costs 
£4.20. Before my first outing with Tommy, Grace was insistent that Tommy pay his own 
way for everything, mindful of my student status. I agreed, also thinking, very much as a 
researcher, that it would be useful to see how Tommy manages different payment 
transactions and the associated interactions. As a result, I know that Tommy can no 
longer manage cash transactions and does not carry cash, but can use his bank card and 
remembers his pin number. I find myself asking Tommy if he is going to order a coffee 
too, but he replies ‘just the soup hen’. I then frantically start trying to ‘fix things’ in my 
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head, something I have spent the latter part of my working life encouraging others not 
to do! Activity switches from execution to narrative rehearsal (Ricoeur, 1984) in my 
imagination.  
I run through different options. Should I offer to pay on this one occasion? Should I 
suggest Tommy pays for both lunches and later give Grace the cash for mine? Or should 
I do what the methodology advocates and ‘follow the flow’. Should, should, should, I am 
not supposed to intervene in the course of action, but does this amount to standing back 
and watching Tommy walk into difficulty and perhaps looking ‘foolish’? In the moment, 
I am unsure whether to observe or intervene. I find myself juggling these different 
requirements. Through my indecision, I observe by default.   
When Tommy comes to pay, sure enough the woman at the till points to the notice and 
apologises for being unable to accept a card payment. Tommy seems nonplussed. He 
looks back at the various items on display, indicates he’ll take a piece of the 
millionaire’s shortbread, picks up a handful of napkins, turns to me and says ‘I’ll take 
that back and split it with Grace’. Sorted! I am taken aback by my lack of faith in 
Tommy’s ability to handle the situation and by the strength of my desire to jump in and 
rescue him. On reflection, I realise that I did not do what I would usually do outside of 
the research field, namely point out the sign to him and ask what he wanted to do. In 
my bid to be a ‘good’ researcher, I drop the authenticity ball. My indecisiveness 
however is in part the result of a deepening knowledge of Tommy’s situation, the 
developing intensity of our relationship and a growing desire to protect him.   
Developing intense relationships, blurring the boundaries between care and protection 
Consistent with previous research with people with dementia (Clarke and Keady, 2002) 
on the whole I find prolonged engagement conducive to establishing a productive and 
ethical research relationship. However, the extended period of engagement also raises 
some issues, particularly as relationships deepen. As with the hermeneutic circle, 
knowing more of Tommy’s whole story enriches my understanding of the parts, and 
knowing the detail of the parts adds to my understanding of the whole. As the study 
progresses I make connections between Tommy’s accounts of ‘being put in with useless 
lot at school’ and his fresh concerns about ‘looking like an old fool’. My heightened 
awareness of the depth of his anxieties brings with it an intensity in my own emotions; 
I become anxious for him.  My instinct (as a woman) to protect Tommy from situations 
where he might end up looking ‘foolish’, at least in his eyes, at times conflicts with the 
imperative (as a researcher) not to intervene. In practice, I find the distinction between 
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‘care’ (particularly responding to another’s need for emotional security) and 
‘protection’ (especially acting with the intention of preventing another from emotional 
harm) a bit blurry. Alongside concerns as to whether to act or observe the flow of 
action, there are times when I am unsure how to respond where I appreciate that this 
could potentially influence the future course of events. 
 
Developing intense relationships without altering the future course of events 
Lawlor and Mattingly (2001) highlight the struggle inherent in simultaneously 
developing intense relationships as part of the research commitment and minimising 
the intrusion on and alteration of the everyday life experiences of interest. I experience 
these struggles on several occasions. For example, as we work our way through a 
numerical key on a visitor’s map, Tommy is prompted to tell me about something that 
happened at the men’s group that he attends. I struggle to follow his account, but gather 
that he became very anxious when asked to remember the number 14, I think as part of 
a group exercise, but later felt more confident when he managed to blurt out ‘14’ at the 
appropriate time. When he concludes, he looks rather pleased with himself. I don’t 
know what the exercise entailed, but in that moment, I reckon that this doesn’t matter 
and the key things to focus on are Tommy’s emotions – ‘getting hot under the collar’ 
and then feeling ‘more confident’. I don’t want to undermine his sense of satisfaction by 
letting him know that I haven’t understood what he’s pleased about. I tell him ‘That was 
great Tommy, you know, that you managed to do that, but when you say you were getting 
hot under the collar, what were you worried about’? Tommy tells me, as if stating the 
obvious, ‘looking stupid’, There it is again –this fear of his. I go on to say, ‘so, 
remembering your number, that made you feel more confident that….?’ and Tommy 
replies ‘I can keep going back’. So, there we have it.  
How should a researcher respond in a situation like this? I find myself saying ‘I know 
how much you enjoy the group and from some of the laughs you’ve told me about, I bet the 
other men really enjoy your company too – whether you remember the number 14 or not’.  
As soon as I say these words, I realise I could be in danger of crossing a line because ‘I’ 
am invested in Tommy and don’t want him to stop going to a club that he enjoys and 
perhaps holds deeper meanings for him. So far, he’s coming up with his own solutions. 
So far. What’s the ‘right’ thing to do? I could point out all the things that he can do. Or 
that Steve, the organiser, sounds nice and might be willing to help him out. I’m not sure 
what’s appropriate, so I decide to pull back and just leave him with the seed of thought 
that his company is enjoyable and not dependent on his memory.  
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I revisit Ward and Gahagan’s (2012) application of the ethic of care principles, notably 
attentiveness to the temporal dimensions of relationships and setting a new path 
forward. Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) also argue that research participation can 
provide a site where people find support for identities, meanings and self-worth. While 
mindful that this is a Narrative Inquiry and not an intervention study, I conclude that it 
is ethical, and consistent with the empowering ethos of participatory research to call 
attention to a research participant’s capabilities. Nevertheless, I worry about potential 
role conflicts.  
Developing intense relationships, managing boundaries and role conflicts 
It is expected that researchers negotiate multiple roles, such as data collector and 
empathetic listener (Lavis, 2010). Ethical dilemmas about possible role conflicts 
concern what constitutes an appropriate distance between participant and inquirer. As 
Lawlor and Mattingly (2001) emphasise, developing intense relationships is an 
important part of the research commitment in studies of this type. I come to see that 
my relationship with Tommy is, in itself, increasing my understanding of everyday life 
with dementia. It is an invaluable research instrument.  For instance, on one occasion I 
am standing at the bus stop waiting for Tommy, watching the ‘bus due’ clock count 
down. When the bus turns the corner, I can see that Tommy is at the front of the queue 
of people waiting to get off, smiling and joking with the driver in his own inimitable 
way. I find myself smiling too and realise that I am genuinely pleased to see him. I 
salute when he sees me as he steps off the bus. He walks towards me and grabs the fur 
of my jacket collar, saying ‘Are you still not feeding that cat’. I laugh, struck and also 
delighted that he has remembered my coat and his previous joke about it. I realise in 
that moment how much we value such social niceties and how difficult it must be for 
someone to build new relationships when the ability to lay down fresh memories is 
impaired. Yet my genuine pleasure in seeing Tommy also raises the important question 
of boundary management.   
 
I am mindful that I have entered Tommy’s life as a social researcher and not as a 
befriender. I understand that developing and maintaining healthy boundaries around 
researcher roles is critical for conducting research in this field, given the potential for 
role confusion that may result when involving people with dementia (Nygård, 2006). 
Consistent with understandings of research relationships as mutually constructed, 
Brinkmann (2007) stresses that boundary confusion is a bidirectional process whereby 
misunderstandings from either the researchers or participants can result in 
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inappropriate roles. I wonder if our boundaries are unhealthy, if the roles being 
enacted are inappropriate. Kvale (1996) in particular warns about the dangers of 
researchers masquerading as friends, thereby masking the power exertion in so-called 
caring consensual dialogues, but I don’t feel my relationship with Tommy is a 
masquerade. Perhaps I have misunderstood. 
 
Developing intense relationships, attending to the emotional self 
I start to wonder if I have come to care too much. For example, I am deeply moved 
when Tommy tells me about Grace sitting in tears watching the dementia storyline 
unfold on Emmerdale and not knowing what to say to her. And I am shaken by news of 
his (as it transpires futile) plans to recover the ability to write his signature when he 
discovers that this form of identity expression has been lost. I recognise the limits of my 
competence; I am a researcher, not a therapist. I have become the repository for his 
emotions and feelings and I know that it falls me to hear and hold his stories. I 
acknowledge the enormity of the issues that Tommy is wrestling with and ask if he 
would find it helpful to speak with someone skilled in providing emotional support, but 
he tells me no, there’s no point worrying about something you can’t change and that he 
just takes things ‘one day at a time’. Later, when he goes to buy his book and engages in 
banter with the man at the cash desk, oblivious that he is creating a queue, I find myself 
welling up. I simply can’t bear the thought of Tommy’s jocular disposition getting lost 
along with his signature. I fear that I have become too involved, I have been negligent 
and allowed the boundaries to evaporate, like Mr Costello’s disappearing ink.  
At this point I find it helpful to read a special issue of Qualitative Inquiry: Exploring 
Narrative Inquiry Practices (2007, 13 (4)) comprising four articles in which narrative 
inquirers (Connolly and Reilly, Campesino, Downe and Mahoney) question whether 
they have acted appropriately given their degree of emotional investment and the 
intimate nature of the relationships established with their participants. Specifically, the 
authors are ‘haunted’ by notions of clinical distance and objectivity, as mandated by the 
quantitative paradigm (Connolly, 2007:453). Cognitively, they understand the 
differences between the two research paradigms, but still wonder if their feelings are 
legitimate and appropriate, even within the qualitative paradigm. The authors conclude 
that in research where knowledge is co-created and stories are co-authored, a 
stretching of roles is necessary. I recognise that dementia brings added complexity into 
the mix, but complexity does not equal rigidity and it does not eradicate the importance 
of attending to the emotional self of either participant or researcher. 
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Mutuality and the management of endings 
Given my emotional investment in Tommy, it is perhaps unsurprising that I experience 
difficulty when this research relationship comes to an end. The management of endings 
is an issue that the Research Ethics Committee rightly grilled me on. I managed to 
address all concerns satisfactorily and indeed, drawing on my past experiences, was 
confident that I could manage endings sensitively. I knew from the outset that entering 
a relationship such as this requires some planning about how to end it (Lawlor and 
Mattingly, 2001). I also found ways to revisit the maximum length of involvement in the 
study repeatedly through the ongoing practice of process consent. Plus, I created a visit 
record sheet (Appendix XV) to offset the risk of misunderstanding, a bold visual 
reminder with its big, unambiguous finish line. What was I thinking? In practice, it isn’t 
quite so straightforward. Below I consider the events running up to my wrap-up 
meeting with Tommy and Grace, and the way in which this meeting actually unfolds, 
before drawing conclusions through a social citizenship lens. 
The end of the line?  
When I meet with Tommy for the last time before our wrap-up meeting he asks me ‘So 
have I filled up another few pages of that book of yours?’ I say, ‘You most certainly have’ 
and thank him. He then says ‘there’s plenty more flower’. I recognise this as a natural 
opportunity to once again revisit the study terms. When I then ask if he’s willing to 
meet with me one last time to go through it all, and to thank him and Grace, Tommy 
replies that he’s ‘happy to keep meeting for as long as it’s useful to me’ and adds ‘you best 
speak to the secretary’. I confirm that I will. He then says, not for the first time, ‘It’s fair 
given me a boost, I’m right glad I’ve met you, I tell you. Right glad.’ 
There has been such a marked shift in Tommy lately. He is talking to me, opening up 
about his feelings and his fears. He seems keen to continue and I am captivated by his 
story. I wonder if we might extend Tommy’s involvement in the study and take this 
issue to supervision, trying to drop the idea in casually. My supervisors are of course 
wise to me and when they ask about my rationale I realise that it is half-baked at best. 
My argument that there are important changes afoot in Tommy’s life is swiftly 
countered. I know deep down that life goes on, there will always be changes afoot and 
Tommy’s story will continue to unfold beyond the study. I recognise this same 
unfolding is happening with the other participants, who I also care deeply about, yet I 
am not facing the same dilemma. What’s different about Tommy? I am not sure. I am 
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encouraged to have a conversation with a researcher who experienced something 
similar during her doctoral research study. 
In the interim, I think hard about the situation. I am acutely aware of Tommy’s lifelong 
need to make himself useful and frequent references to being ‘put in with the useless 
lot’. I have witnessed first-hand his delight on being described as ‘a student’, and heard 
him chuckle when telling me about the lady at his church discovering that he really was 
doing some work with the University. Participating in the study means a lot to him, has 
in itself become a valued activity. Is the issue simply that I don’t want Tommy to think 
that he is no longer useful? That’s certainly part of it, but this is something that I am 
confident that I can handle sensitively. I recognise that it isn’t simply a case that there 
are changes afoot in Tommy’s life, I think participating in the research may have 
triggered a change in Tommy and I feel a sense of responsibility. Although I understand 
that this is something that needs to be appropriately managed, when I then think about 
the rationale for extending Tommy’s involvement in the study from a purely academic 
perspective I conclude that there isn’t one. Yet I am still keen to speak to the other 
researcher, hoping I might have missed something. 
When I speak with the researcher, she listens carefully to me and I find it helpful to say 
things out loud. I discover that she had experienced something remarkably similar, 
with one of her participants beginning to talk about Alzheimer’s towards the end of the 
study period, a word this participant had never used until that point. The researcher 
had reached the same conclusion, namely that this development must be addressed 
sensitively, but ethically did not constitute grounds to extend the period of involvement 
in the study. I take comfort knowing that I am not the only person to have wrestled 
with such issues and that the change I’ve noticed in Tommy is by no means exceptional, 
and arguably represents a positive development.  
I telephone Grace, as is customary, to make the arrangements for the wrap-up meeting.  
Tommy has previously told me about a trip he’d made with his men’s group to an 
underground cove in the nearest city. I’d expressed interest in it and Grace informs me 
that Tommy is keen to go there with me immediately ahead of the wrap-up meeting. It 
involves wearing a hard hat and scurrying about underground with torches, so it is not 
an activity that Grace has any appetite for, but she is very supportive of Tommy’s idea. 
We arrange for Tommy and me to do this together and then meet up with Grace in a 
nearby café to enable me to thank them both and to reflect on the research. I am keen 
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for both Tommy and Grace to be present to avoid any ambiguity, and to make sure they 
are aware of sources of support should Tommy wish to talk more about his developing 
feelings. I am also keen to ascertain if both Grace and Tommy will be happy for me to 
keep in contact with them. 
 
It takes two 
When we meet up, it transpires that Grace has arranged for a private tour. I am still a 
bit apprehensive about wrapping things up in case Tommy is disappointed, but soon 
find that Tommy is actively managing the ending. Previously he has found all manner of 
ways of accounting for my presence; I have been introduced as a younger model that 
he’s traded the wife in for, a lassie helping him out with a photography project, and 
perhaps most improbably, his wee sister. On this final meeting, he informs the girl 
hosting the tour that he has Alzheimer’s and that he has been helping me out with some 
research, adding ‘but that’s coming to an end now and we’ve, well I’m hope I’m not being 
too familiar here, but I like to think we’ve become friends’. I’m overwhelmed by his 
openness and courage, grasping the significance of this introduction instantly and reply 
that I like to think so too.  
 
As we make our way into the darkness, I begin to question the wisdom of this choice of 
venue, experiencing ‘felt’ difficulty. The ground is uneven and we can only see as far as 
ahead as our torches allow. I am afraid that Tommy might fall. I spontaneously recall 
the helpers at Jim’s stroke club, the memory serving pragmatic and semantic functions, 
acting as my guide (Ricoeur, 2004).  Tommy, having been here before, seems more 
certain of the terrain and is delighting in the experience, one step ahead of me.  
I relax a little and begin to enjoy hearing about the history of the place. When the guide 
tells us a story about people being thrown down a well and left to drown on account of 
their left-handedness, Tommy nods knowingly at me, saying ‘that’d be me and you, if not 
for those nuns’. I am aware that Tommy is left-handed, but am astonished that he has 
remembered me telling him that I too was left-handed as a child, but was forced to 
switch to my right hand at school. His memory is failing, laying down fresh memories is 
tricky and yet he has found space for this seemingly insignificant detail of my life, a 
detail I revealed to him some six months previously and that only a handful of people 
know. Standing there in our hard hats, torches in hand, my thoughts are flooded with 
an image of Merleau-Ponty’s well. Our torch lights may only have penetrated so far into 
the darkness beneath, but we have looked at the reflections together, both struck by the 
233 
 
persistence and energy of traces from those formative years, jostling their way to the 
front and breaking the surface, despite having the greatest distance to travel. I think 
this may be a moment of mutual recognition. With another layer added to my 
understanding, I conclude that Tommy’s choice of venue is wiser than I’d first thought.  
Tommy chats to the tour guide, on several occasions getting lost in his remembrances, 
turning to me and saying ‘You know my history’, ‘you know my story’. He expects me and 
trusts me to fill in the blanks, which I am able and happy to do. In so doing, he signals 
that his involvement in the study is over, our relationship has already changed. Once 
again, he is one step ahead of me. I am forced to admit that, despite my best intentions, I 
have seriously underestimated Tommy.  
When we meet up with Grace later, she is quick to tell me that there have been positive 
changes in Tommy of late, and she thinks taking part in the study has been beneficial 
for both of them. Tommy agrees. Grace takes the initiative and tells me that she hopes 
that I will keep in touch and will always be very welcome to come and see them. I 
realise that the mutual construction of the research relationship continues until its 
conclusion. As Clandinin and Connelly (2000) suggest, whatever distance happens to be 
at work within the Narrative Inquiry is co-constructed by the participants and the 
inquirer. Far from being a passive research subject, at several points in the study, and 
certainly the most critical points, it is Tommy, with Grace’s gentle guidance, who takes 
the lead.  
Social citizenship, ethical participation and reciprocal recognition 
Spending time on the Narrative Inquiry landscape puts me in contact with issues that 
arise in the moment. I see the limitations of rational planning, which tries to erode the 
vulnerable, emotional self. Holding on to the ideals of equality and mutuality, yet not 
wishing away cognitive impairment and enacting my responsibilities as a researcher is 
challenging at times. Behar (1996:6) suggests that all too often researchers and 
observers rely on methods to ‘drain anxiety from situations in which we feel . . . 
helpless to release another from suffering, or at a loss as to whether to act or observe’. 
Methods cannot drain the anxiety from some of the situations I encounter. I begin to 
appreciate the necessity of ongoing reflexivity as I live the tensions so familiar to care 
workers and family members who inhabit the contested territories of everyday life 




The experience of being in relationships, of doing relationships, adds an invaluable 
layer to my understanding.  In the midst of doing, I experience uncertainty and feel 
compelled to act in different ways. I care deeply and understand the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of my feelings. I see that things can be very messy indeed, resolved by 
‘muddling through’ in a particular context (Barnes and Brannelly, 2008:385). Most 
tellingly, I find myself worrying about decisions that are not mine alone to make.  At a 
minimum, doing relationship takes two. Turn taking is permissible and it’s okay for the 
other person to lead the way. I come to see, to actually experience that we achieve best 
ends through the suspension of assumptions and through narrative and other 
communicative approaches grounded in deep knowledge of the particular, rather than 
an over-reliance on principles (Holstein et al, 2010).  
Applying a Critical Lens 
Having reflected upon the participatory and ethical dimensions of conducting the study, 
I now look at the fruits of the Narrative Inquiry through a critical lens.  This dimension 
of the EXPECT framework returns to the rationale for broadening the dementia debate, 
discussed in Chapter Three. It underscores the need for studies which challenge the 
assumed homogeneity of people living with dementia and consider the influence of 
multiple sources of privilege and disadvantage on their everyday experiences, address 
the societal attitudes and barriers that people face and reflect the ways in which people 
living with dementia are participating in and contributing to society (Bartlett and 
O’Connor, 2010:7). I review the study’s response to these needs below.  
Recognising diversity and the complexity of identity  
Hulko (2004; 2009) has highlighted the dominance of more articulate and multiply 
privileged voices within dementia research. At the outset of this study, I sought to 
involve people with diverse social locations and characteristics and this aspiration was 
thoughtfully supported by the GP acting as Participant Identification Centre. However, 
once I got to know the participants as people, categories fragmented (Clandinin and 
Connelly, 2000:141). In conducting the research, I respond to the need to recognise 
diversity in a distinctive way. 
 
Fisher (2012) also expresses concerns about the limitations of defining a person 
according to membership of a single group, such as ‘a person with dementia’, as this 
denies the complexity of human identity. She warns of the danger of constructing the 
identities of socially marginalised people as necessarily embedded in forms of 
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suffering, adding that qualitative studies should seek to reveal rather than erase the 
complexities of identity and recognise that social suffering may prompt radical forms of 
resistance. Following her arguments, I recognised the potential of the study to address 
forms of suffering caused when a person is objectified according to categorisations that 
are imposed externally (what they are) and to enable them to articulate alternative and 
more complex self-representations (who they are) (Fisher, 2012). 
 
The people who took part in the study are of a similar age (ranging from 78-85 years) 
and thus all members of that ‘last great generation’ who spent their formative years 
living through World War II. Each participant is white. They all live within a two-mile 
radius in the same small Scottish town. Each participant has lived in his or her 
respective family home for over 35 years and can thus be said to be ageing in place. 
They are all well supported. Yet their biographies, current physical capabilities and life 
circumstances, attitudes to ageing, reactions to the diagnosis of AD or related dementia 
and ways of living with it are very different. Often such differences get lost behind the 
dementia label or overly attributed to social locations. Rather than representing storied 
lives as exemplars of formal categories, Narrative Inquiry enables the nuances and 
complexities of different experiences to be preserved (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).  
 
The resultant narratives are configured in ways that reflect the part that ‘dementia’ 
does or does not play in each person or couple’s life and preserve other differences. The 
resources the participants call upon in making meaning of and living everyday life are 
diverse, with influences scattered throughout the life course, notably the incidence of 
previous disruptive life events. The structural forces of class (in terms of education and 
economic status) and gender cannot be ignored. Factors encompass more specific 
educational opportunities and choices, plus employment decisions made or enforced. 
Other influences include the presence or absence of strong parental or gendered role 
models, whether traditional male: female roles have been enacted within the family and 
the extent to which gendered assumptions are valued or resisted. The differences are 
manifest in the dynamic and dialogic configuration of complex identities. 
 
Alongside differences in physical health and attitudes to ageing generally, there are 
important biographical differences. Couple-specific ways of relating differed and 
Chrissie did not have a long-term partner. The number of children, grandchildren and 
the existence of great-grandchildren shape occupational possibilities and necessities, 
but family relationships, dynamics, closeness of family in the sense of geographical 
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proximity and the competing commitments of family members have greater bearing. 
Loss or survival of peers, and loss or survival of friendships are significant, as are 
relationships with neighbours and community connections. Sustaining sporting and 
leisurely pursuits engaged in over the life course, learning or continuing to drive, 
buying a house near a bus route and making regular use of public transport all play a 
part in facilitating ongoing participation in and contribution to everyday life. 
Societal barriers 
A social citizenship value lens also looks beyond the individual and forms of capital to 
consider societal attitudes and barriers. The narratives call attention to ways in which 
the pace, intellectual and technological demands, capitalist priorities, ageist biases, 
environmental designs and reductive practices of twenty-first century life make things 
more difficult than they need to be. The fear associated with dementia was 
acknowledged by Tommy and the term dementia itself was problematic for Hector, but 
it would be too simplistic to attribute this fear solely to cultural representations. 
Despite the push for earlier diagnosis, there is a tendency to conflate AD with the end 
stage and most participants had direct experiences of people with advanced dementia. 
Hector in particular found this distressing, although perhaps less traumatic than 
witnessing the sudden death of his closest friend.  Chrissie’s brother had AD and was 
‘really bad at the end’, but she explicitly positions this as preferable to sudden death. 
Chrissie is also the only participant who explicitly refers to the attitudes and responses 
of other people, as illustrated by the woman at the leisure centre who treated her as 
though she was ‘not the full shilling’.   
Recognising contribution and attending to misrecognition 
A citizenship approach needs to be based on reciprocity so that the focus is not just on 
the resources required by someone, but also includes consideration of someone’s 
strengths and assets (Marshall and Tibbs, 2006) and promotes participation and 
contribution (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010). The narratives presented in this study 
illustrate what older people living with dementia can be and do. They assume 
responsibilities in line with many and varied life priorities and retained capabilities.  
There are diverse ways of practising citizenship, and those that foreground 
individualist assumptions are hard to sustain. However, many practices are relational, 
creative and generative. This depiction in itself counters cultural representations that 




The narratives also articulate how meanings are made in different situations and depict 
other diverse implicit or purposeful ways of resisting negative cultural narratives, 
including the barely discernible resistances found in the ordinary doings of ordinary 
people in the mundane places of daily sociability (Neveu, 2015) and in the private 
sphere (Fisher, 2008). The narratives affirm that people do not have to integrate a 
diagnosis into their identity to accomplish an ordinary, everyday life or to maintain the 
aim of living a good life, and partners do not have to respond to a diagnosis in the same 
way to live ‘well’. The narratives lend support to my argument that different ways of 
responding to and living with dementia require equal consideration and the suspension 
of assumptions.  
 
The study also calls attention to the importance of ‘recognition’ within inclusive and 
relational understandings of citizenship-as-practice. It illustrates that the quest of older 
people living with dementia to construct positive understandings of the value of their 
lives can be impeded not only by forms of misrecognition which position them as 
inferior (less competent and therefore not equal) and vulnerable to patterns of 
disrespect, but also those which fail to recognise their particularities and contributions 
and thus undermine their self-esteem. One particular form of misrecognition is the 
cognitive testing process. Specifically, it is not simply the ascription of the impaired 
label that proves problematic, but rather the process itself that participants find 
reductive and demeaning.  
 
The study also considered how practices of everyday life are enacted in local cultures, 
which have their own history, rules and constitutions, making evaluation possible. 
People with memory loss are aware of these evaluations, positive or negative. The rules 
and expectations of different practices and cultures can be more or less accommodating 
and can open up or close down possibilities for being themselves, rather than defined 
by their age or diagnosis. The narratives offer examples of how the participants 
variously communicated their uncertainty regarding being able to continue to 
participate in and contribute to ordinary social life in ways that they found meaningful, 
and that were also socially valued. This uncertainty pertained to both processes of 
bodily ageing and concerns about being good enough citizens. As such, the narratives 
represent ongoing struggles for recognition. They add to the ‘nascent field of academic 
narratives of resistance’ (Beard, 2016:232).   
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Translating the Research into Practice 
Having reviewed the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of the 
study, the final dimension of the EXPECT framework concerns the translation of the 
research outputs into practice. In so doing, I contextualise the narrative outputs within 
the key insights distilled from the review of the literature in Chapters Two and Three to 
consider the potential societal implications.  
Unlike other forms of qualitative research where transferability of ‘thematic findings’ to 
other contexts is a key consideration, the value of narratives depends on their capacity 
to provide the reader with insight and understanding about the human condition. This 
is an important response to the urgent need to bring humanity back into considerations 
of ageing and dementia, as highlighted in Chapter Two. It relates directly to Ricoeur’s 
(1984) concept of ‘refiguration’ and the potential for revelation of what has previously 
remained unseen and unheard in the realm of the ordinary and for transformation, 
through an invitation to act differently.  
 
The narratives recognise chance and vulnerability as inherent structures in our lives 
and preserve the blend of love and loss, joy and sadness, acting and suffering that 
characterise all human lives. As a set, they represent struggles for and the attainment of 
recognition and offer an account of the ‘ordinary doing’ of everyday life with dementia 
that is hopeful without being naïve. The narratives may be of value to different 
audiences, including people with dementia and their families, GPs, care professionals, 
students and dementia researchers. Specific narratives may be of interest to leisure 
centres, community centres and service industries.  
 
Additionally, the contrast between the favourable environing conditions of the golf 
club, grounded in intergenerational and sustainable aspirations, and the more hostile 
and less accommodating environments afforded by the specific provisions of the 
aquarobics class and stroke club may also be of interest to those tasked with the 
development of ‘dementia-friendly’ communities. Taking a broader approach is 
consistent with Whitehouse’s (2013) calls for intergenerational initiatives and Barnes’ 
(2012) argument that we need to find ways in which we can all live well together. 
 
From a policy perspective, in the short-term, there are signs of small and undoubtedly 
hard-fought shifts in thinking. In Scotland, the most recent Dementia Strategy (Scottish 
Government, 2017) acknowledges that diagnosis is not without issue, although early 
diagnosis is still championed. It also accepts that most people diagnosed are 
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considerably older than previously thought, often have other health conditions and 
established relationships with care professionals. While there are calls for ‘more 
person-centred’ approaches, dementia-specific provisions are still foregrounded. There 
remains an implicit assumption that diagnosis constitutes the major disruption in the 
person’s life and integration of the diagnosis into identity is prerequisite to the ongoing 
accomplishment of a good life. The narratives in this study reaffirm that existing 
models of support can be very helpful, but challenge the assumption that what works 
for some should be regarded as important to all.  
 
While recent policy developments offer some hope that the political push for proactive 
diagnosis is easing, in the interim the study lends support to assertions that diagnostic 
and ongoing cognitive testing could be kinder (Beard, 2016; Sabat, 2001; Smith, 2009). 
Diagnosis is a social practice and the potential for biographical and ethical fallout (Katz, 
2017) should be more readily acknowledged.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, the literature review in Chapter Two indicates that 
‘ordinary doing’ or ‘everyday activity’ looks set to become the subject of increased 
attention across a range of disciplines with an interest in dementia in the future. The 
Narrative Inquiry may be of value for policy and practice, providing insights into how 
seemingly mundane activities contribute to meaningful existence and self-
understanding, both within the flow of actions and overtime. These insights should be 
foregrounded when conducting ‘some sort of functional assessment of capacity to 
benefit’ (Brayne (2010) in conversation with Lock, 2013:233-234).  
 
 ‘Activity’ is a loaded term, and the study illustrates the very different meanings and 
possibilities it holds for older people living with dementia, and the different routes to 
wellbeing that older people take. Older people with dementia have diverse capabilities, 
and when people are able to ‘do’ less, it is important not to lose sight of the importance 
of ways of ‘being’ and their generative capacity, such as those modelled by Ann. 
Moreover, older people with dementia may not recognise the important contributions 
that they continue to make to the lives of others. By being attentive to and appreciating 
more relational and generative forms of contribution, there is potential to respond to 
the human need for recognition and enhance self-esteem.  
 
Alongside the emplotted narratives, my reflections on the experience of developing and 
‘doing’ relationships with the participants not only facilitates authenticity and 
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trustworthiness assessments, but also underscores the necessity of reflexivity as I lived 
the tensions familiar to care staff and families. I experienced the need to suspend 
assumptions and to adopt approaches grounded in deep knowledge of the particular.  
These reflections may again be helpful to policy makers advancing ‘more person-
centred’ approaches; developing deep knowledge takes time. They may also be 
instructive to people with dementia, family members practitioners and researchers. 
 
The current insistence on using standardised reductive assessment tools throughout 
the life course, from the over-testing of young school children to the systematic and 
proactive unsolicited evaluation of cognitive competence in later life, does not sit well 
with the need to develop deep knowledge. Coupled with the overreliance on 
measurable outcomes to determine the quality of our lives, this suggests there may be 
more ‘testing times’ ahead. However, I am mindful of arguments advanced by Davis 
(2004) and Tremain (2005). These authors suggest that diagnostic expansion and the 
bias for reductive tests must satisfy some productive element of power, in the case of 
dementia producing a more palatably reassuring image of ageing and faith in the white 
coat of medicine. The moral-medical tug-of-war has not been won once and for all. It 
still possible to lend some weight to the moral end of the rope and pull together to try 
to restore a better, kinder balance. For this to happen, we need more individual 
counter-narratives and more critically interrogative accounts, such as those advanced 
in this study. There also needs to be greater honesty about what is and is not known 
about dementia and late onset AD in particular. Films such as Carper’s (2016) Monster 
in the Mind may yet increase societal awareness of ‘the convenient un-truth about 
Alzheimer’s’. 
Limitations of the study 
When thinking about the translation of the research outputs into practice, like all 
studies, the results of this Narrative Inquiry should be considered in the context of its 
limitations, as detailed below: 
 
What researchers can know is always limited and I can only ever contribute to 
understanding in a partial, provisional and perspectival way. My understandings are 
influenced by the different types of activities undertaken with the participants, shaping 
the nature of my participation and opportunities for engaging with meaning-making 
processes. They are also influenced by the nature of relationships developed with the 
participants, each of which was qualitatively different.  
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I have used a continuous process of reflexivity to account for my presence in the 
research, together with a theoretically informed analysis in an attempt to produce 
responsible knowledge. Although seeking to be reflexive from the outset of the study, 
there are limits to reflexivity in terms of the degree to which researchers can really 
know their own subjectivity, and what influences their research. I am therefore 
cautious about how much I claim to know about what has influenced the research, 
including my motivations, reading of the literature, the effects of my presence in the 
field and upon the selections made and interpretations offered in configuring the 
narratives. 
This research was carried out with a small number of people in one small Scottish town 
and cannot claim to be generalisable. Indeed, generalisability and representativeness 
are not the aim of Narrative Inquiry. Nevertheless, many of the details found in and 
across the narratives are consistent with those found in the wider dementia and ageing 
literature, enhancing the trustworthiness of the findings.  These include the mix of 
individual coping mechanism and ‘strategies’ used to live well with ‘dementia’, the 
varying responses to diagnosis and the privileging of emotional goals. 
The study was time-limited, in part to limit the demands on participants, but also to 
satisfy the constraints of a doctoral research study. Given the push towards earlier 
diagnosis, and the importance of restoring age relations, longitudinal and 
intergenerational research that engages directly with the human condition will be 
critical going forward.  
Conclusion 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by combining theory and 
empirical work to enhance understandings of the social citizenship and narrative 
citizenship of older people living with dementia. Specifically, it expands current 
theoretical notions of social citizenship in dementia studies by stepping into the realm 
of the ordinary and engaging with the human need for recognition as a vital aspect of 
citizenship-as-practice.  
 
The study also builds on important arguments for a narrative citizenship in dementia 
studies. The narrative-in-action methodology articulates more fully the relationship 
between narrative and the everyday practices of citizenship, between narrative and life 
and the mediating role of narrative in identity configuration. It holds the potential to 
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elevate the status of narrative as a valued form of evidence with ontological, 
epistemological and ethical significance. Drawing upon narrative theory, it highlights 
the importance of narrative in later life and responds to the specific challenges that 
narrativity can present through the different stages of dementia.  When combined with 
flexible ethnographic data creation methods, the application of narrative theory 
increases participatory possibilities by utilising the different levels of meaning-making 
within triple mimesis, accessing meaning-making-in-action and evoked memories. The 
application of narrative theory also enhances the transparency of analyses. 
 
In this study the methodology generates more nuanced understandings of different 
ways of responding to and living with dementia, illuminating into the diverse 
contributions made by older people living with dementia through relational, generative 
and creative practices conducted in the mundane spaces of daily sociability and the 
private realm. In so doing, it embraces diversity and opens up possibilities for complex 
self-representations, suspending assumptions of difference. It also engages with 
temporality, seeing actions, events and people in time, perceived through a dialectic 
thickening of a past and an implied future. This brings an important third dimension to 
people’s lives, forging connections with possibility and the notion of self-constancy, 
whereby people intend themselves into the future and resist ascribed deficient 
identities in explicit and subtle ways. 
 
Many of the more relational and generative contributions made are at odds with 
individualistic assumptions at the heart of neo-liberal blueprints for citizenship and 
dominant conceptualisations of achievement and success, and thus may be overlooked. 
They may also be impeded by the pace of contemporary life and the busyness of the 
lives of others.  The narratives represent ongoing struggles for recognition and also 
challenge the dominant cultural narrative of loss in implicit and purposeful ways, 
adding to the ‘nascent field of academic narratives of resistance’ (Beard, 2016:232). 
The narratives and accompanying reflections offer insights of potential value to 
policymakers and diverse practice audiences. Importantly, they present arguments that 
say something essentially human about ordinary, everyday life with dementia.  
Diagnostic expansion and catastrophic cultural representations of dementia have 
resulted in a new culture war and much is at stake for older people and for society. In 
these testing times, the narratives are a direct response to calls to bring humanity back 





“It will be at our peril if we put our faith in the measurable, and 
dishonour that which lies beyond statement. For it is the 
immeasurable quality of the spirit that is the true essence of life”. 
 
Florida Scott-Maxwell, The Measure of My Days (1968:64) 
 
 
As I struggle to conclude this thesis, I experience my own ‘testing times’. I feel that time 
is evaporating and I am ever conscious of the ticking hands of the clock. Yet there are 
moments when I simply have to stop the clock and turn my attention inward. I have to 
reflect upon and ‘refigure’ the meaning of my doing, the meaning of my ageing and the 
meaning of time.  During these moments, I look back on some key experiences on the 
Narrative Inquiry landscape. I think of the catalogue of medical appointments and 
procedures that marked Jim’s final weeks at home, and his lament ‘in hindsight’. I puzzle 
over Mary’s wish that his condition was ‘normal dementia’. I think of Hector’s mantra 
‘this is no rehearsal’ and imagine him as a young man reading the slogan painted on a 
wall, lit up by glorious sunshine, blissfully unaware that it will become his touchstone in 
the later years of his life.  I open the illustrated copy of This Life that I Have gifted to me 
by John and Ann and think of them still delighting in the physical presence of each other. 
 
At other times, I think of Tommy revelling in having a pseudonym and laughing at my 
‘wee James Bond gadget’, joking ‘we’re like a couple of spies’. I think of Grace telling me 
about the day in the garden when Tommy asked her to sit with him ‘while the sun shines’, 
reflecting ‘he’d never have said that before’. I then think of the poetic beauty of his likening 
the plaques and tangles of Alzheimer’s disease to ‘a touch of frost’. And I return to 
Chrissie’s assertion that people who die suddenly without getting the chance to say 
goodbye to their loved ones experience a crueller fate than those diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease. I am mindful that she never had the chance to repair the cracks in 
her relationship with her son. The flower-embossed motto on her living room table 
advises: ‘Don’t wait for the perfect moment, take the moment and make it perfect’.   
 
In ‘refiguring’ my own life, I recognise the need to invest more in my relationships, to 
slow down and to ensure that the attempts of older family members to participate and 
contribute are not impeded by the busyness of my life and a flawed conception of 
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‘success’. Only then will I too be able, in later life, to enjoy midnight games of hide-and-
seek by torchlight – a reward for the heavy spade work conducted over a life time.  
 
Going forward, it seems we need better metaphors. I called the narratives in this thesis 
‘fallen fruits’, disconnected from their life source and selected from the wind crop of 
actions, interactions and stories generously made available to me while walking on the 
Narrative Inquiry landscape.  I later discover that ‘Fallen Fruits’ is also the name of an 
urban arts project, initiated in San Francisco in response to a call in the fabulously named 
Journal of Aesthetics and Protest for projects that address social and political issues by 
proposing a solution, rather than raising a critique. The ‘Fallen Fruits’ project mapped 
out fruit trees along previously neglected walkways through the city, enabling passers-
by to share in their abundant resources. The project has since grown exponentially. As 
an alternative metaphor to the dementia ‘epidemic’ or ‘tsunami’, I borrow from this 
initiative and offer ‘Endless Orchards’. These ‘orchards’ are home to an abundance of 
narratives-in-the-making. It would be a shame for this potential to go to waste. What’s 
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Appendix I: Reviewing the Literature 
 
 
This thesis draws on a broad literature base and I included any material which might 
provide insights relevant to the overall study aim of exploring everyday life with 
dementia through a broader societal lens.  The literature reviewed included original 
research, review articles, discussion articles and academic text books. The review 
combined broad scans of different bodies of literature addressing theoretical, 
methodological and empirical questions and deep dives through very specific literature 
searches to gain depth of understanding. The materials were primarily identified 
through targeted searches of the academic databases, although supervisors and 
colleagues additionally suggested core texts and useful articles.  I found the University’s 
Searcher tool helpful, which scans multiple databases, occasionally conducting searches 
using specific databases such as Web of Science, PsycInfo and MedLine. The 
international literature was explored, but limited to English Language. Chapters One 
through Five each draw upon different bodies of literature and the specifics of my 
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approach to search and review differed in each case, depending upon the questions I 
asked of the literature. 
 
Initially I was interested in the different ways in which dementia has been 
conceptualised, asking the questions: What is dementia? What different understandings 
are at play? Searches were undertaken using combinations of the search terms: 
dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, cognitive impairment or cognitive dysfunction and 
theories, models, philosophy, understandings or conceptualisations (singular and 
plural). I drew upon seminal philosophical texts, particularly the work of Julian Hughes, 
including edited volumes which brought together a range of perspectives (Hughes et al, 
2006) plus books that think about dementia, the relationship with ageing and the 
issues it raises in contemporary Western society (Hughes, 2012; Hughes, 2013).  
 
As I discuss in Chapter One, I was always interested in approaching the study in a way 
that would contextualise people’s experiences more broadly and the citizenship lens 
held immediate appeal. However, I was also intrigued by the dominance and continued 
expansion of the biomedical model and the relationship between dementia and ageing 
and sought to understand this better. I began by searching for articles considering the 
problematisation and biomedicalisation of ageing, ensuring to include American 
spellings in search terms. I then turned to the literature documenting the history of 
dementia and the benefits and issues surrounding the increasing biomedicalisation 
cognitive impairment in later life. A few discussion articles considering historical 
developments were widely cited, notably Fox (1989), Holstein (1997) and Whitehouse 
and George (1989).  
 
Insights distilled from the established body of literature were augmented by in-depth 
accounts of recent developments in the field – the fresh chapters that had subsequently 
been added. In this respect, I accessed a number of books, including those bringing 
diverse perspectives to the discussion (e.g. Cohen and Ballinger, 2006) and those 
addressing a particular question or issue (e.g. Lock, 2013). These texts were extensively 
researched and served as a useful reference source, and I retrieved numerous articles 
that I thought would deepen my understanding. I also sought to ensure that I kept sight 
of any new developments by repeating searches periodically, restricting the search 
parameters to volumes published after my initial search (e.g. Beard, 2016). This body of 




Literature searches were also conducted to learn more about the different ‘social 
models’ identified e.g. using search terms dementia (or alternatives) and disability or 
‘social model of disability’ or citizenship. Again, I was interested in understanding how 
these models were conceptualised before considering their empirical application. 
Indeed, a key issue to emerge within these discussion articles was the limitations of the 
existing empirical research evidence, notably the lack of attention to heterogeneity of 
people with dementia and to the wider societal context. I therefore sought to develop 
my own broad understanding of key themes within the established body of literature, 
initially drawing upon systematic reviews of studies investigating the subjective 
experience of dementia, identifying referenced articles of particular interest, and then 
conducting searches repeating the search terms employed by the systematic review 
and restricting the search to articles published since the reviews were conducted. I also 
conducted more targeted searches to develop my understanding of specific issues such 
‘insight’ and ‘awareness’, ‘acceptance and denial’ and topics such as ‘activity’, 
‘occupation’ and ‘everyday life’.  
 
I located my research interest in what has been called the ‘fourth moment’ in 
understanding in dementia studies. This resulted in a review of all articles meeting the 
search criteria ‘dementia’ (or alternatives) plus citizenship.  From there the literature 
search might be likened to a chain reaction or snowballing, as additional material was 
identified by using the reference and citation lists of the journal papers identified 
through the database searches.  I accessed books and journal articles by highly cited 
contributors to developments within dementia studies, notably Bartlett and O’Connor 
(2010). Other articles drew upon an ethic of care perspective and I also accessed the 
works of extensively cited authors, particularly Tronto (1993), Sevenhuijsen (1998; 
2003) and Barnes (2011; 2012). I accessed the wider literature on citizenship and 
related concepts, notably recognition, accessing books by noted authors. The scope of 
the literature examined developed as the study progressed and as important issues, 
gaps in knowledge and the focus of the research became more defined.  This included 
searches using the terms combinations of the terms ‘couplehood’, ‘identity 
development’, ‘narrative’ and ‘temporality’ plus ‘old age’, ‘ag(e)ing and dementia.  
 
Additionally, I searched the literature to identify methodological approaches of 
potential interest, both using and purposefully omitting ‘dementia’ as a search term. I 
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sought to develop a broad understanding of possible theoretical and methodological 
combinations and then assess their likely utility in research with older people with 
dementia. It was through a search using the terms ‘everyday activity’, ‘ordinary’, 
‘biomedical’ and ‘narrative’ that I came upon the narrative-in-action methodology. This 
drew upon Paul Ricoeur’s (1994) early narrative theorising and I initially purchased a 
copy of Time and Narrative Volume I, later engaging more deeply with Ricoeur’s work, 
accessing several books and journal articles. I also accessed literature on my chosen 
methodological approach, Narrative Inquiry, including core texts by Clandinnin and 
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Appendix XII: Sample Field Notes 
M02 – Self-Selected Pseudonym Tommy 
A Visit to the Chapel        
Waiting for the bus 
It is just before quarter to 11. It is a cold, windy day and there is a light drizzle in the air. I 
am parked across the road from the bus stop where I have arranged to meet Tommy. I 
arrived very, very early, having allowed time for possible traffic delays that never 
materialised. I am reading through the notes of my last meeting with Tommy when Grace 
phones me from her mobile. She apologises and says that she must have been looking at 
the Sunday timetable, that the bus won’t get in until 11 at the earliest and she didn’t want 
me standing about in the cold.  I thank her, tell her where I am, and ask ‘so, is that Tommy 
on the bus now?’ Grace tells me that she has caught the bus too, having ‘decided at the 
very last minute to go on to M&S at < local shopping centre > to see if they have an Easter 
meal deal on’. (I suspect that she will have had second thoughts about Tommy getting off at 
the right bus stop, particularly as this will not be familiar to him, and am struck by the way 
she wraps this up to protect him). I ask Grace if I should get the bus back to the house with 
Tommy afterwards, but she assures me that he will be fine getting the bus on his own 
because it stops right outside the door. 
I get out of the car at 10:55 and stand at the bus stop, watching the ‘bus due’ clock count 
down. When the bus turns the corner I can see that Tommy is at the front of the queue of 
people waiting to get off, smiling and joking with the driver in his own inimitable way. I find 
myself smiling and realise that I am genuinely pleased to see him. I salute when he sees me 
as he steps off the bus. He comes over and grabs the fur of my jacket collar and says ‘are 
you still not feeding that cat’. I laugh (noting that he has remembered my coat and his 
previous joke about it) and we both wave to Grace as the bus drives off. She waves back 
heartily and she is smiling, but I note that she looks very tired. 
At this point we cross the road. There is no pavement on the other side and we have to 
walk across a very muddy extended grass verge round the side of a war memorial. Tommy 
says, ‘Jeez, where am I taking us’. I then say ‘I’ll just follow your lead Tommy’ and he says 
‘more fool you’. As we walk down the road towards the chapel I ask about Grace’s flu and if 
he managed to escape it. He tells me that she’s been ‘awfy tired’, that he had it too, but 
wasn’t too bad with it as he’s ‘a hardy soul’.  
Reflections on the method 
The road leading to the chapel is quite long and without pavements. It is deserted. It is very 
windy and there is a tractor in the field to our left. (I am holding my audio recorder in my 
right hand as we walk, but large parts of the conversation are carried off by the wind or 
drowned out by the tractor. This is a known limitation of the ‘walk-and-talk interview’. 
Alsaker, who ‘pioneers’ the enacted narrative method, does not audio record at all during 
shared activities. Instead she records everything as soon as possible after the event, 
‘replaying’ the unfolding scenes in her mind frame by frame, capturing the details using a 
voice recorder – then later typing up. I have found this approach works well for me, but I like 
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to ‘back up’ with audio recorded dialogue where it makes sense to do so. I also find the 
‘difficult to decipher’ audio still serves as a useful sense check, hence my use of the recorder 
as we walk, even though I know the sound quality will be poor in these blustery conditions).  
Back in the bad books again 
Initially we talk about the weather and the signs of spring – or lack of them, prompted by 
the weather and what we see in the fields. As we continue some distance down the road 
Tommy says ‘now mind, I’ve not been down this way before, so I could be getting us lost’. I 
point to the visitor centre entrance up ahead and say ‘I think you’re doing just fine’. He 
looks directly at me and says ‘I wouldnae be too sure about that’. When I ask ‘why’s that?’ 
he replies ‘och, I’ve been back in the bad books again’.  
One for sorrow 
I am mindful of Grace telling me there have been ‘quite a few more mix-ups’ but don’t want 
to push the issue. I wait to see if he expands and he goes on to say ‘I’d like to say it’s other 
folks not, not …, but…..’ I prod, repeating ‘but? ….’ and Tommy adds ‘I’ve gotten it wrong a 
few times’. He sounds a bit fed up. (Tommy has previously told me several times about his 
inability to learn at school, being the black sheep of the family, and has also frequently 
repeated the story of his trip to the GP when he got the ‘four crosses’ on the questionnaire 
that set things in motion regarding his diagnosis. This ‘getting things wrong’ is a recurrent 
theme in the early and latter parts of his life story and I deliberately don’t ask for details). I 
decide to ask him how he feels about that. After a long pause he says ‘Grace is … she’s… I’ve 
started calling her my minder. (I recall that Tommy didn’t want people from his Church 
thinking that I was his minder on our first outing). Cannae say I’m thrilled about it mind, but 
dare say I’m lucky or…. He then points out a magpie in a nearby tree, saying ‘one for 
sorrow’ [is this his way of saying how he’s feeling – about the shift in the relationship with 
Grace, about the alternative, or a total coincidence?]  
Before I have the chance to follow up, Tommy immediately starts giving me a lecture about 
magpies, which I find a bit tricky to follow. It centres on various colourful examples of 
magpies raiding birds’ nests, killing baby birds in savage fashion, chucking them out of their 
nests, and basically ‘hell bent on wiping out all our song birds’. (I think some examples are 
recent, some from when he was growing up, and they run into each other ~ I’m not sure if 
this is a distraction technique, which he’s used a few times, or if it is something different, 
triggered by the magpie sighting and the notion of ‘sorrow’. I am aware that I am listening 
hard (I eventually conclude too hard) for the metaphor. Unlike some of Tommy’s earlier 
stories, this one is self-contained. I note the change in narration style). Tommy concludes by 
saying that ‘their numbers are up’ and ‘it’s high time we had a cull’. By the time he finishes 
we have reached the entrance to the visitor centre adjacent to the chapel.  
Two for joy 
When we go inside Tommy starts his usual patter and chats away about ‘this being some 
set up’ to the young man behind the counter, whose badge reveals his name is ‘Mike’. 
Tommy uses his bank card to pay for his ticket, concentrating when entering his pin 
number, but doing so without any hesitation, and then, on removing his card jokes ‘I could 
buy a small car for that, Mike’. I pay for my ticket, securing a concession by using my 
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student card, and Mike hands over both tickets saying ‘so that’s one student and … two 
students’. Tommy has a good chuckle at the idea, saying ‘I’ve been called many things, but 
that’s a first. Student’. He looks absolutely delighted. (Again I am mindful of Tommy’s 
numerous references to his difficulties at school, lack of educational attainment and in 
particular being ‘put in with the useless lot’, so I sense the greater significance of this 
seemingly throw-away remark).  
A surprise ‘admission’  
Mike asks if we have been before and we both say ‘no’. Tommy adds that ‘it’s a disgrace’. 
He goes on to say that when he saw a programme about it on the telly the other week, he 
decided that it was ‘high time’ he paid a visit. He then adds, ‘I’ve brought my wee sister 
with me’ and winks. Mike smiles at me. (In our previous outings, when Tommy has been 
asked who I am by people known to him, he has joked that he’s traded his wife in for a 
younger model, or that I’m just after his money etc. I am interested that Tommy has taken 
the initiative / felt the need to account for my presence, and also that the relationship that 
he has chosen by way of explanation has changed to ‘wee sister’. I am wondering if there is 
something in this, or if it has simply been tailored on account of Mike’s age and because 
Mike is unknown to Tommy).   
Mike asks Tommy if he’s be interested in getting the annual pass and Tommy answers ‘well 
son, I’ve got Alzheimer’s, so likely I’ll no remember what I’ve seen after today. Dare say I 
could come back a few times’ and has a chuckle. I am really surprised to hear Tommy admit 
to having Alzheimer’s in this way and wonder if he is becoming more comfortable with the 
idea, as previously he has been very keen to keep it from people. However, I am keen not to 
interrupt the flow of his interaction with Mike and so don’t ask about it, but make a mental 
note. 
Spoiler Alert 
Tommy has brought the camera that his granddaughter gave him for Christmas with him, 
but there is a big sign up behind the counter saying ‘no photography inside the chapel’ and 
Tommy asks Mike ‘what’s this sign about’? Mike explains that you can take photos outside, 
but unfortunately not inside the chapel. Tommy questions Mike’s explanation, saying that 
when he watched the TV programme, ‘there were loads of folk inside with big fancy 
cameras, all snapping away’. I admire the certainty of Tommy’s challenge. Mike tells him 
that he’s quite right, that you used to be able to take photographs. He goes on to explain 
that the chapel flooring inside is quite uneven and that one American lady had fallen over 
while looking up to take a photograph, banging her head badly, and she had sued them. He 
adds, ‘so no more photos’ and shrugs. (I note that Mike explains this to Tommy carefully, 
but not in a patronising way, and he has not changed his tone or way of interacting since 
Tommy declared his Alzheimer’s).Tommy responds quite loudly ‘typical bloody yanks, 
spoiling it for everyone’ and draws a few strange looks, including from a small group of 
visitors nearby who I strongly suspect are American! (I don’t feel at all embarrassed, which I 
know I would if say my mother-in-law made such a remark, but instead I am mildly amused. 
I find my own reaction interesting). Tommy thanks Mike for his help, who tells us to enjoy 




Put that in your handbag 
As we follow the signs to the chapel, Tommy hands me the leaflet and says ‘can you put 
that in your handbag’, adding ‘I’ll forget all about it if I shove it in my pocket’. (I am acutely 
aware that I am changing Tommy’s visit by being there, but also accept that this is in fact 
always the case. I am rarely ‘just following the flow’. I also reckon that asking a woman to 
put something in her handbag is an established cultural practice that I rarely stop to 
question, it is something he would likely ask Grace to do with or without Alzheimer’s, and I 
am maybe overthinking Tommy’s request because he also used the ‘F word’ - ‘forget’). I put 
the leaflet and receipts in my bag and Tommy nips into the gents before we go through the 
doors leading to the chapel, saying his ‘bladder is still playing dictator’. (He has previously 
told me he attributes this to his Aricept medication). 
Master craftsman and the broken head 
We make our way outside and are both struck by the coldness of the wind after the warmth 
of the visitor centre. The drizzle persists, but thankfully but hasn’t turned to rain. Tommy 
wants to take a few photos outside the chapel, and I take one or two of my own. Tommy 
takes his time framing the photographs and is very comfortable using the camera. We then 
go inside the chapel and slowly begin to make our way round. There are so many carvings it 
is all a little overwhelming. Tommy picks up a laminated A3 sheet near the entrance. It is a 
picture of the interior of the chapel with the main attractions denoted by a numeric key. 
There is a short description for each. I try to follow Tommy’s lead and mostly we chat about 
the various carvings, trying to orient ourselves using the A3 sheet. Tommy is fascinated by 
the craftsmanship of the ceiling and talks freely and enthusiastically about his days working 
as a plasterer and how he got started. I have heard (and written up) these anecdotes 
before, particularly the details concerning the difficulties he encountered learning to use 
the equipment as a result of being left handed. I realise the possible import of his re-telling 
of particular stories (and later revisit my earlier notes to asterisk those he repeats), but 
focus on the new insights below. 
When we discussed the possibility of visiting the chapel during our last meeting, Tommy 
told me the legend behind the ‘Apprentice Pillar’, which holds that the master mason 
returned from his travels overseas to find that his young apprentice, inspired by a dream, 
had created the beautifully ornate pillar. In a jealous rage, the mason struck the apprentice 
on the head with his hammer, killing him instantly. The pillar holds a fascination for Tommy 
and we spend a long time looking at the intricate details of the carvings that snake round it. 
The information sheet alludes to another carving, allegedly of the apprentice’s head, in 
another part of the chapel, but the head carving is not amongst those numbered on the 
sheet. We spend a long time looking for it to no avail, with Tommy muttering ‘like looking 
for a needle in a haystack’, before eventually approaching a member of staff, who is 
standing with his back to us. (The young man is wearing a dark green fleece which has the 
chapel logo on the front, but from behind there is nothing obvious to suggest that he is 
staff.  I ‘know’ that he is staff, but am thinking for the first time about ‘how’ I know this, and 
more importantly how Tommy knows this, and am struck by the current cultural significance 
of the ‘casual uniform’. It’s like looking at the world with a fresh pair of eyes).  
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When Tommy is standing directly behind the staff member he says ‘excuse me son, we’re 
looking for the apprentice’s head, but we cannae seem to find it’. The staff member turns, 
pulls a laser pointer from his jeans pocket and says ‘that’s it up there,’ as he highlights the 
apprentice’s head high up in a corner of the chapel, marking out the scar where the 
hammer struck with the green circular dot of the laser. Initially Tommy seems more 
interested in the pointer and says ‘Jeez son, what a great wee gadget that is’. He wants to 
know if I ‘have one of them’ and I tell him that I’ve used one when giving a presentation, 
but ‘don’t have one of my very own’. Tommy asks ‘would you like one?’ and I say ‘not 
especially, would you?’ In response Tommy tells me that ‘you’ve got to keep up with the 
new technology, you cannae be looking like an old fool all the time’. Tommy then reads the 
text describing the carving from the information sheet again, partly to himself, but saying 
the odd word out loud, and concludes with the words ‘struck …. head’.  
Tommy then looks up, turns to me and asks me ‘did you see that thing on the telly where 
the vicar was telling his wee boy that he had dementia?’ I’m slightly taken aback by this 
second, seemingly unprompted reference to ‘dementia’ (named as such) in a short space of 
time– this is not like the Tommy I know.  I say that I didn’t, and he goes on to say, ‘it’s one of 
those shows that Grace always watches, on all the damn time. I cannae stand it’. I am 
frantically trying to think of a soap with a vicar in it when Tommy sings ‘doo doo doo doo’ 
(instantly recognisable as the first line of the Emmerdale theme tune). I say ‘oh, 
Emmerdale’ and Tommy says ‘aye, that’s it, bloody Emmerdale. [There is no one no one 
close by, so I quickly pull my audio recorder out of my jacket pocket and place it on a ledge 
between us, before Tommy goes on]. 
T: I thought that was good, you know. The wee boy said ‘daddy, what’s wrong with you?’ 
and he just said ‘there’s a wire broken in my head’ and the wee boy asked him ‘will they be 
able to fix it?’ and he says ‘no, not very well’. I thought that was good – aye, good.  
K: Mmmmm.  Oh, yeah. D’you mean you thought the explanation was good – the broken 
wire? (I now realise that Tommy’s reference to dementia was prompted, but by the 
apprentice’s ‘broken head’ rather than by me, and am intrigued by this) 
T: Aye, you can… and well, just coming out with it and telling the bairn like that. 
K: Being right upfront about it? 
T: Aye, a, a wire broken in my head, makes…, doesn’t sound… 
K: Yes? 
T: Not…. too terrible 
K: Not too terrible?  
T: Just a wire broken in my head (I note he says ‘just’ – it’s one of my watchwords) 
K: Sure. Sure. I remember you told me before you thought a lot of people were frightened 
of it, of dementia? 
K: Aye, I did that   
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K: So, d’you think that sort of explanation, you know, on the telly, could maybe… well, 
lessen the fear? 
T: Maybe, maybe (sounds doubtful) 
K: But? 
T: Well, no really, no. 
K: Oh? 
T: Och, he’s getting awfy worse. Much worse than me, I tell you. And he’s no an old duffer 
like me. And quite quick mind. Right quick. Didnae know his wife the other night. One 
minute she goes up stairs, next thing she comes back down and he doesnae remember. 
K: Oh? He didn’t remember ….his wife? 
T: Didnae know she was his wife. That daft woman he married before, and she’s still in her 
wedding dress. You know, yon one with the whiney voice?  
K: Sorry Tommy, I haven’t watched it in years, but maybe I should 
T: Grace was in tears 
K: Oh really? Oh, Tommy. So, did you talk about it … with Grace? (I have a mental image of 
Grace in tears watching the programme and Tommy just looking at her. I have not managed 
to keep the emotion I feel from creeping into my voice) 
T: Nae, nae hen. Nae. She’s hooked on it mind. I cannae stand it. And that ugly looking 
woman he used to go with marrying them, you know, her, what’s her name? The lady vicar 
with the hair hinging like a pair of old curtains, looks like a dug … och, it’s a load of rubbish 
K: It sounds very complicated 
T: No, it’s just rubbish  
K: But… but you liked, you liked… the explanation, about the broken wire?  
T: Oh aye 
K: So, d’you think the programme makers … maybe spoiled that – by having too much other 
stuff going on, with ….the lady vicar and the wedding dress?  
T: Well…..Aye, maybe, maybe (sounds plausible) 
K: Maybe... maybe it’s a bit, bit like in here – you know, there are so many carvings that you 
can miss some of the details. I mean we even missed the apprentice’s head. Cos, it’s all ….a 
bit much? 
T: Well, that’s a right good way of putting it... Aye, right good. I cannae stand it though. 
Cannae stand it. 
K: Emmerdale? 
T: Bloody Emmerdale. 
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At this point another member of staff begins a talk charting the history of the chapel using a 
mic and everyone inside, as if programmed to respond to this cue, starts to move towards 
the central seating area. I ask Tommy if he wants to take a seat, and he points to the seats 
at the side. I pop my recorder back in my jacket pocket and we move to the side, sit down 
and listen to the talk, which lasts about 15 minutes. Tommy loves history and at first he sits 
forward, listening intently. However, the presenter has a very heavy French accent, is highly 
animated and talks very quickly. The acoustics are tricky and I find it quite hard to make out 
some of what she is saying. I see Tommy fiddling with his hearing aid. He looks utterly 
dejected and is looking at his feet. I lean over and quietly ask if he wants to move on, but he 
shakes his head. When she finishes I ask him if he could understand her accent and he says 
‘no, not a damned word’. I say ‘me neither’ and he smiles. We get up and continue to make 
our way round the chapel, looking at various carvings of fallen angels, angels with bagpipes 
and my particular favourite, the ‘green men’.  
Hot under the collar 
A little later we are standing at the opposite side of the chapel looking at the laminated 
sheet together and checking how many of the featured carvings we have seen (we have 
been looking at the carvings in order of interest to Tommy, rather than sequentially). We 
start with number one on the sheet, both saying in unison ‘seen that’, ‘number two, seen 
that’ etc. This seems to trigger something in Tommy’s mind as he says to me, ‘14, 14, that 
was my number’. I ask ‘your number, when was that?’ and he replies ‘at the Murray Club’. (I 
know from our previous meetings that the Murray Club is a men’s group run by a former 
minister at Tommy’s Church that he particularly enjoys). I have no idea what he means by 
’14 was my number’. I wait, but as he doesn’t say anything more on this I say ‘you’ve told 
me that you really enjoy the Murray Club, but I didn’t know you had a number’. He then 
tells me a story that I struggle to follow, but it involved ‘a sheet, a bit like this one’ (the 
laminated sheet) and ‘everyone had a different number, 13, 14, 15’. Tommy’s number was 
14. I ask if it was a quiz, but he says no. I can’t work out if everyone was given a different 
number early in the evening, or had to work something out on the sheet, but I get a clearer 
sense that the discussion had then moved on. Steve, the former minister had said to 
Tommy just to write his number on the back of the sheet, but he couldn’t (I assume 
because it was a laminated sheet). Tommy goes on to say that he just kept saying it to 
himself ‘14, 14, 14’. He goes on to say ‘I was getting right hot under the collar about it’, but 
then when it came to his ‘turn’, he ‘just said it out loud, you know, ‘s’if I was sure - 14’ and 
after that, he tells me that he felt ‘a lot more… confident’.  
Tommy looks rather pleased with himself when he concludes. I still have no idea what the 
sheet was, or what the exercise was, but I reckon that this doesn’t matter and the key 
things to focus on are Tommy’s emotions – ‘getting hot under the collar’ and then feeling 
‘more confident’. I don’t want to undermine his sense of satisfaction by letting him know 
that I haven’t understood what he’s pleased about. I go on to say ‘that was great Tommy, 
you know, that you managed that, but when you say you were getting hot under the collar, 
what were you worried about’? Tommy tells me, as if stating the obvious, ‘looking stupid’. 
(There it is again –this fear). I then say, ‘so the fact that you remembered your number, 
that made you feel a lot more confident that….’ and Tommy says ‘I can keep going’. So 
there we have it. I find myself saying ‘I know how much you enjoy it and, from some of the 
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laughs you’ve told me about, I bet the other men really enjoy your company too – whether 
you remember you’re number 14 or not’.  
Trying it on for size – Concepts of time 
As soon as I say these words I realise I could be in danger of crossing a line because ‘I’ don’t 
want Tommy to stop going to a club that he enjoys. So far he’s coming up with his own 
solutions. So far. What’s the ‘right’ thing to do? I could point out all the things that he can 
do. Or that Steve seems to know about his condition, seems willing to help him out. I’m not 
sure.  So I decide to pull back and just leave that seed of thought with him. I am struck by 
the contrast between Tommy’s desire to keep things from the men at the Murray Club and 
his willingness to tell Mike about his Alzheimer’s in such a casual way when buying his 
admission ticket. I realise also that he now keeps introducing Alzheimer’s into his 
conversations with me, actually today there is no keeping it out, whereas previously it was 
kept more in the background – he’d talk about the diagnosis or the side-effects of the 
medication, but not the condition itself. His thinking is shifting. I wonder if by telling Mike, 
someone unknown to him, he is testing the water, ‘trying it on for size’. I am reminded of a 
Journal Article on GPs thoughts on the ‘timeliness’ of a diagnosis of dementia, which spoke 
about the slow unfolding of becoming a person with dementia. In Tommy’s case this 
unfolding is happening before my eyes. The article referred to the Greeks having two 
different forms of time –the familiar ‘chronos’ and ‘kairos’ - which is concerned with there 
being an opportune or right time;  the latter being more in keeping with GPs understandings 
of ‘timely’ than ‘early’. I sense Tommy has his own timetable. He is finding his own ‘right 
times’.  
Looking out for the danger signs: Pride comes before a fall 
(I am aware that my last exchange with Tommy was an important one, but I have had to 
rely on my own memory store to record the details. There is no one else in the part of the 
chapel that we are walking round, so I retrieve my recorder from my pocket and hold it 
discreetly inside my right hand). At one point I am stepping back to look up at a carving of 
the seven deadly sins. There is a steep stairwell leading down to the crypt a few feet behind 
me. Tommy says to me ‘mind you didnae step too far back, or you’ll be down that stair, and 
you might no be as lucky as yon stupid American woman’. I say ‘thanks Tommy, if I fell 
down those stairs I’d be a goner’. I then add ‘Looks like you’re my minder today’.  (I had 
actually forgotten about the stairs and although I am a good few feet away from them, am 
touched that Tommy is looking out for me. I am also struck that he has effortlessly 
remembered what, to me, seemed like a fairly ‘insignificant’ detail about the American lady 
falling while taking a photograph, yet has been having real difficulties remembering other 
‘significant’ things, such as meeting arrangements, or the seemingly crucial ‘number 14’). 
Tommy says ‘first thing I did when we came in was look out for the danger signs, says to 
myself you better mind that Tommy, and you better mind that’.  I ask if that’s something 
he’s always done or learned to do more recently and he says ‘just common sense, pride 





Taking care of the needy and enforced voting habits 
We move from the seven deadly sins to the seven corporeal acts of mercy (‘a right bloody 
mouthful’, in Tommy’s words), the first of which is ‘taking care of the needy.’ When I read 
this out from the information card below the carving Tommy jokes with me: 
T: Well, it cannae be that Osbourne fellow 
K: (laughs) Spot on, I didn’t know you were into politics Tommy (this is the first time he’s 
mentioned anything remotely political -. I suppose Tommy has taken me by surprise) 
T: No really, but his ugly mug is never off the news 
K: You’re right there 
T: You’ll be a Tory voter, won’t you’? 
K: Are you kidding me? 
T: (Shakes his head) 
K: No, no, I’m no fan of the Tories, Tommy (very indignant) 
T: Oh, I thought all the clever folk voted for them 
K: I’m not sure I’m all that clever Tommy, but what makes you think that all the clever folk 
vote for them anyway?  
T: I… was … when I first got the vote, you heard of Home? (Pronounced Hume) 
K: Sir Alec-Douglas? Yes, I used to get dragged round the Hirsel by my gran in the Easter 
holidays 
T: Aye, so you’ll know he was the landowner. And a Tory. 
K: Mmmm  
T: A right clever man, you know, educated, Oxford and that, and he told us that we had to 
vote Tory or we would be out of a job. So you did as you were told.  
K: Seriously? Like a threat? 
T: Oh aye, I didnae really know enough about it all to be truthful. But I needed a job. I’ve 
always voted for them. Just habit really. 
K: Still? 
T: Aye 
K: But …. (Wondering whether to pursue this)…but you said Osbourne’s not one for helping 
the needy? 
T: Cannae stand the man 
K: So, so, why do you still vote for them …now? 




T: (Laughs) No, no hen, you know what I mean.  
K: (Laughs) Sure. Reducing the deficit (in posh voice). Would you ever think about voting 
differently’?  
T: What, like for her with the pair of legs like a thingamy…, clomping about in her big shoes 
like Minnie Mouse? I don’t think so. No, no, I’m a Tory voter, just stick to what you know.   
K: Fair enough, we’ll agree to disagree as they say. 
T: (Laughs) As they say. I hope I havenae offended you hen. 
K: Not at all Tommy. No, I’m fascinated. 
Taking care of the dead: straightening nails, straightening bodies 
We continue looking at the carving of the seven corporeal works of mercy. I am still 
bemused by Tommy’s revelations about his lifelong voting habits, but then my attention is 
caught by the last act of mercy, which is ‘taking care of the dead’ and depicts two people 
placing a body in a cask.  This part of the carving has a particular poignancy for me as I had 
attended the funeral of one of my husband’s lifelong friends the day before. He had died 
suddenly, suffering a massive heart attack at home alone while his partner was out with her 
friends. The service, led by a humanist celebrant, was both heart-warming and heart 
breaking, and I must go deep into thought. 
Tommy picks up on my apparent interest in this carving and I become aware that he is 
looking at me quite intently. After a moment he asks me if he’s told me about the time he 
worked with the undertaker when he was a boy, and I shake my head. (The seven works are 
all captured in the same carving, so I am not sure how Tommy knows it is the last one that I 
have been thinking about ~ a coincidence? However, I am struck that the carvings are 
serving the same ‘memory prompting functions’ for both of us). He goes on with his story: 
T: Was the year after the war broke out, I got a job with the undertaker, Bill, straightening 
out old nails, you know, cos new nails were guy hard to come by at that time. What, with 
the war and all. 
K: Sure. 
T: I was nine. I’d been, well, helping out for oh, a few weeks, when he gets word to go and 
collect a body from one of the farms up by, and asks me come with. Turns out the farmer 
had gone out in the morning with his horse, up to, to plough the field and must have 
dropped dead halfway down the first furrow. That horse! Phew. Just carried on going up 
and down the field, up and down, up and down, and so nobody knows the farmer’s died ‘til 
the horse came back to the stables at 5 o’clock without him.  
K: Amazing. 
T: Because the farmer’s been dead for so long, the rigor had set in and he was stiff as a 
board. But his arms were (demonstrates arms straight out in front of him as if still pushing 
the plough). So old Bill’s gonna have to… to snap them, like to get him into the… box, you 
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know, one he keeps in the van for taking the bodies back to his. That’s why he’s asked me 
along.  
K: Oh? 
T: I gets the job of taking the farmer’s wife for a long walk. Tells me to take her, well there’s 
a great big oak tree down by the stream (pointing into the distance) and he says head down 
there. Should be far enough away that she willnae hear, you know, his arms cracking.  
K: Oh God! 
T: But the poor woman’s sobbing that hard, and I’m only nine mind. Just a laddie. She could 
hardly put one foot in front of the other, poor soul, so we didnae get very far. Oh, she 
heard the cracks alright.  
K: [I am transfixed and when he tells me about the cracking noise, I instinctively put my 
hand over my mouth.] 
T: Aye, then after old Bill’s got the farmer in the back of the van, poor woman’s still in 
shock. Couldnae just leave her, so Bill says we need to take her, well it was her sister’s 
house, which was a fair distance away mind. So she’s in the front of the van with Bill and I, I 
has to go in the back, sit on top of the box, you know, with the farmer’s body inside, all 
broken and… all the way to the sister’s. After that I never went back. No more …nail 
straightening. 
Often Tommy’s stories start midway through and he jumps about a bit, but this story is told 
fluently and has an obvious start and end point. When I look at him as he is telling it, I have 
a sense that he is replaying the scene. 
I am horrified. Tommy catches my expression.  
T: You’ll have the hankies out next.  
K: Sorry Tommy, I’m a bit lost for words. That must have been such a traumatic experience 
for anyone, let alone, what a nine year old boy? I’m not surprised you never went back…. 
You seemed, I don’t know, to be reliving it there. God, that was shocking Tommy, really 
shocking, it must have really affected you.  
T: Aye, you’re right there. Had a thing about them since. Och, I know I’ll end up in one, no 
fear of that, but I have a horror of lying for hours ‘fore anybody finds me. 
 [Tommy has told me before that he has a strong faith and has no fear of dying, but the 
main reason that I don’t probe any further is that I am a bit thrown by his story, and also 
still puzzling over the fluency of his narration]. 
On the way out Tommy asks me if I’m going to sign the visitors’ book and I say ‘do you want 
to?’ he says ‘you sign it for both of us.’ I ask ‘with your pseudonym?’ and he laughs loudly, 
shakes his head and says ‘James Bond’. (I don’t actually think anything about this at the 
time).  
Forgotten skills, forgotten wives 
T: I’m going to get a book like that 
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K: A visitor’s book? 
T: No, just like that, with lines in. I’m gonna start writing again. 
K: Are you? (Surprised) What sort of thing are you going to write about?  
T: I’m a bit worried about going back to tell you the truth. 
K: Going back… to writing?  
T: To the dentist.  
K: Oh? 
T: I was there last week and it was a new one again. Third new one we’ve had. First that 
Greek fella that Grace fancied (I have heard all about him!), then the Polish woman. Now 
one of these women from Africa. What do you call them, with the thing they wear? You 
know, on their heads?  
K: A Muslim? 
T: Aye, so you cannae see their faces. 
K: Is that why you’re worried about going back to the dentist? Because you can’t see her 
face? (I am thinking Tommy has maybe done what I call ‘jumped tracks’ – this is something 
he seems to do quite often when telling stories) 
T: No hen, I could see her face alright.  She didnae have the full thing, with the wee… 
(Makes gesture of a slit across his eyes). No, she was very nice. I made her laugh. Grace was 
giving me the look. 
K: I’m sure you made her laugh Tommy. You make everyone laugh. It’s a real gift. But, but 
what is it that’s, well, worrying you, about going back? 
T: I don’t want to have to say I cannae... I cannae do it again. 
K: Did something happen at the dentist Tommy? (I am now stitching what I thought were 
two separate stories together in my mind. I think I know what he is going to say, but don’t 
want to ask directly in case I’m wrong) 
T:  They asked me, you know, to thingyme the form, and I couldnae do it. I couldnae write 
my own name. I was just….blank. 
K: Oh, I see. So, you want to buy a book - to practice writing your signature at home?  
T: Aye, like when I had my stutter. At school. I’ve told you. When I was the black sheep and 
they couldnae teach me anything. Not a damn thing. I just kept at it – saying my name, over 
and over ‘til I could do it … without, without stuttering. I’m going to do it again. Start 
writing again. (Says his full name three times and makes a writing gesture in the air). But I 
need to buy a book first. 
K: Sure, sure. A book … with lines. Yes. (Faltering: I am aware that I am treading water here. 
This strikes a painful chord. I am remembering the first time my grandad couldn’t remember 
how to write his signature. So this is the down side of these ‘moments in the present’ 
305 
 
triggering ‘memories from the past’. I am not immune to them either. I am saying to myself 
get back to the present Karen, come on, back to the present. This is a big, big thing Tommy 
is telling you. He needs your undivided attention).  
K: I know you’ve told me before that you’ve always found writing a bit tricky. Was this 
different? (He has told me he found it hard at school and also found it a bit tricky when he 
signed the consent form for the study, but he did manage). 
T: Aye, I couldnae do it. Then same thing at the Murray club (I suddenly realise that when he 
told me he couldn’t write the number 14 on the sheet at the Murray Club, he meant he 
literally couldn’t write it – and I missed it, completely missed it!!)  
K: And you’re worrying about this Tommy? 
T: It gave me a start. A right bloody start. Just hit me. You know. So, this is what it’s going to 
be like. One day it’s how to write my name. Next … 
K: Yes? 
T: Next minute... (Shrugs) 
K: Oh Tommy, that’s a pretty big thing to be carrying around with you. Have you talked to 
anyone about it? About the future? There are people who are really skilled in helping with 
things like this. If you are worrying about it, it might help?  
T: No hen, no. I’m going to get worse. I know I’m going to get worse. But I’m trying no to 
worry about it too much. Just don’t want to look like an old fool next time I go. 
K: I know. Of course.  
T: No point worrying about things you cannae do anything about. Best just trying to forget 
about it - and that shouldnae be difficult (laughs). 
K: Tommy! You said Grace was with you, at the dentist? 
T: Aye, gave her a start and all. But then she says writing’s never been my strong suit. 
There’s plenty things I still can do. Plenty. Chuckles. 
K: That’s certainly true. Like making everyone you meet laugh for one. And stopping daft 
women like me falling down the stairs for another. 
T: (Laughs) Aye there’s that. 
K: So, you’d rather focus on the things you can do?  
T: Doesn’t everyone? 
K: I think they probably should, but it’s not in everyone’s nature.  
T: Maybe not. No point though. One day at a time, I say  
K:  One day at a time (lifts water glass) 
T: Aye (clinks glass) 
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 [Long Pause] 
K: So, is there much going on at your church in the run up to Easter? (Seems I’ve decided it’s 
time to change the subject – rather than waiting for Tommy to steer the conversation –a 
sign of my discomfort?) 
T: Aye, stuff on every night. All the different churches get together, take it turnabout. It’s 
our turn tonight. 
K: And are you going? 
T: Of course. 
K: Will there be many there? 
T: No, no. Less than 20 last night, maybe only 15… Not sure what time it all starts.  
K: I guess we should be getting back up the road, before Grace starts thinking I’ve abducted 
you 
T: She’ll be glad of the peace hen. I think I’ll get one of those books though. 
K: With the lines? 
T: Well, that, but one about the chapel. That they had at the desk. 
K: That’s a nice idea. After you. 
T: I’ll nip into the gents first – this bladder again 
K: I’ll nip into the ladies too then.  
I switch off the recorder, put it my pocket and we make our way across to the toilets.  
Identity crisis 
I nip into the ladies, aware that I am trying to go at speed and get back into the foyer before 
Tommy. I am not sure of the details of the latest ‘mix-ups’ that Grace has referred to, but I 
don’t want one to happen ‘on my watch’ – and this is what I find I am thinking – ‘on my 
watch’! 
When I come out into the foyer there is no sign of Tommy and I loiter for a bit. When he 
comes out of the gents he says to me ‘my, I didnae know I was so old and ugly. I looks in the 
mirror and thought, who’s that funny looking old bloke?’ I say ‘must be the lighting in there, 
you look just dapper to me’. However, I am also remembering the story that Grace told me 
during our initial meeting about Tommy going up to one of the mirrors in the hallway of a 
hotel, having become a bit disoriented after coming out of the gents. Apparently he had 
asked his reflection (another funny looking old bloke) if he knew the way out. She 
concluded by saying ‘I thought, oh my, we’re a bit further down the road than I thought’.   
We head back over to the desk and Tommy buys a copy of the book about the Chapel. He 
enters his pin without hesitation. I am trying to come to terms with Tommy’s ‘identity 
crisis.’ I am struggling to reconcile his inability to write his signature and apparent difficulty 
recognising his own reflection with his retained humour, quick witted ability to deal with the 
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payment scenario in the café, and recollection of little conversational details such as the 
American woman falling over taking a photograph. I realise once again the limitations of 
the ‘stages model’ of dementia. Tommy is chatting away to Mike about his visit, joking, 
something about what’ll happen to him if he tells folk he ‘spent the morning looking at little 
green men’, completely oblivious that the chap in the queue behind him is shifting about 
impatiently. I find myself welling up. Oh Tommy - one day at a time! 
Real mints or Captain’s mints?  
We head outside and make our way back to the bus stop. As we are walking back up the 
road I take a packet of mints out of my bag and say to Tommy ‘would you like a mint? 
Refuse nothing but blows?’ Tommy laughs and asks ‘is it a real mint hen, or a captain’s 
mint’. I tell him I don’t know what a captain’s mint is and another story ensues.  
Tommy tells me that when he way away with the church (I already know that he and Grace 
go to an annual retreat with a large group from his Church) they were staying on the 
caravan park and there were rows and rows of caravans that ‘all looked the ruddy same’. At 
some point he must have gone off site on his own and then when he headed back to the 
caravan park he couldn’t find his own caravan. ‘Up and down, up and down. No idea how 
long I was wandering about’. Eventually Grace started to get anxious that he hadn’t 
returned and ‘the Captain’ (a character who features regularly in Tommy’s stories) set off to 
look for him. Eventually he found Tommy and he says ‘there you are, what are you playing 
at, there’s something not right with you, not right at all’. Then when they got back to their 
own house a few days later, the Captain came to the door and handed Tommy ‘a nice wee 
tin of peppermints, you know the kind, for what I’ve got’. I say ‘oh, the senior moments 
mints, for memory loss?’ and Tommy says ‘aye, that’s them, but I call them the Captain’s 
mints’. Tommy goes on to tell me that Grace came to the door and the Captain said to her 
‘But I think he needs something more than these. There’s something not right with him’ 
and Grace said ‘you don’t need to tell me there’s something not right. I have to live with it’. 
I am slightly outraged by the Captain’s behaviour. I met him once while out walking with 
Tommy and found him very direct then too. I ask Tommy ‘how did you feel about that?’ He 
replies ‘he was trying to help’. I then ask how Grace felt about it and Tommy tells me that 
she just laughed. ‘Thought it was, well kind of him I suppose, you know, that he’d gone out 
and bought the wee tin specially’. He adds that ‘when the Captain’s wife found out though, 
she was livid, absolutely livid with him’. I find myself saying (rather unguardedly) that I’m 
not surprised. Tommy says, ‘no hen, he means well, he means well’. I then ask Tommy if 
this was recently, since he’s had his diagnosis, and he tells me no, no lass, it was before 
that, oh, quite a bit before that. 
A twist in the tale 
As we carry on walking I am thinking, well this is a twist in the tale. Up until now Tommy has 
been quite adamant that he would never have known anything about his Alzheimer’s if he 
hadn’t gone to his GP with his shoulder and failed the ‘four crosses’ test. He has told me 
numerous times that he would have been ‘none the wiser’. I am thinking about the study 
design and the length of engagement. I am not sure if Tommy is disclosing more 
information to me because he trusts me more (I am now his wee sister rather than a floosy 
after his money) or if this is an indication that he is processing the information about his 
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condition, pulling in threads from the past, and the narrative is being reconstructed as he is 
coming to terms with it more. It is also becoming tighter – the stories of his past that all ran 
into each other have ceased. Or maybe a bit of both. Or maybe he is simply mistaken about 
the timing of the ‘Captain’s mints’. I certainly have formed a very different picture today 
than during my previous meetings with Tommy. I am aware that I only have the wrap up 
meeting left. I am captivated by his story and I really don’t want to put it down.  
Next Steps 
As if reading my mind, Tommy asks ‘so have I filled up another few pages of that book of 
yours?’ I say, ‘you most certainly have’. He then says ‘there’s plenty more’. I recognise this 
as an opportunity to revisit the study terms and say light-heartedly ‘I think I’m probably 
already over the number of words that I’m allowed to use, honestly, you’ve given me so 
much Tommy. I then remind him of the ‘wee yellow leaflet’ and that it talks about us 
meeting up to seven times in total. When I ask ‘would you be happy to meet with me once 
last time to go through it all, and to thank him and Grace?’ Tommy replies that he’s happy 
to keep meeting for as long as it’s useful to me and adds ‘you best speak to my secretary’. I 
confirm that I will do, adding that I’ll give her a phone once he is on the bus. I then say 
maybe we should leave it a wee bit longer ‘til we meet up, rather than ‘rushing over the 
finish line’. Tommy thinks about this and then says well, we’ve got Tam the Bam for the 
next couple of weeks (a friend’s dog that they look after from time to time), so that’s 
maybe not a bad idea. He then says ‘it’s fair given me a boost, I’m right glad I’ve met you, I 
tell you. Right glad.’ 
While we wait at the bus stop we chat about the dog and how much Tommy is looking 
forward to having him stay. The bus arrives, I thank him again, confirm that I’ll let Grace 
know that he’s on the bus and will fix up a date with her for our next meeting. He waves as 
the bus drives off and I wave back. 
I get into my car parked up the road and phone Grace to let her know that Tommy’s now on 
his way home. She says ‘you’ll be ready for a lie down’ and laughs. I say ‘not at, all’ and I tell 
her how much I enjoyed it, adding that I think Tommy did too. Grace says ‘oh, he’ll be full of 
it. He always is after he’s seen you’. She asks me if we managed to get a bite of lunch, and I 
confirm that he had soup and a roll, adding ‘but the soup wasn’t as good as your own’. I 
then ask Grace if she is still okay for me to meet up one final time, just to wrap up and 
thank them. I add that Tommy seemed to be up for it, but I am aware that she’s been 
feeling tired and to please say if it’s too much. She says no, no, she’s very happy about that. 
I stress that the meetings with Tommy and with her have been extremely useful, and can’t 
thank them both enough. I then say that I thought I should maybe leave a bit of a longer 
gap ‘til the final meeting, and know that they have the dog for a few weeks any way. I leave 
it that I will call in a couple of weeks to fix up a date maybe a couple of weeks after that.  
As soon as I come off the phone to Grace, I pull my recorder from my pocket. I push my 
seat back, put my seat into the recline position, shut my eyes and replay the visit, scene by 





Appendix XIII: Selection of Reflexive Journal Entries 
 
Wading through the theoretical literature: Where’s the ‘Fun’ gone? [February 2014] 
I keep a photograph of a painting beside by desk at home as a reminder of the importance 
of asking the right questions. I came across it several years ago while supporting a digital 
storytelling project at the SSBA centre in Cumbernauld. [This experience also taught me 
that there is an art to making things happen – I had a meeting the same day at an NHS 
hospital about a similar initiative – by the time a meeting with the various powers that be 
was set up to approve the project, the SSBA had already held an ‘OSCAR ceremony’]. 
 While working at SSBA I asked about their fantastic outdoor adventure playground and was 
told – ‘there’s a story behind that’. Having secured funding to build the playground, they 
wanted to make sure that they got it right and the first thing they did was consult the 
experts. This revealed that the top 3 things that children with physical disabilities enjoyed 
were water, sand and swings. This was followed up by a discussion group with children who 
attended the centre – which asked what they most enjoyed doing when they went to a play 
area, and with some minor variations, this pretty much confirmed the experts’ views. 
However, an art worker at the centre then said ‘you’re asking the wrong question – you’ve 
literally got a blank sheet of paper here’ and she asked the children to draw a picture or 
write a story about what they’d really like to be able to do when they go out to play. Those 
with siblings generally wanted to be able to play on the same equipment as their (able-
bodied) brothers or sisters, but the runaway top answer was: 
 “We want to go up high”.  
With a little imagination, the aspirations were accommodated. 
I’ve been drawn to this painting a lot over the last few weeks and asking what it’s trying to 
tell me – beyond ‘you need to ask the right question’.  There was undoubtedly a greater 
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degree of risk involved in meeting the children’s aspirations – but their aspirations were 
respected – presumably because their reasoning was ‘deemed to be sound’ – and the 
solution was affordable. The children were unable to go up high, but ‘technologies’ could 
be developed to compensate for the physical impairments – modifying the environment 
consistent with the social disability model. There was a genuine opportunity for them to be 
and do the things they valued, and which were socially valued. So I’m thinking capabilities. 
The art worker’s question opened up new possibilities by giving the permission to think 
beyond adaptive preferences. And these were actualised 
This is all well and good – but I think what it’s trying to tell, what it’s really trying to tell me  
is that what’s missing in the sociological and philosophical texts that I am reading is the 
place of creative imagination, senses, emotions, dreams and pleasure …. .  
So I’m wondering: Where has the fun gone? Surely there has to be a little room for 
enjoyment too? 
Is this pointing me to Martha Nussbaum? Is capabilities thinking going to be my theoretical 
lens? 
A chance encounter with a music professor – A classic case of misrecognition? [October 
2014] 
On Friday I took my mother-in-law to an appointment with her cardiologist and while sitting 
in the waiting area I struck up a conversation with a delightful and rather outlandishly 
dressed older lady who was in ‘to see about these cataracts’. She mentioned problems with 
her ‘music glasses’ and when I asked if music played a big part in her life, a story unfolded. 
She was a professor of music and had worked for 56 years at the Music Academy in a 
nearby town (‘or the conservatoire as they are now calling it – there, of all places!’. She had 
been planning on retiring in June anyway (she travelled from Edinburgh by train and had 
reduced her working hours to one day a week when she turned 75).However, 3 weeks 
previously she  had received a letter in the post telling her that she was ‘no longer fit to 
teach’. The reasons for this assessment were attributed to her ‘increasing forgetfulness’ – 
and she relayed a catalogue of incidents involving losing a handbag (I was distracted by 
excitement of seeing a former student), making an undue fuss and being overwhelmed by 
its loss (it held everything I depend on), getting on the wrong train and stepping out in front 
of a car (both because I couldn’t see) and finally arriving for a concert at 8p.m. rather than 8 
a.m. (I ask, who holds a concert at 8 in the morning?).  
Her distress centred on being informed of this decision by post and crucially having her 
ability to teach called into question. She said that her confidence had been damaged 
beyond repair, adding that ‘they said I was welcome to continue to attend the Friday 
concerts – they are terribly good and free – but felt I should have a chaperone. A 
chaperone! I’ve been making the same journey for 56 years. I could do it in my sleep’. 
When I asked if she would continue to attend the concerts, she answered that she was 
undecided, adding ‘it’s the one place where one can still be someone and that’s terribly 
important. But having been discredited, I rather think it may take the pleasure out of it’. 
Before she left I reminded her of the excitement she’d described on seeing her former 
student, told her how delightful I’d found her company, hoped things went well with her 
cataract operation and suggested not being too hasty in reaching her decision. When I 
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shared the story with my mother-in-law she said ‘well let’s hope she doesn’t step out in 
front a train’. 
Afterwards, I started thinking about the loss of cultural capital and how this could result in a 
loss of social capital, so I guess in I’m Bourdieu mode just now. The lady was obviously very 
‘well heeled’ and economic capital didn’t seem to feature. Was the letter an act of symbolic 
violence? Was I at risk of seeing symbolic violence everywhere? But then I started thinking 
about those other elements in the story – that word ‘pleasure’ and then the ‘excitement’ of 
seeing someone whose life she’d contributed to – this rather than impaired memory 
serving as the explanation for ‘forgetting’ about her handbag. So I’m still on that 
bandwagon. But then the handbag – it contained everything she depended on. What life 
props were inside: money, keys, train tickets, her ‘music glasses’, a phone, a diary? How 
much do our everyday lives depend upon these things? Do they matter more or less when 
memory starts to fail? At what point do they cease to matter? What does this symbolise? 
Or was it simply the case that her understandable behaviour was attributed to her 
‘condition’? 
I think I may be on the long road back to where I started – retracing the course of 
recognition. 
Reflection on what lies within the domain of the possible [27th March 2015] 
 
Janelle Taylor asks:  
Why is it apparently so difficult for people to “recognise”—as a friend, as a person, as even 
being alive—someone who, because of dementia, can no longer keep names straight? How 
does the turning away of friends, at the level of personal networks, relate to processes of 
“social death,” social exclusion, and abandonment of people with dementia on a broader 
level? In short, how do questions about “recognition” in its narrowly cognitive sense get 
implicated in the “politics of recognition” on a broader scale? 
 
She says: ‘my mother’s decline has been very slow and gentle, and she has remained good 
tempered and affectionate throughout….Even though my Mom is seriously impaired she is 
still sweet, cheerful, and sociable. I enjoy her company. Many other families are far less 
fortunate in their experience of dementia, and for them perhaps the gothic and zombie 
stories do resonate. But my experience with my mother’s dementia is no “horror story”—
and this, too, lies within the domain of the possible’. 
 
And it IS possible. Over the last year, Rachel, who has been my faithful fun-loving friend 
since my very first day at school, has shown me that it is quite possible to hold the story of 
a loved one until death. And today, having never spoken in public in her life, she chose the 
convent care home where her dad lived his final chapter to make her debut. She had given 
me a clue that she might say something when we went to hear Sally Magnusson talking 
about her mother’s experience of dementia some time ago, but I wasn’t sure if she would 
be able to go through with it. Walking to the front of the packed chapel, she calmly told 
those who had gathered to mark her dad’s life and passing that his quality of life was not 
poor. He continued to have a role within the family, always joining in the family 
celebrations, even if that meant her husband and son had to carry him unceremoniously 
from the car, up the path and over the threshold, seating him at his usual place at the table 
and indulging his passion for peppermint creams. Hats off.  
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Tommy: The Poet Who Doesn’t Know It [February 2016] 
 
Looking through the transcripts from my last outing with Tommy, I am struck by the poetic 
quality to his talk. I’m not sure where this fits in with the study aims, if at all, but for a man 
who was ‘put in with the useless lot’, I can’t help thinking I should do something with it. I’m 
pulling out a few extracts for safe keeping! 
 
We could go for a walk cos they’ve said that 
I’m needing to burn off the fat  
They’ve put me back on the 5s,  
I couldnae cope with the 10s 
I mean it says on the packet that  
They give you cramps and upset your sleep 
And can make you need to pee 
But, och I tell you hen 
The wife’s that disappointed in me 
 
When I wake up  
In the wee small hours  
That’s when my mind starts reeling 
I daren’t wake the wife 
So I just lie there, stock still  
Counting the dots on the ceiling 
 
In the field and getting all caught up in the unfolding story:  
Temporality is critical [February 2016] 
More by accident than purposeful design, my methodology has ending up combining 
different types of narrative. I planned to engage with the concept of ‘enacted narratives’, 
the little mini-stories or self-contained episodes that make up the stuff of the flow of 
people’s everyday lives. In so doing however I have also been treated to constructions of 
the participants’ life stories (or selected extracts from across the life course). Finally, 
although not intended to be a longitudinal study, I have become part of the unfolding 
narrative of people’s lives as I meet with them over several months. For me, the purpose of 
repeated meetings with each participant was to engage in different everyday activities, 
both routine and those with more cultural significance, potentially with different people 
and in different settings, in order add breadth and depth. I recognised implicitly that this 
might result in encountering change and continuity over the duration of the study, but it 
was not a core focus. I had not anticipated getting caught up in (or possibly shaping) the 
unfolding stories of people’s lives.  
 
‘Context’ has always been central to my research. I set out with an aspiration to locate the 
experience of living with dementia within a broader socio-political and cultural context. It 
has become apparent that ‘contexts’ matter at two levels: the immediate contexts in and 
through which people enact their daily lives and the changing contexts that form the 






Embracing the circle [March 2016] 
 
I am thinking about Ricoeur’s account of the dynamic circular relationship between 
narrative and life, inserted within the forward arrow of cosmological time. I find my 
attention wavering and soon I am back in my old science classroom at school – a highly 
unsuitable venue at the top of a winding staircase of an old building known as ‘the Tower’. 
It is Chemistry, we are studying aromatic hydrocarbons and Mrs J is at the blackboard. She 
is recounting the story of Kekule’s dream while on board a London omnibus. For years the 
structure of benzene has plagued him and then into his daydreams comes the image of a 
snake chasing and then swallowing its tail. Suddenly he has it, the electrons are not rigidly 
paired in alternating double bonds, but spinning round and round in a circle, ‘dancing 
mockingly before his eyes’. And Mrs. J’s conclusion? ‘A lot of things in life make more sense 
if we stop thinking rigidly’. I find I have been doodling. I realise that I too have been thinking 







Needing to go deeper [April 2016] 
By engaging with older people with dementia as they went about their everyday 
occupations in real-time, I expected to observe their habits and established practices, with 
a view to picking up on cultural clues (the individual habit is the cultural norm for the 
group) – [habitual or identity agency] 
I also expected to observe to some of the issues they might encounter along the way, and 
get a sense of how they manage to negotiate and coordinate (or not) – [pragmatic agency] 
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There was also an expectation that in the course of carrying out these occupations people 
might connect with images from the past, or perhaps from the future and that these might 
be shared as ‘small stories’ about the stuff of everyday life. There was the aspiration to use 
these stories, again by drawing upon cultural norms, to situate people’s experiences within 
a broader socio-cultural context. 
I also had the idea that people might be less future oriented –at least in terms of making 
long-term plans, perhaps having different aspirations - and that this could mount a 
challenge to the emphasis on ‘life course’ style agency in policy – (based on individualist 
notions and the belief that human time is only meaningful if it is full of plans and goals ~ as 
if we might ‘colonise the future’] 
My interest was sociological. 
Things did happen pretty much as expected. It would be quite possible to give an account 
of the different forms of agency I encountered, how agency was enacted, and to offer a 
cultural reading of people’s everyday occupations. 
BUT…. 
What I found fascinating once I actually entered the field was not what the evoked images 
from the past or imagined future ‘did’ or what they contributed to in practice – but their 
content and the way in which they were ‘evoked’. I came to see that towards the end of a 
long life, so much of the past is ‘in’ behaviour – people don’t just have histories, they are 
their histories. What’s more many of the evoked or recalled episodic autobiographical 
memories were described in rich detail (something that the memory testers maintain does 
not happen in old age, let alone in dementia). In the small acts of doing, often memories 
were introduced from deep in the past. 
And because the memory-images were recalled or evoked ‘in action’, prompted by what 
was happening, they were often turned into small stories with dramatic structure, 
conveying their emotional importance. [The theory is that they are recalled for what they 
add to the present situation, and may also guide responses to the situation encountered, 
opening up new ways of perceiving it - but it not so much a capacity to imagine alternative 
futures for themselves that I’ve encountered, such that actions can be changed in 
thoughtful ways, but more a case of what might have been for them, which is often turned 
into an imagined alternative future for others….].  
Sometimes the most poignant memories seem to be from a particular period in time for 
that person [childhood, early days of parenting, doing things with now absent friends] and 
are transformed into hopes or aspirations for grandchildren, ‘the next generation’ or the 
exercising of responsibility to those who have gone before. 
Good old Ricoeur has quite a bit to say on this distinction in terms of ‘effort’ involved, 
drawing as always on Aristotle. As with time (chronos and Kairos), the Greeks had two 
words (‘mneme’ and ‘anamnesis’) to distinguish between memory as appearing passively, 
to the point of characterising an affection, a memory popping into mind - and memory as 
the object of a search ordinarily named recall, recollection. Time remains the factor 
common to memory as affection and memory as recollection as active search. The latter 
stems from our capacity for searching – the starting point remains under the control of our 
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explorer of the past, whether the connection that follows is the result of necessity or habit. 
‘The main thing is that one must know the time’ – to be able to make an estimation of 
intervals lapsed, whereas the evoked memory requires no such capacity – the source is 
external. Aristotle presents the first analytical description of the mnemonic phenomenon of 
recollection, which is contrasted with the simple evocation of a memory that comes to 
mind. The richness and subtlety of his description puts him at the head of a wide range of 
schools of thought seeking a model of interpretation for modes of connections arising from 
‘necessity; or from ‘habit’   
And these memories didn’t all come at once – I began to make connections between 
specific events and the whole story in true hermeneutic fashion – it has reaffirmed the 
connectedness of human experience. And when people remembered a particular episode – 
they tended to recall the whole situation – ‘bounded’ as a distinct episode.   Thinking and 
acting in the present are related [connected] to situations separated by space and time 
Thoughts of the future very much endorsed Wray’s (2004) gerontological concept of agency 
as relational, creative and generative.  Temporal and relational connectedness is very 
strong in the data, there is almost a responsibility to the past and to the future [for H a 
greater connection to those who have gone before and A &J those who are yet to come] – 
Schutz [predecessors, contemporaries, successors] 
Sense that although temporal orientation is impaired [or reduced] with dementia – [e.g. 
none of the participants would pass the day, date, year test] in some respects the 
participants (at this early stage) all displayed a more expansive sense or experience of time. 
These emergent stories are primarily about continued citizenship – in many different ways 
and in accordance with people’s own local cultures, challenging negative stereotypes. There 
is something also about the different nature of family inputs, but what is really leaping out 
is that the biggest changes and threats to occupations have been shaped by other 
dementia-unrelated and ‘bigger’ things in life. I think my conclusion is the obvious – if you 
look for deficits or ways of coping with adversity, there’s plenty to see, but if you put 
dementia to one side, there is a ‘much richer’ and more nuanced picture.  
Coming up for Air…… [13th May 2015] 
The Limits of Temporality: Reflection on Unfaithful Music and Disappearing Ink 
So, I have just finished reading this book and I am in tears. I ‘fell in love” with the 
bespectacled musician within seconds of his first appearance on Top of the Pops in 1977 in 
the way that only a 13 year old girl can. But the love endured. His music has provided the 
sound track to the highs and lows of my own life story ever since. Ten years and one day 
older than me, once upon a time I truly believed that our biorhythms were synchronised, 
with each new album giving voice to my dominant emotions of the time, telling my whole 
life with his words so to speak, although not with his ‘song’ singular, but through a vast 
musical catalogue spanning almost forty years. A truly objective reading of this 
autobiography was never a possibility. But armed with my evolving understanding of 
narrative and its purpose, and a (semi) critical eye, I thought the construction was perfect, 
achieved greater coherence than a linear amble through the milestones, and made perfect 
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sense. It also helped me pinpoint what it was about ‘Time and Narrative’ that has been 
jarring.  
Elvis’s father, the late Ross MacManus left home when ‘Elvis’ was seven and his early 
memories of the man are few, yet they give structure to and somehow seem to fill the 
book. The autobiography begins with an account of the first time Elvis saw his dad perform 
with the Joe Loss orchestra at the Hammersmith Palais one Saturday afternoon (simply to 
give the lady who lived below a break from his flying scissor kicks during the wrestling). This 
fuelled his desire to perform. The book concludes with a recollection of the first time he 
was allowed to accompany his dad in a musical performance while still a novice guitar 
player, volume turned down, and the words ‘everything since has been a similar trick of the 
light’. 
In the latter third of the book comes the longest chapter, ‘Putting away forbidden play 
things’. It is punctuated with the lyrics from ‘The Puppet Has Cut Its Strings’ – a song about 
his father’s death. The chapter opens with an account of how Elvis came to compose and 
first perform (a rehearsal) ‘The Birds Will Still Be Singing’, his father’s favour song, and ends 
with its performance at his father’s funeral. In the pages in between is a heartfelt account 
of his dad’s signs of ageing, followed by his at times harrowing battle with Lewy body 
dementia: 
“In the waking hours, his agitation and hallucinations mounted, his eyes widening in 
horror as he called out for someone that none of us knew, scrabbling until his heels were 
raw in an attempt to escape something that none of us could see”. 
The book title ‘Unfaithful Music and Disappearing Ink’ is intriguing. I instantly recognised 
‘Disappearing Ink’ as a lyric from All the Rage ‘don’t try to touch my heart, it’s darker than 
you think, and don’t try to read my mind, it’s full of disappearing ink’, but ‘unfaithful music’ 
I had assumed was a metaphor for the fickleness of the music industry. However, it’s 
significance came to light when Elvis describes summoning a brass ensemble visiting the 
care home to perform ‘Danny Boy’ outside his dad’s room (the song his dad had sung at 
Elvis’s third wedding seven years earlier, stealing the show) only to have to ask them to 
stop when it proved intolerable to him. ‘Perhaps there was no magic in this unfaithful music 
after all’.  Perhaps. 
Yet he persisted in playing music in his dad’s room, believing intuitively that this would be 
preferable to silence. When I read his account of his leaving his dad’s room one night while 
Fred Astaire’s ‘The Way You Look tonight’ was playing softly in the background, turning to 
see his dad looking up and singing: 
Oh but you’re lovely 
With your smile so warm 
And your cheeks so soft 
There is nothing for me but to love you…..  
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… before his voice trailed off, I thought my heart might break, as the curious pattern of 
water stains on pages 540 and 541 now attest. I actually thought that I might have to stop 
reading at that point, but there, just over the page, was my reward – my chink of light. 
“As he slipped in and out of sleep over the next few days I tried to think of things 
we’d done together that might give him joy in a moment of recollection. I soon realised 
that I had exhausted our shared experiences very quickly. What lay between us was not 
measured in time”. 
Ah, so there it is! I think maybe Julian Hughes had the answer all along – there is one 
human experience that does not require temporal awareness or ordering to acquire 
meaning – the spontaneous experience of authentic human love. And so it seems love has 
the first and final word in this reflection. What power. 
I am not entirely sure what this all means yet, but I do know it is significant.  
Back to good old Ricoeur – let’s see what he has to say about the limits of temporality and 
selfhood. 





Appendix XIV: Selection of Analytic Notes 






Chrissie: Possible Plotline 
NOTE TO SELF: It’s about the Story Vs Applying Categories 
There is an awful lot of stuff that relates to gender and gendered assumptions - appearance 
still important to her and her domestic and social caring roles, but in some ways, there is 
less female subordination – e.g. I am struck, based on the pressures that I experience, that 
there is ‘no concept of ‘in-laws’. Overarching: all about giving – but without sense of 
sacrifice or burden. Interplay between possibility and necessity. Relational agency – 
challenges individualistic assumptions – ‘Corporeal Generosity’. Don’t want to overplay the 
class and gender card – it’s more complex than that! Narrative Inquiry – is about presenting 
storied lives in storied ways, not as exemplars of social structures and formal categories. 
Neighbours – One Possible Thread 
Jessie and Elsie could have moved to the pensioners’ houses in the past, but decided to stay 
together – Chrissie is literally sandwiched between them. She has become friends with 
them over many years. 
Jessie does not install a stair lift because she does not like the idea and doesn’t want to 
send out a message of being disabled to the world at large – (break-ins are common place]. 
She falls down the stairs, does not regain enough mobility to return home (within current 
care at home provisions in Scotland) and moves into a care home.  
Elsie is saddened by this. Elsie has a son who dutifully attends to her functional needs but, 
unlike Chrissie, she does not have a daughter to pick up on other more emotional and 
aesthetic needs. Elsie’s son would not think to take her to visit Jessie and Elsie would never 
ask. [Gendered assumption here - but maybe also distanciation?] 
Chrissie values her relationship with Elsie. Elsie has provided a shoulder to Chrissie through 
some sad times in the past. Chrissie is responding to Elsie’s sadness (the is result of 
something unplanned / unforeseen) with extra treats and she plans to take her to see Jessie 
on her birthday – giving Elsie something to look forward to – and also Chrissie: [Enacted 
togetherness - occupational possibility]. But again, Chrissie entertains the possibility that 
Elsie might move on too. 
Family and Extended Family – Another Thread 
Chrissie will need to soon stop driving and will be more restricted in her movements. (Helen 
is now ‘having to’ learn to drive, but is not finding it easy and Chrissie will be reliant on her]. 
Craig may visit less. Chrissie can foresee this. Although Helen has moved in with her, Helen 
is working at present and has other commitments as a mother and grandmother.  
Connection with above: Chrissie’s daily visits to Elsie (an established routine) are taking on 
extra significance. Chrissie doesn’t want Elsie to move on – as she may become more 
dependent on her 
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A Sub-Plot? Talking more to me about her deceased son, Kevin, including revealing that one 
grand-daughter is jealous of Craig, feels perhaps that he is a substitute for Kevin; that she’s 
trying to replace him.  [Life Review] 
I am struck by the busyness of her life – talks to me when we find a rare oasis of calm –– 
maybe the importance of having some time for quiet contemplation? Or purposefully 
evading this? 
Has busyness been a buffer? She thinks about him Kevin daily… but wouldn’t wish him back 
to life. 
Holidays – spending time together now as a family while able to do it [sons’ and daughter’s 
circumstances lend themselves to this – all divorced] – sense of making amends for leaving 
her family when they were kids – but no opportunity to make amends with Kevin? 
That’s what families do’ – occupational necessities – leading to occupational possibilities 
Helen’s moving in is as much about giving Natalie a place to live with the new baby as it is 
about Chrissie needing someone there for her – son next door, Helen out all day 
Family members and others also make demands on Chrissie’s time: occupational 
necessities 
Trips to shops, bingo, swimming etc. enable me to see ‘routines’ and also ‘functional 
coordination of problematic situations’ in different settings. However, gain deepest insight 
into Chrissie’s life (and how busy it is) as a result of being there at times when she had to 
change plans / was tied to the house in order to fulfil certain occupational necessities – for 
family members –  
The ‘busyness’ of her days captured through the image of the opening and closing patio 
doors – or the constant ringing of the mobile phone. It’s like Piccadilly Circus – but that’s 
the way we are and that’s the way she likes it. 
 Pick up great-grandchildren from school at short notice and take them places 
 Son has the car today because his is off the road ~ constraint 
 Babysitting – including looking after the new baby (great grandchild) 
 Overseeing the selling of the pram (Craig’s mum) – ‘I’ll come round’ 
 Taking in Stanley because grand-daughter couldn’t look after him properly and 
Chrissie was worried she might sell him to dog fighters (paying for his operation to 
have teeth removed) 
 Managing the handover of the Yorkshire terrier puppies 
 Giving daughter a lift to work  ‘they use you as a taxi service’ 
 Making arrangements to let a homeless friend stay in the house while on holiday 
 Looking after Helen’s pal’s son with learning difficulties while they went to Cyprus 
Going to care for old boyfriend at the end of his life 
 Helping daughter with cleaning jobs – ironing etc. 






Chrissie reveals she has never really liked the place where she lives – she moved simply to 
be beside family. Daughter behind her – son next door. [Necessary?]  
Place attachment to her former home – query coinciding with losing a sense of belonging or 
a sense of displacement in the present? 
Contradictions: competing storylines re ‘wanting to turn back the clock’ to an idyllic 
moment in time – had to leave and ‘you can’t turn back the clock’. 
IT’S COMPLICATED and AD very much in the background, a footnote. 
  

























Appendix XVI: Ricoeur on Temporality and Selfhood 
Kitwood’s (1990; 1997) work has been critiqued on philosophical accounts, In 
particular, Davies (2004) suggests that the philosophical starting point for discussions 
about the self should address the fundamental question of ontology, rather than the 
relations between subject and object world that fall more conventionally within the 
epistemological realm. He draws upon Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective on 
Being-in-Time to challenge Kitwood’s views that those without memories are merely 
disabled. Davis contends that losing memories is not anything that can be so simply 
palliated and trying to preserve personhood-without-memory, or rather, persons-
without-awareness of their Being is more than a point of academic curiosity.  
 
In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur (1992) considers what ontology of the self is in view. It is 
as if he anticipates the line of argument put forward by Davies. Ricoeur stresses that 
there are different levels of self-understanding. He rejects the direct route to self-
understanding through introspection, favouring the long route through the Other. 
 
For Ricoeur, attestation is the assurance by credence and trust of existing in the mode 
of selfhood acting and suffering.  One of four primordial acceptations of being is acting. 
Self and Being-in-the-world are basic correlates – a ground at once (being and action) 
as both actuality and potentiality. He refers to Spinoza’s notion of ‘conatus’, such that 
each thing in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own Being – to exist. 
 
He develops his argument to state that self-consciousness is not the starting point as 
Descartes would have it. Rather, first is the passivity of the body or the flesh, second the 
otherness in relation to inter-subjectivity and then third the mostly deeply hidden, that 
of the self to itself – conscience.  When considering the need to address deeply 
concealed forms of suffering including the incapacity to tell a story (p320) and other 
forms that go far beyond mishaps that can always be made meaningful through the 
strategy of emplotment, he attends to the lived body. The body denotes resistance that 
gives way to effort – the relational structure is wholly contained here as effort and 
resistance form an indivisible unity. The body receives the indelible significance of 
being my body- highlighting the experience of the active body illustrated by the dancer 
submissive to music alone, capricious humours – impressions of content or discontent 
and the resistance of external things. It is through active touch that things attest to their 
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existence as indubitably as our own. Existing is resisting – it is the same sense that 
gives the greatest certainty of our existence – one’s body is revealed as the mediator 
between the intimacy of the self and the externality of the world. 
 
His second point of reference is Husserl’s ontology of the flesh and the body – inter-
subjectively found in nature. He contends that Heidegger’s ‘Being-in-time’ did not allow 
an ontology of the flesh to unfold. It is necessary to make the flesh part of the world if it 
is to appear as a body among bodies – the otherness of others, other than me, has to be 
interconnected not only with the otherness of the flesh. Ricoeur argues that it is 
because Husserl thought of ‘the other than me’ only as another me, and never the self of 
another that he has no answer to the question: how am I to understand that my flesh is 
also a body? Ricoeur suggests that Heidegger placed too much emphasis on fear and 
Being-towards-death rather than existence itself and his concern with the 
phenomenology of spatiality does not receive the attention it deserves. The unfolding of 
the problematic of temporality prevented this ‘as though temporality were the exclusive 
theme of a mediation on authentic existence and the authentic features of spatiality were 
finally to be derived from those of temporality’. He continues that Heidegger substituted 
the transcendental of the act for that of substance. Instead, the entire forefront of the 
ontology of selfhood must move in accordance with the three dimensions of otherness. 
(p328-329)   
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